Written evidence from Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (RUS0016)
The Association of Ukrainians in Great Britain (AUGB) is the largest representative body for Ukrainians and those of Ukrainian descent in the UK. It exists to develop, promote and support the interests of the Ukrainian community in the UK. We have branches around the UK and work through a network of volunteers. We have no political affiliations but promote and support the democratic development of Ukraine, including closer Ukrainian integration into the EU. We have close links with academic and cultural institutions in Ukraine, and with various civic groups.
The AUGB is making this submission because we believe it is important for the inquiry to take into account the views of the Ukrainian diaspora, who have a real interest in the development of policy strategies which bring long term benefits for both the UK and Ukraine.
We welcome the opportunity to provide a written statement for this consultation and would be happy to provide oral evidence if required.
Our submission is in three parts:
The actions of Russia in Ukraine are without justification and violate a number of international laws, the UN Treaty and the Budapest Memorandum.
Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergiy Lavrov, has called for a ‘re-set’ of relationships between Russia and the West, but this should be approached with caution and from a position of resolution and strength.
The UK must take a clear position which sends a strong message that tyranny will not be tolerated. In particular, the UK should:
1. While relationships may have cooled, there is little evidence of active ‘management’ and we have concerns about the FCO’s ability to influence the EU (particularly given current UK/EU relationships) to maintain a strong response to Russia, in the light of growing calls from some European politicians that sanctions should be loosened. We endorse Lord Tugenhat’s comments on the publication of the House of Lords report into the Ukrainian crisis
“… the UK’s expertise within the Foreign Office has diminished significantly. The lack of robust analytical capacity, in both the UK and the EU, effectively led to a catastrophic misreading of the mood in the run-up to the crisis. Furthermore, as a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum, the UK had a particular responsibility towards Ukraine and it has not been as active or as visible as it could have been.”
2. The Select Committee is well aware of Russian foreign policy and how it is impacting on international and bilateral relationships. (Section 3.1).
3. We believe that a key issue is that of ‘responding’ to events, where the UK and its international partners seem to have been constantly on the back foot.
4. While sanctions against Russian banks and individuals involved in the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas are welcome, and we appreciate the UK’s support, they are not a sufficiently strong response to Russian aggression. The sanctions are relatively limited in scope and generally relate to individuals, many of whom are unlikely to have significant assets in the UK and Europe or be affected seriously by any visa ban. London is still a haven for Russian money, no action has been taken against the oligarchs who actively support President Putin’s policies and few of President Putin’s inner circle are on the sanctions list.
5. There are calls to remove sanctions against Russia from some European leaders and MPs, citing progress in peace talks over Ukraine. In reality, the Russian Federation has largely disregarded the Minsk agreement and has failed to deliver its commitments (Section 3.2). Sanctions were initially placed upon Russia for the annexation of Crimea: as such, there can be no question of sanctions being weakened or lifted whilst Russia or Russian-backed forces occupy any part of Ukraine’s territory.
6. The question of sanctions more generally needs to be revisited in the light of the findings of the Litvinenko inquiry – where the government response has been weak. Expressing ‘our profound displeasure’ is unlikely to change Russian government policy. We believe strongly that the time has come for the UK to implement a ‘Magnitsky law’ and extend the sanctions regime so that it has real impact on the oligarchs and policy makers who can influence Russian foreign policy.
7. The UK and its international partners should review the effectiveness of the United Nations. In particular, Russia has used its right of veto on the UN Security Council to prevent investigation into its complicity in promoting conflict in Ukraine and elsewhere, and into the MH17 disaster, hampering the United Nations’ role of conflict prevention and resolution.
8. At the same time, the UK should extend its programme of aid to Ukraine. We acknowledge the aid that has already been provided: for training for the army, winter and medical equipment and for the process of reform, and welcome the further aid that will be provided through the Magna Carta Fund for Human Rights and Democracy. However, the question of arms for Ukraine needs to be back on the table - to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capability and its ability to protect its eastern borders. As a signatory to the Budapest Memorandum, the UK can do no less. (Section 3.4)
9. Recently, attention has moved away from Ukraine to Syria. The need to target Daesh in Syria is clear, and there are calls for partnering with Russia to achieve this. However, it is clear that Vladimir Putin’s objectives do not align with those of the UK. While concerted international effort will be needed to deal with the geopolitical risk that Daesh represents, this must not be achieved at the expense of the very real threat that Russia poses to European security.
10. We are concerned that some may believe that quietly allowing Russia to keep Crimea may be a price worth paying for co-operation in Syria and elsewhere. This would simply foster Russia’s belief that it can violate international agreements with impunity. Using Ukraine as a bargaining chip would betray the democratic choices that the Ukrainian people have made and would not create any climate of trust or understanding for the longer term.
