Written evidence from Free Tibet and Tibet Watch (HUM0011)

Summary

The FCO’s human rights priorities

• Placing emphasis on rule of law has limited value in countries, such as Tibet, where the law itself is discriminatory and institutionalises abuse of human and civil rights

The FCO’s use of external advice

• In our experience, the FCO is receptive to and appears to appreciate the provision of information about Tibet
• At political (ministerial) level, the FCO is defensive and unwilling to engage in debate about the effectiveness of its policies
• The FCO has shown itself unwilling to provide stakeholders with information that would allow them to input effectively on its policies and effectively evaluate them
• Meeting ministers may permit them to give the public impression of consultation and stakeholder engagement even when they fail to engage

Evaluation of performance

• Although the FCO provides information about its activity, it does not provide information about its strategy and goals, which hampers proper evaluation of its effectiveness

The annual human rights report

• In Tibet’s case, superfluous policy content of the HR report appears to be inserted for political purposes
• While useful as a report on global human rights abuses, in its current form the report is not a useful tool for assessing the effectiveness of UK human rights policy

Free Tibet and Tibet Watch

Free Tibet (www.freetibet.org) is a London-based international campaign organisation. Our vision is a free Tibet in which Tibetans are able to determine their own future and the human rights of all are respected. Free Tibet’s research partner, Tibet Watch (www.tibetwatch.org) promotes the human rights of the Tibetan people through monitoring, research and advocacy. It documents human rights abuse in Tibet using sources in Tibet, interviews with Tibetan refugees and monitoring of Chinese government websites and media.  All of the information provided by Tibet Watch about events in Tibet is verified and corroborated as far as is possible within the limitations which apply in Tibet.

The task of evaluating and analysing the human rights situation inside Tibet is extremely challenging. Since the Tibetan Uprising in 2008, independent international media, human rights NGOs, diplomats, government and parliamentary representatives and institutions of the United Nations have been given almost no access to Tibet by the Chinese government and no free access at all – the rare, officially sanctioned visits are tightly-controlled. Tibetan communication with the outside world is very closely monitored and Tibetans transmitting information about human rights abuses or concerns both within and outside Tibet face heavy penalties.

Free Tibet and Tibet Watch’s areas of expertise and experience with the FCO do not encompass all the aspects of the inquiry and our evidence will be confined to our areas of knowledge.

The FCO’s human rights priorities

1. Since being invaded in 1950, Tibet has been controlled and ruled by the People’s Republic of China. Tibetan opposition to China’s rule has been sustained since the invasion. China’s policies inside Tibet threaten the Tibetan culture, environment, language, religion and national identity. While it is impossible to systematically evaluate the views of Tibetans inside Tibet, it is clear that many oppose Chinese rule in principle, in addition to opposing specific Chinese government policies in Tibet.

2. China criminalises activities defending or asserting Tibetan freedom and national identity, or which express implicit or explicit opposition to Chinese rule. These activities are usually defined as “separatism”, an imprecisely-defined “state security” crime (Article 4, State Security Law of China, 1993) which carries severe legal penalties, up to and including the death penalty. Suspects of state security crimes have lower levels of protection (such as access to legal representation) than is the case for suspects of other criminal activity.

3. As a result, and in addition to the general failure of Chinese criminal law to comply with internationally-recognised human and civil rights provisions, “separatism” law reduces the legal protections available to those charged with the offence and provides a legal justification for criminalising and punishing political, social and cultural activities by Tibetans. In this context, the focus on rule of law does not address legal discrimination against, and persecution of, Tibetans.

4. In the Tibetan context, the UK’s emphasis on rule of law can be actively counterproductive. It may transmit a signal to China, which has a comprehensive legislative framework and developed legal bureaucracy, that the UK places a higher priority on a stable legal framework for business to operate in than on the defence of citizens’ fundamental human rights. These are China’s own priorities in developing rule of law and the UK risks validating and reinforcing the Chinese government’s approach.

The FCO’s use of external advice

5. Free Tibet and Tibet Watch’s relationship with the FCO is primarily with the China directorate. Our interaction consists of: (a) provision of information about current events in Tibet (through distribution of press releases and meetings with officials); (b)submitting full thematic reports about developments in Tibet; (c) participation in consultations prior to the UK-China Human Rights Dialogue; (d) requests to take up individual political prisoner cases; (e) ad hoc meetings or correspondence in relation to campaigns or emerging issues (sometimes in joint meetings with other Tibet and/or China-related NGOs); (f) occasional meetings at ministerial level (as part of wider Tibetan or China-related groups).

