Written evidence submitted by Christian Aid

 

 

THE CURRENT SITUATION

 

  1. 2016 has been a particularly grueling year for South Sudan, three years after the eruption of bitter conflict on 15 December 2013. While then conflict was mainly concentrated in the previously troubled region of Greater Upper Nile, the violence has since spread across the whole country, as the previously peaceful and prosperous Equatorias have been sucked into a deepening civil war, and Greater Bahr el Ghazal has struggled with regular clashes and rising ethnic tensions. Despite a seeming respite brought by a peace agreement[i] signed in August 2015 following IGAD plus UK, US, Norway, China, EU, AU and UN diplomacy (albeit an agreement widely accepted to have its flaws, and signed ‘with reservation’ by President Salva Kiir), little significant progress was made against the agreement in the following months. This culminated in the dramatic explosion of renewed war in Juba on the eve of South Sudan’s fifth anniversary of independence in July, when the rising tensions between SPLA and SPLA-IO soldiers which returned with Riek Machar in April 2016 erupted into intense street battles and neighbourhood warfare as many of the SPLA-IO were driven into the bush, leaving the peace agreement hanging by a thread.
  2. The events of July 2016 resulted in a worsened humanitarian outlook, and also signified a grave marker of the extent of the changed humanitarian environment. UN OCHA currently reports that 1.87 million people have been displaced within South Sudan, and 1.1 million have fled to neighbouring countries[ii]. 4.8 million are food insecure, and WFP and FAO have warned that 3.7 – 4 million (more than a third of the total estimated population) are currently severely food insecure – a million more than this time last year[iii].
  3. The results of the unpredictable security situation have had implications for donor and diplomatic presence in country, and FCO and DFID presence is currently limited in number due to security concerns. However, the UK’s strong commitment to South Sudan as exhibited through this continued presence, strong engagement in diplomatic efforts in coordination with other key countries, and enhanced efforts to engage with strong analysis and new ideas is extremely welcome. The practice of maintaining a joint FCO-DFID Sudan and South Sudan unit is to be commended, enabling information sharing and coordination around efforts driven by concerns for peace and development in South Sudan.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 

-          The Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) should continue their strong and coordinated commitment to South Sudan, including efficient information sharing with other diplomatic and development actors. This support should include funding for humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding work which is sensitive and adaptable to the complexity of the context and the need for a holistic, long-term perspective. Support to longer-term development and peacebuilding work must continue while urgent humanitarian needs are addressed.

-          DFID should continue its approach to engaging regularly with humanitarian actors, wider civil society, relevant stakeholders and those with long-term expertise, being open to innovative and context appropriate ideas, and facilitating coordination and information sharing between these diverse actors.

 

A CHANGED HUMANITARIAN ENVIRONMENT

 

  1. According to the annual Aid Worker Security Report, South Sudan is now one of the most dangerous places in the world to be an aid worker [iv]. Aid workers face an increasingly challenging climate, working within a complex political, military and legal landscape in the context of a highly fluid security situation. While South Sudanese national aid workers have become increasingly vulnerable on the basis of their ethnicity or perceived affiliation, international aid workers also face increasing threats to their safety. This has also further sharpened awareness of the threats South Sudanese experience on a daily basis, with regular violent attacks and widespread sexual and gender based violence (over 100 separate cases were reported as a result of the July 2016 violence)[v]. Broadly speaking, increased fears around working in South Sudan have impacted on recruitment and staff retention in an environment where there is frequent staff turnover and a high burnout rate. This is particularly critical when now more than ever there is a need to retain experienced staff, and an increased reluctance to send inexperienced staff into a highly volatile environment. At the same time, the instinct to withdraw into a protective ‘green-zone’ style environment must also be resisted, and humanitarians must look outside of the Juba bubble to truly understand South Sudan and fulfill the promise to stay and deliver.
  2. There has been a clear trend in narrowing humanitarian space, marked by denial of access, obstruction of movement of goods and personnel, bureaucratic impediments, violence against humanitarian staff, extortion and rent-seeking behavior, looting and seizing of assets, programme interference, and general insecurity – which has been accentuated in the weeks following the events in July 2016. At the same time, the war has had severe repercussions for civil society and public space amidst a pervasive climate of fear and civilians, especially those involved in civil society organisations, political activism, and journalism, are extremely vulnerable. 
  3. Recurring themes in reflective discussions among humanitarian actors have included the need to retain institutional memory, to learn from the past, to build strong relationships with local communities, to overcome the tension between short cycles of humanitarian response and the need for long-term engagement, and an overall need for effective conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity. There has been an increasing recognition that in order to meet the challenge of operating within this context, humanitarian response needs to be more strategic and smarter – ‘better not bigger’ – but how this will happen will require commitment, and dedicated time and space.
  4. The ‘South Sudan Peace Portal’ website[vi] is about to be launched as an online information sharing resource that aims to make relevant research and analysis more readily available to those working in South Sudan, informing understanding of context, planning and effective approaches to working in South Sudan. This is closely related in spirit to the ‘South Sudan Humanitarian Project’ website[vii], which was established in 2015 as an online information sharing platform ‘for humanitarians by humanitarians’, in an attempt to facilitate access to learning which is directly relevant to humanitarian operations. Beyond these efforts, some have said that a lot more needs to be done, for example a bigger UN-led review or analysis of overall humanitarian response in South Sudan. Others have emphasized the need to resist the urge to withdraw into an isolationist and defensive approach and to explore how humanitarian response can be context sensitive and correspond more strongly with other local peacebuilding approaches.
  5. DFID and other donors have responded by supporting the formation of a Conflict Sensitivity Resource Facility, a recently established resource centre which aims to assist in ensuring that donors and implementing partners are able to deliver more effective and more conflict sensitive programmes.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 

