Written evidence from Dr Robin Porter (CHI0002)

 

Short summary

 

  1. China’s rapid rise and engagement with the international economy over the past thirty-five years was long overdue, and has been both a trigger for and a consequence of globalization. An assessment of the implications of these developments for the UK is given below, looking in particular at:

 

 

About the author

  1. Robin Porter is a China specialist and former British diplomat, now retired.  He holds a PhD from SOAS, first visited China in 1972, and has taught extensively on China at universities in Canada, Australia and the UK. He worked as full-time adviser on China to the British motor industry in the 1980s, was Britain’s senior science diplomat in Beijing from 2002 to 2005, and has since served as an adviser to the European Commission on science and technology issues with China. He has also taught and researched British diplomatic history; his mentor as an undergraduate in this field was a former British diplomat who had been an aide to Harold Nicholson at Versailles in 1919.  Dr.2 Porter’s most recent books are: ’From Mao to Market: China Reconfigured (Hurst, 2011) and ‘British Foreign Policy and the National Interest’, ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

 

 

Evidence and analysis

 

The current state of UK-China relations; HM Government’s priorities in managing this relationship and the FCO’s role in the policy

 

  1. The UK began to trade with the People’s Republic of China in 1953, and has been at pains to preserve diplomatic ties with the mainland through often very difficult times ever since.   Having weathered the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, and the Tiananmen incident of 1989, and having resolved the Hong Kong question in 1997, Britain has for some years now had a positive relationship with China. The current state of UK-China relations, therefore, is generally very good, though some caution should be exercised with respect to the assertion that this is a ‘golden age’ in the two countries’ dealings with one another. 

 

  1. The UK’s principal interests in China in the present century are commercial, and in the promotion of a positive image of Britain to provide a context within which our trade can be carried out.  However, commerce with and in China always takes place within a framework that is highly political, a fact that has not always been appreciated by British business people charged with the task of developing ties with China, nor sometimes by visiting Government Ministers.  This political environment is not a recent phenomenon; as early as two thousand years ago bureaucrats who constituted the political elite under successive Emperors routinely interfered with trade to their own advantage, and dictated the terms under which it could be carried out. 

 

  1. The British Government’s priority has therefore been to encourage British exports and technology transfer to China, and inward investment into the UK by Chinese companies.   The FCO itself has, in collaboration with the former DTI, UKTI and successor bodies, become much more skilled in advancing these commercial aims over the past twenty years, but has also concerned itself with other ‘global’ objectives which have traditionally been at the heart of its work.  These have included promoting a belief in the rule of law and human rights, a primary concern with the international politics of Europe (expressed in China through close collaboration with the EU office in Beijing, and with the delegations of EU countries in China), the military defence of the realm (expressed through the monitoring of security matters, and through some limited joint project work with the Chinese military), and Consular work together with the Home Office to maintain freedom of movement for British subjects, to issue visas, and deal with other matters.   To these concerns have been added in recent years the monitoring of instances of terrorism (few in China), a brief to identify threats to the security of UK energy supplies (little relevance to China), as well as an active and growing collaboration with the Chinese side on climate change and scientific projects of all kinds. 

 

 

The UK’s economic, financial and trade interests with China, including the effects of the UK leaving the EU on the UK-China relationship

 

  1. It is frankly difficult to quantify with accuracy the extent of the UK’s economic, financial and trade interests with China, though the Department of International Trade will undoubtedly offer figures.  Much depends on how the various elements are defined, whether items are assured or just projected, whether the full set of Chinese Government approvals for any particular deal has been achieved, and other considerations.  The assertion by UKTI (one of the DIT’s predecessor bodies) in 2015 that President Xi Jinping’s visit to the UK had resulted in a £40 billion boost to UK-China trade has been challenged for these and other reasons.

 

  1. Nevertheless, it is possible to say with confidence that the UK’s economic, financial and trade interests in China are quite substantial, and growing.  UK investment in China by companies such as BP, Rolls-Royce and others has been complemented more recently by Chinese investment in the UK.  UK financial institutions have had some success, though Chinese regulatory issues, and the Chinese Government’s desire to retain overall control of the country’s banking system, have proved to be obstacles.  Our direct trade with China has grown steadily over recent decades, with outstanding performances from manufacturers of luxury goods such as Jaguar Land Rover.  However on direct trade it must be said that China still sells to us much more in value than we sell to it, and our export performance there has long since been surpassed by that of other countries – the United States, Japan, South Korea and Germany for example.

