Written evidence from Guney Yildiz, Turkish and Kurdish Affairs Analyst (ISL0044)
◦ For practical policy purposes, it is useful to classify political Islamist groups as either democratic Islamists or extremist jihadists. The term "democratic Islamists" does not necessarily mean that groups that fall under this category are truly democratic. Instead, it means that these groups prefer to engage with or make use of democratic mechanisms such as taking part in elections in their struggle for power. In this regard, they share a common political understanding with the West, which makes it easier to negotiate with them. However, militant Islamist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas also engage with democratic processes but could resort to violence and other anti-democratic means at the same time. For the extremist jihadist pole, the most aggressive and militant group throughout modern times is the so-called Islamic State (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria and its ally Boko Haram in Nigeria. For the “democratic Islamists”, Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has been regarded as one of the best examples.
◦ The novelty about ISIL's political strategy is that it didn't seek to take over existing state structures through a revolution but attempted to establish its own state in areas where the control and legitimacy of the states, in this case, Iraq and Syria are weaker.
◦ Another useful categorization of the political Islamist groups is between those who seek to Islamicize their societies from the bottom up through educational activities for the youth and charity activities for the poor, or from the top down through state power or taking control of certain areas within a weakened nation-state. However, it should be noted that most political Islamist groups employ both means if and when they are available.
◦ Political Islam, even in its forms that favours a return to the beginning of Islam, is a modern phenomenon which has been influenced by secularist ideologies as well as the religion of Islam. Both democratic Islamists and extremists filled in the political vacuum in their respective countries left by the failure of secularist nationalist and socialist movements who failed to live up to their promises of bringing prosperity and true national independence. It has been largely the same resentment towards among people in the Muslim countries that took on the colours of secularist nationalism, socialism and then Islamism. Modern secularist concepts and ideologies combined with a religion such as Islam, which doesn't have a broadly accepted central authority and doesn't recognise a separation between politics and religion, can lead to at times authoritarian or totalitarian political projects.
◦ Turkey's ruling AK Party had been regarded as one of the best examples of a democratic Islamist movement. In its first couple of terms, the party's rule was broadly hailed in the West as an example of how Islam and democracy can live together. However, the party's rule has come under severe criticism from the West, as the foreign policy preferences diverged significantly concerning Israel, Egypt and later in Syria. AK Party's crackdown on dissent in Turkey also came under criticism from within Turkey and from the West.
◦ AK Party rose to power in 2002, largely because of the failure of the military-bureaucratic Kemalist establishment in integrating Kurds and the pious Islamic Turks in the periphery into the political centre. Being aware of this shortcoming, Turkish military establishment, following the military coup in 1980, adopted an approach called Turkish-Islamic Synthesis against the threat from the Turkish and Kurdish left wing opposition. The rise of AK Party and its political predecessors also came off the back of this shift in the policy and the party was initially encouraged and tolerated by the military-bureaucratic establishment.
◦ During the first 8 to 10 years, the party introduced significant political reforms that led to the launch of EU membership negotiations and broadened political freedoms, but it failed to undertake structural reforms that would transform the authoritarian aspects of the Turkish politics into a democratic one. Instead, the party resorted to the same authoritarian features when it felt threatened by street protests, judicial cases or elections. Turkish political system was set up by the Kemalist establishment in a way that allows the establishment undermine the democratically elected governments through presidency, judiciary and in the last instance by the military. For the first time in Turkey's history, one political party managed to bring under its control most of the state structure. This has worried some urban secularists and the Kurds that with such power the AK Party can transform the society in its image. AK Party hasn't undertaken many steps in the name of Islamicising the society in the first two terms of its power. Seeking to use Islamism to legitimise its actions came later for the AK Party. President Erdogan started using a language considered sectarian from 2010 onwards in reference to his rival, the leader of Republican People's Party (CHP) and about Syrian civil war from 2012 onwards. The party also hugely increased the number of official religious schools across the country.
◦ Another significant current of Islamism in Turkey is the movement led by Turkish Islamic cleric Fethullah Gulen. Organised since the 1960s, the movement emphasised that it isn't a political movement and that it won't establish a political party. Its strategy was Islamicizing the society from the bottom up through educational activities. However, the group actively sought to infiltrate into security and civilian bureaucracy and largely succeeded in that especially under the AK Party rule. Having a very strong influence across the bureaucracy, along with a media support, the group helped the AK Party in sidelining the military. When their alliance with the AK Party broke down, the group then tried to use its influence against the AK Party. So far, the AK Party seems to have stopped the influence of Gulenists by allying with ultranationalists and the military. Gulen movement is a good example of an Islamic movement which emphasised to transform the society from the bottom up but resorted to top-down measures when it felt necessary.
◦ In the case of Turkey, Turkish nationalism provides a strong ground for an alliance between Islamists and secularists. Turkey had been isolated from the Arab and Muslim world for almost a century and developed as a nationalist country rather than a universalist Islamist one seeking to unite the Islamic Ummah. There are no revolutionary Islamist figures like Sayyid Qutb in the Turkish context. The primary aim of Turkish Islamism since its inception is to protect the state, initially the Ottoman Empire and then the Turkish Republic. That is why Turkish Islamists were easily mobilised against the Turkish left, the Greeks, Armenians and the Kurds when the future of the state was challenged.