6. Free Tibet and Tibet Watch’s experience of working with the FCO’s China team is generally very positive. They are accessible, receptive and engaged. They demonstrate appreciation for information provided (which is hard for the government to obtain itself from Tibet) and a willingness to take action, such as seeking information about individual cases. We are invited to participate in meetings in advance of the UK-China Human Rights Dialogues and are provided feedback when they have taken place. Prior to her appointment, the consul to Chengdu personally visited Free Tibet’s office to gain our insights on the situation in Tibet. This engagement is welcomed and appreciated.

7. Free Tibet and Tibet Watch have appreciated the willingness of ministers to publicly take up the cases of Tibetan prisoners on the basis of information we have provided.

8. Our relationships at ministerial level have not recently been satisfactory, however, and meetings have taken place only in response to our requests, rather than being proactively solicited by the FCO. Requests for meetings with the Secretary of State have been rebuffed or ignored.

9. Free Tibet and Tibet Watch have participated in two meetings with Minister of State Hugo Swire (in 2014 and 2015), in the company of other NGOs. In both, his level of engagement was low, leading to concerns that the meetings are “box-ticking” exercises rather than consultations. Indeed, our experience is that he has approached these meetings extremely defensively and been unwilling to acknowledge the legitimacy of criticism or engage in constructive debate. On one occasion, he appeared to have a pre-prepared list of responses to potential criticisms which he literally ticked off as he answered each point.

10. An unwillingness to listen to the views and analysis of country experts and human rights professionals - and, indeed, a propensity to lecture them on why they are mistaken – is both disrespectful and a barrier to good policymaking. Any criticisms of UK policy in regard to human rights in Tibet and China made by Free Tibet, Tibet Watch and other human rights advocates we work alongside are not politically motivated but arise from legitimate concerns over its effectiveness.  Our perception is that we have sometimes been treated as if we were simply closed-minded ideologues blowing off steam rather than as professional stakeholders whose insights, experiences and analysis form a valued – or any - part of policy formation.

11. During the meeting between Mr Swire and China-related NGOs that took place on 13 October 2015, prior to the State Visit of President Xi Jinping, we sought specific information from the minister about how human rights would be addressed during the visit – such as at which level discussions would take place, whether particular issues or cases would be addressed and so on. Mr Swire declined to provide that information, stating “you wouldn’t expect us to tell you that in advance of the meeting”. Mr Swire failed to make clear, however, why it was inappropriate for HM Government to advise stakeholders of the government’s plans in regard to this important issue. His silence gave rise to concerns that the information wasn’t being provided because there was no plan to raise human rights in a substantive way during the visit. We still don’t know whether they were (see para 12).

12. Similarly, in advance of the visit, Mr Swire failed to respond when the same information was requested via a Written Parliamentary Question (Question 1104, 9 October).  In addition, in response to an Urgent Question during the visit itself (Hansard, 22 October 2015, col 1125-1134), Mr Swire said: “I am sure that many Members on both sides of the House will want to know what was discussed and when. I shall do my best to answer that question, although I stress that the state visit is still under way” (column 1126). However, neither in that reply nor since the visit has information been released providing any detail on any human rights discussions that took place (including in Mr Swire’s response to oral questions on 24 November [Hansard 24 Nov 2015: Column 1173]).

13. The failure to provide such information regarding the government’s political and diplomatic activities in support of human rights is a significant barrier to stakeholders providing effective policy input. It is also a clear failure to exercise accountability, especially, in this case, in the context of President Xi’s visit when there was strong public and media interest in the government’s approach to human rights in China and Tibet.

14. During the debate of 22 October, Mr Swire reported that he had “met a lot of pressure groups and non-governmental organisations . . . who came to raise their concerns” in advance of the visit (Hansard, 22 October, col 1131). Given that Free Tibet, Tibet Watch and many other organisations attending the meeting felt that Mr Swire had failed to engage or respond constructively to our input, the reply can be seen to carry a misleading and politically-advantageous implication of meaningful consultation and the inclusion of stakeholder input in government policy. A number of organisations have expressed the view that if such meetings are a box-ticking or PR exercise, it may be better not to participate in them at all.  

Evaluation of performance

15. Accountability to the public and external stakeholders is an essential facet of good governance. Provision of information is the fundamental prerequisite of accountability. In addition, external stakeholder input is essential to a proper and objective evaluation of government policy and activity. While security and diplomatic considerations may prevent full disclosure of all the government’s activities in support of human rights, there should, nevertheless, be a presumption that the fullest possible disclosure of information about activities, results and strategy is essential to the development and evaluation of policy. To the largest extent possible, external and internal evaluation should be the same thing.

16. As things stand, however, the government’s approach to the disclosure of information poses a significant barrier to external evaluation of its human rights policy. In the area of our expertise, Tibet, we currently do not know what the government seeks to achieve in supporting human rights there, how it evaluates its performance or whether it has met its goals.