11. In developing strategies to deal with terrorism in Syria and elsewhere, the UK must continue to take a strong line on non-recognition of Crimea’s annexation: anything other will simply confirm the view of the current Russian leadership that they are dealing with weak and ineffectual international partners.
12. In the long term, a Ukraine which is economically successful, with European standards of public administration, and with a well-trained and equipped defensive capability will enhance Europe’s security and provide the best possible response to the increasingly authoritarian and hostile ideology of the Russian state.
13. The House of Lords report referred to above concluded that there was a critical need to rebuild analytical expertise and deepen the FCO’s knowledge of the political context of Russia and the region.
14. We note the moves announced by the Home Secretary in response to the Litvinenko inquiry in relation to strengthening the role of security and intelligence agencies to counter terrorist threats in a changing world, but have not seen any evidence that the FCO is in fact rebuilding the lost depth of analytical capability.
15. Without that, the UK government will continue to be in a position where it responds to events, after the event. However, analytical capability needs to be matched with a willingness to act more decisively and, if necessary pre-emptively, given that Russia has shown quite clearly that it respects only strength.
16. The UK government and the FCO does not currently appear to have the capability to counter Russian propaganda, which is shaping the views of the Russian people as well as fostering support for Russian foreign policy across Europe (Section 3.3).
17. The cuts to the BBC World Service, and to the Ukrainian and Russian services in particular in 2011/2012 were a huge mistake. Reducing the number of broadcasting hours (or eliminating them completely in the case of the Ukrainian service) to countries with low internet access has meant that millions no longer have an alternative viewpoint or access to independent journalism, particularly in Russia where state-sponsored media dominates.
18. While the UK has reduced its output in channelling independent journalism to Ukraine and Russia, it has on the other hand granted broadcasting licences to Russian media, including the RT channel, which is funded by the Russian state and has a specific role in disinformation and promoting the Kremlin’s viewpoint to European audiences.
19. In a world where Russia is using disinformation as a weapon, the FCO should review the impacts of the cuts to the BBC World Service and the Ukrainian and Russian services and consider the potential benefits of reversing those cuts and increasing the number of broadcasting hours.
20. As for cultural exchanges, these have some value in creating personal relationships and promoting understanding. However, when prominent Russian cultural figures such as Valery Gergiev, Iosyf Kobzon and Valeriya, openly support abuses of human rights in Russia, the annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, they should not be allowed visas to perform or work in the UK.
21. The human rights situation in Russia, and as a consequence of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine, is significantly worsening (Section 3.5). We recognise that the UK has bilateral relationships with many countries that have a dubious human rights record. However, Russia’s record must be a factor in considering how the relationship should develop and an integral part of the analytical capability of the FCO since it is a key indicator of Russia’s ideology, how Russia assesses external responses to its actions and the extent to which Russia can be trusted to conform to international norms of behaviour. If Russia perceives the West to have a weak response to violation of international borders and international agreements, it is hardly likely to believe that there will be a stronger response to human rights and judicial abuses.
22. Nevertheless, the UK government should use every opportunity to condemn human rights abuses unequivocally and in particular, to press for the release of Ukrainians currently held in Russia as a result of politically motivated trials.
23. We are particularly concerned about the mounting evidence of war crimes being committed with impunity in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine: deliberate attacks on civilians, torture of prisoners and summary executions, with Russia protecting those responsible. The UK and international agencies must support Ukraine to ensure all those culpable are brought to justice.
24. In February 2014, Putin launched an operation to annex Crimea. Following the annexation of Crimea, Putin instigated and continues to fight a war in Eastern Ukraine. In both cases, there is clear evidence that Russian forces were directly involved, despite denials from the Russian state. President Putin himself said that the invasion of Crimea was planned from Moscow, and has awarded medals to those Russian forces involved. Igor Strelkin, a Russian with FSB connections, has said in numerous interviews that he and other Russians “pulled the trigger of war” and that if his squad had not crossed the border, the situation in Eastern Ukraine would have normalised, as it had previously in Kharkiv and Odesa.
25. This war has devastated Eastern Ukraine, resulting in over 9 thousand deaths. http://www.un.org.ua/images/stories/12th_OHCHR_report_on_Ukraine_EN.pdf
Over 2.2 million people have been displaced.
‘Humanitarian’ aid from Russia has armed, equipped and financed separatist forces, while the self-appointed leadership has banned international humanitarian organisations from working in the region.
26. The BUK weapons system provided by Russia resulted in the downing of MH17, a commercial flight shot down over Ukraine, murdering 298 innocent people, including 10 British citizens. The Russian Federation has failed to acknowledge its role or apologised for this horrific act.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-29109398
27. The facts are that there was never any threat to Russian citizens, the Russian language, or to any residents of Ukraine of whatever race or creed that could have justified any intervention by any foreign power.
