Written evidence from Sir Roderic Lyne (RUS0039)

Memorandum by the Rt Hon Sir Roderic Lyne (British Ambassador to the Russian Federation, 2000-2004)

Introduction

1. In this paper I have sought to address some of the broader questions in the Committee’s terms of reference. I am not in a position to comment on the FCO’s management of the relationship with Russia, on the role of UK cultural institutions or on the details of the human rights situation in Russia.

2. I have referred extensively to “Western” policy (with some qualification of the extent to which “the West” remains a valid concept). The UK is not without influence on Russia, as a large European and NATO state, a member of the G7 and a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council; as a trading partner; and as a country in which many educated Russians choose to do business, educate their children and reside. However, acting alone the UK is not able to have a significant impact on Russian policy. It therefore makes sense to look at the UK’s approach within a wider Western context, albeit at a time when the West is in considerable disarray.

The Historical Context

3. In December 1941 – just after Pearl Harbour, years before Yalta and Potsdam – Stalin spelled out to Eden what he wanted at the end of the war. This included part of Finland, the Baltic States, the Bessarabian province of Romania, while the future of Poland was to be decided.

4. His position was in direct conflict with the Atlantic Charter proclaimed by Rooosevelt and Churchill the previous August. The US/UK manifesto emphasised self-determination, sovereign rights and self-government – principles which were later to be incorporated in the UN Charter.

5. What Stalin had demanded, the Soviet Union eventually acquired – and much more besides.

6. When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Russian Government recognised the rights of the former Soviet republics and former Warsaw Pact states to self-determination in a series of actions and agreements, including the OSCE Paris Charter (November 1990), the entry of 14 ex-Soviet States to the UN, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and the 1997 NATO/Russia Founding Act.

7. On this basis, through the 1990s and beyond, the West sought to integrate Russia progressively into the Euro-Atlantic community and pursued a vision of a strategic partnership.

8. Despite periods of friction (over the two wars in Chechnya and, notably, over Kosovo and NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999), a great deal of progress was made towards these objectives up to 2004. Western states and institutions helped Russia’s transition to a market economy. Western trade with, and investment in, Russia grew. Cooperation developed rapidly in many sectors, both governmental and non-governmental. This included the NATO-Russia Council; the EU-Russia Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation (1997); and Russia’s entry to the G8.

9. This strategy of progressive integration broke down from 2004 onwards for a number of reasons, of which the most important was the sharp disagreement over the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

10. The fundamental reasons why the West and Russia are at now odds are the same as in 1941:

• It is a core Russian belief that their security requires a cordon sanitaire of weak or neutralised territories which they can dominate.

• The West is wedded to self-determination. The Russians are not.

• For reasons of geography and history, Russians believe that their country has to be accepted as an independent “Great Power” and accorded a commensurate position in international decision-making. They are prepared to be disruptive and adversarial to achieve this.

The Russian view of 1991-2016

11. For a decade, the Kremlin has propagated a view of the past quarter-century which is at odds with the Western interpretation of history; which denigrates the efforts and achievements of liberal reformers in Russia from 1987 onwards; and which portrays Russia as having been the victim of Western attempts to undermine and humiliate the country. This view has been reflected in many public statements by President Putin, but it is important to recognise that it is shared widely in the Russian “political class” and across the nation. It can be summarised roughly as follows:

• There was no need for the Soviet Union (as opposed to the Communist system) to collapse. This was the fault of Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Western plotting.

• The Soviet Union was not “defeated” in the Cold War. It was not like Germany and Japan in 1945. It was the peoples of the USSR – not the West – who overturned Communism and chose to end the Cold War peacefully. But, whereas the USSR had helped to determine the post-War global order in 1943-5, in the 1990s the USA unilaterally sought to impose a “pernicious” unipolar world of “one master, one sovereign” (Putin at Munich, October 2007).

• In the 1990s, the West took advantage of Russia’s weakness. It refused to allow Russia a role in decision-making.  NATO decided to enlarge. Russia worked with the West in the Balkans and played an important role in the diplomacy – but was ignored over the decisions to bomb Belgrade and, later, to recognise Kosovo.

• The West failed to support Russia in two wars against Chechen separatists. It gave comfort to the rebels by criticising Russia on humanitarian grounds and giving visas to Chechen refugees and political representatives.

