Written evidence – Robert M. Vasquez QC (GLT0005)
House of Lords EU Select Committee – Brexit: Gibraltar Inquiry
Written Submissions by Robert M. Vasquez QC, Chairman of the Gibraltar Social Democrats
Content
Page
Heading and Contents 1
1. Brief Personal Background 2
2. Introduction 2
3. Executive Summary 3
4. General Background 4
5. Submissions 5
5.1 Introduction 5
5.2 Sovereignty is not the issue 5
5.3 Nuanced outcome to apply to Gibraltar 6
5.4 Spain 7
5.5 Frontier fluidity for goods 9
5.6 Frontier fluidity for persons 9
5.7 Cross-border workers 11
5.8 The Single market for services 12
5.9 Opportunities 12
6. Conclusion 13
1.1 I have been a practicing lawyer in Gibraltar for 40 years and am a Queens Counsel. I am, also, the Chairman of the Gibraltar Social Democrats, currently the Opposition in the Gibraltar Parliament. These submissions are made in my capacity as Chairman of the Gibraltar Social Democrats. Prior to Opposition, the Gibraltar Social Democrats governed Gibraltar between 1996 and 2011.
1.2 I began my involvement in electoral politics by joining the Gibraltar Social Democrats in 2014 and running as a candidate in the 2015 General Election. Additionally, for many years, I have been an active political activist and commentator. I participate in pressure groups and write opinion pieces that are published from time to time in the local press. I make appearances also, as and when invited, on political programmes and debates transmitted by the Gibraltar Broadcasting Corporation.
1.3 Between late 2008 and late 2010 I wrote a political blog that can be found at www.llanitoworld.blogspot.com; today I contribute via my political Facebook page: “Llanito World ... Freedom of Speech”.
2.1 These submissions will cover four main issues that the Committee has indicated that it will examine:
All of these aspects are interrelated and interdependent, so it is difficult to separate them under each heading. They are dealt with in a composite manner. These submissions are brief. They are intended to provide an overview in order to act as an alert to possible issues and be a catalyst to deeper analysis and more detailed consideration.
2.2 The submissions are affected by three primary considerations:
2.2.1 The continuing high level of uncertainty over the terms and conditions on which the UK will leave the EU and the future relationship between the UK and the EU following the UKs withdrawal from the EU, inclusive of how Gibraltar will be dealt with by the UK within those arrangements;
2.2.2 That much depends on how Spain deals with the situation going forward, bearing in mind the overriding consideration that Gibraltar will not make any concessions on the issue of British sovereignty; and
2.2.3 Linked to the first two, is Spain’s reaction to Gibraltar’s position within any agreement reached between the UK and the EU on its departure from and its future relationship with the EU, as allied to the extent to which such agreement is allowed to apply to Gibraltar and in particular how Spain will manage flow of persons, vehicles and goods at the land border between Gibraltar and Spain.
2.3 These submissions are tempered because the issues and matters that the present Gibraltar Government is considering on the topic of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU are not in the public domain, beyond some public announcements by the Chief Minister, the Deputy Chief Minister and the Chief Minister’s own oral evidence to this Committee. These submissions agree that the main overarching matters that concern Gibraltar are two, namely, frontier fluidity and the single market for services: There is unity on this. The element on which there may be disagreement is on how one should proceed to obtain the outcome that Gibraltar seeks.
2.4 Additionally the interests of the Ministry of Defence may impact on issues that arise that involve Gibraltar in the context of Spain. Gibraltar’s importance for the UK in Defence has been emphasised recently. The impact of Defence considerations have not been factored into these submissions, because matters that may be pertinent to such consideration are not in the public domain.
3.1 The submissions that follow are an overview that will require deeper analysis and more detailed consideration and reconsideration, as the uncertainty that exists currently becomes clearer and evolves and more information comes into the public domain.
