Written evidence from Dr Zeynep Kaya, Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science (ISI0032)
I am a Research Fellow at the Middle East Centre at the LSE. My research focuses on the international relations of the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on Kurdish politics in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. In my comments, I will use the expertise I derived from my work on and focus on five of the questions raised by the inquiry.
Syria’s main Kurdish party, the PYD, is not part of the Syrian opposition delegation for the peace talks. Does their exclusion undermine the process?
- The Democratic Union Party’s (PYD) exclusion from the peace talks undermines the process. However, the PYD’s exclusion is only part of a larger problem that has undermined the previous and current peace talks on Syria. This problem is the inability of the parties to agree on which groups to invite to the talks. The state parties and military/political groups use their own politicised conceptions of ‘terrorist organisation’ as reasons to justify the obstruction of certain groups from taking part in the talks. This is not leading to a constructive process and it hinders the ability to even start any meaningful talks.
- It is important to note that the PYD does not consider itself to be a terrorist organisation, mainly for three reasons. Firstly, it implements democratic governance with an elected council where different minority groups form part of the governing process. It considers itself to be a progressive force, which adopts and implements the principles such as human rights, minority rights, gender equality and environmentalism. Secondly, its armed forces, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), have been conducting an effective fight against radical Islamist groups, such as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. Thirdly, the PYD has recently become an ally of the Western powers on the ground in the fight against the ISIS. Its military forces have been receiving support from Western powers, including the US and the UK.
- The PYD’s exclusion from the peace talks could undermine the chances of a viable solution. The PYD is the main Kurdish political party in Syria. It has de facto control of the area called Rojava, where the party is implementing a democratic governance system based on the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) leader’s, Abdullah Ocalan, doctrine. This doctrine envisions a system of localised rule he describes as ‘democratic confederalism’. Although there are other Kurdish factions that reject the PYD’s role as representatives of the Syrian Kurds, particularly the Kurdish National Council, a group supported by the Kurdistan Regional Government, and close to the anti-regime groups in Syria, in practice, the PYD is the main ruling power in the Syrian Kurdish areas. Therefore, their exclusion means that Syrian Kurds are not fully represented in the talks.
- Moreover, from PYD’s perspective, not being invited means they are unable to contribute to the resolution of the conflict and the formation of a transitional government. It means the rejection of Kurds’ special status in Syria and implies only limited opportunities to raise Kurdish demands and bargain during the talks.
Do we assume that Turkey is behind the exclusion? [if yes] What is Turkey trying to achieve by insisting on their exclusion?
- Yes, we can assume that Turkey is behind the exclusion of the PYD. Turkey is doing this because there is a lot at stake for Turkey if the PYD takes part in the peace process. Turkey does not want to see a strong PYD in Syria. It believes that strong Kurdish rule in Syria might legitimise the demands of its own Kurds. Kurds in Turkey are proud of the Rojava project in Syria. Rojava has fed into the Turkish Kurds’ nationalist sentiments. During the fight between the YPG and ISIS in Kobane, many Kurds in Turkey said ‘Kobane is Diyarbakir’ (Diyarbakir is the largest Kurdish populated city in Turkey). Turkey considers this as a potentially harmful direction.
- Turkey is concerned about the increasing Kurdish nationalist sentiment in Turkey and its potential cross-border reach. The main reason for Turkey’s concern is the link between the Syrian Kurdish PYD and Turkish Kurdish PKK. Both parties are part of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) that adheres to Ocalan’s doctrine of ‘democratic confederalism’. It aims to link different Kurdish regions in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran without threatening the territorial unity of each state. Turkey sees such plans as a stepping-stone towards an independent Kurdistan in the Middle East, which will cost Turkey a large proportion of its territory.
- Linked to the above point, Turkey is concerned over any possibility of further links between Syrian and Turkish Kurds. Political, ethnic and social links between the Kurds in Syria and Turkey have always existed. However, since the PYD carved out autonomous Kurdish rule in Syria, cross-border links have become stronger and more visible. Turkey sees this as a potential threat to maintaining its border with Syria.
