Written evidence submitted by The Henry Jackson Society

About the Author

Dr Andrew Foxall is Director of the Russia Studies Centre at The Henry Jackson Society, the London-based international affairs think tank. Previously, he held academic positions at Queen’s University Belfast and the University of Oxford. He holds a DPhil from the University of Oxford.

Dr Foxall’s research focuses on economic, political and security trends in Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. He is the author of Ethnic Relations in Post-Soviet Russia (Routledge, 2014) as well as numerous academic articles, book chapters, policy reports and opinion pieces. He contributes frequently to major international media outlets, including The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times and Foreign Affairs.

About The Henry Jackson Society

The Henry Jackson Society is a think tank and policy-shaping force that fights for the principles and alliances which keep societies free - working across borders and party lines to combat extremism, advance democracy and real human rights, and make a stand in an increasingly uncertain world.

Evidence

1. There is a prevailing belief in the UK Government that Russia can be accommodated; that without Russia no solution is possible to the most pressing security issues in the world; and, that the greater danger is of over-reacting to Russia’s behaviour, not of appeasing it. I profoundly disagree. I argue that:

• Russia is a revisionist power, and its current military policy and strategy pose a clear and evident threat to the UK, the UK’s allies, and NATO;
• The UK is yet to fully understand Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare concept and capabilities, and is ill-equipped to deal with it;
• In combatting Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare, there are a number of things that can be done;
• Greater dangers lie ahead, for both the UK and NATO, if Russia’s aggressive behaviour goes unchecked.

2. Russia has a number of policy documents consequential to military policy and strategy. The most prominent of these is the ‘National Security Strategy’, which was signed by President Vladimir Putin on 31 December 2015 and which is unambiguously aggressive toward the West. The Strategy makes clear that Russia is a revisionist power. It identifies the United States and its allies as the main threat to Russian security and strategic interests; regards the existing international security order as unfair and actively seeks to change it; is hostile toward NATO and the post-Cold War international system; and, makes clear that the Kremlin regards the role of force in global politics to be as important as ever. The Strategy also explains Russia’s so-called ‘nuclear de-escalation doctrine’, which allows it to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on it with conventional forces.

3. Russia’s commitment to its military is not mere words, and its current military policy and strategy pose a clear and evident threat to the UK, the UK’s allies, and NATO. Since 2008, Russia has invested in modernising its military on a scale not seen in the West in over a generation. It has made considerable new investments and has dramatically improved its capabilities. Since 2012, expenditure on the military has increased and, during the period 2013-17, defence expenditure will amount to 4.8% of Russian GDP. Russia has embarked on a US$720 billion weapons-modernisation programme which aimed to increase the 10% of equipment classed as ‘modern’ in 2012 to 70% by 2020.

4. The Russian military’s increased effectiveness has been demonstrated in a number of ways, including: the large-scale ‘Zapad’ 2013 military exercise in the Baltic region; its effective deployment of special operations forces in the annexation of Crimea, in March 2014; and, its bombardment of Syrian rebels, with cruise missiles launched by the Russian Navy from warships located in the Mediterranean Sea, since late 2015.

5. Russia has also exercised scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons. Russia’s 2009 ‘Zapad’ military exercise involved a simulated nuclear strike on Poland. The ‘Vostok’ 2010 military exercise involved simulations of a nuclear strike. In 2013, Russian jets simulated a nuclear attack on Sweden. And, in 2014, Russian jets simulated a nuclear attack on Denmark.

6. The increase in Russian conventional capacity has been mirrored by an increase in Russian willingness to engage in a combative relationship with the West. This includes: Russia’s simulated strategic bomber strikes against much of north-western Europe, since 2005; Russia’s war in Georgia, in 2008; Russia’s continued occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, since 2008; Russia’s annexation of Crimea, in March 2014; Russia’s invasion of east Ukraine, from April 2014 onwards; and, Russia’s intervention in Syria, in September 2015.

7. Some of Russia’s aggressions have been directed at the UK. Most notably, in 2006, Alexander Litvinenko, a British citizen, was poisoned with polonium-210, a rare radioactive isotope, in a central London hotel by two individuals acting on behalf of the Russian state. Sir Robert Owen believes that Mr Litvinenko was killed ‘probably’ with the knowledge of President Vladimir Putin.