◦ Jihadist extremism has weak roots in Turkey. The Islamic milieu was dominated by much less aggressive Sufi movements and non-rebellious religious orders (tariqats). However, since 1990's there have been several active radical Islamist movements in the country. Some of these groups, like Turkish Islamic Jihad, which was active in the 1990s, and Turkish Hezbollah, which did not target the Turkish state but mainly the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), also received support from Iran. Turkish military also tolerated Hezbollah's violent crimes, for its anti-PKK activities. One of the rare militant extremist Islamist movements born inside Turkey without foreign support was called Islamic Great East Raiders Front (IBDA-C). The group is responsible for carrying out a chain of bomb attacks and political assassinations throughout the 1990s.
◦ With the rise of the AK Party, the visibility of smaller radical groups was largely diminished. Burning American and Israeli flags during small protests following Friday prayers outside some mosques in Istanbul was used to be a weekly phenomenon in Turkey. This has largely faded after the AK Party came to power. Radical Islamist and militant groups in Turkey find it more difficult to challenge the AK Party government due to its Islamic roots.
◦ However, further Islamisation of the country under AK Party is helping radical groups to broaden their support base and will make it easier to mobilise masses to achieve their political goals when they think the political environment is ripe.
◦ Furthermore, the rise of ISIL, Al Nusra Front and other Islamist groups in Syria gave a significant boost to jihadism within Turkey. Apart from the thousands of Turks who travelled to join extremist organisations in Syria, many more stayed in Turkey to organise support for jihadists in Syria or organised as sleeper cells. Indeed, some of the suicide bombers used by ISIL to carry out attacks in Turkey were Turkish citizens radicalized in the last few years. ISIL supporters in Turkey that I have interviewed displayed a strong understanding of a sophisticated ideology and political tactics of ISIL indicating that they went through an indoctrination programme.
◦ AK Party's Islamism is more visible in its foreign policy than its domestic policy. The party's uncritical support for Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, its political support for Hamas or support for radical Islamist groups in Syria came under heavy criticism from the West. However, it shouldn't mean that the AK Party inclined to support Islamist groups just because of their Islamist roots. The party also regarded, albeit mistakenly, that allying with Islamist groups during Arab Spring would be in favour of Turkish national interests.
◦ The UK has a strong potential to influence political developments at the government level in Turkey and the Middle East. The image of a British diplomat in Turkey, Iraq or Egypt is stronger than diplomats from any other European countries. However, recently, relationships with Turkey were largely maintained via EU rather than bilaterally. I argue that improving the bilateral relationship with Turkey would give the UK more leverage and understanding of the political developments in the country with regard to the possibility of the rise of a hostile form of political Islam and concerning the Turkish government's strategy towards Syria and the Islamist movements in the Middle East.
◦ When covering or analysing Turkey, the UK media and the UK foreign policy circles are getting their information mostly from Turkish urban liberal elites who painted an overly positive picture with during the first couple of terms of AK Party and then started condemning the party very quickly following the government's breaking their alliance with liberal figures. As both pictures were not accurate, a better way to understand Turkish Islamist milieu is to engage with Islamist intellectuals and political figures themselves.
◦ The UK maintains a strong security cooperation with Turkey and this cooperation could be utilised to engage with Turkey at a deeper level.
◦ It should also be noted that, despite the rhetoric of universalism in Islamic movements, most of these groups still act as primarily nationalist movements, and their foreign policies are determined according to their national interests rather than their religious perspectives. This approach could help understanding why Iran gives or used to give support to anti-Shia Islamist groups in Turkey, Iraq and Syria when its national interests dictate such an approach.
◦ Lack of coherent planning and understanding of the situation and movements in Libya and Syria caused the most significant problems for the UK and her allies. In Libya, the aftermath of the Muammar Qaddafi regime saw a rise in extremist jihadist groups; and in Syria the uprising quickly came to be dominated by the extremist groups. Apart from Syria and Iraq, ISIL has a strong presence in Libya too.
◦ Relationship with Egyptian government under President Mohammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was also problematic.
◦ The rise of Islam is in correlation with the collapse of the states, like Iraq, while in countries like Egypt where state structure is supported by a strong army, radical Islamism is kept under check.
◦ I don’t predict any state espousing “political Islam” in the short term given the political failures of Islamists in bringing stability after the Arab spring. However, in my opinion regions like Caucasus and Central Asia could see a further rise in jihadist extremist presence.
◦ Apart from democracy and human rights, promoting political stability should also be a guiding principle for the FCO especially given how the extremist groups benefited from the turmoil created by the Arab Spring. The upheavals in the region also caused Western Allies such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey to turn from stabilising forces into increasingly destabilising forces in the region. Lack of political stability also makes formerly democratic governments run by Islamists into unpredictable regimes.
◦ The best way to ensure a working democracy is to promote a strong liberal opposition to limit the possible excesses of an authoritarian government. Supporting secularist nationalist elites that were replaced by the political Islamist governments would only legitimise more authoritarianism on the side of the Islamist governments.
◦ Supporting groups deemed 'moderate Islamists' against extremist groups proved to be a failure and resulted only in helping further Islamicizing countries and communities thus broadening the possible support base for extremist groups.