Written evidence from Alison Pargeter, Researcher and Middle East Analyst (ISL0039)

•Relationship with democracy:  Have political Islamists upheld the democratic system and sought, used, or transferred power in a democratic manner?

While it is difficult to generalise about political Islamists given the specificities of each particular group or movement, for the most part those political Islamist movements that belong to or have sprung out of the Muslim Brotherhood wasati tradition have broadly upheld the democratic system, at least in a procedural sense. In Tunisia for example An-Nahda has shown a willingness to work within the confines of the democratic system and also to cede power, albeit somewhat begrudgingly, when it was clear that it could not continue. In Morocco the PJD has also displayed a willingness to uphold the democratic system.

The Egyptian experience is more difficult to assess because the Brotherhood was never fully in control of the political arena. From the outset it was confined by its relationship to the military, which remained a key force throughout its time in power. As such, the Brotherhood came to power with one hand already tied behind its back and it soon found that it was unable to rule. Indeed, Egypt’s democratic experience was crippled from the start as the military and the Brotherhood battled it out for control. Thus some of the less democratic and ill-considered moves made by the Muslim Brotherhood, such as President Morsi’s controversial Constitutional Declaration of November 2012 in which he placed himself above judicial oversight, should be considered within this context. 

However, while these movements have proved broadly capable of upholding democracy in its procedural sense, they have all struggled to comprehend democracy in its wider cultural sense. They have tended to equate democracy with majoritarian rule, believing that their victory at the ballot box has given them the right to impose whatever they see fit, thereby ignoring the rights and freedoms of the individual. They have also upheld their predecessors’ focus on the state, as if the state is everything. It is notable that none of these movements sought to alter any of the fundamentals of the states they inherited. Rather than engage in genuine reform processes they sought to replace ‘corrupted’ individuals with more virtuous and pious men within the existing system, as if this would remedy the ills of society. Thus while they have been largely willing to play by the rules of the democratic system, they have tended to view democracy as a vehicle or a tool rather than as a cultural concept.

These movements also failed to distinguish themselves from the political parties they created or in An-Nahda’s case it did not separate its members who were in positions of power from its own leadership. The blurring of this distinction raises important questions about these movements’ commitment to democracy. So too does their habit of bypassing formal political channels and relying on their own networks and members, as well as on mobilisation in the Egyptian case, to achieve their political objectives.

However, the way that these movements have approached being in power is hardly surprising. Aside from the fact that for most of them, this has been a new experience and they are still learning how to turn themselves from clandestine or semi-clandestine opposition movements into mainstream political actors, they are all products of a region that is undemocratic and that has little experience with genuine democracy or democratic culture. It is notable that secular or liberal parties or regimes have behaved no better (if not worse), as demonstrated in Egypt where the liberal parties allied themselves to the military in order to overturn a democratically elected power. Thus these movements should be judged by the standards of the region that has spawned them.

•Relationship with violence and extremism: Do political Islamist parties have links with violent or extreme groups, or provide a permissive environment for them?

While some political Islamist parties or individuals within them may have links to violent or extreme groups, in general these Brotherhood-type movements have shunned violence and extremism. The Muslim Brotherhood in particular has never been a revolutionary movement that has sought to overthrow the state. Instead it has always preferred a gradual bottom-up approach that focuses on reforming the individual and by extension society, hence its reticence to join the 2011 uprisings at the outset.

As such while there may be certain ambiguities around these movements’ relationship to violence arising largely out of an unwillingness to review their own early history, where some of them did engage in violent acts, in the main these groups have shied away from using or advocating violence. Even in Egypt where the movement is facing extreme repression, the movement has continued to urge for peaceful protest despite the fact that some of its youth are agitating for a more robust response. In fact violence has been the mainstay of many of their opponents, such as Khalifa Haftar and his supporters in Libya, the current regime in Egypt, or the military regime in Algeria.

As to these movements’ relations with more extreme groups, their attitude has largely been that the best approach is to try to contain them. Many have expressed the view that followers of more militant or extreme interpretations of the faith are misguided and should be brought back to the straight path through dialogue and by being taught the ‘correct’ version of Islam as propounded by themselves. However, this approach has proved flawed and recent experience has shown that more extreme groups have flourished under a more permissive environment and have been able to outflank groups such as the Brotherhood or An-Nahda.

•Response to repression/freedom: Does repression push political Islamists towards extremism? Does the freedom to participate in politics encourage moderation?

There is no generic formula related to repression or inclusion that can explain how Islamist movements behave. Each party or movement has responded to its own particular environment or circumstances differently. In the Libyan case, for example, the freedom to participate in politics has not encouraged moderation and the Libyan Brotherhood has allied itself with some of the most extreme elements in the name of fighting what it believes are the counter-revolutionary forces of the past. This is reflective of the extremity of the situation in Libya that unfolded after the revolution.

In Tunisia, meanwhile, participating in politics has encouraged moderation, although it should be noted that An-Nahda had already gone down this path, presenting itself as one of the most progressive of political Islamist groups prior to the 2011 uprisings. This progressive approach has been largely down to the figure of its leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, who has pushed the party in a more liberal and open direction despite the presence of conservatives inside the party who are resisting such changes. However, the problem facing An-Nahda is that the more it engages in politics, the more it secularises and the more it sheds its Islamic character, resulting in the leadership becoming increasingly alienated from the base, some parts of which are struggling to understand what differentiates their party from others in the political arena.