17. Active resistance to providing information about how the government supports human rights at diplomatic and ministerial level (para 11) is problematic in three ways: firstly, as noted, it prevents external stakeholders such as Free Tibet and Tibet Watch from effectively contributing to any internal or external evaluation of human rights policy; secondly, it prevents stakeholders tailoring their activities in ways which are complementary to the government’s approach; thirdly, it may lead to unjustified or counterproductive criticism of government by stakeholders, based on their ignorance about what the government is actually doing. Needless to say, the resistance to dialogue and the provision of information does not foster the trust of stakeholders, potentially exacerbating the risk of such criticism.

18. While ministers’ advisory bodies on human rights are likely to have more detailed and comprehensive information about the formation of government policy and mechanisms of evaluation, of necessity they can only include a limited number of stakeholders, who will tend to have wide interests and a generalist approach. Stakeholders with expertise in thematic or geographical areas also require access to such information.

19. While the lack of detailed information available to stakeholders is a major limitation on the value and effectiveness of external feedback, any expressed opinion by human rights advocates on the government’s performance, either directly to the FCO or in the public domain, must form a part of the evaluation of its effectiveness. Put simply, if human rights advocates are unhappy with the government’s performance, that is an indication that something is wrong. That may arise from poor performance, poor communication or some other reason but it must be accounted for in any evaluation.

20. Activity should be evaluated by results. Ministers robustly and repeatedly defend the UK’s approach to human rights in China but do not provide systematic evidence of its success. A basic mechanism of evaluation is to publish targets or goals and measure success against them. This allows stakeholders to assess the validity and value of the targets themselves and to assess the government’s effectiveness in meeting them. It is surprising that the government does not follow that good practice in regard to its human rights work.

The annual human rights report

21. In regard to Tibet, the human rights report is generally accurate in our view and constitutes a valuable resource, often providing additional weight to the information published by campaigning organisations, which may be viewed with scepticism by some audiences. Free Tibet and Tibet Watch also appreciate that a section is provided for Tibet specifically and that issues there are not simply folded into the China narrative.

22. In Tibet’s case, however, we are gravely concerned that the government does not confine its content to the human rights situation but also states current UK government policy on the sovereignty of Tibet and its constitutional future: The UK’s policy on Tibet remains unchanged. The UK recognises Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China and does not support Tibetan independence (2014 Human Rights and Democracy Report, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/china-country-of-concern--2/china-country-of-concern).

23. Tibet is a “core concern” for the Chinese government and a topic on which it is exceptionally sensitive. It issued robust criticisms of the UK government over the meeting in 2012 between David Cameron, Nick Clegg and the Dalai Lama, a development which the UK government believes to have led to a “deep freeze” in diplomatic relations. At the time of the report’s publication and preparation, UK-China relations were improving substantially and the UK used the exact language quoted above repeatedly in public communications.

24. The HR report does not elsewhere explicitly articulate the government’s position on internal constitutional matters and it is difficult not to conclude that its inclusion in this section is a political gesture designed to mollify Chinese anger in response to human rights in Tibet being raised at all. The report is not an appropriate place for the government to promote, explain or pursue its foreign policy goals. Doing so undermines its credibility.

25. In regard to its role in describing the work of the FCO, the HR report contains introductions by ministers outlining the government’s priorities and principles and ample anecdotal evidence of the FCO’s activity in support of human rights. It does not, however, publish the FCO’s human rights strategies at a global or regional level, indicate its targets or progress in meeting them and provides no other benchmarks for the effectiveness of its policy. As a mechanism for reporting and evaluating UK human rights policy, the HR report is currently inadequate.

26. The activity and performance of other departments in regard to human rights is not adequately reflected or addressed in the report.

Recommendations

Strategic priorities

• Ensure that where policy relies on enhancing “shared values” – such as, in China’s case, the rule of law – it does not send a signal that “unshared values” – such as whether law should protect fundamental human and civil rights – are not important to the UK.

Use of external advice

• Recognise the value of human rights NGOs and other stakeholders in the formation and assessment of policy.
• Actively solicit expert stakeholder input on human rights policy – including at local and regional level.
• Operate on the presumption that the fullest possible disclosure of plans and activity is desirable in the interests of accountability and to allow stakeholders to contribute to UK policy development.

Evaluation of success

• Place strategy, targets and performance in the public domain.
• Actively solicit the input of stakeholders as part of the evaluation process for human rights policy.
• Provide comprehensive information about political and diplomatic level activity to allow stakeholders to effectively evaluate UK policy.
• Include NGO feedback in evaluation.

Annual human rights report

• Ensure content is confined to human rights reporting and relevant human rights activity by the UK.
• Provide full information about strategy, targets and effectiveness in the report.
• Alternatively, consider a separate report on UK human rights policy, providing information on strategy, targets and effectiveness.
• Ensure all human rights activity across government is adequately reflected and reported.

February 2016