 

  1. Although the China market for British goods has been talked up by politicians in the wake of the UK’s referendum on membership of the EU, and Theresa May’s recent visit sought to highlight this potential, certain hard facts ought to be borne in mind.  First, although certain brands have some appeal, there is no particular loyalty to British brands overall, and we have plenty of competition in China.  Secondly, opportunities for economic engagement with China (principally exports as the DIT would see it) will not magically increase just because we leave the EU.  Selling to China takes a great deal of effort and a unique blend of skills, and past experience suggests that not all British companies are up to the challenge.  Thirdly, and this is a matter with a strong political dimension to it, the Chinese Government has seen us as a desirable partner in the past precisely because we were part of the European Union, and has seen the EU as an important counterbalance to US power.  We therefore render ourselves less attractive in trade and investment terms, and for broader geopolitical reasons, by leaving the EU.

 

 

China’s role in the main international organizations alongside the UK, including the UN Security Council, other UN bodies and organizations, the G20 and WTO

 

  1. Others are better placed to comment.

 

 

The extent to which the UK and China’s international and security interests align, including their approach to:

 

  1. Current security crises and disputes
  2. The role and development of international law
  3. The challenge of violence from non-state actors
  4. Climate change 
  5. Alleviating poverty and development

 

  1. Others are better placed to comment on 1,2,3 and 5.

 

 

China’s approach to climate change 

 

  1. During the writer’s tenure as Science Counsellor at the British Embassy in Beijing (2002-2005), the Science and Innovation Section jointly held responsibility for this brief along with a dedicated member of Political Section staff.  In my experience the Chinese Government’s attitude to climate change altered dramatically in this period, beginning around 2004, and leading to acceptance of the need to address climate change, and a much more co-operative approach at the various international climate conferences.  A critical stage in this process was release of an academic paper by a leading Chinese expert in 2005 taking the view that if climate change continued at the existing pace China would be able to produce 30% less food by 2030 than it did in 2004.  As food crises have been the trigger for revolt throughout Chinese history, this rang alarm bells.  In 2006 climate change and sustainability shot to almost the top of the agenda at the Communist Party Congress.  In 2007 the first official White Paper on Climate Change was produced.  In 2008 a Ministry for Environmental Protection was created.  In 2011 the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011-2015) addressed climate change and issues of sustainability throughout.

 

  1. Thus, climate change is an example of an issue where the Party’s own objectives coincide with those of the UK, and indeed where the UK may have had some influence on Chinese policy.  There is now broad commitment in China to the concept of climate change, despite some remaining discord over the rate at which a reduction in carbon emissions can be achieved.

             

 

The extent to which the UK China relationship affects, and is affected by, the UK’s relationship with the USA, Russia, Japan and the ASEAN nations; also, China’s policies in East and Southeast Asia

 

The USA:

  1. In late 2012, at the beginning of his second term, President Obama launched his ‘pivot to Asia’ programme, marking a re-focusing of US attention back to Pacific Asia from other parts of the world, and setting out plans to achieve comprehensive trade arrangements in the region, and other forms of collaboration.  By and large these aspirations have not been fulfilled, and under the Trump Presidency are likely to be discarded.  However, even under Obama it has been the military dimension of the ‘pivot to Asia’ that has preoccupied China, which has seen it as a renewal of the 1950s policy of ‘containment’ at one remove.  The strengthening of US naval and other military capabilities in the region, the retention and updating of bases, the beginnings of a new US military presence in Darwin, all are seen as potentially threatening by China.  Moreover, the hostility shown by Donald Trump toward China is almost certain to cause US-China relations to deteriorate still further.  The issue of Taiwan is dealt with below.

 

  1. In the view of the writer it will be essential for the UK to distance itself from US policy toward China under the Trump administration. While understanding and applauding the US intention to engage with a range of Asian states in a variety of ways, the UK should avoid any action which would associate it with US military or intelligence endeavours in the region.   We have no national interest in supporting any US policy which the Chinese see as threatening. 

Russia:

  1. The UK’s relations with Russia are cold at present, and it is clear that Russia under Vladimir Putin has the intention to push the boundaries in its foreign policy, both figuratively and literally.   This should be of much greater concern to the UK in Europe than in Pacific Asia.  China has renewed its co-operation with Russia in recent years, but potential rivalry, and a deep-seated mistrust of Russia among many older Chinese who remember the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, set limits on that relationship.  In terms of possible Russian naval expansion, China’s presumption of dominance in the region is likely to act as a counterweight.  Russia moreover is not able to provide advanced technology to assist with China’s development.  It is suggested that the UK-China relationship, therefore, will neither affect nor be affected by our relations with Russia to any great degree.

Japan:

 

  1. In this vein, insofar as possible the UK should stay out of any disputes which may arise between China and Japan, given the significant degree of popular antipathy that exists between these two nations for historical reasons.  It is worth remembering however that despite the harsh words sometimes exchanged between the Chinese and Japanese Governments, Japan’s economic interests in China are substantial, that both sides are fully aware of this, and are unlikely to do anything to seriously compromise these mutually beneficial arrangements.