• The gestures which Putin made to the West from 2000-03, including his support after 9/11, were not reciprocated. President Bush left the ABM Treaty and developed plans for missile defence. The Baltic States were admitted to NATO. Iraq was invaded. The West gave asylum to traitors and enemies of the regime such as Boris Berezovsky and Alexander Litvinenko; and supported Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

• In 2003/04, the West supported regime change in Georgia during the Rose Revolution. It then encouraged President Saakashvili to defy the Kremlin.

• Crucially, in 2004/5, the West backed – or even fomented – the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Putin had given Yanukovich his personal support in his election campaign in 2004. When Yanukovich’s victory in a rigged election was overturned, and Yushchenko won the re-run Presidential election, Putin was humiliated. The popular uprising was a threatening example for him. He had invested in relations with the West and had been betrayed in an area that affected Russia’s vital interests. He was also being criticised by the West for curbing democracy in Russia.

• In the same period, the West blocked the Russian plan for Moldova.

• By 2005, thanks to the rise in oil prices, the economy was growing fast. Russia was strong again. It did not need Western support, let alone criticism. After the Orange Revolution, Putin turned definitively against the West – notably in his 2007 Munich fulmination against the United States.

• In 2006 Putin announced a long-term programme to invest in and modernise Russia’s armed forces to counter “the emergence of a whole arsenal of destabilising weapons” and “respond to attempts from any quarters to put foreign policy pressure on Russia”. (Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, 10 May 2006.)

• In 2008, Washington sought to propel Georgia and Ukraine towards NATO membership. This was seen as posing a direct threat to Russia, forcing Ukraine (part of the Russian motherland) into the Western camp and raising the prospect of NATO bases close to the heart of Russia. In April 2008, the NATO Bucharest Summit, while setting aside “Membership Action Plan” status for Georgia and Ukraine, “agreed that these countries will become members of NATO.” Putin went to Bucharest to express his opposition to this; to US plans for Theatre Missile Defence installations in Eastern Europe; and to the recognition of Kosovo. On all three points he was ignored.

• This led almost directly to the Russo-Georgian conflict of August 2008 and Russian recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. President Saakashvili was put in his place. The conflict demonstrated Russian strength and Western weakness. President Sarkozy of France brokered a settlement largely on Russian terms. The West scrambled to get back to get back to “business as usual”. In 2009 the USA tried to “reset” relations and the EU launched a “Partnership for Modernisation”.

• Since 2011, Russia has stood its ground and shown strength in a deepening confrontation with the United States and the West – over Libya, Syria, Ukraine, the Magnitsky Act, Snowden, Litvinenko, sanctions, TMD, NATO forward defence.

A Western View of Russia’s Current Strategy and Tactics

“ We are always ready for Realpolitik…We just have to wait until the end of the election campaign.”  (Sergei Ivanov, ex-Head of the Presidential Administration; Financial Times interview, 23 October 2016.)

12. President Putin’s overriding aim appears to be to retain power for himself and his associates. He has no perceptible exit strategy.

13. Vladimir Putin is clearly the decision-maker on all major issues. Insofar as he consults on matters of foreign and security policy, it is within a small and secretive circle (sometimes described in Moscow as the “black box”). However there is interdependence between Putin and a wider group of perhaps a hundred or so associates who control most of what matters in Russia. They comprise competing clans and interest groups, but are bound together by the need to retain the power and wealth which they have accumulated.

14. The broad strategic outlook of this group reflects the nation. I do not believe that they are working to a master plan, and I think they are more concerned to defend their positions than to expand Russia’s territory and global reach. They are conscious of the limitations and constraints on Russia’s power, especially economic weakness. But they seek opportunistically to regain ground lost in the 1990s; and have a vision which is widely shared:

• A vision of hegemony and a power of veto over the territories of the former Soviet Union. Putin’s generation have never accepted the loss of power and territory of 1991. They are not trying to recreate the USSR, but to the extent possible they would like to assert Russian control over neighbouring states and Russia’s claimed right to protect ethnic Russians living in them. When Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical disaster of the past century, he was not referring to the end of Communism but to the diminution of the State – and he was speaking for the large majority of his countrymen. It will take at least another generation for the Russians to accommodate themselves to their reduced status.