28. As far back as March 2014, an open letter to President Putin signed by representatives of Jewish organisations in Ukraine put the issue bluntly:
“Unfortunately, we must admit that in recent days stability in our country has been threatened. And this threat is coming from the Russian government, namely – from you personally. It is your policy of inciting separatism and crude pressure placed on Ukraine that threatens us and all Ukrainian people…we do not wish to be “defended”... We decisively call for you not to intervene in internal Ukrainian affairs, to return the Russian armed forces to their normal fixed peacetime location, and to stop encouraging pro-Russian separatism.”
http://eajc.org/page32/news43672.html
29. The French, German, Ukrainian and Russian leaders have engaged in talks, (the Normandy Format), with the objective of bringing peace to Ukraine. In February 2015 a second Minsk agreement was reached.
30. The agreement included commitment to a full ceasefire. Since the ceasefire, Ukrainian government forces have been attacked on over 15,000 occasions, OSCE monitors in separatist-held territory have had their movements restricted and, on several occasions, come under attack themselves.
http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/216551
31. The agreement included the withdrawal of all foreign armed formations and military equipment. There is little evidence of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. Since the agreement, more Russian military equipment has been moved into Ukraine. In October 2015, the OSCE reported the movement of the Russian TOS-1 ‘Buratino’ weapon system, a particularly destructive and indiscriminate weapon.
32. The agreement included the restoration of control of the state border to the Ukrainian government in the whole conflict zone. There is no evidence that any steps have been taken to ensure this happens.
33. The Ukrainian government entered into the Minsk agreement to save lives in the face of overwhelming Russian military superiority and is in the process of fulfilling many of its commitments under the Minsk agreement, including withdrawal of weapons and new legislation to decentralise government powers and functions to the regions. However, the Russian-supported separatists are refusing to hold elections under Ukrainian law, and there is no evidence that Russia is using its influence to promote genuine and lasting peace.
34. Putin has consistently deceived the West with a range of blatant lies about the situation in Ukraine and the involvement of the Russian Federation. The Russian government has poured huge amounts of money into developing its media throughout the EU, particularly the Russia Today channel, which has a licence to broadcast in the UK, and through its army of ‘twitter trolls’.
35. Two specific examples of how the Russian propaganda machine has been used to distort the truth can be seen in the claim that Crimea was annexed through a popular uprising and a legitimate referendum, and the continuing false claims that the Ukrainian government is fascist. In both the Presidential and parliamentary elections, far right parties received a fraction of the vote – indeed a significantly lower percentage than far right parties in other European countries, including France. In Crimea, Russian forces were instrumental and the ‘referendum’ (overseen by representatives of some of Europe’s most far-right parties and Putin supporters) did not comply with any aspect of Ukrainian or international law. other European countries, including France.
36. In 1995, the UK, US, Russia and Ukraine signed the Budapest memorandum. Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees.
37. Only this week, the Russian Embassy in the UK tweeted Sergiy Lavrov’s statement that Russia had not breached the Budapest Memorandum, as it had not threatened Ukraine with nuclear weapons. This is a blatant lie. Of the six articles of the Memorandum, Russia has breached articles 1, 2 and 3 in relation to the annexation of Crimea, armed intervention in Luhansk and Donetsk, economic sanctions and appropriation of Ukrainian property and industries.
38. Under pressure from the West, Ukraine destroyed stockpiles of weapons. After giving up their weaponry, Ukrainians believe that more active help should be provided by the Budapest Memorandum signatories by supplying weapons to help defend the territorial security that was ‘guaranteed’.
39. The AUGB notes that the UK and USA have not taken part in the Normandy Format discussions. Their involvement would be welcome in any further peace negotiations.
40. In annexed Crimea, the human rights situation continues to worsen. A year after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, Amnesty International highlighted human rights abuses by the de facto authorities, including the failure to investigate a series of abductions and torture of their critics, and their unrelenting campaign of intimidation against pro-Ukrainian media, campaigning organisations, Crimean Tatars and other individuals critical of the regime.
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/03/crimea-annexation-critics-attacked-and-silenced/
41. Since then, the Crimean Tatar leader, Mustafa Dzemielev, has been banned from entering Crimea and has spoken about further ‘disappearances’ of Tatar critics of the regime.
42. Russia has been perverting its legal system with trials which Amnesty International has said are reminiscent of the Stalin era. Ukrainian citizens subjected to show trials include the film director Oleg Sentsov and Alexander Kolchenko, sentenced to 23 and 12 years respectively. Sentsov’s claims of torture were dismissed by the court. The Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko is currently on trial after her abduction from Ukraine, on false charges of murder where, most recently, the court has disallowed video evidence which proves that she had already been captured by Russian forces before the alleged murders took place.
43. There is a mounting body of evidence of war crimes being committed in Eastern Ukraine, with those responsible confident that Russia will shelter them from international justice.
http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1453252240