Written evidence from Dr John Esposito (ISL0001)

 

Political Islam, Democracy, Global Terrorism, and Western Foreign Policy

 

Written Evidence Submitted by Dr. John L. Esposito

University Professor and Professor of Religion & International Affairs

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Georgetown University

Dr. John L. Esposito is University Professor, Professor of Religion and International Affairs and of Islamic Studies and Founding Director of the Prince Alwaleed bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. His more than fifty books include: Religion and Violence, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, Who Speaks for Islam?: What a Billion Muslims Really Think, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring, What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam, Islamophobia and the Challenge of Pluralism in the 21st Century. Esposito’s writings are translated into more than 40 languages. A former President of the American Academy of Religion and the Middle East Studies Association and member of the World Economic Forum’s Council of 100 Leaders, he has served as a consultant to the U.S. government and governments, corporations, universities, and the media worldwide.

 

Executive Summary

 

AQ, ISIL, terrorist cells in Europe and America reinforce fears of radical Islamic movements. Post 9/11, the war against AQ and global terrorism became a green light for authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world, from North Africa to Southeast Asia, to further limit the rule of law and civil society and to repress opposition (both secular and Islamic). To excuse their authoritarianism, all Islamic movements, mainstream (non-violent), they characterized as wolves in sheep’s clothing, as well as extremist movements were labeled “terrorists”.  As a result, many Western governments overtly or quietly pursued a “double standard,” espousing the right of self-determination, democratization and human rights, while practicing “democratic exceptionalism,” supporting authoritarian Muslim regimes, fearing that Islamic candidates’ participation in elections would necessarily lead to the hijacking of elections. These fears often ignored the fact that many, if not most, rulers (secular as well as religious) in the Muslim world had non-democratic, authoritarian track records in which violence and repression are state sanctioned, relied on the military and security forces (thus the designation, mukhabarat states) for their legitimacy and stability.

 

 

The Other Face of Islamic Movements:

  1. While AQ, ISIL and other militant movements reinforce the threat of the dark side of political Islam, its extremists with their theologies of hate and destruction, it is critical for policymakers to also be aware of the diversity and importance of mainstream Islamic movements in modern of electoral politics and democratization.
  2. The example of Islamic candidates and movements turning to ballots not bullets is not new.  If much of the 1980s had been dominated by fears of Iran’s export of revolutionary Islam, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Islamically oriented candidates or leaders were elected as mayors and parliamentarians in countries as diverse as Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. They served in cabinet level positions and as speakers of national assemblies, prime ministers (Turkey and Pakistan), deputy prime minister (Malaysia) and Indonesia’s first democratically elected president. The general response of many governments to this political power of Islam was to retreat from open elections, identifying their Islamic opposition as extremist and/or simply falling back on their “time honored tradition” of canceling or manipulating elections as in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Jordan.
  3. The most remarkable demonstration of Islam’s prominence in mainstream politics was the victory of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (commonly referred to as the AK Party), which won a parliamentary majority in a Muslim country that has long been seen as a symbol of secular Islam. The party's victory followed similarly important performances by Islamic candidates in Morocco, Bahrain, and Pakistan and the persistent strength of religious currents in countries like Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Malaysia and Indonesia, all key American allies.
  4. The pattern continued in the 21st century. Elections in late 2001 in Pakistan, Turkey, Bahrain and Morocco reflected the saliency of Islam in Muslim politics in the early 21st century. Islamic candidates and Muslim parties increased their influence: in Morocco threefold and in Pakistan tenfold. In Turkey, the AK (Justice and Development Party) came to power, and in Bahrain Islamic candidates won 19 of 40 parliamentary seats.
  5. Islamic candidates and parties shared some common issues but also reflect significant differences. All were critics of the status quo, their political and economic establishments. Most cast themselves as reformers and emphasized justice and development. Importantly, most of their supporters were not just the downtrodden but also the aspiring middle class. The leadership of most Islamic movements were lay rather than clergy, graduates of modern educational systems rather than madrasa; trained in science, engineering, education rather than religious disciplines. Their attitudes towards the West varied considerably from Pakistan’s Joint Action Forum’s denunciation of American influence and presence to the Turkish AK’s care to demonstrate that it was not anti-American or anti-European and its agreement to permit the placement and deployment (in a war against Iraq) of American-led military forces in Turkey. 
  6. The continued performance and relative success of Islamic movements in many countries reflected the failures of their governments and the extent to which mainstream Islamic movements were prepared to participate in the electoral process. At the same time, their performance was a reminder that Islam remains a potent force in mainstream Muslim politics. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell in an interview went out of his way not to rule out U.S. support for Islamic parties. At the time of Turkey’s election and the AK Party victory, Powell noted:

''The fact that the party has an Islamic base to it in and of itself does

not mean that it will be anti-American in any way. In fact, the initial indication we get is that the new party, which forms the new government, understands the importance of a good relationship with the United States.''