• A vision of strong defence – against Islamist terrorism; against the “existential” threat from NATO and the US; and (not stated in public, but often in private) against the long-term threat from the more powerful and resource-hungry Chinese neighbour (from which Tsarist Russia took 1.5 million square kilometres in the mid-19th century). The Russian leadership believe that their strategic defence requires recognition of Russia’s cordon sanitaire or “zone of influence”. The circle around Putin is dominated by the “men in epaulettes” or “siloviki”. They see the maintenance of buffer zones around the country – territories denied to NATO and subject to a Russian power of veto – as essential for their security. Ukraine is foremost among them, but this also applies to Belarus, Moldova, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Arctic. NATO’s intrusion into the Baltic States has penetrated Russia’s security perimeter and must be countered – as must the US missile sites in Romania and Poland.

• A vision of Russia as an independent Great Power, respected and feared; and one which cannot be ignored. The Russian administration yearns to be treated by the United States as an equal, based on its nuclear power and its geography – not dismissed as an economically backward “regional power”.

15. Tactically, President Putin has shown himself to be adroit, opportunistic, disruptive and ruthless in advancing his aims. He evidently does not feel constrained by domestic or international law. As the West, in his view, has abused international law and circumvented the UN, he is free to do so. He argues that the rules of the game were imposed by the USA in the unipolar moment of the 1990s. Russia rejects this status quo. The rules should be rewritten to reflect Russia’s status as a major power and include Russia in Europe’s security architecture – as a decision-maker with the power of veto.

16. In Ukraine from 2014, Putin had to counteract a second defeat from the Maidan and the EU’s attempted armlock. In Syria, he had to pre-empt regime change and the potential loss of Russian bases. In both places, Russia has pushed forward in the face of a weak response from a divided and preoccupied West. On both issues, the West has been forced to negotiate with Russia – a strong Russia exercising military leverage.

17. If the next US administration and Europe (insofar as the EU and European members of NATO remain capable of acting cohesively) accept the changed status quo, Russia is prepared to deal – as a competing or adversary power, not a partner, and from the position of strength which the Kremlin believes it now occupies. President Putin would prefer to strike deals over Syria and Ukraine and achieve the ending of sanctions – so long as he can do so on his terms. Both conflicts are expensive. Russia does not want to have to fight endlessly in Syria. The Russians are ready to drop Assad so long as they retain a sympathetic regime and their bases in Western Syria. Absent a deal, Russia feels strong enough to continue to threaten and to disrupt.

Could the West have done better over the past 25 years?

18. The dwindling band of liberal “Westernisers” in Moscow lament that the West missed an historic opportunity to lock Russia in during the 1990s by bringing her into the EU and NATO. This was manifestly unfeasible.

19. Some Western commentators argue that the present impasse is largely the fault of the West. I do not agree. The break-up of the USSR was well handled; and the West invested heavily in helping the Russian transition in the 1990s and beyond. But, with hindsight, there are factors which contributed to the West’s failure to integrate Russia into the status quo:

• Russia and the former Soviet Union – understandably – slipped down the priority list. More pressing international problems demanded attention (the Middle East, the Balkans, South Asia, international terrorism, the rise of China, issues of globalisation and so on.)

• The West developed the benign long-term vision of a “strategic partnership” with Russia but was unrealistic about the time this would take; and clung to the concept when events were clearly moving in the opposite direction. (In documents from 1997 to 2005, the EU proclaimed “common interests and shared values…in particular democracy, human rights, the rule of law and market economy principles.” This was delusional.) The forces of conservatism in Russia, and the time it would take Russia to adjust to the shock of the collapse and the loss of territory, population and status were underestimated. A small group of liberal intelligentsia seized the reins under Yeltsin but never commanded support across the nation. The security forces, military, bureaucracy and ex-Communist apparatchiks regrouped and eventually (from Putin’s second term) regained control.

• Even the liberals intended Russia to dominate the former Soviet hinterland or “near abroad”. They tried to retain a single security zone and economic union. They warned from the early days that Russia would be prepared to intervene with force to defend its interests and ethnic Russians in neighbouring States.  Western policy-makers did not factor this mindset sufficiently into their calculations.

• From 2004, the Putin regime began openly to bully its neighbours. Russia-watchers in the UK and elsewhere speculated about the possible annexation of Crimea (an obvious low-hanging fruit) and possible use of force against Ukraine. They forecast conflict in Georgia long before 2008. But Western Governments were too slow to react to Russia’s changed approach. Continuing to offer “partnership” to a Russia bent on an assertive and confrontational course and rebuilding its military signalled weakness and encouraged opportunistic Russian behaviour. (As Josef Joffe of Die Zeit has recently remarked:“ Putin is at war with us, but we are not at war with him – both the US and Germany are desperately trying to cling to a decent relationship.”)