8. Since Alexander Litvinenko’s murder, Russia has been ceaselessly belligerent toward the UK. Russia’s Air Force bombers are frequently intercepted, by RAF jets, in close proximity of UK airspace; Russia’s warships often sail near British waters; and, Russia’s submarines have attempted to record the ‘acoustic signature’ made by the Vanguard submarines that carry Trident nuclear missiles.[1]

9. Somewhat alarmingly, in 2008, a Russian Tu-160 Blackjack bomber carried out a dummy nuclear attack on northern England. Flying toward Hull, the bomber came within 20 miles of British airspace before turning away.

10. Russia’s Air Force and Navy aggressions toward the UK serve a propaganda purpose for the Kremlin, but they are primarily a military exercise. Through them, Russia has been able to gain valuable information about the chain of command within the UK defence system; the RAF’s and Royal Navy’s reactions times; the capabilities of the Air Force pilots and Royal Navy captains; and, the levels of co-operation between NATO members. Russia has also sought to record the ‘acoustic signature’ made by the Vanguard submarines that carry Trident nuclear missiles, which would have serious implications for the UK’s nuclear deterrent.

11. Knowing how the UK – and NATO – react in an emergency, gives Russia crucial insights into how they will behave in war. No matter how unlikely a war between Russia and NATO may seem, while it remains a possibility the Kremlin will make preparations for it.

12. Other Russian military activities are no less concerning. In recent years, the Kremlin has intensified its nuclear rhetoric. President Vladimir Putin has raised the spectre of a possible nuclear attack on neighbouring states, while the strategic value of nuclear pre-emption has been openly discussed among more nationalistic Russian politicians and policy analysts. At the height of anti-Western hysteria during the annexation of Crimea, in March 2014, Russian TV presenter Dmitry Kiselyov, widely regarded as the Kremlin’s chief propagandist, claimed that Russia was capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash.

13. At the same time as its behaviour has become increasingly aggressive, Russia has reduced its military transparency through non- and selective implementation of a number of arms control agreements and confidence- and security- building measures. In 2015, Russia suspended the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, though it had largely abandoned the Treaty since 2007. Russia exploits loopholes in the Vienna Document, which is an agreement between members of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Open Skies Treaty, which establishes a program of unarmed aerial surveillance flights over the territory of its signatory states, in order to mis-report or avoid reporting major military exercises.

14. Because of the relative weakness of its conventional forces, Russia has increasingly turned towards ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare. This warfare encompasses not just conventional military activity but also propaganda, disinformation and psychological warfare. The concept is not new and the model of ‘reflexive control’ has been an element in Russian military doctrine for some time. Nevertheless, the UK is yet to fully understand Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare concept and capabilities. This type of warfare is aligned to Russia’s strengths, and it is considerably more difficult for the UK, and NATO, to counter.

15. Russia has practiced different types of ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare over recent years, including: cyber-attacks, in which attacks are carried out against state infrastructure networks and websites; information operations, in which lies are disseminated in order to confuse the enemy and influence opinion both at home and abroad; psychological operations, in which agents of influence and propaganda are used to encourage the targeted state’s population to undertake subversive activity; economic attacks, in which sanctions and the blocking of trade flows are used to destabilise the economy of the targeted state; and, proxy attacks, in which forces who operate without insignia or official affiliation are used to carry out military goals.

16. Over the past decade, Russia has engaged in numerous examples of ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare. It has undertaken: cyber-attacks against Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), and Germany (2014); intensive information and psychological operations against Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-2016), and Germany (2016); economic sanctions against Moldova (2006), Georgia (2006), Lithuania (2013), Ukraine (2014), and the European Union (2015); and, energy attacks on Belarus (2004 and 2006), and Ukraine and, by extension, much of Central and Eastern Europe (2006, 2009, and 2014).

17. A key part of Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare is control over media and communications. Russia retains media hegemony over the Russian-language space in Europe, and through its mouthpiece RT the Kremlin also has access to Europe’s English, German, French, and Spanish speakers. Russia uses the opportunities this affords to create divisions, and exploit pre-existing frictions, that support its world-view. This includes spreading narratives that: question the worth of democracy; are hostile towards liberalism and multiculturalism; oppose U.S. global leadership; challenge NATO; are critical of a law-based international system; and, seek the end of the European Union and re-nationalisation of Europe.

18. Russia uses not only media, but a myriad of Kremlin-linked instruments to spread its propaganda in NATO member states. This includes: think-tanks; government-organized non-governmental organizations; cultural and linguistic institutions; and, Christian Orthodox groups. The Kremlin also uses economic, diplomatic, and political instruments to gain influence. The strength of Russia’s approach is that it does not rely too heavily on a single instrument to achieve its goals. Instead, different instruments are combined and their mix is adapted to the requirements of each target country.

