Written evidence from Sondos Asem (ISL0041)

Independent scholar, formerly: Foreign Media Coordinator at the office of President Mohamed Morsi, Egypt.

Executive summary:

i)                    This submission addresses the terms of reference of the Political Islam Inquiry as announced by FAC in March 2016, with a focus on Egypt.

ii)                 I argue below that the revolution in Egypt wound up becoming essentially a power struggle between Muslim Democrats and the military regime, rather than a struggle over the religious or secular identity of Egypt.

iii)               The evidence presented here shows that the track record of Muslim Democrats in Egypt indicates their respect for the democratic process, their resilience and pragmatism, and their ability to ally with their secular counterparts around common non-ideological political platforms.

I. MUSLIM DEMOCRATS IN THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION

1. In the context of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Muslim Democrats are parties and groups that took part in the peaceful 2011 revolution and supported its democratic demands, while emphasising that Islamic values inspired their political platforms.
2. The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), Al-Wasat Party, and the Strong Egypt Party have emerged as the largest three Muslim Democratic parties in Egypt after the revolution.
3. The majority of Muslim Democrats that emerged after the revolution are now political prisoners.
4. I will focus here on the FJP, since it represented the largest Muslim Democratic party in post-revolutionary Egypt.
5. The FJP was the first attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood to establish an official political party reflecting its ideology.
6. The FJP won the votes of the majority of Egyptians in five elections after the revolution for a number of reasons. The first is the popularity of MB and its wide reach as the largest civil society organisation in Egypt. Secondly, the FJP contested elections as part of a cross-ideological alliance, including secular parties and Coptic Christian candidates, reflecting the spirit of the 2011 revolution. Third, the rest of the parties failed to convince the electorate of their pro-revolution agenda and focused instead on trying to discredit the FJP and its political figures.
7. A number of analysts wrongly repeat the historical fallacy that the FJP “hijacked the revolution.” The truth is that members and supporters of the MB were among the first to join the Tahrir protests on 25 January. The MB as an organisation wisely chose not to announce its official backing for the protests because that would have labelled the protesters as Islamists and thus would have given the Mubarak regime a pretext to discredit the revolution.
8. As a revolutionary myself, I took part in a protest on 25 January in front of the High Judicial Council in Cairo near Tahrir Square. The protest was organised by “The Popular Parliament”, an initiative by parliamentary candidates who had been cheated out of their seats in the notorious elections of 2010. Mid-ranking leaders of MB, such as Mohamed Beltagy and Hazem Farouk, protested side by side with liberal figures such as Ayman Nour. I took part in a women-led march that was probably the first to enter Tahrir Square after challenging security cordons. I could recognise many faces of MB and non-MB friends on that day. But that was not relevant for us. We were there as Egyptians irrespective of our backgrounds.
9. In his memoirs on the revolution,[1] the now-jailed MB leader Essam El-Erian explains that the MB intentionally asked its top leaders not to show up on 25 January, but encouraged younger members to participate. The regime recognised the power of MB to mobilise. This is why it arrested 34 of its highest-ranking leaders on 27 January prior to the mass protests scheduled for 28 January-The Friday of Rage. One of those arrested was Dr Mohamed Morsi who was later elected as president of Egypt.
10. The 2011 revolution represented a remarkable example of the unity of various forces from across the political spectrum around a common agenda, namely the overthrow of Mubarak’s dictatorial regime.
11. After Mubarak’s overthrow, polarisation started with the debate over the 19 March referendum that was primarily designed to determine the roadmap of the democratic transition. Disagreement amongst the political forces was mainly on whether to start the transition with a Constituent Assembly appointed by the military council (SCAF), or to start by electing a Parliament that would then be tasked with nominating members for a Constituent Assembly. The MB sided with the second option, namely electing a parliament first. The majority of voters in the referendum chose to start with parliamentary elections. That triggered accusations that the MB was seeking to dominate the constitutional writing process. However, many observers argued the opposite. [2]
12. In its founding statement in June 2011, the FJP identified itself as a “Civil” political party rather than an “Islamist” one.
13. The party elected Mohamed Morsi (an academic and former parliamentarian) as its president, and Rafiq Habib (a Coptic Christian intellectual and activist) as its vice president.