3.2 Answers to the various questions posed will depend on the progress of the withdrawal negotiations and Spain’s attitude but, currently, the UK has indicated that Gibraltar will withdraw on terms as may be negotiated by the UK for itself, but the UK should factor in that some aspects should be nuanced for Gibraltar. The UK, in its overall negotiation, has a responsibility to take into account specifics that are applicable to Gibraltar, for example at the land border with Spain.
3.3 Spain attempts to make sovereignty the issue: It is not the issue. Consequently, the UK should not fall into the trap of making it the issue. Gibraltar’s British sovereignty is guaranteed by the Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006 and by the stated policy of the Labour and Conservative parties. Spanish proposals for joint sovereignty have been roundly rejected by Gibraltar: Spain recognises that this will remain unchanged.
3.4 The UK should bear in mind (and use for mutual benefit) that Spain is conscious of the needs of Spanish nationals working in Gibraltar and of the potential socio-economic impact on the Spanish hinterland of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, as applied to Gibraltar.
3.5 Fluidity of persons (including personal vehicles) and fluidity of goods at the land border are important issues for Gibraltar. Freedom of movement of persons is not a binary issue: Either in or out. It is capable of being thin sliced to meet the UK’s policy intent and aims to control migration of workers and benefit claimants, whilst not hindering free access for cross-border workers, temporary visitors and tourists. For example, the US has migration controls in place that give practical effect to the ability to visit the US with a large element of freedom.
3.6 Freedom to provide services is the second area of importance for Gibraltar. Gibraltar would seek inclusion in any arrangements negotiated by the UK with the EU that allow freedom to provide services. In any event, Gibraltar’s current arrangements by which it has freedom to provide services into the UK should continue beyond the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and be enhanced. Liam Fox, Secretary of State for International Trade, has stated publicly that this would be the case.
3.7 Opportunities, whilst difficult to identify at this early juncture, may arise, not least the ability to exploit areas that are curtailed presently by EU law, with care being taken that these should not undermine any bilateral arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar. Additionally Gibraltar should consider inclusion in trade deals negotiated by the UK, as well as progressing on a double taxation agreement with the UK.
4.1 Gibraltar’s current relationship with the EU is founded on the UK’s membership of the EU. Gibraltar acceded to the EU by virtue of the provisions of Article 355(3) of the Lisbon Treaty (previously Article 299(4) Treaty of Rome), by which a European territory (in this case Gibraltar) for whose external affairs a member of the EU has responsibility accedes to the EU with that member state (in this case the UK).
4.2 Gibraltar’s accession predates the accession of Spain to the EU. At that time certain derogations were negotiated by the UK for Gibraltar as follows:
As is the case for the UK, Gibraltar does not form part of the Schengen Area.
4.3 On Spain’s accession to the EU in 1986, a declaration (Declaration 55) was appended to the relevant treaty which provides that,
“The Treaties apply to Gibraltar as a European territory for whose external relations a Member State is responsible. This shall not imply changes in the respective positions of the member States concerned.”
4.4 Spain’s accession to the EU was preceded with the full restoration of movement of persons and vehicles across the land border between Gibraltar and Spain in 1985. This followed closure by Spain of the land border between Gibraltar and Spain in 1969. This closure followed five years of withdrawal of the entire Spanish workforce working in Gibraltar at that time, total disruption of vehicular access and an absolute restriction on the transportation of goods across the frontier with Spain.
4.5 Despite that Gibraltar is outside the Customs Union and of freedom of movement of goods, practical arrangements were introduced at the Gibraltar border to ease movement of goods across the land frontier between Gibraltar and Spain. It is understood that these are concessionary on the part of Spain. The actual denominated border for the exportation of goods is at either Algeciras or Malaga. The practical issues that this may give rise to on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU may be an issue that deserves further inquiry and investigation of the Gibraltar Government or those who engage in the transportation of goods.
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 At this stage the only answer to the issues under consideration in this inquiry is that it depends. It depends entirely on the outcome of the withdrawal negotiations between the UK and the remaining Members of the EU and on Spain’s attitude and reaction to that process. One can only reply based on what is in the public domain. Stating the obvious, Gibraltar will, therefore, be withdrawing from the EU with the withdrawal of the UK and on the terms to be negotiated by the UK for the UK, inclusive of and as may be nuanced for Gibraltar, with all the opportunities, advantages and consequences that such withdrawal will bring about. These circumstances will be enhanced, mitigated or aggravated by the reaction of Spain toward Gibraltar in the process of and following the UK’s withdrawal.
5.1.2 The evidence provided recently by the UK’s Brexit Minister, David Davis, to the relevant House of Commons Select Committee made clear that he did not envisage a special arrangement for Gibraltar as part of the UK’s deal to leave the EU, saying that he “would be loathe to go down that route”, although he left open the possibility. This position places responsibility on the UK Government to negotiate terms in its overall agreement that will take into account the specifics of Gibraltar, albeit by agreeing nuanced arrangements that take into account Gibraltar’s location, situation and needs. It should be noted in this context that, on the UK’s accession to the EU, Gibraltar obtained and has always had special arrangements applicable to it alone within the EU, as explained above. These are derogations from those applicable to the UK.
5.2 Sovereignty is not the issue
5.2.1 Mr Davis went on to say that the primary issue for Gibraltar was the issue of sovereignty and the Spanish claim to it; with respect, this is not correct. Sovereignty is an issue for Spain but it is not the, or even an, issue within or relevant to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. It is Spain that attempts, opportunistically, to make it the issue.
5.2.2 We must not fall in the trap that the British sovereignty of Gibraltar should become the, or an, issue. Gibraltar’s British sovereignty is guaranteed by the ‘double lock’ undertaking to be found in the preamble to the Gibraltar Constitution Order 2006. The undertaking found in the Constitution binds the UK in terms that:
“Gibraltar will remain part of Her Majesty’s dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament otherwise provides, and furthermore that Her Majesty’s Government will never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes.”
In addition there are statements made by the Labour, Coalition and Conservative Governments subsequently, that the UK Government would not enter into any process of negotiations with Spain on sovereignty with which the Government of Gibraltar is not content.
5.2.3 It is Spain that attempts to conflate the issue; this Spanish attempt to make sovereignty the ‘Gibraltar issue’ within the UK’s withdrawal from the EU must be resisted by the UK. It will be resisted by Gibraltar.
5.3 Nuanced outcome to apply to Gibraltar
5.3.1 The real issue is the terms of withdrawal of the UK from the EU; within that the terms applicable to Gibraltar come into play. It is unlikely that a special or differentiated status for Gibraltar would be a realistic possibility, like a special status in the vein of a European Micro-State solution or a reverse Greenland solution, where Gibraltar and Scotland stay within the EU and England and Wales exit. Neither the EU nor the UK Government will likely agree to such proposals, although if they did, any ensuing suggestions may be worthy of consideration. In the prevailing circumstances, there is a need to concentrate on ensuring that the overall terms negotiated for the UK should apply to Gibraltar. That, however, does not restrict the ability of the UK to negotiate arrangements applicable to Gibraltar that are nuanced in their detail in manner that will meet certain specifics applicable and important to Gibraltar (e.g. resolving issues specific to the operation of the land border between Gibraltar and the EU/Spain, about which more below).
5.3.2 Of course, much will depend on what the UK will negotiate for itself. The stark reality is that Gibraltar should expect to receive the same rights and conditions as are negotiated for the UK in the withdrawal from the EU. Gibraltar is and is treated as part of the UK for EU purposes. The treaty provision by which its membership came about: Article 355(3) was the membership criteria that qualified Gibraltar to be part of the EU as an integral part of the UK: It is not a differential. Consequently, there is no basis to make any fundamental distinction in the treatment of Gibraltar in the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and in any negotiated arrangements to achieve that objective, save for any nuances that may be negotiated in order to meet specifics applicable to Gibraltar.