• We thought Russia would be more heavily constrained by economic weakness, interdependence, the vastly increased interchange of information and people, and the exemplar of the Western model.

• Western governments focused too heavily on Russia and paid insufficient attention to other ex-Soviet States – especially Ukraine. They argued for their rights of self-determination, but did not do enough to help them develop as effective and self-sufficient countries. The EU’s “Eastern Partnership” programme was too little, too late.  Ukraine – a large European country of 45 million people in a vital strategic space – was largely ignored for 20 years after independence and rarely visited by Western leaders. It was misgoverned, slid backwards, and became ever more vulnerable to Russian pressure. The West had no “Ukraine strategy” and woke up too late to its importance. When the EU pressed for the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement, it failed to factor in the likely Russian reaction. The EU, US and Western institutions find themselves propping up a country which is in deep trouble, without a strategy for long-term success.

• Some aspects of NATO enlargement were mishandled. It was known from the outset that this was a highly sensitive issue for Russia. NATO at first moved carefully. The “dual track” policy of developing NATO’s relationship with Russia in parallel with incremental enlargement facilitated the accession of three ex-Warsaw Pact states in 1999. It carried through to 2002, when President Putin (much to the dislike of his generals) reluctantly accepted NATO’s decision to admit the three Baltic States as part of a second wave. However the pressure applied by the then US Administration in 2008 – with the acquiescence of the UK and some European members, but opposed by Germany and others - to give Georgia and Ukraine Membership Action Plan status was, in my view, a huge strategic error. Neither Georgia nor Ukraine was nearly ready for this step. Polling showed that a majority of the Ukrainian population was opposed at that time. The error was compounded by NATO’s Bucharest communiqué (April 2008) which faced in two directions simultaneously. NATO was playing irresponsibly with fissile material. Russia was bound to react very strongly.

What are the options for the West now? How should we deal with the challenge from Russia over the next 5-10 years?

“…suddenly the relationship had crossed a threshold and entered an unexpected but qualitatively different phase…they [US & Russia] were now adversaries, convinced the other side meant to do as much harm to their country as the former’s scheming would allow.” (Professor Robert Legvold, “Return to Cold War”, 2016.)

“Moscow is trying to rattle Washington by projecting its political and military might as the most dangerous crisis develops in US-Russian relations since the Cold War era.”              (Academician Alexei Arbatov, Carnegie Center article, 17 October 2016.)

20. At present Russia appears stable. The Kremlin is not under domestic pressure. The September Duma elections were a success. The economy is sluggish and spending (including on defence) has been cut back, but is coming slowly out of recession. The Russians have absorbed a 10% fall in average real incomes since 2014 without significant social unrest.

21. Although change can happen suddenly in Russia, with little warning, the best assumptions on which to base Western policy are that Vladimir Putin (now 64; in power for nearly 17 years) will opt for a further Presidential term, running to 2024; that he and his associates will keep tight control of the country, and will seek to promote like-minded successors; that the economy will grow slowly (at 1-2% annual GDP growth) and remain uncompetitive (70% is controlled by the State), but under sound macroeconomic management; and that the regime will not risk the more ambitious options for structural reform and modernisation. Putin turned the economic and foreign policies of Russia through 180 degrees between 2003 and 2005. He will not reverse the current strategic direction.

22. On these assumptions, Russia – while militarily weaker than the US and NATO and economically much weaker than Western Europe, the USA or China – will continue to represent a potential challenge and a threat to the stability and security of Europe, and to Western policy in other areas such as the Middle East.

23. How might British and Western policy-makers approach this challenge?

• Analysis: Analysis should be the foundation stone of strategic decision-making. During the Cold War the West invested heavily in all-source analysis of the Soviet Union. Information about today’s Russia is much easier to access, but the Western analytical capacity and coherence has declined and needs to be rebuilt. EU governments proceed from very different starting points in their approaches to Russia.

This is not the Cold War, for many reasons. But we need to define the problem. We need a better common understanding of the Russian adversary – of Russia’s motives, aims, capabilities and points of vulnerability.

We also need to study the Sino-Russian relationship. There is a mutual wariness. Both parties claim more for the relationship than currently exists. They are competitors in Central Asia. Russia and China tend to align their positions in the UN Security Council. How do we assess the risk of a genuine strategic partnership between Russia and China in the years ahead?

