Written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (AR60001)

When I gave evidence to the FAC on 29 November, I promised to write to you with more information on some of the issues we covered.

I enclose a summary document with the information you and colleagues requested, covering human rights, ODA, Mosul planning and CSSF funding.

As part of my next quarterly update, I shall include information about the MOU between the FCO and DExEU.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Q24-28: Can you give more detail on the meetings the Foreign Secretary has with his Advisory Group on Human Rights?

The Foreign Secretary met his Advisory Group on Human Rights on 16 November. Discussions are confidential but you may wish to know that the Foreign Secretary in particular raised the role of civil society and members of the Group will discuss this further with FCO officials. The Foreign Secretary will meet the Group again in 2017.

COMMONWEALTH PROTOCOL

Q 34-37: Please supply the Committee with information on the protocol arrangements and support offered to Commonwealth Heads of State and Government visiting the UK, including contact with Ministers.

Ministers meet regularly with their counterparts from Commonwealth countries, both in London and on their visits overseas. We value bilateral Ministerial meetings, which provide the opportunity for discussions on a range of Commonwealth and other issues and are an essential tool of our trade.

The majority of the Commonwealth's 52 Member States are represented by High Commissions or other representation in London – although a few cover the UK from Brussels.  It would be normal practice for those High Commissions to take the initiative in seeking meetings with UK Ministers for their incoming high level visitors. 

Where a Head of State or Government is formally invited to the UK by Her Majesty's Government, facilitation of the visit is arranged through the FCO’s Protocol Directorate.  Under the UK’s Inward Visits Security Policy, protection is provided to any Head of State or Government visiting the UK on official business. 

However, London is a global hub and many Heads of State and Government pass through London without notifying the FCO and there is no obligation for them to do so.  Many of them are simply transiting through the UK or are here on private visits or conducting their own business and they do not require or request our support.  Where we are aware of visits to London we consider whether to offer either Ministerial or official calls.

CSSF

Q139-144: Can you provide more detail on how the FCO spends CSSF funding, which is what DFID does in its annual report?

The DFID annual report covers HMG’s total ODA spend by country, and an indication of the main HMG spending departments (which in 2014 included the Conflict Pool, the precursor of the CSSF).   DFID’s annual Statistics on International Development (SID), published on 17 November, contains the same information but also provides a breakdown of CSSF net ODA by government department (which includes both DFID and the FCO, amongst others). This is not the same as, and is more than, a breakdown of DFID’s own CSSF expenditure. We pass the FCO’s data to DFID for publication.

Details of CSSF ODA spend (per calendar year) is already available through the Statistics on International Development publication produced by DFID.

For ODA transparency, the CSSF is contributing to the government’s aim that all UK government departments are ranked as ‘Good’ or ‘Very Good’ in the international Aid Transparency Index within the next five years.

CHANGES TO OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE REPORTING

Q149: Please supply a note explaining what the changes to ODA reporting are and their implications, in terms of your budget and what is ODA-able.

The revised reporting directives of ODA for peace and security came into effect on 19 February 2016. These revisions have clarified the circumstances when engagement with military institutions and the police is recognised as ODA. They confirm that engagement with the partner country’s military forces is not eligible, except for exceptional circumstances where the operating environment may make necessary the delivery of humanitarian aid or development services through the military of the partner country.

Only the additional costs associated with the use of military personnel or existing equipment of the partner country’s military forces are reportable as ODA when used exclusively to: a) deliver humanitarian aid in accordance with humanitarian principles, or b) perform development services, provided that there is a specific requirement that cannot be met with available civilian assets.

The directives also detail what training of partner country military is ODA-eligible.

An ongoing UN-OECD technical review of the ODA eligibility of UN peacekeeping operations, due to report in 2017, will also take into account the revised directives; the proportion of the UK’s assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping that is reportable as ODA could increase as a result. Activities preventing violent extremism in developing countries are reportable as ODA, as long as they are led by partner countries and their primary purpose is developmental.

The revised directives were circulated to all FCO programme managers and will potentially allow us to fund some activity which we had previously not considered to be ODA eligible.  But our ODA allocation remains unchanged and is fully committed this FY.

A copy of the revised directive is attached.

IRAQ

Q166-7: Is CSSF funding going to be made available for the stabilisation of Mosul, once the city has been liberated? Please give details of budgetary figures or the resources available.

The CSSF is a flexible fund which can respond quickly to changes in context. For example, in addition to the original CSSF allocation for Iraq, during 2016 the CSSF provided two uplifts totalling £6m to support activity around the liberation of Mosul. CSSF funding will be available to fund further activity supporting the stabilisation of Mosul during 2017 as appropriate.

The CSSF also funds the UK Stabilisation Unit, a centre of expertise on conflict, stabilisation, security and justice to support UK government activities in fragile and conflict-affected states. For Iraq, the Stabilisation Unit provide advice to CSSF decision making bodies and civilian experts in Stabilisation, Policing and Communications in country to support the broader Mosul effort. And, drawing on this advice, UK CSSF funding for the stabilisation of Mosul, as well as other liberated areas in Iraq, has focussed on the following:

-          £9.25 million to the UNDP Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS), which includes funding 8 Municipal Stabilisation Advisers in Ninewah;

-          £7.75 million for the management of explosive hazards, including Counter-IED, primarily through the UN Mine Action Service. This has also included technical advice and support from the UK Defence Attaché in Baghdad, the British Army's Senior Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Search Expert. The UK is also the Global Coalition’s military C-IED training lead in Iraq;

-          £1.75m on essential support for strategic communications and civilian-military cooperation in support of the Mosul campaign.

Q168-169: What sort of work is happening with the Americans, the French and others to ensure that there is an international approach on this and that an adequate amount of money and resources are pooled to help the city of Mosul?

The UK is working closely with our international partners, including the US, and France to support the Government of Iraq in its efforts to quickly re-establish legitimate governance, security and delivery of basic services in liberated areas, including Mosul. This support is coordinated through the Global Coalition against Daesh.  We lead the Coalition’s Strategic Communications work,; and Germany and UAE lead the Coalition’s support to Iraq for stabilisation and the Italians the policing component of it. 

UNDP administers two funding facilities which channel international support: the Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilisation (FFIS; working with the Government of Iraq to deliver basic services like water and electricity, and rebuilding livelihoods) and the Funding Facility for Expanded Stabilisation (FFES; working with the Government of Iraq to deliver longer term infrastructure). Out of $240 million raised to date for the FFIS, the US has contributed $65 million, Germany $33 million, and the UAE $10 million.  As set out above, the UK has contributed $12 million (£9.25 million) to the FFIS.  We have not contributed to date to the FFES, because it has a longer-term focus we see it as a lower priority than FFIS.

Q174: What is the political plan for the stabilisation of Mosul and its administration once it is captured?

Over the past year we have been working with the US, UN and other international partners to encourage the Government of Iraq to establish a plan for the post-liberation governance of Mosul and Ninewa.  But, ultimately, we need to accept that this is for the Iraqis to grip; much will be done behind doors that are closed to us and the Coalition. 

This campaign is different from 2003, and deliberately so.  The UK is in Iraq at the invitation of a democratically-elected Iraqi government.  We have to work with and through the Iraqi government and our Coalition partners.  We do not control the battle space.  Nor do we have a casting vote in Iraqi politics.  It is ultimately the Iraqis who control the timeline and the politics.

November 2016