Written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (ISL0057)
Foreign Affairs Committee Inquiry: Political Islam
It was good to meet you and Committee Members recently to discuss issues related to political Islam. I am writing in response to the subsequent questions that your staff forwarded. Taking those questions in order:
Q1 Some of our witnesses have described to us a particular variety of Islamist group that embraces democracy, non-violence, and a more flexible interpretation of their faith. Ennahda in Tunisia and the PJD in Morocco are some examples that we discussed yesterday.
As I pointed out in the oral evidence session, the term ‘political Islam’, as generally understood, covers a broad spectrum of non-violent movements and ideologies. That is why it would not make sense to have a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy towards political Islam.
I think the right approach is not to try to come up with a specific policy approach to each different strand within political Islam. Rather we should approach it from the perspective of our own values and interests. So we should encourage moves towards more democratic, accountable, pluralistic cultures which respect other faiths and minorities and defend human and civil rights. And we should be prepared to engage with all parties and movements which are prepared to renounce violence and move along the democratic path.
You mention Da’esh (ISIL) and al Qaeda in your question. I think we need to be clear that such violent terrorist groups are beyond the pale in terms of UK engagement. Nor would we include them in our definition of political Islam.
As I said in my oral evidence, we should celebrate when there are free and fair elections in the MENA region in which these groups can participate. And, if Islamist parties embrace the path of peaceful, democratic politics and are prepared to adhere to the rules of the game (as for example in Tunisia and Morocco), then we should applaud that development. At the same time, we should engage with Islamist parties, as we do with secular parties, on issues of concern around governance and human rights. Your question also touches on another important issue, namely the danger of a winner takes all approach. That is a failing, I should stress, which both secular and Islamist parties are prone to and which points to the need to develop a culture of democracy throughout the region. Whichever party comes out on top in an election needs to recognise the need to govern on behalf of all sections of the electorate.
Q2 The FCO’s written evidence said that, “in some cases”, the participation of political Islamist groups in the democratic process was “purely tactical”. Being specific, which groups in which countries did this refer to?
I think I covered this point in my oral evidence, but to clarify: this was not so much a reference to any specific group as to a general concern about the potential motivations of some of those involved in political Islam. The key point is that when political Islamist groups declare that they are going to embrace the democratic process, we should welcome that but remain vigilant as to whether this is a real and lasting conversion. Our approach in this area will always be to judge these parties both by what they say and by what they do.
Q3 Mr Ellwood spoke in yesterday’s session about “the attempted Islamisation of the Egyptian state and society” as having taken place under the FJP. Can you give us some examples of how this Islamisation manifested itself?
In addition to statements made by individual Muslim Brotherhood (MB) leaders in the media, the main accusations that the MB were attempting to Islamise the Egyptian state coalesced around the 2012 constitution. Language stipulating that “the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation” remained unchanged in the Constitutions of 1971 (as amended in 1980), 2012 and 2014. But in 2012, two new articles were introduced that expanded on this language. Article 219 defined the principles of Islamic Sharia as “general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community”. Article 4 said that “al-Azhar’s Council of Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters relating to Islamic Sharia”. By widening the definition of what constituted the principles of Islamic Sharia and setting up an obligation to consult al-Azhar on matters of Islamic Sharia, many feared that the new constitution laid the foundations for a much greater role for Sharia Law in domestic legislation and undermined the traditional position of the Supreme Constitutional Court.
In addition previously existing articles in the constitution on the exercise of rights and freedoms gained addendums stipulating that this must be compatible with the principles of state and society. For example, the proposed article 18 said that “rights and freedoms are to be exercised in a way that is consistent with the components that are set out in the Chapter on the state and Society in this Constitution”, referring back to article 219 on Sharia. Some Egyptians feared that such caveats in Morsi’s proposed new constitution would open the door to more conservative legislation on issues like women’s rights or apostasy. These fears were increased when the Morsi government proposed dropping from the final version new clauses from earlier drafts of the constitution on protecting women from violence, limiting the age of marriage and discrimination.