• Western cohesion: Russia is exploiting the fragmentation of Europe and the distraction of the United States. I have used the term “the West” in this paper as convenient shorthand for the Euro-Atlantic community, but some would question whether “the West” still exists. The Cold War helped to bind us together. An unpublicised inner directorate of four Western governments (the “Quad”: the USA, the UK, France and Germany) played an important part in guiding Western policy. Restoring a greater degree of Western cohesion (in which Putin’s actions of the past two years have helped) is a critical step if we are to face the challenge down. Given the current condition of Europe and great uncertainty about the stance of the incoming US Administration, that is no easy task.

• The UK’s role? Throughout the Cold War, the UK played a leading role in matters of European security and in bridging the Atlantic. In the diplomacy around Ukraine, we have stood on the sidelines. Brexit has alienated our European allies and, thus far, diminished the UK’s clout also in Washington. As UK alone, we have very little leverage over Russia. Indeed, Russia is now treating Europe as a nullity. We need a hard-headed assessment of the ability and willingness of the UK, preoccupied for years ahead with Brexit, to play a meaningful role.

24. What are the broad strategic options for the West?

25. For a decade and a half, up to 2004, Russia and the West were, broadly, on converging paths. Since then, the paths have diverged sharply to the point where we are now in a potentially dangerous confrontation.

26. We need to develop ways of managing the current challenge until such time (perhaps many years off) as it becomes possible to build a more fruitful and secure relationship. We should also bear in mind that there remain many active areas of interchange between Russia and the West, to an extent that did not exist during the Cold War, especially in business and in non-governmental people-to-people contacts of many kinds.

27. Some of the options (not all mutually exclusive) include:

• Deeper isolation of Russia (a “rogue state”)? While advocated by some Western politicians and commentators, a punitive isolation of Russia would entrench power in the hands of the most hard-line elements, and deprive us of our best instruments for long-term change. It would also risk driving Russia more firmly into the arms of China. It would be expensive and in my view counter-productive.

• Pressure on Russia’s vulnerable points? The Soviet Union was brought down through a combination of internal failure and external pressure. Russia stands alone, without any significant allies. Its economy is more resilient than the USSR’s, but is weak and over-exposed to hydrocarbons and other raw materials. Sanctions are hurting at the margins, especially restrictions on high technology. Eight years of investment have improved defence capabilities (after 25 years of degradation), but the Russian military are vastly overmatched by the US. Heavier investment by Putin in defence would be politically risky because of the cuts required in other sectors. The latest budgetary proposals of the Russian government envisage a reduction in defence spending of around 15% over four years. Russia cannot afford a new arms race. If faced with that prospect, the Russian regime might well respond asymmetrically in ways designed to raise the threshold of risk.

• Peaceful coexistence? Some in Moscow are reviving the old Cold War term. It implies accepting as a fait accompli Russian hegemony in the former Soviet Union.

• Constraint and deterrence combined with pragmatic engagement? Can we build up the existing constraints on Russia, including through NATO, while continuing to engage where mutually beneficial (Iran nuclear and other proliferation threats; trade and natural resources etc)? How do we manage the risks of containing Russian brinkmanship, whether in Syria, Ukraine, Kaliningrad, the Baltic or the Black Sea?

• A “Grand Bargain”? The argument has been made, not only by President-elect Trump but also by some politicians in Europe such as Francois Fillon, that the West should bury its differences with Russia and seek to collaborate in order to defeat terrorism. The superficial attractions are obvious and the idea needs to be debated. However this would be a deal struck on President Putin’s terms. He is demanding that NATO should pull back from measures to defend the Baltic States and other territory close to Russia. His annexation of Crimea and intrusion into the Donbas and Lugansk –  blatant violations of international law – would be accepted as a fait accompli. Russia’s claimed “zone of influence” around its borders would be recognised de facto; as would be its defence of the Assad regime in Syria. A further problem is that President Putin’s definition of a terrorist is not necessarily the same as ours, and Russia’s methods are not ours (Russia having been accused of many breaches of international humanitarian law in Chechnya and Syria).

28. Western strategy needs also to take account of some more specific questions:

• Should the arms control agenda be revived? Putin justifies his actions internally by maintaining that Russia faces an existential threat from the US and NATO (including US plans for TMD and for space-based weapons). Some of his military strategists argue that Russia is already in the first stages of a conflict with the West. The US and Russia are no longer discussing strategic stability. The array of East/West arms control agreements built up since the 1960s is breaking down. The US left the ABMT. CFE is a dead letter. Nunn-Lugar ended in 2013. Russia has just suspended the plutonium agreement with the US. Now at risk are the INF Treaty (1987), New START (2010) and the CTB Treaty (1996).

• What is our Ukraine strategy? What happens to Ukraine will have a critical effect on East/West relations over the next decade. The optimal solution for Ukraine would be to have harmonious political relations and close trading links with its neighbours to both the East and the West. This is not currently an option, but should remain the long-term objective. The Ukrainians have developed a strong sense of nationhood. Over 90% of Ukrainians voted for independence on 1 December 1991, with majorities in favour in every region including Crimea. Russia’s hostility since 2014 has enhanced that sense of nationhood. Ukraine’s right to full independence and self-determination has been supported by the West, but is not accepted in Moscow. For how long can the West keep an ailing Ukraine on life support? Is it feasible for the West to invest in a major effort to turn Ukraine into an effective European State? Is there a middle way – a neutralised Ukraine in harmony with both Russia and the EU, but in neither camp? Or are we going to leave the Ukrainians to their own devices (and therefore as prey for the Russians)? There are no easy options.

• How do we strengthen NATO and consolidate Western Europe? Russia has been probing into soft tissue and meeting little resistance. The European members of NATO are reluctant to invest in defence. Russia is seducing some of the weaker brethren (Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece); on the look out to make mischief in the Balkans; playing on populist movements across the Continent; using disruptive cyber-attacks; and investing heavily in propaganda. How will the incoming US Administration approach NATO? Is the UK willing and able (as in the past) to play a leading role among the European members of NATO in responding to the challenge?

• Is our defence of the Baltic States credible? Does deterrence theory work there? What do the Russians calculate would happen if they triggered the tripwire and the Balts invoked Article 5? Are we doing enough to support the Balts against hybrid or asymmetric attacks?

• How do we balance the challenges to the status quo of both Russia and China? We need to keep the two apart, not drive them together.

• Is Russia building a disruptive position in the Middle East? The Russians are cooperating with Iran in Syria; putting out feelers in the Gulf; and keeping on terms with Israel. What are their objectives?

• Where does Turkey stand? Are we seeing the beginnings of a Putin/Erdogan axis, Syria notwithstanding?

• And Japan? President Putin is about to visit Japan. Where is the Russo-Japanese rapprochement leading?

29. Finally, how do we define our longer-term objectives for Russia? Countering the challenges posed by the current Russian regime is not enough. We need to articulate a credible, positive vision of the relationship we would like to develop when we have worked past the present confrontation. It is important to counter the falsehood that NATO is an existential threat to Russia; and to broadcast, loud and clear, the message that – while standing firmly by our values and the principles of the UN Charter – we are seeking cooperation, not enmity.

30. When the time comes, the West should be ready to address Russian concerns about exclusion from Europe’s security architecture (without buying into Russian aspirations for a “second Yalta” which would recognise Russian hegemony in its claimed “zone of influence”).

31. One option would be to revert to the earlier Western strategy of seeking to integrate Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community. However the time for that may now have passed. Before and during President Putin’s first term (2000-04), Russia tended to look towards Western Europe as an exemplar. The President declared that Russia shared European values and aimed to achieve the standards of EU economies.

32. Liberal Europe is less of a pole of attraction now. Conservative values (influenced by the deeply conservative Russian Orthodox Church) have come to the fore. Russia is keener to stand apart as a separate power, straddling Europe and North Asia.

33. So our long-term objective might best be expressed as:

A cooperative political and close economic relationship between Western and Central Europe and a stable and law-based Russian Federation, living at peace with its neighbours and working in partnership with other leading actors in a law-based international community.

34. My repetition of “law-based” is deliberate, as so many of our recent disagreements with the Russian government have stemmed from the latter’s indifference to the rule of law. A more stable and secure relationship in the future will require agreement to adhere to common sets of rules.

Roderic Lyne

22 November 2016

Biographical note: Roderic Lyne was the British Ambassador to Russia from January 2000 to August 2004. He served previously in Moscow from 1972-4 and 1987-1990; and was Head of the Soviet (and then Eastern) Department in the FCO from 1990-1993. Since retiring from the Diplomatic Service in 2004 he has visited Russia more than 40 times, and was a co-author of “Engaging with Russia: The Next Phase” (Report to the Trilateral Commission, 2006); “Russia: The Challenges of Transformation” (New York University Press, 2011); and “The Russian Challenge” (Chatham House Report, 2015).

November 2016