19. The UK is not as exposed to Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare as other countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kremlin uses of a number of instruments in order to further its interests in the UK. The most well-known of these is the broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today), but Russia’s influences is much wider and far less obvious to the naked eye. Russia’s instruments include: public diplomacy and public relations; well-equipped and Kremlin-aligned print- and broadcast-media outlets; a raft of cultural and linguistic programmes; political allies on the left and right; and, expert academic and policymaking communities.[2]

20. For almost a decade and a half, the UK, together with its NATO partners, has focused on counter-insurgency warfare – in Iraq and Afghanistan – against a lightly armed insurgent force, rather than on conventional state-on-state warfare. This very different form of warfare has introduced logistics systems, training, exercises, equipment, and priorities quite different from those of the Cold War, and quite different to those required to respond to and meet a Russian threat. As things stand, the UK is ill-equipped to deal with Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare.

21. Taken together, Russia’s actions over the past decade are those of a hostile state, whose interests – from upholding the rule of law [3] to countering Islamic extremism in the Middle East [4] – fundamentally diverge from those of the UK, its allies, and NATO. Because of this, the scope for military-to-military cooperation, except in cases where the UK’s national interests are at stake, are severely limited.

22. In combatting Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare, there are a number of things that can be done.

23. NATO’s Article 5 is the cornerstone of Western security, but it is ill-suited to dealing with Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare. The UK should take a leading role in fundamentally rethinking the nature of Article 5. Such a rethinking must reassure NATO’s most vulnerable members in the Baltic and Eastern Europe that, even at the earliest stages of ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare, effective counter-measures will be employed to deter Russia’s aggression.

24. A security crisis in the Baltic region is the single most dangerous threat facing NATO and, with it, the UK. Reckless behaviour by Russia could lead NATO to choose between a full-scale military conflict (including the potential use of nuclear weapons) or surrender, with the collapse of our most fundamental security arrangements. NATO should, in order to deter this, devote more resources to conventional territorial defence. The alliance has qualitative and quantitative advantages over Russia, but it must properly resource its conventional capabilities to maintain this edge. It needs a policy and strategy to deal with a crisis in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, where the Russian military has regional superiority.

25. NATO should integrate Finland and Sweden into its capabilities and planning, and otherwise maximise cooperation in every respect. These countries are not members of the Alliance, but it would be very difficult for NATO to defend the Baltic states without them. NATO, and its members, should take every opportunity to foster high-level political dialogue with both countries in and around NATO.

26. Russia will complain vigorously about NATO bolstering its most vulnerable members, in the Baltics and Eastern Europe, and furthering its integration with Finland and Sweden. But it should be made clear to Russia that NATO is undertaking such measures solely because of Russia’s aggressive policies towards them.

27. The UK and NATO should revive their information-warfare capabilities. This is not a new Cold War, but important lessons can be learnt from past experiences.

28. The UK could generously fund Russian-language public media, but on the understanding that, in the 21st century, new solutions are required, in particular for the digital space. Boosting existing media, rather than creating new ones, would both lower the cost of the initiative and make use of existing public trust.

29. While the Kremlin is attempting to control the digital space in Russia, there are limits to this. The truth about Russia’s invasion of eastern Ukraine came not from journalists, opposition figures, or activists, but from soldiers themselves, posting on ‘VKontakte’, Russia’s equivalent of ‘Facebook’. The UK and NATO, therefore, should harness the opportunities provided by social media to challenge and disrupt the Kremlin’s information-warfare. This would involve government investment in social media and other Internet-based monitoring.

30. The UK could undertake a public information campaign to inform UK audiences about the differences between journalism and disinformation, and how to spot these. Neutral parties, such as media ombudsmen, anti-propaganda experts, and fact-checkers, should be introduced at media outlets to filter out Russia’s propaganda and to disprove Russia’s lies before they are able to enter mainstream media.

31. Russia’s ‘multi-dimensional’ warfare is working in NATO countries. The Kremlin is successfully undermining not only Western unity, but also confidence in the Western system. This poses an existential threat to NATO, and therefore to UK security interests. It is time to take this threat seriously and to devote resources to addressing it.

32. The UK has traditionally played a leading role in creating and upholding the international system. This system greatly benefits UK interests, insofar as it acts to dampen geopolitical competition and thus enables the UK to concentrate its strategic and economic resources on building up its wealth, prosperity, and position in the wider world. [5] Russia is threatening this system, and it is in the UK’s interests to stop this. Greater dangers lie ahead, for both the UK and NATO, if Russia’s aggressive behaviour goes unchecked.

Andrew Foxall, Director, Russia Studies Centre, The Henry Jackson Society

11 February 2016