Written Evidence Submitted by Fr. Atta Barkindo

I am writing in my capacity as a PhD Research Student at SOAS, University of London and the founder of the Africa Conflict and Security Analysis Network (ACSAN). I have been researching for the past 10 years on the issues of history, memory and resistance in Africa, looking at the transformation of conflicts and terrorism, with specific reference to the evolution of the Boko Haram sect.

The drivers of the Boko Haram and Fulani Herdsmen Conflict in Nigeria

Since Nigeria’s return to multi-party democracy in 1999, ordinary citizens have shifted their loyalty away from the central state to ethno-regional, religious and informal networks to protect community interests and to contest power with the state. Recently, Boko Haram and the Fulani Herdsmen have been carrying out series of violent attacks against innocent civilians in the northeast and the middle belt region respectively.

Since the emergence of Boko Haram, the group has killed over 20, 000 people and displaced more than 2.2 million people mostly in Nigeria’s northeast and around the Lake Chad border region. Boko Haram’s conflict is driven by the salafi-jihadi ideology which argues that literal and total submission to the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet is the truest form of Islam. Therefore the group rejects everything un-Islamic, and calls for a pure Islamic environment. In terms of mobilisation, radicalisation and recruitment, Boko Haram exploits the memory and historical narrative of Islam, the Kanem-Borno Empire, and corruption in Nigeria, to present a salafi-jihadi ideology that fits local context. They present the Nigerian state as a product of western culture which undermines Islam and must be rejected. Using this narrative Boko Haram attracted over 280, 000 followers (not members) around the Lake Chad border region before it turned violent.

Another factor that drives the Boko Haram conflict is the region’s geography defined by territorial structure, religion and language. The territory has vast and sparse forests, surrounded by unprotected borders and the high Mandara Mountains which can easily support guerrilla warfare. The area is predominantly Muslim with high regard for Islamic scholars. Yusuf and Shekau the leaders of Boko Haram, both eloquent in Arabic, transcribed most of their sermons and lectures into Kanuri, the region’s dominant language, spoken around the Lake Chad border region. Using religion, Boko Haram recruits most of its members from within the region. The region provides the space and the local networks, fishing unions, market groups and farming communities for mobilisation and recruitment. Using the Kanuri language and the local knowledge of the area, Boko Haram members ensure the training of new recruits. Thus, the language, religion and region were co-opted by Boko Haram as channels for communications, indoctrination, infiltration and operations. Additionally, weak cross-border institutions of law and order in the region around Lake Chad has allowed the Boko Haram conflict to fester.  According to the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Boko Haram uses about 1,487 illegal routes to have access to different parts of the region to conduct illegal businesses in the Lake Chad region. They use these routes to smuggle in arms and participate in organised crime to raise funds. Sometimes these arms are transported in sacks of beans and grains, using donkeys and camels, with the help of Kanuri local businessmen.

The Fulani herdsmen have destroyed over 700 churches, thousands of homes, farmlands and property belonging to indigenous farming communities. There are three significant factors to be considered. The first is environmental degradation. The lower Sahel and Sudan Savannah ecologies of Northern Nigeria has suffered immense environmental degradation over the past decades. This led to severe decline in rainfall, excessive desertification, droughts and reduced food production. One of the groups that have suffered most is the herdsmen who have been forced to move in search of grazing fields for their cattle in north-central and southern Nigeria. Second, undocumented internal and cross-border migrations added to an already increasing human populations in the host regions. As populations increased, there is incessant demand for land, water, space and grazing fields. Both farmers and herdsmen are forced to compete for land, leading to violent conflict. Another dimension is the political failure to enact and implement laws that provide designated ranches for grazing without taking away fertile land from local farmers who depend on subsistence farming. The third factor is link to the exploitation of primordial variables. As internal and cross-border migration increased, communities manipulate the indigene settler ideology, explaining their exclusive rights to the land based on historical and primordial factors. This further adds to the conflict. Finally, other existential factors such increasing rate of youth unemployment, political, economic and cultural exclusion, poverty and corruption must also be taken into consideration.

What Can DFID Offer?

Recognising the limited resources available compared with the enormous work in Nigeria, DFID can assist Nigeria in three areas: The first and most significant area is that of education. There is a need for DFID to carry out a comprehensive study of the education sector in Nigeria and assist the country implement reforms in areas of critical education. This will involve identifying northern states with more Almajiri (Qur’anic) school systems than secular primary and secondary schools. It also means helping the government include critical thinking as part of the education curriculum. In particular, to help reform schools’ physical infrastructure in villages and communities most affected by the conflict and to give children of these communities another opportunity for a better future.

Again, DFID should pay close attention to the issue of climate change and environmental degradation. The northern region has a large number of illiterate people, more than 80% of which are employed primarily in agriculture, fishing and pastoralism. Climate change and environmental degradation is likely to be Nigeria’s next ‘Boko Haram’. With lack of investment, job opportunities and economic growth, many local people depend on the land for everything. At the moment, desertification caused by both natural and human factors have added to the level of drought, hunger, internal migration, cross-border mobility and competition over land and resources. DFID could conduct research to classified areas under threat from climate change. It will identify primary forms of intervention in terms of enlightenment campaign and tree planting interventions. The UK government could even establish a special institute for the study of climate change and conflict in Africa, located in northeastern Nigeria.

Finally, DFID could assist the Nigerian government carry out a post-conflict security sector reforms. During the Boko Haram conflicts, different groups of people have been co-opted to fight alongside the Nigerian security forces. This includes the Civilian Joint Task Force, local vigilantes and hunters. Most of these ‘informal security agents’ belong to different ethnic groups, religious networks and communities. However, they have been armed and exposed to the conflict. There is need to carry out a comprehensive study of these groups to assist the Nigerian government draw up a legal framework for demobilising them. Alternatively, those who are qualified could be integrated into the main stream security forces, otherwise they could be targeted for reprisal attacks or even recruitment by terrorist groups such as Boko Haram.