-          Humanitarian actors and donors should carefully balance humanitarian response with awareness of long-term goals and impact (including in relation to development and peacebuilding goals), and ensure a set of principles that underscore ‘Do No Harm’. DFID must continue to monitor and react to the security risks to aid workers, and humanitarian operational concerns.

-          DFID should continue to inform its approach with a rigorous context analysis that is responsive to the situation and historic dynamics within South Sudan, avoiding analysis based on unrealistic expectations and externally imposed models. Conflict advisers are critical for embedding conflict sensitivity into programming, and these positions should continue in both FCO and DFID.

-          DFID should ensure support for diverse and representative civil society groups, and take care to engage beyond the range of groups that may be the best resourced or outspoken.

 

THE ROLE OF LOCAL AND NATIONAL PARTNERS

 

  1. Christian Aid is strongly committed to a partnership approach, implementing only with national partners, and as a consequence has developed strong expertise and understanding of the diverse benefits, challenges and risks involved. We strongly believe that there is immense value in a genuine partnership approach (often built on long term relationships based on an equal balance of power, respect and understanding; going beyond fiduciary transactions to incorporate understanding and support for capacity, shared action plans, and accountability frameworks). We are committed to this model – as evidenced by the years of partnership we have maintained with national partners, including walking with the churches of South Sudan since the 1970s.
  2. Multi-agency research published in May 2016[viii] (by Christian Aid, CAFOD, Oxfam and Tearfund) found that National Non-Governmental Organisations (NNGOs) and CBOs (Community Based Organisations) faced significant barriers in accessing the main funding streams available to humanitarian actors in South Sudan. Most NNGOs received funding via larger international organisations, and the majority of partnerships between international agencies and NNGOs are of a sub-contracting nature: they are often short-term, project-specific and prescriptive. However, it is when the comparative advantages possessed by NNGOs are complemented and supported by those of INGOs (International NGOs) that the most effective humanitarian partnerships can emerge. In particular, partnerships established pre-crisis were fruitful, facilitating rapid and effective response an access to harder to reach areas. If effective partnerships are to become the norm, rather than the exception, systematic changes are needed. The international humanitarian community must redouble its efforts to develop support, long-term partnerships and to build local capacity and resilience before, during and after an emergency. The recent World Humanitarian Summit made excellent progress on commitments to ensuring that more humanitarian aid spending is passed to national NGOs.
  3. DFID has demonstrated an appreciation for the value of partnership and the need for longer-term project cycles (for example, in its Humanitarian and Resilience Program in South Sudan). However, it has yet to be seen whether this has resulted in genuine partnerships or the continuation of sub-contractual relationships.

 

RECOMMENDATIONS:

 

-          DFID should continue to further its recognition, understanding and support for the specific roles and needs of national and local actors, and the value of humanitarian partnerships, for example in line with the recommendations in the ‘Missed Out: The role of local actors in humanitarian response in the South Sudan conflict’ report. This includes supporting efforts within the humanitarian system in South Sudan to help national NGOs to navigate humanitarian structures and funding mechanisms.

-          On an international level, the UK government should continue to lead global reform with its commitment to the Grand Bargain, including more support and funding tools for local and national responders.

