Written Evidence submitted by Sinn Fein for the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee’s inquiry into Northern Ireland and the EU Referendum (EUN0001)

Summary

1. The prospect of increased or full withdrawal by the British state from the EU, has negative implications for Ireland, north and south.
2. The strategic and political implications of a 'Br-Exit' run entirely counter to Irish national interests.
3. The ideological hostility of the British Conservatives to the European emphasis upon social solidarity and cooperation, as well as citizens' democratic and human rights is opposite to Ireland’s national interests.
4. A full British withdrawal or even a position of ‘Half Out’ conditionality would represent a setback for political and economic progress and continued democratic transformation of the north.
5. It would represent a major set-back for the political process in the north, and directly challenge the integrity of the Good Friday Agreement, as an internationally binding treaty.
6. It would also undermine all-Ireland co-operation and harden partition.
7. It would cast the north adrift and undermine the ability of the southern Irish state to benefit from the most positive benefits associated with EU membership.
8. More generally a withdrawal from the EU would have huge consequences for human rights legislation.
9. It is clear that this British government is embarked on a strategy to dilute and restrict human and employment rights and other protections for citizens.
10. That agenda and its repercussions are unacceptable to Sinn Fein.
11. Sinn Féin will oppose and campaign against any attempts by the British government to withdraw from the EU or make its relationship more conditional.

1. Political context

1.1        The reality is that the north has depended heavily upon our relationship with the EU both economically and politically due to -

-                 Our endemic patterns of societal inequality and underinvestment;

-                 Decades of political conflict and its consequences, and

-                 The structural weakness of the regional economy, limitations of the public expenditure budget and our lack of fiscal independence.

1.2        Between 2007-13 an estimated 10% of the regional economy's GDP was related directly to the EU, in terms of investment, trade, employment and funding. Then add to that the strategic significance of the north as a magnet for North American FDI and as a gateway to the European mainland.

1.3        The arguments for a Brexit made in the British state, and by its local advocates, do not take account of these factors, and fail to set out proposals which would prevent even more damage being done to the already weak structure of the local economy, as well as the adverse knock-on effects upon all-Ireland co-operation.

1.4        The case for Brexit is not motivated or sustained by alternative and better strategies and policies.

1.5        Instead it is the product of a growth in influence by narrow English nationalism linked to conservative, Tory ideological interests.

1.6        The momentum for Brexit is a reaction against several things.

1.7        First, the continuing reverberations of the 2008 global financial crash.

1.8        Second, hostility to the promotion of rights and protections under the aegis of the European Parliament, European Court of Justice and European Charter of Human Rights.

1.9        Third, opposition to free travel, and a xenophobic resentment towards the international refugee crisis, which stems directly from war, conflict and global insecurity, especially in the Middle East.

2. Sinn Fein and the EU

2.1      Sinn Fein has deep concerns about the imperfections of the EU.

2.2        Over recent years it has shifted increasingly to the right in response to :

• The changing nature and demands of international finance capital arising from global economic and financial instability, and
• The resultant political acquiescence and embrace by many European governments of austerity programmes.

2.3        As a result, democratic accountability, decision making and transparency have become casualties of this dominant trend.

2.4        Sinn Fein opposes that direction of travel.

2.5        We seek a social Europe -

• which celebrates the primacy of people over profit,
• which promotes and creates economic prosperity, but not at the expense of workers' rights, fair play or tax justice, and
• which acts as a champion of equality, inclusion and fairness.

2.6        But we also believe that the European institutions can only be changed from within, and not outside the EU.

2.7        The EU is an unavoidable arena of political struggle and activism for the progressive left.

2.8        The correct strategic position from a republican and democratic perspective is to critically engage and reform the EU from within its structures.

2.9        That is the best way to challenge narrow nationalist, conservative and anti-democratic opposition to a social Europe.

2.10   Sinn Fein believes that Ireland's place - north and south - is within the EU.

3. BrExit implications for Ireland north and south

3.1      A Brexit is opposite to the interests of local people. The combined financial loss of EU investment, subsidies and funds to the north of Ireland, and the southern border counties, arising from a Brexit would be in the region of £2.5 billion.

3.2        In the event of Brexit, we would see a myriad of serious and far reaching consequences.

These include:

• The prospect of reinforced partition and hardening the division between north and south; with the potential for customs checkpoints, trading tariffs, and adverse knock-on effects for all-island economic activity and cooperation.
• The damage to the agric-economy and potential loss of CAP single farm payments and similar financial supports for the fishing industry.
• The loss of EU structural funding which has been central to small, medium enterprise development, community regeneration and government programmes.
• The undermining of the north as a region attractive to foreign investment and as a gateway point for US investors and investment to mainland Europe itself.
• Negative impacts upon local business, and the potential for growing the private sector and promoting enterprise and growth.  (During the period 2007-13 10% of the north’s GDP was estimated to be reliant upon EU funding)
• The effects of any possible change to the existing Common Travel Area between Britain and the southern Irish state.

3.3        However, wider political implications for the island as a whole would arguably arise in the event of full British withdrawal.

3.4        These relate to the nature of the southern Irish state’s own economic recovery, growth and stability; and the objective of maintaining peace and stability on the island and future relations between Britain and Ireland; as well as keeping Ireland at the heart of Europe in a way that best serves the interests of Irish citizens.

3.5        The Institute of International and European Affairs has argued that British exit would be retrograde because the fragility of the peace process requires constant attention in London, Belfast and Dublin. BrExit could adversely affect both cross-border cooperation, and institutional bilateral contact between British and Irish government officials at formal and informal levels.

3.6        Moreover, the Irish trade union movement has concluded that a BrExit would pose a threat to the interests of the all-island economy and Irish workers north and south, by damaging the social dimension of the European project – leading to social dumping and unfair competition – which would inevitably push Irish society further into a race to the bottom.

3.7        An additional concern for Sinn Fein at this time is the danger inherent in the British government's intent to replace the Human Rights Act, with the consequent dangers of derogation from the European Charter of Human Rights for the promotion of human rights legislation and provisions.

3.8        While not strictly related to Britain's relationship with the EU, this emanates from the same British conservative logic, and this issue risks getting entangled in any referendum debate.

4. A joint civic and political platform opposing Brexit is required.

4.1      Those of us who recognise the dangers inherent in a Brexit now need to bring increased momentum to our arguments.

4.2        Opposition to a Brexit needs to be expanded into widespread and representative common ground.

4.3        Those political parties, social partners and civic stakeholders who are of one mind on this issue across Ireland, Scotland, Wales and England should coalesce and speak with one voice against Brexit.

4.4        A joint civic and political platform opposing Brexit is required.

4.5        In the north of Ireland, local political, business, trade union and other leaders should put a concentrated focus on creating such an alliance to inform public opinion, and commence a positive pro-active campaign highlighting the dangers of Brexit.

4.6        Sinn Fein believe that an effectively mobilized body of popular opinion against Brexit particularly in the north of Ireland, Scotland and Wales could have a very decisive influence on the outcome of a British referendum.

4.7        However, a failure to act collectively, and speak with one voice, and with maximum resolve,  against Brexit in the coming months exposes the economic and political systems and processes on this island to far-reaching jeopardy and threat.

4.8        Such a failure should not be contemplated.

4.9        Sinn Fein stands ready to play its part in taking forward this agenda with others in society across these islands. 

16 February 2016