5.4 Spain
5.4.1 The consequences for Gibraltar may be aggravated by its special circumstances, primarily its geographical position giving rise to an adverse reaction from Spain on withdrawal by the UK from the EU. Membership of the EU greatly ‘managed’ the ongoing relationship between Spain the UK and Gibraltar over Gibraltar; it put into abeyance the potential practical consequences that could follow from Spain pursuing its claim to sovereignty in an aggressive manner, for example, by measures at the land border between Gibraltar and Spain similar to those imposed by Spain in the 1960s i.e. closure of that land border and other interferences in communications between Gibraltar and Spain. The first evidence of the potential for aggravation has come from the pronouncements of the, now replaced, Spanish Foreign Minister, Jose Margallo.
5.4.2 What is unacceptable is the suggestion made recently by Mr Margallo, seeking joint sovereignty within the Spanish Constitution as the basis upon which Gibraltar could hope for a relationship with the EU. Gibraltar is united about resisting any degree of sovereignty by Spain over it and will continue to resist that throughout. The Committee is encouraged to take that position as non-negotiable, without a need to rehearse any arguments as to its merits, beyond restating the UK’s commitment to Gibraltar in the preamble to the Constitution (see above).
5.4.3 That said clearly, Mr Margallo’s proposal, in any event, are unacceptable:
A recent piece published on this subject in the Gibraltar Chronicle on the 2nd November 2016 is attached. It explains these matters in a little greater detail.
5.4.4 The recently appointed new Spanish Foreign Secretary, Alfonso Dastis, has not vocalised Spain’s position in as strident a manner as Mr Margallo. His pronouncements do not seem to make the issue of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU one of sovereignty, recognising that little will change in Gibraltar and so the UK on this front, although, noticeably, he does restate Spain’s settled foreign policy, which is to recoup sovereignty of Gibraltar. He maintains the position that any continued relationship between Gibraltar and the EU is subject to bilateral discussion and agreement between Spain and the UK, reportedly having said: “If Gibraltar wants a relationship with the EU, it will have to go through us, and that will require a bilateral agreement between Spain and the UK... When the time comes to draft the text ... the principle that Gibraltar’s fortune in the EU depends on Spain, will have to be there ... What I am interested in is the final objective [which] remains the same ”. As stated above this is not so, Gibraltar forms an integral part of the UK for the purposes of the EU withdrawal negotiations, as made clear by the UK Government. Consequently, the UK withdrawal negotiation, inclusive of Gibraltar, is between the remaining EU member States and the UK, and not just bilaterally with Spain on the subject of Gibraltar.
5.4.5 What Mr Dastis says further is that Spain will be conscious of the needs of the Spanish nationals who work in Gibraltar and of the socio-economic impact on the hinterland of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as it concerns Gibraltar. By way of brief examples, (a) Residents of the neighbouring Spanish town of La Linea, working in Gibraltar receive approximately Euros 97.5 million annually; (b) non-Spanish cross-border workers spend approximately £30 million in Spain; (c) Gibraltarians spend approximately £72 million annually in Spain; (d) Gibraltar has an impact on the economy of the region of approximately £568 million annually. Undoubtedly this economic activity and additional unaccounted for and unquantified activity give rise to a joint interest that should be relied on to achieve favourable arrangements for Gibraltar in the withdrawal negotiations. This statement by Mr Dastis is as clear an indication as there can be that it is not Spain’s intention to return to the nasty and aggressive behaviour of the 1960s, which led to a total blockade at the frontier; it is important to maintain and encourage this position.
5.4.6 It is inconceivable that a return to the behaviour of the 1960s could come about between two democratic European nations that have belonged to the EU for so long and treated each other with the respect that such membership brings about, simply because of the change in the membership status of one of them. There must have been and there must be more depth of thinking on the part of Spain, when it restored “normality” at the land border between Gibraltar and Spain in 1985. Additionally, there are wider relationship and economic interests between Spain and the UK, totally unrelated to Gibraltar, that both will want to maintain and strengthen, without allowing Gibraltar to become a stumbling block in the context of the ‘double lock’ undertaking given to Gibraltar by the UK.
5.4.7 On that basis, bearing in mind that one of the two most important issues for Gibraltar, as publicised by the Government of Gibraltar and agreed to by the Gibraltar Social Democrats, is frontier fluidity (the second being the single market for services, which is dealt with below), what is required is an analysis of what a strict application of EU law at the Gibraltar/Spanish border might be and what the consequences of that will be. This analysis has to consider fluidity of persons (including personal vehicles) and fluidity of goods separately with a view to the continuation of the current ease of access.
5.5 Frontier fluidity for goods
5.5.1 So far as goods are concerned, negotiations should strive to maintain the regime currently applicable at the border. This regime does not arise out of EU obligations, as the principle of freedom of movement of goods does not apply to Gibraltar, so Spain has no argument to change it based on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. A change of this regime would be simply an aggressive act against the UK without reason or excuse. Spain’s concession allows for movement of goods as it should be between two modern European democracies. The checks at the border are essentially limited to ensuring that goods are exported to a destination ‘outside’ the EU (in the sense of outside the Customs Union and without the benefit of freedom of movement of goods) in order to ensure that any claim by an exporter that VAT is not payable is correct and rightly made. The withdrawal of the UK from the EU does and should not alter this. Gibraltar is outside the Customs Union and is a third country for the common customs tariff.
5.5.2 This fluidity for goods is not only useful to Gibraltar and its economic wellbeing but it coincides also with Mr Dastis’ stated objective that the withdrawal from the EU should not have a socio-economic impact on Gibraltar’s Spanish hinterland. Any diminution of the fluidity for the transportation of goods that currently exists at the frontier would have an economic impact on the many Spanish commercial entities that have established a cross-border trading relationship with Gibraltar. Reducing fluidity would have a substantial adverse effect on the employment in and financial wellbeing of the Spanish hinterland and its inhabitants, beyond those that are employed in Gibraltar, which is what Mr Dastis seeks to avoid.
5.6 Frontier fluidity for persons
5.6.1 Any reduction on the fluidity of movement of persons across the border will have an adverse effect on the socio-economic wellbeing of the Spanish hinterland and on the cross-border workers coming into Gibraltar (inclusive of Spanish nationals). Such a reduction on fluidity would thus be contrary to Mr Dastis’ stated policy objective. It would curtail the enormous influx that there is of British citizens with a higher spending power from Gibraltar into Spain. There are an enormous number of businesses in the Spanish hinterland that benefit from this spending power with the beneficial effect that this has on employment in Spain. In addition there are the cross-frontier workers of many nationalities whose ability to be employed is dependent, aside from the principle of freedom of movement of persons, on fluid access across the border and whose spending power in and for the benefit of the Spanish hinterland by reason of their residence in Spain is considerable.
5.6.2 The principle of freedom of movement of persons is what has kept fluid the movement of persons at the land border between Gibraltar and Spain, although this is itself at risk, even without the UK’s withdrawal for the EU, by reason of new tighter controls that will be introduced as from March this year under the revised Schengen Code. These will require systemic document checks. It is this principle that has been relied upon by EU Inspectors when and if Spain has become difficult at that border to ensure continuing fluidity. In the event that the UK opts out of freedom of movement of persons fully, as seems to be the current announced intention, and absent any agreement to cater for the situation, the strict application of external border controls at the border between Spain and Gibraltar will undoubtedly affect fluidity.
5.6.3 Who will be affected in this eventuality will depend hugely on practical arrangements at the land border because, absent any specific arrangements, the new Schengen Code will require systemic document checks in any event but, absent the introduction of that change, under current arrangements different treatment from that applicable to EU citizens (subject to any UK wide negotiated arrangements or arrangements introduced by Gibraltar as explained below) will apply to non-EU citizens, inclusive of all British nationals.
5.6.4 The current external border controls require that a non-EU citizen, for stays not exceeding 90 days in any 180-day period, needs to possess a passport with a valid visa (if there will be a visa requirement, which currently remains unknown, which would give rise to considerations as to where such a visa could be obtained), that he/she justifies the purpose of the intended stay, he/she show sufficient means of subsistence, he/she does not have an alert issued in the Schengen information system that would lead to a refusal of entry and he/she should not be considered a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or international relations. Entry may be refused if any of these conditions are not met, absent special reasons like humanitarian ones. Passports will be systematically checked and stamped on entry and exit. If all this criteria is strictly applied at the land border between Gibraltar and Spain, one can see that the required checks will cause delays on crossing.
5.6.5 These checks will not apply to an EU citizen exiting or returning to the EU, in this case Spain. In the case of an EU citizen only a check by Spain to establish that citizenship is required. That will mean that practical arrangements could be agreed at the border by which the exit from Gibraltar by EU citizens is not delayed by any checks carried out on non-EU citizens. Obviously the unfairness of a situation of this nature to non-EU citizens is palpable. On entry it is for Gibraltar (in fact the UK authorities) to decide what controls, if any beyond a passport check, would be required. The issue is one to be decided upon based on weighing up the political price to be paid (if any), security issues (which should not change from those that apply currently) against the economic price that Gibraltar would likely pay if entry or exit of EU citizens is hindered.
5.6.6 The issue of freedom of movement of persons is not a binary issue namely that either the UK is in or out. Freedom of movement of persons encompasses many related and unrelated rights that are capable of being thin sliced in order to cater for specific situations that will benefit both the UK and the EU. Freedom of movement of persons permits currently mobility of workforce and the ability to claim benefits, which are the areas in which control is sought; the imposition of this type of control should not impact, in practical terms, on the freedom for temporary visitors, be they business related or tourists or cross-border workers. New arrangements could permit, subject to agreement, for eased border controls for cross-border workers, tourists and visitors and allow for migrant settlement in different Member States of persons of sufficient and independent means who do not intend to work; the US runs systems to facilitate this type of access.
5.6.7 Additionally, the treatment of persons from one Member State who are already settled or are working in another Member State (including cross-border workers about which more below) should be different from the treatment that may be applied to a new migrant taking up or seeking new employment; the reality is that in practical terms nothing changes for existing workers, other than applicable rules that arise on the UKs withdrawal: Such arrangements should permit the continuation of existing employment arrangements.
5.6.8 It is suggested that all these and probably many more factors, where specific ‘thin sliced’ arrangement could be negotiated, should be taken into account in the process of negotiation that will be initiated following notification of withdrawal by the UK under Article 50.
5.7 Cross-border workers
5.7.1 Regulation EC1931/2006 allows for special passes to be given, in certain circumstances, to cross-border workers travelling from a non-EU country to work in an EU member state. It does not deal with the reverse situation, i.e. EU citizens working in and so commuting into Gibraltar, which would be the main applicable situation at the land border between Gibraltar and Spain. In this reverse situation, aside from treatment at the border on entry into and exiting from Gibraltar, which is dealt with above in which case the issue of thin slicing of freedom of movement of persons is important to allow ease of cross-border access and right to reside, the issue of ability to work becomes one for Gibraltar.
5.7.2 These frontier workers will lose their EU based right to work here and would be rendered subject to any conditions for foreign workers that Gibraltar might impose. As matters currently stand they would become “detached workers” who would need to register with the Employment and Training Board etc. or “non-entitled”, thus requiring work permits and/or visas in addition to registration, as for “detached workers”. The reality is that whilst some control may become necessary, it would be Gibraltar that would be the loser were those controls to hinder or delay the ability of cross-border workers to find employment in or work in Gibraltar in areas where there is a need.
5.7.3 It may be necessary to give consideration to the issue of payment of tax in Gibraltar by cross-border workers. Currently any tax paid in Gibraltar by these workers is credited against any tax liability that they may have in Spain. There is no reason why this arrangement should not continue after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Social security and healthcare is an issue that would need further consideration and on which agreement may be needed, so as not to place cross-border workers at a disadvantage.
5.8 The Single Market for Services
5.8.1 As highlighted by the Chief Minister also and on which the Gibraltar Social Democrats agree, the second area of greatest importance for Gibraltar is the right of establishment and freedom to provide services, the second limb being the more important one. Fluidity at the border (dealt with above) is important to ensure continuation of and ability to grow this activity. This single market is of great importance, for example, to the financial services sector in the UK, importantly inclusive of the City of London; likewise it is of primary importance to Gibraltar in financial services and other services.
5.8.2 Gibraltar should be included in any arrangements negotiated by the UK with the EU that will allow UK businesses to freely provide services to remaining EU States. It is inconceivable that any such arrangements should exclude Gibraltar. Gibraltar has had the equal benefit as the UK to take advantage of this fundamental freedom. Gibraltar will urge the taking up of and support any and all initiatives taken by the UK to ensure continued access to provide services throughout the EU.
5.8.3 In any event, Gibraltar currently benefits from its ability to freely provide certain financial and other services, for example online gaming, into the UK through bilateral arrangements with the UK and by reason of the existence of EU passporting rights. These make up, according to the Gibraltar Government, 94% of all such business undertaken in or from Gibraltar. These arrangements should and it is imperative that they continue beyond any withdrawal of the UK from the EU and that they be enhanced in any other areas that may be identified and discussed between Gibraltar and the UK.
5.8.4 The UK’s withdrawal from the EU does not give rise to any good reason why current arrangements should not survive that withdrawal. Liam Fox, Secretary of State for International Trade, gave Gibraltar comfort toward the end of October 2016 on this issue, when he announced that, despite the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the UK would look to continue the existing free trade arrangements between the UK and Gibraltar. In this context it is relevant to note and understand that regulation of financial services and other services operate in Gibraltar to EU standards and, consequently, comity of standards exists.
5.9 Opportunities
5.9.1 It is not possible at this early date, without knowing the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU or even the UK’s negotiating position, to identify opportunities that may arise for Gibraltar following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. In general terms withdrawal from the EU will likely open up the opportunity to take up initiatives that may currently or in the future be restricted by EU treaties and laws. There is a likelihood that certain advantages will be forthcoming in time and with thought by reason of the freedom to act that withdrawal from the EU will give to the UK and Gibraltar. However, Gibraltar will need to be conscious that any opportunity that it takes advantage of does not undermine any benefit or advantage in any area enjoyed as between the UK and Gibraltar.
5.9.2 Consideration should be given to Gibraltar being included in trade deals and deals for the provision of services that may be negotiated by the UK with any country following withdrawal from the EU. Additionally, thought can be given to making progress towards concluding a double taxation agreement between Gibraltar and the UK.
6. Conclusion
6.1 The current situation is uncertain, fluid and evolving on most fronts. The submissions made are based on known factors that are in the public domain. These submissions will likely be greatly influenced by changes, as and when known, in what is an evolving situation. It may well be that the fundamental aims and objectives, fluidity at the land border with Spain and freedom to provide services, will not change but it is likely that the detail and how to achieve them will be subject to developments.
6.2 The Gibraltar Social Democrats are very conscious of the need for unity in Gibraltar at this juncture in its history, as has been the case on many occasions in the far and recent past. We look forward to working toward and developing a bi-partisan approach The Gibraltar Social Democrats are conscious, also, of its function in a democratic society and the need to maintain the basic foundations of democracy by not shirking from expressing its views, which are at all times motivated by its overriding wish and desire to do the best by Gibraltar.
6.3 The call of the Chief Minister for unity is a good call, which is welcome and will be heeded positively by the Gibraltar Social Democrats, within the democratic functions that it has a responsibility to perform; that the Chief Minister should call for that unity to be for a common purpose is also laudable. However that requires, at least 3 important factors (1) leadership (2) definition of the common purpose and (3) inclusion, in this context, of the Gibraltar Social Democrats in the issues under consideration by the Gibraltar Government. Delivery of all of these is in the exclusive domain of the Government of Gibraltar. The Gibraltar Social Democrats look forward to participating and cooperating with the Government of Gibraltar in the Select Committee of the Gibraltar Parliament established for the purpose of dealing with Brexit issues and to developing a bi-partisan approach.