II. MUSLIM DEMOCRATS AND SECULARITSTS

14. When the date for parliamentary elections was set and parties started campaigning for their platforms, the FJP shunned ideologically exclusive coalitions and chose to contest elections as part of a coalition with liberal and leftist forces.[3]
15. On the eve of parliamentary elections in 2011, three major electoral coalitions emerged: The Islamic Alliance-a strictly Islamist coalition, consisting of Salafist parties; the Egyptian Bloc-a strictly secularist alliance; and the Democratic Alliance for Egypt-a cross-ideological alliance, consisting of the MB’s FJP, the liberal Al-Ghad, the leftist Al-Karama along with other parties from across the political spectrum.
16. The parliamentary elections were held on 28 November 2011 until 15 February 2012 with a voter turnout of 54% (30 million people) of all registered voters.
17. The Democratic Alliance garnered 44.9% of the vote. The Islamist bloc led by the Salafi Al Nour party received 25% of the votes. The remainder of the votes went to the Liberal Al Wafd party (7.5%), the Egyptian Bloc (6.7%) and a coalition of young revolutionary activists (1.6%).
18. Elections of Al Shura council (the Upper House) led to almost 90% victory for predominantly Islamist parties (MB and Salafis).
19. The Carter Centre commented on the results saying they “appeared to broadly represent the will of Egypt’s voters.”
20. The results reflected the overall sentiment of Egyptians, as reflected by a 2011 Gallup Poll, which stated that the majority of Egyptians rejected theocratic rule but supported “a representative government where religious principles guide the democratic process.”[4]
21. The results, however, came as a shock to a number of stakeholders in Egypt. Secular parties felt wary of the dominance of Islamist parties over the legislative bodies. On the other hand, the ruling SCAF and the Mubarak era deep state felt threatened by the rise of an organized and popular MB party.
22. An ideal scenario, I would argue, would have been a united civilian pro-democracy front that reflected all the parties that took part in the revolution or supported its demands. The Democratic Alliance was an attempt towards that end. But a number of MB-opponents, from both the secular and Salafi camps, refused to ally with the FJP and preferred to campaign for a distinct ideological agenda.

III. SCAF RULE

23. The military capitalised on that polarisation and attempted to derail and delay the democratic transition in a number of ways.
24. First, despite its earlier promise to end the transitional phase by August 2011, it postponed parliamentary elections until November 2011, which was seen as an extension of SCAF’s control over the legislative and executive powers.
25. Second, SCAF was accused of undemocratic tendencies by unilaterally introducing amendments to the March Constitutional Declaration without a referendum.
26. Third, under SCAF’s rule, military and police forces resorted to excessive use of force to disperse anti-military protests.  On March 9, many revolutionary activists were arrested and many reported that they were tortured. At least 150 men and women were referred to military tribunals after arrest.
27. Moreover, SCAF oversaw a horrific massacre against Coptic Christian protesters, known as the “Maspero Massacre”.
28. On 9 October 2011, a number of peaceful Egyptian demonstrators, predominantly Coptic Christian, staged a sit in in front of the Maspero state television building in Cairo calling for the dismissal of the SCAF-appointed Governor of Aswan due to his failure to bring to justice those responsible for the demolition of St. George Church in Merinab village in Aswan on 30 September. They condemned the fact that he even justified the attacks. [5]
29. At least 29 Coptic Christian citizens were reportedly killed on that day.
30. According to video evidence compiled by Human Rights Watch, “at least two and perhaps as many as three APCs drove into the crowd and crushed protesters.”[6]
31. Human Rights Watch criticized the authorities’ failure to investigate the incidents:

“This failure to investigate and prosecute perpetuates official policies of the Mubarak era, when authorities also failed to provide a remedy to victims of sectarian violence, resorted to extra-legal settlements to resolve disputes, and played down periodic outbursts of sectarian violence as private disputes unrelated to religious differences.”[7]

“The generals seem to be insisting that they and only they investigate the Maspero violence, which is to ensure that no serious investigation occurs…The military has already tried to control the media narrative, and it should not be allowed to cover up what happened on October 9.”[8]