Furthermore, the Morsi Government proposed instituting reforms of school textbooks; removing a picture of Doria Shafik, a feminist activist who advocated universal suffrage in the 1940s, because she was unveiled. The MB was also accused of doing little to deal with radical attacks on Christians and Shi’a Muslims by groups that acted as self-declared enforcers of public morality.
Q4 In the FCO’s assessment, have Muslim-Brotherhood factions fought in the wars that followed the Arab Spring: in Libya or Syria or Yemen, for example?
In Syria, some elements linked to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood have taken part in armed resistance to the Assad regime (as many other groups have done). In Libya, the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood has not participated directly in the conflict, though many of its members are likely to have links to armed groups. In Yemen, the Islah party (which includes the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood as well as salafi and tribal elements) has not participated directly in the conflict. But Islah is part of the Government of Yemen and Islah-aligned fighters have taken part in military action against Huthi and Salih-aligned forces.
Q5 The Muslim Brotherhood Review’s Main Findings discussed the relationship of the Brotherhood with violence. Why did the Main Findings make no mention of the violence perpetrated against the group, particularly (but not exclusively) in Egypt during the summer of 2013?
That was not part of the Review’s Terms of Reference. The Review, as the then Prime Minister said when commissioning it, was about getting to grips with the background behind MB in order fully to understand the nature of the organisation and its implications for UK interests. That did not require an examination of events in Egypt following the fall of the Morsi Government. However, I do note that the review did not shy away from references to violence against the Muslim Brotherhood. In the Main Findings, there are references to the suppression of the Egyptian MB under Nasser including the arrest, torture and execution of many MB members and to the execution of Sayyid Qutb in 1966.
Q6 What interventions did the Government make with the Egyptian military and the Egyptian Government after the military took power on 30 June 2013, before they cleared the demonstrations with the use of lethal force in August 2013?
The UK Government was in contact with the Egyptian military and Government on a number of occasions following the events of 30 June 2013. We publicly and privately urged all parties to resolve their differences through dialogue and avoid the use of violence and excessive force when dealing with protesters. These private conversations took place at Ministerial and official level as part of a series of meetings urging both sides to negotiate a political settlement.
The then Foreign Secretary, William Hague, spoke to the acting Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mohamed Kamel Amr on 3, 4 and 8 July 2013 and underlined the need for all parties to avoid violence and to reach a political settlement. He spoke to Vice President El Baradei on 31 July, to welcome his efforts in de-escalating tensions and to ask how the UK could support.
The then Foreign Office Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, Alistair Burt, visited Cairo from 24-25 July. During his visit he met with a range of Interim Government figures, including Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy and Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Minister Amin El-Mahdy as well as members of the Muslim Brotherhood and members of the 30 June protest movement. In these meetings he urged all sides to take steps to de-escalate in order to avoid violence.
Philip Hammond, the Defence Secretary at the time, spoke with the then Minister of Defence and Head of the Egyptian Military, General Al-Sisi, to urge restraint in any actions to clear protesters. The then Defence Senior Advisor Middle East, Lt Gen Simon Mayall, visited Cairo from 21-22 July and met with key military interlocutors. In these meetings he raised the issue of the protesters around Raba'a Allawiya and made the case that it was in the Egyptian armed forces interests to avoid violence. The then FCO Political Director, Sir Simon Gass, reiterated these messages with the Egyptian Chargé to London on 9 August.
The Egyptian National Fact Finding Committee set up to investigate the events following Morsi’s removal have not yet released their full report. So far, a 57-page executive summary of its conclusions has been released. In December 2014, President Sisi stated his commitment to publishing the report in full. The UK has encouraged the Egyptian Government to release the report in full and has stressed the importance of accountability for the deaths that took place during the clearances at Raba’a. I personally raised this issue with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on 9 September 2015.
I hope you find the answers above helpful in finalising your Inquiry. I look forward to reading your report when published.
September 2016