- The most important reason, which underlies the three factors mentioned above, is the nature of the link between the PKK and PYD (For a detailed analysis of the relationship between the PYD and PKK, see Zeynep Kaya and Robert Lowe (2016). ‘The Curious Question of the PYD-PKK Relationship’, In: Gareth Stansfield and Mohammed Shareef (eds.) The Kurdish Question Revisited. Hurst, London, UK. ISBN 9781849045629). Turkey sees the PYD as an extension of the PKK in Syria. Therefore, it believes that a strong PYD means a strong PKK. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organisation by Turkey and by western powers. Considering the decades long war between the Turkish government and the PKK, and the recent resumption of fighting in 2015 after a short ceasefire, this is not a hugely surprising reaction. However, the PYD emphasises that its affiliation with the PKK remains at an ideological level and it does not aim to threaten the unity of either Syria or Turkey.
- At the regional level, obstructing the PYD’s inclusion is also part of Turkey’s strategy to minimise Russia’s influence in the peace talks. Russia is the main actor that wants the PYD included in the talks. The tension between Russia and Turkey, especially since Turkey downed a Russian warplane in November 2015 for crossing its air space, hinders Turkey and Russia from reaching a consensus on whether the PYD should be invited to the talks on Syria.
Might the involvement of Ahrar al-Sham, opponents of the PYD, undermine the peace talks?
- The involvement of Ahrar al-Sham and other opponents of the PYD would not undermine the peace talks. A participatory process that includes as many parties as possible would increase the chances of the peace talks making progress. However, what would harm the peace talks is the exclusion of the PYD when others are included. As one of the key political actors in the war in Syria, the PYD should be party to the talks. The PYD believes that the invitation of groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, known for their radicalism and low democratic credentials, gives legitimacy to those groups at international level.
- Inviting Ahrar al-Sham and not including the PYD is problematic. This problem is again linked to the fundamental issue of defining what constitutes a terrorist group. Actually, the problem is not the conceptual debates about these terms. The problem is how political divisions and alliances within different groups and states, and the strategic interests of the actors, shapes their definitions of terrorism and terrorist organisation. The challenge is to depoliticise the definition of terrorism as much as possible and limit its use to only specific extreme cases. Although this is very difficult to do, it would alleviate many of the complexities that have stalled the start of the peace talks.
How can the UK persuade Turkey to take a more moderate stance towards the Syrian Kurds?
- In order to persuade Turkey to change its policy towards the Syrian Kurds, the UK could engage in diplomatic activity to smooth Turkey’s relations with the PYD and Russia.
- Turkey and PYD has had some interaction in the past and the PYD has on several occasions assured Turkey that it does not pose a threat to Turkey’s territorial unity because it is a Syrian party and its activities and goals are limited to Syria. The UK, as well as the US and other European states, could initiate meetings between the PYD and Turkey to improve their relationship and act as mediators in these meetings.
- The tension between Russia and Turkey is one of the sources of Turkey’s anti-PYD stance. Russia supports both the Assad regime and the PYD. Turkey sees both the Syrian regime and the PYD as hostile political actors. The increasing influence of Russia and its support for the regime and the Kurds concerns Turkey. Diplomatic mediation by external states, such as the UK, might lead to some interaction between the Russia and Turkey and a reduction of hostilities. Despite the tense relationship between Russia and the UK, the UK could act as mediator in the context of the Syrian talks. Improved relations between Turkey and Russia might contribute to moderating Turkey’s stance towards the PYD.
At our last evidence session, Chris Phillips argued that the UK had limited leverage over the combatants, and should instead focus on influencing its allies in the region, principally Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Do you agree?
- I agree with this statement. I think the UK could do this by developing a two-fold strategy: 1) understand the Turkish government’s concerns over its national security and territorial unity; 2) support efforts to strengthen democratic institutions in Turkey and the efforts to end the conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK.
- Turkey is going through a process where the democratic credentials of its political system are weakening (for a short analysis of Turkish democracy at present and in historical context see Zeynep Kaya, ‘The Declining Health of Turkish Democracy’, Middle East Centre Blog, Nov 2015). Freedom of expression has become even more limited. The resumption of the conflict with the PKK is further damaging a democratic political solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The country is looking increasingly more polarised around different visions for the Turkish political system. Western governments are highly critical of these developments in Turkey. However, this should not lead them to reduce their engagement with Turkey. There are significant forces in Turkey, even within the ruling AK Party, that aim to achieve a more genuine democracy, stronger rule of law and greater accountability in governance.
March 2016