 

Arab Spring/Arab Winter?

  1. The second decade of the 21st century was a period that proved ripe for change. The wave of violent and non-violent demonstrations that occurred in Cairo, Tunis, Rabat, Manama, Damascus, Tripoli, and Sana’a and percolated throughout North Africa and the Middle East was a clear indication that Arab and Muslim societies were no longer willing to accept the authoritarian bargain. They confirmed what many major polls (Gallup World Polls, PEW, Zogby and others) had reported previously: majorities throughout the Muslim world desire participatory politics and the freedoms and liberties associated with democratic government.
  2. The “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening” marked a historic transition in the political makeup of countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. A broad sector of society, eager for change and democratic reforms, made their voices heard, reclaiming their dignity and national pride and insisting that they would decide the direction and the future of their countries. Though initially not among the leadership, Islamist candidates and parties swept into power in democratically held elections in Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and Salafi, especially the Noor Party) and Tunisia (Ennahda, the Renaissance, Party) although not in Libya.
  3. The election results were the product of a free and fair process. This process was also a beginning — a first step on a path towards a future that will hopefully consist of more free and fair elections, more political parties, more freedoms, and the evolution of democracy in a region where free and fair participation has been absent. Far from monolithic, Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda and Salafis incorporate diverse currents, ideologically, politically, and socio-economically. Many in new leadership positions were challenged to move beyond decades of struggling for survival in the face of government repression and face the challenges of governance and engage in greater power sharing. American and European policymakers were equally challenged to work with Islamically oriented government leaders.
  4. The question of “How” will Islam and democracy be compatible became even more real and relevant. New governments in both Egypt and Tunisia spoke of a civil state with an Islamic reference and equality of citizenship for all, what would that mean regarding implementation of Shariah and the rights and freedoms of religious minorities, secularists and women. However, the challenges facing new governments needing to satisfy the expectations of diverse sectors of society, and in particular to jump start failed economies and address issues of high unemployment and high popular expectations were formidable.
  5. The new Islamist led Egyptian and Tunisian governments were challenged by secular parties, including illiberal secularists, and especially the entrenched remnants of the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes (military, police, judiciary, and a vast bureaucracy), referred to as “the deep state”. 

 

 

 