 

LOCAL PEACEBUILDING AND THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH:

 

  1. The conflict dynamics of 2016 have sharply illuminated the flaws of previous attempts to resolve conflict, including a focus on narrow high-level peace talks, technocratic approaches, and focusing on development without directly addressing conflict dynamics.
  2. The 2015 report of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan inquiry into international engagement with South Sudan 2011-2014[ix] emphasized that the international community must engage more widely, deeply and consistently with the people of South Sudan, and that peacebuilding must be South Sudan-led and owned if it is to take root and flourish. National peace cannot be achieved without local level conflict transformation, requiring national commitment and avoiding the manipulation of local tensions for political gain. Community-based peacebuilding can contribute to repairing trust, inter-communal cohesion, reducing violence, building an ability to absorb economic and social shocks, and can provide an important bridge to ensure that national approaches to peace are informed by local realities.
  3. It is widely recognized that the churches in South Sudan have an especially influential role to play in mediating and addressing the root causes of conflict. Since the 1990s, and long before, the churches have sought to facilitate and mediate dialogue, using its moral authority and credibility among a wide range of actors in country. The South Sudan Council of Churches is an ecumenical umbrella body comprised of seven member churches and three associates in South Sudan. The SSCC has a strong legacy of leading peacebuilding, reconciliation and advocacy, including relief and rehabilitation throughout the Sudanese civil wars.
  4. The often cited ‘people-to-people’ approach was developed and led by the then New Sudan Council of Churches, and the best known of these people-to-people meetings is the 1999 Wunlit dialogue which brought together Dinka communities of the former Lakes Province area of Bahr el Ghazal and Nuer from Western Upper Nile. This approach was emulated in a series of peace conferences as part of a grassroots peacemaking initiative during the years of the previous civil war, and experience of this continues to inform and inspire current efforts to build an approach that fits local and national contexts in South Sudan. At the core of this approach is the traditional method of inviting people into a forum in a recognized local setting in a village or town where all may have a chance to speak, where truth-telling is encouraged, and where consensus is built over responses to issues ranging from theft to contested borders or killings. Facilitators or mediators are often known and respected figures, with moral standing and political stature. These approaches represent the basis for a functional society – voices from a broad spectrum, moral authority and guidance, and a consensus-based approach towards peaceful resolution of contested issues.
  5. In June 2015, SSCC heads of churches met in Kigali, Rwanda and committed to an Action Plan for Peace (APP), which they formalized and officially launched in April 2015. The APP identifies three strategic areas of action that will directly contribute to and compliment the implementation of national and community peace processes. This includes: Advocacy at the national, regional and international levels for a negotiated peace and to address hate speech; Neutral Fora to create space for stakeholders and parties to come together in safe spaces for dialogue with an aim of overcoming mistrust, disagreement; and Reconciliation. Regarding the latter, this is a church-led process which does not impose models of reconciliation, but is carefully guided by a process of consultation and dialogue – targeting all levels of society and considerate of existing and traditional approaches - to build an approach tailored for the South Sudan context.

 

Recommendations:

 

  1. The UK government should recognize and support the role of the church in South Sudan. It is critically important that these initiatives are South Sudanese led and owned, and therefore DFID should ensure its approach to this is sensitive and informed by understanding of the complex relationships and conflict dynamics. This includes factoring this understanding into a holistic approach to other wider programming.
  2. DFID should ensure an inclusive approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation, in particular recognizing the role of women, youth, local church, and traditional leaders. This should include finding ways to enable effective peace initiatives to access small and manageable grants.

 

 

 

1

                            CHRISTIAN AID SUBMISSION


[i] ‘Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, August 2015: http://www.jmecsouthsudan.com/uploads/jmec_signed_peace_agreement.pdf

[ii] ‘South Sudan Humanitarian Bulletin’, UNOCHA, 21 November 2016 http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1601121_OCHA_SouthSudan_humanitarian_bulletin18.pdf

[iii] http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-complex-emergency-echo-wfp-fao-unhcr-who-echo-daily-flash-10-november

[iv] Aid Worker Security Report: Figures at a glance 2016, Humanitarian Outcomes: https://aidworkersecurity.org/sites/default/files/HO_AidWorkerSecPreview_1015_G.PDF_.pdf

[v] ‘UNMISS statement on incidents of sexual violence in the July 2016 conflict in Juba, South Sudan’, UN Mission in South Sudan, August 2016. http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/unmiss-statement-incidents-sexual-violence-july-2016-conflict-juba-south-sudan

[vi] ‘South Sudan Peace Portal’, http://www.southsudanpeaceportal.com

[vii] ‘South Sudan Humanitarian Project’, http://www.southsudanhumanitarianproject.com 

[viii] ‘Missed Out: The role of local actors in the humanitarian response in the South Sudan conflict’, Christian Aid, CAFOD, Oxfam and Tearfund. May 2016. http://programme.christianaid.org.uk/programme-policy-practice/sites/default/files/2016-04/J4626%20Missed%20Again%20South%20Sudan%20WEB_0.pdf

[ix] ‘Bridging the Gaps: Lessons from International Engagement with South Sudan 2011-2014’, February 2016. All Party Parliamentary Group on Sudan and South Sudan. http://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/bridging-gaps-lessons-international-engagement-south-sudan-2011-2014