Written submission from PCS Union

 

 

Introduction

 

  1. PCS represents around 190,000 members in the civil service and related agencies, bodies and contractors.

 

  1. Within this, we represent over 51,000 members based in the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), of which, approximately 15,000 work in Jobcentres. The majority of staff working in Jobcentres are PCS members.

 

  1. PCS gave written and verbal evidence to the previous Work and Pensions Committee Inquiry into benefit sanctions policy beyond the Oakley Review, in 2014-5.

 

  1. PCS has maintained a principled position of opposition to the use of benefit sanctions.

 

  1. PCS notes the findings of the National Audit Office Report (NAO) on Benefit Sanctions. In particular we welcome the conclusions that the use of sanctions is inconsistent, there is significant variation in use between different Jobcentres and different Work Programme providers, there is a lack of international evidence to support the use of sanctions, that the DWP refuses to allow a full investigation into the impact of the use of sanctions, and that there is no appreciation of the wider impacts of sanctions on other public services.

 

  1. PCS acknowledges that sanctions rates have fallen since the peak in 2013.

 

PCS members’ view of sanctions

 

  1. PCS surveyed members working in Jobcentres on the issue of sanctions in 2014. When asked “Does sanctioning positively impact on claimants finding employment?” 70% responded “no” and only 30% said “yes”.

 

  1. In the same survey, 73% of members reported an increase in verbally abusive and 61% an increase in physically abusive incidents in Jobcentres, since the introduction of the 2012 changes in sanctions policy.

 

  1. Members have consistently expressed the view that the sanctions regime is a hindrance to their ability to offer a supportive service that results in claimants finding sustainable employment.

 

  1. Members report that, when sanctioned, claimants’ priorities become more focused on dealing with the hardship that they find themselves in, rather than searching for work.

 

  1. PCS members report that there are better ways to incentivise claimants’ job search activity than the threat of sanctions, such as focusing on the financial advantage of being in employment.

 

  1. PCS members feel that rather than being a supportive job role, helping claimants find employment, Jobcentre work coaches’ primary role has become about policing the benefits system. In many cases it is also the view of claimants that work coaches are there to police the system.

 

  1. This echoes the conclusions of the Work and Pensions Committee’s recent report on the future of Jobcentre Plus which stated:

 

“Much of whether JCP can achieve its objectives in supporting claimants with complex needs rests on Work Coaches and their relationships with claimants. Work Coaches are tasked with referring claimants for possible sanctions at the same time as supporting them into and in work. This combined role may mean that many claimants see JCP staff as policemen rather than genuine coaches, potentially undermining claimant trust and confidence. Trustful, positive and personalised support is central to the Work Coach model working effectively, but currently the Department has little means of assessing how far this is being delivered.”

 

  1. This means that claimants are often defensive and tense in their dealings with work coaches and are not able to take full advantage of the service that could be offered.

 

  1. PCS members have reported an improvement in the culture relating to benefits sanctions. It was clear that at the height of sanctioning activity in 2013, members were given targets for sanction referrals and issued Performance Improvement Plans to increase the number of claimants referred. Reports of sanctions targets or pressure to increase sanctions referrals are now rare. This evidence supports the conclusion of the NAO report; that it is not claimant behaviour that drives sanctioning levels but management priorities within DWP and the Work Programme. It is not difficult to conclude that this is related to the prevailing political culture.

 

Work Programme

 

  1. It is clear from the NAO report and the reports from members that the Work Programme providers proportionately refer considerably more claimants for sanctions, and that these referrals are far more likely to be inappropriate.

 

  1. PCS believes that this is because it is not in the interests of the Work Programme providers to work constructively with those claimants who are harder to help into work. This is expensive and does not necessarily achieve the required results, as defined by crude payments-by-results mechanisms.

 

  1. There is likely to be less sanctioning activity as the Work Programme runs down and is replaced by the Work and Health Programme, with more in-house DWP activity in this area.

 

Vulnerable claimants

 

  1. PCS believes that the impact of benefit sanctions on vulnerable claimants should be investigated, particularly for those with poor mental health and learning difficulties.

 

  1. There is anecdotal evidence that claimants with poor mental health and learning difficulties are more susceptible to sanction activity and also less well equipped to deal with the consequences.

 

  1. For example, these claimants may not be able to deal with Hardship applications or be able to navigate their way through the appeals procedures.

 

  1. The impact of sanctions on these claimants is also disproportionately adverse as they may struggle more than others to cope with the loss of income. This then renders them further from the labour market as they are faced with additional adversity and barriers to finding employment.

 

Financial implications

 

  1. Sanction activity is very expensive to manage. Within DWP there is activity to refer claimants for sanctions from the Jobcentres, decisions then need to be made on the referrals, there are mandatory reconsiderations to be conducted and appeals to be processed, many sanctioned claimants will claim hardship payments which will also require an interview in the Jobcentre and a decision on the application.

 

  1. There is the additional work that will be generated by the Work Programme referrals.

 

  1. 11% of all JSA sanctions referred by Jobcentres in 2015, and 26% of all Work Programme referrals, were overturned. This is costly and unnecessary activity (NAO statistics).

 

  1. The DWP estimate the cost of administering sanctions at £30m - £50m. It is estimated that the administration of Hardship Payments costs the DWP a further £35m (NAO statistics).

 

  1. The estimated value of the payments not made by the department as a result of sanctions is £132m (NAO statistics).

 

  1. The cost to the individuals can be catastrophic and in some cases has lead to death, including suicide.

 

  1. The wider cost to society is huge. PCS is clear that the increased use of sanctions has lead to the massive increase in the use of foodbanks. This is in addition to the impact on health and social services which is considerable, as homelessness, depression, anxiety and other ill health increase as a result of the extreme poverty caused by sanctions.

 

  1. Additionally since the demise of the Social Fund, Local Authorities are now responsible for the administration and payment of emergency welfare support.

 

Recommendations

  1. There should be an independent inquiry into the use and impact of sanctions.

 

  1. That the DWP should introduce a trial where there is no use of sanctions and evaluate the outcomes against the standard practice.

 

  1. That there should be a more holistic assessment of the costs and benefits of the use of sanctions in wider society.

 

  1. That DWP report on the Sanctions Early Warning trial as a matter of urgency and implement its findings.

 

5 December 2016