 

ASEAN:

 

  1. China’s relationship with the ASEAN states may prove more problematic, particularly in view of China’s claim to islands in the South China Sea, and the construction on some of facilities of various kinds of both a civil and a military nature.   The Asia-Pacific region is pre-eminently China’s ‘neighbourhood’, in which in pre-modern times she exercised influence, conducted trade and extended her diaspora, but did not seek to take territory. In recognition of this, a revived China may be expected to re-establish a presence in the region, including in the Indian Ocean, through which she conducts her growing commerce with India and Africa, and this should be kept under review. Britain favours maintenance of the status quo in the region. That said, this development is not inherently threatening to the UK, and from the UK’s point of view little would be gained and much Chinese goodwill could be lost by seeking to oppose it.

 

Taiwan:

 

  1. Perhaps the most potentially explosive issue in the region at the present time is the future of Taiwan.  It is unfortunate that Donald Trump has chosen to re-activate the verbal conflict with China over Taiwan at the beginning of his Presidency.  It took the US and China almost a quarter of a century up to 1972 to come to a compromise which both sides could live with in the form of the One China policy, under which essentially Taiwan was recognized as an integral part of China under separate administration, enabling the US in due course to establish diplomatic ties with China and to massively develop its business with the mainland.  The fact that Trump was willing to talk at some length directly with the President of Taiwan, leader of the Independence Party, has thrown the whole status quo over Taiwan into jeopardy. Nor in retrospect does it appear that this was a gaffe; rather that it was fully intended.  It is in the UK’s interest, having as it does currently a good political relationship and very substantial business interests with China, as well as business interests in Taiwan, to distance itself from any further pursuit by the Trump administration of policies which would overturn the One China agreement.

 

 

The opportunities and threats posed to the UK by China’s long-term relative and absolute growth as an economic and security power

 

  1. China’s rise, in the writer’s view, offers neither opportunities nor specific threats to the UK.  Commercial and political opportunities are there already, and need to be handled with care.  So is the threat to the status quo in the region, which is likely however to be limited to the expansion of Chinese political and military influence, but not the taking of territory, notwithstanding the unresolved issues noted above.

 

 

The extent to which it is possible for the UK to help shape China as a positive contributor to global stability and security

 

  1. The notion that the UK can help ‘shape’ China in any way may belong to another era of diplomacy.  However if the UK is skilful in its cultivation of China, it may have some influence through finding common ground on issues of global stability and security, which could be reflected through the adoption of common or similar positions at the United Nations or at international conferences.  In the writer’s experience, China only ever adopts a position when it can see benefit for itself (as with its evolved position on climate change).  For the UK to succeed then, it must try to see issues through Chinese eyes, and put a case on the basis that the action in question will benefit China.

 

 

UK ‘soft power’ in relation to China, including through education, tourism, the British Council, etc.

 

  1. In recent years we have increased our capacity for influence in China in terms of what is often referred to as ‘soft power’.  This comprises those dimensions of our national life that form the image Chinese people have of Britain. These include respect (among some at least)  for our political institutions and legal system, for our science and technology, our engineering and architectural achievements, our business acumen, our educational practices, our culture – theatre, dance, literature, cinema -  our sporting achievements, and so on, activities through which our particular skills and values are expressed.  Resources to support exchanges and collaboration in these areas (and not just through the British Council) have a major positive impact, and help to create the context for successful business and political co-operation.  For example, a succession of programmes of scientific exchange initiated in 2005 by the Embassy’s Science Section under the banner ‘UK-China Partners in Science’ has done much to encourage joint research and common projects of commercial innovation.

 

 

The UK’s engagement with China on human rights and wider values, including the UK-China Human Rights Dialogue

 

  1. The current British Ambassador, Dame Barbara Woodward, has a long view of the human rights dialogue, and is much better placed to comment.  Engagement with China in discussion of wider values may also be worth exploring, however.  Confucian attitudes are embedded in the Chinese psyche despite many decades of communism, and there is much in the humanistic approach of Confucianism which could resonate with Western values and form a basis for common policy positions.

 

The FCO networks of Consulates in China, and plans to build a new Embassy

 

  1. The writer believes the current network of Consulates in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing and Hong Kong meets the need, along with the Embassy in Beijing.  A new Embassy building in Beijing (on the lines of the Australian or Canadian Embassies) could potentially bring all functions, including the British Council and Visa Office, under one roof, but the gains may not be worth the disruption or expense.

 

 

Recommendations for Action

 

  1. Broadly speaking, the UK should continue on its present path in its relationship with China, resolving differences (of which there may be many) through patient discussion and negotiation.  Particular points to watch out for, however, may include the following: