Written evidence submitted by the National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) (RLS0009)

Introduction

The National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) welcome the opportunity to submit our views as part of TRANSCOM’s inquiry into railway safety.

The RMT organises workers across all front line grades in the GB rail industry including workers at Network Rail, and the train and freight operating companies, working at all grades from driver to station staff.

Executive Summary

• RMT believe that a national, time limited programme of level closing closures should be established.
• RMT believe the Rail Personal Security Group should be re-established
• RMT believe there should be a rail industry investigation into the role of accredited health and safety representatives and the positive impact they can have on health and safety management.
• RMT believe that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to PTI issues and that the industry has recently begun to jointly agree the best way forward.
• RMT believe there are some undoubted benefits to retaining some EU health and safety legislation.

• The Department and Network Rail's progress in implementing recommendations made by the previous Transport Committee on level crossings, and further actions which could be taken to reduce harm at level crossings:

RMT submitted evidence to the Transport Select Committee in September 2013. RMT policy on level crossings is for a national programme of level crossing closures and their replacement with tunnels and bridges where it is decided that the need to cross the railway still remains.

Since Transom’s inquiry Network Rail, out of a total of more than 6000 level crossings have closed a total of 40 level crossings, 52 consultations are in the process of taking place and the company are in the process of advancing closure work prior to consultation on 24 crossings.

RSSB (formerly Rail Safety and Standards Board) note in their most recent Annual Safety Performance Report that safety performance at level crossings is difficult to assess but in the last three reporting years (2012/13, 13/14 and 14/15) there have been marginal improvements in the number of level crossing fatalities. With the current level of fatalities, the industry continues to look at and assess the suitability of allowing pedestrians, cyclists and motorists on to the infrastructure.

RMT believe that if dedicated resources were provided the crossing closure programme could be delivered more speedily. Although the Committee have not previously recommended a number of crossings they would wish to see closed RMT believe that a national, time limited programme of level crossing closures should be established.

• The Department, BTP and BTPA's progress in implementing recommendations made by the previous Transport Committee on security on the railways, the effectiveness of current measures to reduce violent crime, and the appropriateness of the BTP’s current priorities.

Despite a submission from the RMT, the Transport Committee report into Security on the Railway made no recommendations on improvements to safety for workers on the railway.

Although the trend in workforce assaults have shown to be improving over recent years the regular strains put on staff by verbal and physical assault make this an important area of concern that continues to be neglected by the railway industry in recent years.

Until 2013 there was an industry body - the Railway Personal Security Group (RPSG) whose sole focus was the issue of policing, violence and assault on passengers and staff. RPSG was a cross-industry tasking group set up to raise the profile of personal security on the railway and to reduce the impact of assaults on all those who work on or about the railway and passengers. Since RPSG was disbanded industry has not had a single body to look at work to reduce the level of assault on railway workers.

RPSG was disbanded after RSSB’s business review (2014) into the overall management of risk in the rail industry, the work of the group was subsumed into a new group the Train Operations Risk Group despite RMT demanding the industry maintained a group with a focus on the problems of violence and assault among staff and passengers.

RMT members have also had to recently face a campaign by one TOC – Southern/GTR where we have seen social media campaigns, that whatever the intention of the TOC, have resulted in increases of assault and abusive behaviour against RMT members and other railway workers.

Southern/GTR’s first attempt to turn the travelling public against our members was to co-ordinate a variety of public service announcements blaming staff for not being on duty. There were allegations by our members employed in the franchise of bullying, harassment and psychological intimidation by their employer. RMT wrote to both the company and ORR asking them to investigate these allegations.

Southern/GTR then further inflamed the situation by releasing detailed figures on guard/conductor sickness absence into the public arena. The company’s next step was to cancel a whole raft of train services and reduce the number of carriages on trains. This led to severe overcrowding on some services that led to an increase of reports of personal abuse on our members carrying out frontline duties.

Most recently the employer has taken full page advertisements in newspapers widely available on the network calling on members of the public to take matters in their own hands by urging them to “strike back” against the RMT. RMT have evidence of at least two assaults we believe are directly associated with this poorly thought out campaign.

• The effectiveness of the current system of rail safety management, investigation, regulation, enforcement and policing, including the ability of industry and government bodies to coordinate effectively.

Broadly speaking the arrangements for the management of safety in the rail industry are of a high standard.

There are a number of pockets of best practice especially in the sphere of a developing safety culture which is finally beginning to recognise the exemplary safety role trade unions and in particular trade union appointed health and safety representatives play.

The best demonstration of this is within Network Rail. Following on from the decision of the company to insource track maintenance work it was recognised by the company and the RMT that a new Health and Safety Procedure agreement was required and negotiated. Following agreement on the new process in 2012, the RMT reached agreement with the company for the release of a number of Health and Safety Representatives on a full time basis to assist in embedding the new procedures into the company safety structure and assisting the company in the development of their Safety Management System (SMS).

These safety representatives are now seen as essential components of the company’s SMS and central to developing worker led solutions to health and safety problems. Within Network Rail these full time representatives oversee the work of over 700 RMT accredited health and safety representatives.

These representatives also play a central role in the investigation of accidents and incidents and in promoting a culture in which accident investigation is no longer seen as a prelude to disciplinary action and dismissal but as an opportunity to learn the lessons from accidents and take steps towards eradicating repeat cause accidents from the workplace.

RMT is actively engaging with all other operators in the rail industry including the contractor and supply chain community where RMT officers are leading projects within the Track Safety Alliance on improving, amongst other areas, mental health and on developing an improved safety culture within this sector.

RMT are keen to see safety culture and other similar initiatives developed more among the train operating community where we believe we have a vital role to play in raising safety standards across the industry.

• The effect of the result of the EU referendum on the current framework for rail safety and security.

RMT believe that improvements to safety management in the rail industry are more rightly associated with the industry’s response to major accidents and incidents such as Clapham Junction, Southall and Ladbroke Grove rather than improvements in the existing EU legislative process.

Notwithstanding this, in terms of general health and safety provision, RMT believe that no changes should be made to existing legislation that would see a backwards step in worker and passenger safety.

With regards to the EU Fourth Railway package currently under consideration in Brussels there are some elements of this, in particular the move to allow the European Union Agency for Rail (ERA) to issue Safety Certificates and Safety Authorisations which would represent a backward step that would allow Railway Undertakings and Infrastructure Managers to in effect play one Regulator off against another and could lead to a lowering of safety standards.

• The extent to which growing passenger numbers, infrastructure upgrades, and major infrastructure projects may impact on the safety of passengers, workers, and the public.

There is evidence that the rail industry does not handle major projects well in terms of their impact on safety. West Coast Route modernisation a project who’s ultimate goal of 140 m.p.h. trains was never delivered and finally came in 3 years late and more than 3 times over original budget; overcrowding at London Bridge and untold delays in the Thameslink programme; and the Xmas 2014 debacle at Kings Cross and Paddington where over-running engineering work caused massive and unplanned congestion are all examples of industry’s difficulties with major projects. It is essential that the impact of new works is better and more safely managed.

While HS2 is broadly supported by RMT, with the caveat that it should be a publicly owned and publicly accountable railway, its construction will have a major impact on the existing railway, most notably at Euston station where plans are already underway for a major redevelopment.

The risks to workers, passengers and the general public need to be managed better than they are at present.

• The scope for further improving the management of infrastructure and train operation, including strategies for maintaining assets in poor weather conditions and minimising accidents and near misses caused by rail worker fatigue.

In response to six landslips which occurred on Network Rail infrastructure between June 2012 and February 2013, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) undertook a class investigation into earthwork issues related to land neighbouring the railway and to risk management during adverse weather.

RAIB made 5 recommendations to Network Rail on this matter:

• NR should revise its processes and standards for managing earthworks
• NR should improve information on earthworks categorized as marginal
• NR should improve processes for collection of real time intelligence about unusual rainfall and flooding
• NR should formalise it processes for improving management of earthworks
• NR should formalise its processes for dealing with rare circumstances

Looking at the RAIB recommendations response report[1] these recommendations all appear to still be live. Despite this we have recently experienced the highest risk incident in recent years on the rail network at Watford Tunnel on 16th September 2016[2] where a train was derailed after striking a landslip at the entrance to the tunnel.

This incident had the potential to be the most serious, multi fatality rail accident in recent years, a train collision inside a tunnel represents a combination of some of the highest risk factors experienced by the industry. All through this incident the rail staff involved, the driver and, in particular, the guard acted in an exemplarily professional manner utilising the training, skills and knowledge they have been equipped with to reduce the impact of the aftermath of the incident on the passengers onboard the train.

RMT organise an annual conference for our health and safety representatives and each conference takes a particular theme and provides delegates with a dedicated training course on the theme. In 2010 the theme chosen for conference was the subject of fatigue as this issue was recognised as being of particular significance to rail workers.

RMT publish a general guide to fatigue[3] in the transport industry as a whole and a guide to managing fatigue in the rail industry[4] to assist our health and safety reps and other representatives in their dealings with the employers.

Fatigue is a serious issue that needs to be managed effectively. Any Fatigue Risk Management System (FRMS) should include consultation with Union Reps who will look at rosters, time off and risk assessments to ensure that fatigue is being managed properly. The result of not managing fatigue correctly is a reduction of safety which in turn can lead to accidents – some of which can be devastating and fatal.

Work is also underway on developing a third guide to the potential ill-health risks from working long hours and it is our intention to publish these three briefing documents as a comprehensive tool for our representatives to be launched at our next annual health and safety conference in 2017, where once again the theme will be fatigue and the vital role trade union health and safety representatives play in working with the employers to manage and reduce the risks of work that are associated with shift work.

The risks from fatigue can only be reduced when trade unions and employers work together to identify risks from fatigue, designing working patterns and limiting exceedances to agreed hours. Unfortunately, in the rail industry we still have many employers utilising many working hours practices such as zero hours contracts, bogus self-employment, contracting out of auxiliary services and other examples whereby low rates of pay force staff to work longer and longer hours to make ends meet. HM Chief Inspector of Railways, (Director of Railway Safety, ORR) himself recognised the problems when he stated that the working arrangements of zero hours contract staff had “a generally negative effect on the attitudes and behaviours of those involved which is not conducive the development of a safe railway.”

• The adequacy of measures to protect persons at the platform-train interface

RMT would respectfully draw the Committee’s attention to an inaccuracy in the glossary to the Transport Committee publication “The future of rail: Improving the rail passenger experience”. There is a definition of Driver Only Operation that RMT believe is not factually correct. In the report the term is described as:

“DOO—Driver Only Operation, operating system under which train doors are opened and closed by the driver of the train, using cab-mounted cameras and display screens to ensure that it is safe to do so, rather than by an on-board Conductor or Guard.”

A more accurate description of the term and one commonly understood by the industry would be:

“DOO—Driver Only Operation, operating system under which the train driver is the only safety critical person on-board with sole responsibility for both operational and passenger safety.”

Non DOO is when there is a second safety critical person on board in addition to the Driver. Because the role is safety critical passengers are guaranteed that a second person will be on the train. Or in other words DOO means trains can run with just the driver as the safety critical person.

The safety critical role of the guard on the train is much more than simply control of the doors. In its recent publication on the safety critical role of the guard which partially focuses on a number of recent incidents at the platform train interface[5] RMT detail some of the 35 safety critical competencies that are covered by the role of the guard. These competences include an understanding of the risks associated with working on electrified lines, track safety, dealing with a train accident or train evacuation, failed trains, managing incidents, single line working, signalling systems and signalling regulations, station duties and train despatch, speeds, track possessions, train defects, on train equipment, dealing with fires, dealing with suspect packages and route indications.

In recent months the debate around Driver Only Operation has been overly simplified as to what is “safe” or not “safe”. Safety however needs to be considered in respect of the level of risk. So for example if a non DOO service with a guard or a DOO service without a guard runs 500 services without incident then it is objectively the case that both have been safe. But if a DOO service runs and there is an incident, for example a derailment or fire, then it is also objectively the case that having only one person rather than two to deal with the incident and assist passengers will place passengers more at risk, particularly if the driver is incapacitated, trapped or distracted with other duties.

A very recent case in point is the derailment inside Watford Tunnel on 16th September 2016. During this incident the train driver was trapped inside the driving compartment. This meant that although he, the driver, was able to communicate with the signaller, the company control centre and the guard, she, the guard was left in sole charge of placing protection on the line to protect the train from further collision and the safety and welfare of the 150 passengers on-board the train.

In her own words the guard describes the steps she took in carrying out her safety critical functions:

“I started to walk towards the front to check my driver. I was calming passengers down while walking.”

“I put down track circuit operating clips to protect the line my train was on, the up slow.”

“I was making sure all passengers are OK as I made my way to the front.”

“Some passengers pulled the door release on the right side and I informed them the safest place is to stay on the train.”

“I had one man who was suffering back pain but not life threatening and one woman who was having a panic attack….. I made sure she was not alone and looked at when the emergency services arrived.”

If the service had been DOO the guard would not have been on board to reduce the level of risk that passengers were exposed to.

A point which we think it is central for the committee to consider is that there is not a “one size fits all” for train dispatch.  Indeed, to imagine that there is a one size fits all approach within the rail industry to guard’s duties is incorrect; there are many versions of operation whereby a second or safety critical person is retained on board and does not have sole responsibility for door operation.

So despite the Department for Transport seeking to mandate DOO the industry is in reality in many instances seeking to work together to come up with solutions. So for example the majority of TOCs are non DOO and many TOCs also have a middle way where the Driver opens the doors and the Guard closes them. This arrangement importantly maintains the guarantee of a second safety critical person in addition to the driver.  In the last year alone the RMT has made agreements with Scotrail, Virgin East Coast and First Great Western which have guaranteed the second safety critical person on the train. 

Most recently the unions and rail companies attended the first ever industry wide meeting to discuss train dispatch and the platform train interface. The meeting was convened by the ORR with also the RSSB present and allowed for what we believe will be the first of a serious dialogue to seek a consensus on what works best and safely for the platform train interface in any given circumstances.   

One criticism from the rail industry on the RMT’s safety campaign to retain safety critical role of guards has been that guards control of doors creates unnecessary ‘dwell time’ – i.e. the time at the station between the trains arrival and its departure. Industry has argued that putting the guard in control of this operation will reduce the amount of time trains are stationary at platforms. Despite parliamentary questions and Freedom of Information requests not one piece of evidence has been provided to support this argument. Indeed, as highlighted above TOCs have been happy to reach agreement with RMT on a variety of methods of operation.

It is interesting to note that Edward Welsh, Communications Director of the Rail Delivery Group (RDG) appeared on You and Yours on Radio 4 on 22nd September 2016 and was questioned on how the removal of guards would affect access for disabled passengers. His response was in direct contradiction too what RDG tell us about improvements to dwell times when there is DOO operation:

“Let me tell you what the passenger assist protocol is at the moment. If you have a staffed station, then it is for staff to help people on and off a train. If it an unstaffed station then it is for the second person on the train, a guard or a conductor or a supervisor to help somebody on and off. If there only a driver, it is for the driver to help somebody on and off the train.”

“my colleague who worked at the station would then talk to the driver and say we've got somebody on the station who needs assistance and the driver would help that, so it does happen.”

In both of these scenarios, envisaged by RDG it will be necessary for the driver to secure the train, exit from their driving cab, walk along to the passenger requiring assistance, provide the required assistance – e.g. to board or alight the train and then return to the driving cab to continue the journey. There is no conceivable way this process will lead to shorter dwell times. There seems to be no publicly available data on the number of passenger assistance requests that are made but RMT would suggest that this represents a significant number of delay minutes if it is train drivers that are responsible for this process.

• Progress on current initiatives to improve railway worker safety and further actions which could be taken to improve the safety of railway workers, including those individuals working on infrastructure construction and on the tracks, and those exposed to occupational hazards.

RMT fully support the need to improve protection for track workers in the rail industry. The most likely outcome of a track worker being struck by a train or another moving object is death.

The most telling examples of the industry’s inability to work with the unions are firstly the appalling length of time taken by Network Rail to deal with the risks from runaway vehicles and secondly Network Rail’s current programme on Planning and Delivery of Safe Work/Safe Work Leader (PDSW/SWL).

On the night of 15 February 2004, at Tebay on the West Coast Mainline, due to the criminal negligence of one of Network Rail’s sub-contractors, four men, Colin Buckley, Darren Burgess, Chris Waters and Gary Tindall, were killed. All four men were employed on the railway and were members of the RMT. In addition to the deceased, six more members of the gang received physical and psychological injuries.

Following this tragedy, the union campaigned for the development of a warning system to give workers a ‘one last chance’ warning of the approach of such a danger and to persuade Network Rail of the need for such equipment.

That campaign has then taken 12 years to come to fruition causing the Chief Executive of Network Rail, Mark Carne to recently apologise to the survivors and the families of the deceased for the company’s shortcomings in this regard.

The second example is Network Rail’s current PDSW/SWL programme. The ORR challenged Network Rail a number of years ago that there needed to be a programme developed to improve track-worker safety. Network Rail came up with the concept of having, at a local level a ‘single controlling mind’ in charge of the task and the safety of the staff involved in performing the task rather than have task and safety responsibilities being controlled by two individuals.

While RMT fully bought into the concept of ‘single controlling mind’ we differed with the company on how the concept should be developed and rolled out across the industry.

RMT believed that the company’s proposals would evolve over time and should not be set in stone until they had been proved by practical testing in the workplace. We urged the company to conduct widespread trials of the new process before committing to a final procedure. In opposition to this the company pushed ahead with a fully-fledged system, never tested at the ‘coal face’ which proved to be a complete failure.

At every step of the way the RMT urged the company to reconsider their proposals but these entreaties fell on deaf ears. As a consequence, nearly all of the problems that the RMT predicted during the development and initial roll-out of the process have been proven to be correct and the whole mess is now being abandoned.

RMT are currently in talks with the company on how to find a way forward with regard to vitally important issues around track-worker safety but in the meantime Network Rail have spent an estimated £55 million on a new safety system that does not work.

RMT have for many years campaigned that workers’ contribution to developing health and safety is vital. The skills and knowledge that RMT members have about working conditions, the hazards they face and most critically of all how to control those hazards is a deplorably under-utilised resource not only in the railway industry but in the wider world of work.

Rather than seeing health and safety reps as a hindrance or a blockage to health and safety they should be seen as a valuable resource. Health and safety representatives have a vital understanding of work processes and the risks arising from those processes. They also have a clear understanding of what will work in controlling those risks.

The TUC publish evidence[6] on the impact trade unions play in improving health and safety in Britain’s workplaces that includes academic research that proves that organisations with active trade unions have much lower accident/incident rates. RMT argues that if those, current working arrangements could be improved upon then accident rates could be reduced even more.

One example of this approach – Network Rail and RMT working together is the Safe and Efficient Access programme whereby the union has been involved from day one of the programme in designing and improving the system to allow faster and safer access to the infrastructure to enhance renewal of the asset. This programme involved participation and consultation with the union from the very beginning of the programme, listened to and took on board the concerns of front line workers and resulted in a process that has just been awarded the 2016 National Rail Safety Award[7] - the first time in the award’s history a trade union has been nominated for such an award.

This is the way that employers should be using the resources, experience, expertise and skills of their workforce and should be an example of best practice to all industry across the country.

RMT believe there should be a rail industry investigation into the role of accredited health and safety representatives and the positive impact they can have on health and safety management.

• The effectiveness of measures to prevent trespass and fatalities on the railways and other approaches which could reduce the numbers of fatalities and injuries.

Although RMT supports the industry’s approach to dealing with trespass and suicide on the railways our role has recently been downplayed by the national industry group responsible for suicide and trespass. The trade unions had representation on the National Suicide Prevention Group but our attendance has been removed and now the RMT are only briefed on the work of the national group. This is a retrograde step in contrast to the work described above.

October 2016