32. A signal of SCAF’s attempt to impose its will, undemocratically, on the forthcoming constitution was manifested by the so-called Selmi Document. On 1 November 2011, the vice-president of the liberal Wafd party, Ali Al Selmi and the vice president of the Supreme Constitutional Court judge Tahani al-Gebali proposed a set of supra-constitutional principles allegedly designed to preserve the secular nature of the forthcoming constitution. However, opponents of the documents rightly expressed concerns about two articles that explicitly immunized the military from future oversight by any elected parliament. The document proposed that 80 out of 100 members of the constituent assembly be appointed by SCAF rather than elected.
33. Understandably, the proposal was met by fierce opposition from the FJP and the Democratic Alliance, as well as secular revolutionary youth groups like April 6.[9]
34. In response to the proposal, the Democratic Alliance called for mass protests on 18 November, also known as “the Friday of Protecting Democracy.”[10] By the end of the day, the Democratic Alliance announced the end of the protest and evacuated Tahrir Square. The statements by leaders in the coalition encouraged participants to focus their efforts on the parliamentary elections, due a week later, as the most effective means of ending SCAF’s rule. A number of activists and families of revolution martyrs, however, preferred to remain camped in the square and to stage an open-ended sit-in.
35. The following day, 19 November 2011, the SCAF regime committed another massacre against peaceful protesters near Tahrir square. It took place as military police forcibly dispersed the sit-in and attacked protesters will live bullets, leaving at least 50 dead.
36. The tragedy of Mohamed Mahmoud was both about the horrific loss of life and the polarisation that followed the massacre mainly because of the MB’s decision not to participate in the protests on that day. Accusations of betraying the revolution and the revolutionaries and focusing on electoral campaigning were systematically levelled against the MB by their opponents since that day. The accusations were mainly that MB had struck a deal with the ruling SCAF and had favoured electoral victories over the revolution.
37. I would argue, however, that these accusations were unfounded and only served to divide the revolutionary ranks, thus benefiting the military. The FJP’s rationale was that a perpetual cycle of protests without a proper transition to elected democratic institutions would only derail the transition, thus prolonging the military’s hold on power.
38. The military, however, outmanoeuvred the FJP by attempting to disband every elected institution using its influence on some Mubarak-era judges.
39. For example, on 10 April 2012, shortly after its formation in March 2012, an administrative court decision dissolved the Constituent Assembly which had been elected from within the two chambers of parliament. The court cited the unconstitutionality of the way members were selected. The verdict explained that parliamentarians could not elect themselves, according to a 1994 Supreme Constitutional Court ruling. This came as a challenge to the parliament’s decision on 17 March to assign 50 seats in the constituent assembly to MPs.
40. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), “this decision was viewed as reflecting institutional competition in the transition process, and as evidence of the Egyptian judiciary being aligned with the military and anti-Islamists.” [11]
41. Alarmed by the results of the first round of presidential elections, and what the army perceived as a direct challenge to its grip on power by Morsi and the MB-dominated parliament, The Supreme Constitutional Court disbanded the Parliament on 13 June 2012. Accordingly, the SCAF seized legislative powers from the disbanded parliament only a few weeks from Morsi’s election to the presidency.
42. Three days later, on 17 June, SCAF issued a constitutional declaration that effectively stripped the forthcoming president of a wide range of powers, including his role as supreme commander of the armed forces, thereby subordinating the presidency to the army. It prohibited the president from taking any decisions related to the work of the armed forces. It also reinstated martial law, granting the army the power to detain civilians. Moreover, the declaration granted the military the power to scrap any articles in the upcoming constitution, and the power to form a new Constituent Assembly if “any barriers” emerge. Furthermore, SCAF added a provision that grants the Supreme Constitutional Court the power to accept or reject controversial articles in the constitution.
43. A report by the New York Times on July 3, 2012 revealed the role of Mubarak-era judges in dissolving the elected parliament and the assembly. According to David Kirkpatrick, New York Times Cairo Bureau Chief, the vice-president of the Supreme Constitutional Court played a significant role in cementing the military’s grip on power and delaying the democratic transition. According to the report, Judge Tahani al-Gebali “advised the military not cede authority to civilians until a constitution was written.”
44. The counterrevolutionary tendencies of the military and the judiciary led President Morsi to adopt a confrontational approach once he assumed power.
45. President Morsi challenged the military and their allies in the judiciary by reinstating the dissolved parliament on 8 July 2012. This triggered a backlash by Mubarak-era judges led by Ahmed al-Zend (who later became Sisi’s Justice Minister) and the Supreme Constitutional Court.
46. On 9 July, the Supreme Constitutional Court announced it rejected President Morsi’s decree, dismissing it as “an unacceptable interference in the work of the court.” 
47. SCAF defended the court’s response, arguing that the army was “confident that all state institutions will uphold all previous constitutional declarations” and that its decision to dissolve the parliament was no more than an implementation of a court decision.
48. Eventually, President Morsi’s decree was not implemented.
49. The inability of President Morsi to safeguard elected institutions led him to resort to the controversial November 2012 decree that granted his decisions temporary immunity from judicial oversight to protect the Constituent Assembly from dissolution until a referendum is held. This step has been consistently cited by his opponents as evidence of his dictatorial tendencies. However, numerous scholars, such as Noah Feldman of Harvard University,[12] justified the decree as a necessary step for Egypt’s democratic transition. In response to protests against the decree, President Morsi rescinded it.
50. The above examples show that the real struggle in the Egyptian transition was not simply ideological, but was a power struggle between pro-democracy forces and an entrenched undemocratic military regime.
51. Understanding the motives behind the key decisions taken by President Morsi is necessary not just for historical accuracy but also to forecast the future of Muslim Democrats in Egypt.
52. Muslim Democrats, judging by their track record in the revolution and under the Morsi presidency, were not simply preoccupied with the “Islamisation” or “Brotherhoodisation” of Egypt.[13] The coup against President Morsi was perhaps a result of his persistent (but failed) attempts to challenge a deeply entrenched military regime.
53. Muslim Democrats emerged as “post-Islamist” movements that deemphasised ideology and allied with secular democrats.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office should:

1. Condemn the counter-revolution in Egypt and support the demands of democratic forces, especially the unconditional release of all prisoners of conscience, including President Mohamed Morsi and his aides.
2. Reject attempts by the military and its allies to label the MB or other Muslim Democratic parties as “terrorists,” or to erroneously conflate them with violent extremist groups.
3. Recognise that Political Islam in Egypt cannot be objectively judged unless its adherents are released from prisons and allowed to participate freely in politics and society.
4. Recognise that forecasting the development of political Islam in Egypt should be informed by how different political Islamic movements reacted to the dynamics that followed the Arab Spring and the 2013 military coup.

April 2016