Egypt and Tunisia

  1. In contrast to the chaos and civil war in Syria and Libya, Egypt and Tunisia’s democratically elected leadership proceeded on the path to democratization but had distinctively different experiences and results. Egypt’s democratic experiment hit a dead end with the toppling of the Morsi government in a coup and restoration of military backed authoritarianism. Only Tunisia produced a functioning parliamentary system.
  2. Initially, Islamist parties, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahda (Renaissance) Party were not among the leadership in their countries’ uprisings. However, in subsequent presidential and parliamentary elections, in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and in Tunisia the Ennahda swept into power in in their countries’ first democratic elections after decades of authoritarian rule.
  3. President Morsi faced a formidable opposition. The military, police, security, judiciary and bureaucracy, all Mubarak government appointees, remained in their positions. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a group of senior Egyptian military officers, who took over power to govern Egypt after President Hosni Mubarak’s departure, had ruled from February 2011 until June 2012, the start of President Mohamed Morsi's term of office. Its close relationship with the courts was evident. The Supreme Constitutional Court consistently issued invasive decisions such as dissolving the Brotherhood’s FJP and the Brotherhood and Salafi-dominated parliament as well as the Constitutional Assembly.
  4. The Morsi government also made mistakes and mishandled multiple opportunities: they failed to build a more representative coalition government with liberals, Christians, especially Coptic Christians, secularists and leftists and they completely excluded Arab youth leaders and groups who were the backbone of the revolution.  In reacting to the SCAF and in particular the Constitutional Court’s interventions, Morsi unilaterally implemented policies that alienated sectors of society who charged that his Muslim Brotherhood dominated government was intent upon imposing an Islamic state. In response to opponents’ charges of an “Islamist coup,” he maintained that these actions would protect the work of the Constituent Assembly, allowing them to drafting the new constitution without judicial interference, and these actions would only last until the draft constitution was completed and ratified by a national referendum.
  5. The deep state (military, judiciary, security forces), with assistance from the media, used growing dissent to move from popular opposition demands for major reforms to a call for Morsi to either resign or be driven from office. The result was a military-led coup under General Sisi, Morsi's Minister of Defense. The democratic process was bypassed to topple the first democratically elected government in Egypt's history and usher in a return to authoritarianism in the guise of a restoration of a secular, democratic safe secure future.
  6. Three weeks after the removal of President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from power, the interim government appointed 19 generals as the governors of Egypt's provinces. General al-Sisi moved to outlaw, suppress and eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. He called upon Egyptians to take to the streets to support the army’s use of force in its "war against terrorism" and suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. The charges and actions flew in the face of the decades long non-violent track record of the Brotherhood.
  7. For more than forty years, despite provocation, arrest, detention, rigged elections and state sponsored violence, the Brotherhood had not engaged in political or religious violence. Militant Egyptian Islamist organizations, as well as Ayman Al-Zawahiri, the current Egyptian leader of al-Qaeda, have long opposed the Brotherhood because of its gradualism and willingness to compromise even during the Morsi presidency.
  8. The post coup military-backed government with support from the courts initiated a massive wave of arrests and imprisonment of Morsi and MB leaders and supporters. On August 14, 2013, faced with large non-violent sit-ins by the Muslim Brotherhood at Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda Squares in Cairo, Egyptian security forces, used lethal force and snipers to clear and expel Muslim Brothers and other Morsi supporters, the vast majority of whom were unarmed civilians, including women and children. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and other experts described the raids as the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history. According to the post coup interim government’s statistics, 638 people were killed, 595 civilians and 43 police officers, and some 3,994 injured at Rabaa Square.  However, other more independent estimates ranged from 2600 upwards dead and more than 4500 injured in what came to be called the Massacre at Rabia Square.
  9. Government repression increasingly extended beyond the Brotherhood. In February 2014, HRW reported, Egyptian authorities "demonstrated almost zero tolerance for any form of dissent, arresting and prosecuting journalists, demonstrators, and academics for peacefully expressing their views.

http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/02/19/egypt-high-price-dissent

  1. Amnesty International in “Roadmap to repression: No end in sight to human rights violations” (23 January 2014), reported, "On the eve of the third anniversary of the "25 January Revolution", the human rights outlook in Egypt remains grim. ...The Egyptian authorities are using every resource at their disposal to quash dissent and trample on human rights... Across the board the Egyptian authorities have tightened the noose on freedom of expression and assembly…. Security forces have been given free rein to act above the law and with no prospect of being held to account …”

http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-three-years-wide-scale-repression-continues-unabated-2014-01-23

  1. In March and April Egyptian courts set a new record in judicial history. In March 2014, an Egyptian court condemned 529 alleged supporters of Morsi to death on charges of killing a single police officer. In April 2014, 683 people were sentenced to death in the biggest capital punishment sentence in modern Egyptian history and without hearing the defense arguments.

 

Democratic Transition in Tunisia

  1. In contrast to Egypt, Tunisia made significant strides towards democratization. Despite strong disagreements, some violence and politically and religiously motivated roadblocks, Tunisia’s political elites demonstrated a commitment to national unity, and the institutional formation of a democracy, characterized by an inclusive constitution, a progressive electoral law, and an institutional setting that prioritized dialogue and compromise over exclusion and partisanship. This process was aided by a favorable context. In the wake of the uprisings, Tunisia’s brutal security apparatus collapsed and its small yet professionalized military, which historically had no interest in politics, remained silent in the wings. In civilian politics, Islamists and secular factions were evenly matched; the Islamist party, Ennahda (Renaissance), won a plurality in Tunisia’s first free democratic elections and had reached out to include secular opposition parties in the government.
  2. Key features account for the difference between the Tunisian and Egyptian cases, both tied to the will of the political elite. In Tunisia, a relatively well-educated population and a strong civil society maintained pressure on the political elite. Strong, independent unions in Tunisia, including the General Union of Tunisian Workers, along with other actors, including the trade union federation, the law association, and human rights groups, it also served as an important mediator among political actors. In Egypt, civil society and unions were neither as powerful nor as independent.
  3. Tunisia’s Ennahda party avoided polarizing stances. It demonstrated its emphasis on national unity and inclusion by promising before elections that, if victorious, it would appoint a non-Ennahda citizen as president and reach out to opposition parties to create a coalition government. After two years in power and engaging with a contentious opposition in dialogue, opted to step down in favor of technocratic leadership to preserve national unity. The military stayed out of direct involvement in politics, enabling political actors to negotiate a new system.