•Human and legal rights: Do political Islamists accept the values that the FCO promotes? Do they tell Western audiences what they want to hear, but behave differently in the region?

Political Islamist parties may sometimes tell Western audiences one thing and behave differently when addressing their own constituencies. However, this is not a deliberately deceptive act. Rather it is a reflection of its populist politics and of its immaturity within the political arena. It is also intrinsically linked to these movements’ longstanding desire to encompass as wide a constituency as possible. Indeed the Brotherhood has always sought to be all things to all men and while this has been a source of its strength over the years, it has also repeatedly landed it in hot water.

•Relationship with their opponents: Can Islamists and their opponents share power?

Again there is no general rule and each movement has reacted and operated differently according to the particular situation they have found themselves in. However, in general these groups have proved able to share power but at the same time they have struggled to work in a truly consensual fashion. This has been particularly evident in Egypt where the Brotherhood very quickly alienated the opposition, eventually going on to push it into the arms of the military. The Egyptian Brotherhood also tended to rely primarily on its own cadres, prioritising loyalty and trust over ability and appropriateness for the job in hand. Similarly, in Libya the Brotherhood did not work consensually with its liberal counterparts, even pushing hard for legislation in the form of the Political Isolation Law to try to manoeuvre them out of the political arena. Even in Tunisia where An-Nahda was willing to be part of a troika government, there were complaints, including from its troika partners, that it was seeking to dominate the political process and that it only trusted its own.

This reluctance to work with others is drawn out of a deep and lingering sense of persecution arising out of its own historical experience. These movements have been unable to shake off the conspiracy/victim mentality and have tended to see danger at every turn. This has hampered their ability to work with or trust others.

However, the tendency to dismiss their opponents is also drawn out of political inexperience. These movements failed to understand the difference between their core support base that would back them regardless of how they behaved in the political arena and those who voted for them to give them a chance or in order to prevent the forces of the past from returning. As such there was a kind of arrogance about these movements that felt so emboldened by their electoral victories that they did not understand the need to work with others, especially during a time of transition.

•UK policy: Were the Muslim Brotherhood Review’s conclusions correct? Has the UK’s understanding of political Islamist groups evolved since 2011? What were the policy implications of the outcome of the Muslim Brotherhood Review?

The UK’s Muslim Brotherhood Review conclusions were in part correct. However, some parts were deeply flawed and mischaracterised the movement. Describing the Brotherhood as a movement that promotes “radical transformative politics….in which the reconstruction of individual identity is the first step towards a revolutionary challenge to established states and a secularised if socially conservative order” is misleading. The Brotherhood has never been a revolutionary movement and has never promoted radical transformative politics. Indeed, its experience in power following the Arab Spring is evidence of such. As noted above, the Brotherhood did not seek to implement any serious transformation of the state or indeed the society it was elected to lead, including in the religious arena. Rather it sought to control the existing order and to people it with what it considered to be more virtuous and morally untainted individuals.

It is also incorrect to infer that the Egyptian Brotherhood has deliberately incited violence since Morsi’s toppling in 2013. While it is true that there are certain restive elements among the Brotherhood’s youth who have argued on social media platforms in favour of retaliating against the repression they are currently experiencing, the movement’s leadership has disowned such arguments and has been clear that its members should engage in non-violent protest only.

As to the report’s focus on Hamas, this is rather overstated and somewhat misleading. It is true that Hamas is considered as a member of the global Muslim Brotherhood movement. However it has always had its own dynamics that are tied to the particular situation it is operating in. Furthermore, Hamas is certainly not under the control of the Egyptian Brotherhood. While it is also true that senior Brotherhood members have supported Hamas and its use of violence against Israel and that they have employed anti-Semitic language, this should be considered within the context of the society in which they are operating. While certainly not condonable in any sense, this pro-Palestinian rhetoric has been and continues to be employed by nationalist regimes, by liberal and secular parties, and by society in general across the region. As such these views are not specific to the Brotherhood but are reflective of the general popular mood. Indeed it is notable that one of President Morsi’s few foreign policy successes was to help broker a peace deal between Israel and Hamas.

It is also true that some Brotherhood leaders have advocated the use of violence against occupying forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, it should also be noted that the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood (The Iraqi Islamic Party) did not use violence against US and British forces but instead engaged with the political process against the advice of the Brotherhood’s international movement. 

Similarly claims made by Brotherhood leaders that the 9/11 attacks were fabricated by the US and that the war on terrorism is a pretext to attack Muslims are not unique to the Brotherhood but mirror the general sentiment that holds sway both within the establishment in the countries of the region and in the street.

The UK’s decision to conduct this review and to focus on the Brotherhood and its relationship to violence (as opposed to its engagement in the political process) while failing to speak out more robustly against the atrocities being committed against the movement and its supporters by the current Egyptian regime is highly questionable. Its doing so has only compounded the view that is held widely throughout the region that the West prefers dealing with authoritarian regimes, that it is opposed to Islamism, and that its rhetoric on democracy and human rights is completely hollow. 

May 2016