 

Roots and Development of Today’s Global Jihadist Movements

  1. 11 September 2001 heralded the global threat of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and the genesis of global movements and networks with a global agenda and use of violence and terror in the name of Islam. The global jihad by Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida (The Base) against corrupt Muslim governments and the West emerged as the primary movement and model for others that subsequently emerged, including ISIL ISIS. Al Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist groups represented a new form of terrorism, transnational in its identity and recruitment and global in its ideology, strategy, targets, and network of organizations, as well as economic transactions. Individuals and groups, religious and lay, have seized the right to declare and legitimate unholy wars in the name of Islam.

 

But What about ISIS Islamic Pedigree and Vision?

  1. ISIS offers a unique militant Salafi ideology/religious rationale to justify, recruit, legitimate and motivate many of its fighters to achieve its goals. Baghdadi has blended religion and politics into a more comprehensive religious ideology, with its symbols, slogans and discourse and promoted it through social media, and to a degree that neither AQ nor any other Islamist movement has done in modern times. Baghdadi’s commitment to the restoration of the Caliphate identified his movement and proto-state with an idealized period of history that many Muslims see as the Golden Age of Islam religiously, politically and culturally. Restoration of the caliphate is cast as a rejection of the legitimacy of post WWI European colonial creation of modern Arab states.

 

Radicalization & Recruitment

  1. Militant Muslim groups in recent decades reveal diverse personal, religious, and socioeconomic profiles and motivations. Studies on radicalization, terrorism and global suicide bombings by the EC’s European Network of Experts on Violent Radicalization (of which I was a member) post 9/11 and 7/7 on radicalization in Europe on terrorism and others have found that in most cases religion is not the primary source of most extremists’ behavior. The drivers of radicalization are diverse and influenced by specific contexts. Narratives are shaped by experiences such as xenophobia, anti-Islam and anti-Muslim bias and racism, lower employment and educational levels, lack of a sense of dignity and self-esteem. The results often include a sense of marginalization and alienation, moral outrage, and search for a new identity with a sense of meaning, purpose and belonging. In many cases, terrorists are neither particularly religiously literate nor observant. As the UK’s MI5 briefing report on radicalization (2008), concluded, “far from being religious zealots, a large number of those involved in terrorism do not practice their faith regularly. Many lack religious literacy and could be regarded as religious novices.” Contrary to conventional wisdom, the report concluded that, “a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalization”.

  1. Many Europeans and Americans who join ISIS are often not necessarily religiously literate or devout. The case of Yusuf Sarwar and Mohammed Ahmed, two jihadi wannabes who in July 2014 pled guilty to terrorism offences, are a not uncommon example. Before they set out from Birmingham to fight in Syria last May, they ordered two books online from Amazon, Islam for Dummies and The Koran for Dummies. Similarly, security officials believe that the decision to go fight in a foreign conflict is usually less an act of religious commitment than of young male rebellion and thirst for meaning and adventure.
  2. ISIS is a symptom of much deeper systemic problems in the Arab world that must be addressed by Arab political and religious leaders, Arab societies and the West. There is a direct link between the emergence and spread of extremism and authoritarian and repressive governments and the perception of experience among a small fraction of Muslim youth of marginalization and alienation in Western societies. The fallout from the failure of the Arab Spring, crushing hopes for democratization, suppression of moderate Islamist and secular opposition by authoritarian Arab regimes with the acquiescence or support of Western allies have all been a gift to ISIS and other terrorists’ propaganda and recruitment.

 

April 2016