Written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (RUS0011)

 

FCO policy towards Russia and the UK-Russia bilateral relationship

 

Contents

 

Introduction

UK/Russia bilateral relations since the Cold War

The 2014 Ukraine crisis and UK response

Current UK policy

              Protecting UK national security

Engaging with Russia

Advancing UK prosperity

Promoting cultural, scientific and people-to-people links

Promoting UK values

Resourcing and Expertise

Conclusion

 

Annexes:

 

A:              Previous material laid before Parliament

B:              Timeline of key events

C:              Economic relations and UK prosperity

D:              Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

Introduction

 

1.     The UK’s bilateral relationship with Russia has had a chequered history, and has been subject to frequent tensions as a result of bilateral disputes and contrasting world views. The UK’s overall objective is to respond to threats to UK security and challenges to the international rules-based system whilst maintaining dialogue in areas of shared interest.

 

2.     The Government has long been clear that Russia's disregard for international norms and principles represent a significant threat to our national security. By annexing Crimea and destabilising Ukraine – behaviour the like of which we have not seen in Europe since the Second World War – Russia has flouted the basic principles of European security and the international rules-based order.

 

3.     Our immediate priorities are to protect the UK from challenges to our national security, to deter Russia from further destabilising actions in Ukraine and the eastern neighbourhood, to ensure that Russia’s actions in Syria do not hinder progress towards political transition and an end to the conflict, and to take forward guarded dialogue where this is necessary to advance UK interests.

 

4.     Against this background, the Government recognises that Russia is a strategically important country for the UK. It has the world’s 13th largest economy and holds the largest proven gas reserves in the world as well as one of the highest proven reserves of oil. It provides a significant proportion of the energy imports of EU countries. UK companies are major foreign investors in Russia. As a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear weapon State, Russia retains a strong voice in determining the international response to a variety of global security challenges in which we have a major national interest.

 

5.     The UK has longstanding, historical ties with Russia, from working with the Soviet Union as an ally during the Second World War to cooperating with the current leadership on issues of global security. The UK is a major destination for Russian private and corporate investors and students. We have strong cultural ties and there is a long history of cooperation between institutions, individuals and governments on both sides.

 

6.     This memorandum should be read in conjunction with: the relevant sections of the recently-published National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR); previous evidence submitted to the House of Lords to help inform its debate on EU-Russia relations; the evidence recently provided by the Ministry of Defence to the Defence Committee; and the Home Secretary’s statement to the House on the Litvinenko Inquiry on 21 January. Hyperlinks to this material are at Annex A.

 

7.     Annex B sets out a timeline of key events in UK/Russia relations since 1991. Annexes C and D provide further background on the UK/Russia economic relationship and human rights situation in Russia.

 

UK/Russia bilateral relations since the Cold War

 

8.     From the end of the Cold War, the West’s broad objective had been to try to promote Russia’s integration into the international system and global economy, and build a strategic partnership with Russia. 

 

9.     The UK was at the forefront of this approach. Following the dissolution of the USSR, the UK moved swiftly to establish diplomatic relations with the newly-independent Russian Federation and to develop a strong and productive bilateral relationship.  We sought to address Russia’s fear of perceived NATO encirclement by supporting the establishment of a formal relationship through the NATO-Russia 1997 ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security’ (NRFA). We strongly supported Russia’s inclusion into a wide range of multilateral organisations and groups, including the Council of Europe in 1996, the G8 in 1997, and its accession to the World Trade Organisation. The UK was also active in providing technical support to Russia in its transition from a planned economy to a market one. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10. The high-point of this early period was the State Visit to Russia by HM The Queen in 1994.  Relations initially continued this positive trajectory following Vladimir Putin’s election as Russian President in 2000.  The high watermark of the post-Cold War relationship was Putin’s State Visit to the UK in 2003, following which a landmark deal was concluded by BP for the establishment of a major new joint venture in the Russian oil sector.

 

11. Since then we have seen a significant cooling in relations between Russia and the West.  Tensions have stemmed from disputes over: the US-led intervention in Iraq and wider deterioration in US-Russia relations; the ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia and Ukraine respectively in 2003-4; concern in the West over disruptive Russian behaviour in international organisations and its human rights record; Russian opposition to the prospect of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine; divergent approaches to the Kosovo question; and Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008.

 

12. In the UK’s case, this deterioration was compounded by bilateral disputes over the UK’s granting of asylum to two prominent opponents of the Russian authorities in 2003 and the murder of British citizen Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006. In its 21 January 2016 report, the independent Litvinenko Inquiry found unequivocally that two Russian nationals, Andrei Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun, were responsible, that there is a strong probability they were acting under the direction of the Russian domestic security service the FSB, and that the operation was probably approved by Nikolai Patrushev, the then head of the FSB, and by President Putin.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

13. Some areas of collaboration remained – for example, from 2010-2013 we cooperated with Russia on energy issues and at the 2010 NATO summit we committed to work with our Allies to build a partnership with Russia. HMG also announced a limited channel of engagement with Russia on security for the 2013 Winter Olympics in Sochi. But it has become increasingly clear that Russia’s approach towards the West has changed from seeking closer integration to a more confrontational approach. Its actions in Ukraine from early 2014 saw the West’s relationship with Russia, and by extension UK-Russia relations, reach a new low-point.

 

The 2014 Ukraine Crisis and UK response

 

14. The roots of the Ukraine crisis lie in Russia’s rejection of the right of the people of Ukraine to choose their own future, free from external interference. Since 2007 Ukraine had been working towards an Association Agreement with the European Union. This was an open, transparent process between a sovereign State and the European Union. 

 

15. When Russia decided that it did not agree with the path that its neighbour was following, it put extreme pressure on the then President Yanukovych. As a result, at the last minute he decided not to sign the agreement.  This unexplained about-face provoked the protests in Maidan square which were met with violence by the security forces. Yanukovych fled to Russia, abandoning his constitutional responsibilities and causing the Ukrainian parliament to remove him from office on the grounds that he had vacated his post.

 

16. Russia’s occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea followed in March 2014.  Shortly afterwards Russian troops and weapons started crossing the border to support ‘separatist’ proxies in fighting Ukrainian forces in the Donbas. Russian forces have been directly involved in the fighting and our assessment is that, despite Russian disavowals, a Russian military presence remains in eastern Ukraine. This all resulted from the deliberate and calculated policy formulated in the Kremlin.

17. We are clear that the blame for the crisis lies squarely with Russia and the separatist proxies they continue to support in eastern Ukraine.  The illegal annexation of Crimea represented a flagrant violation of a number of Russia’s international commitments, including: the UN Charter; the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine’s Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Budapest Memorandum); the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation, signed in Helsinki on 1 Aug 1975; and, the 1997 Russia/Ukraine Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Partnership. President Putin has stated publicly that it was planned well in advance of the so-called referendum. Meanwhile it has been clear throughout that Russia’s objective is to destabilise the Donbas in order to secure strategic influence over Ukraine’s future. As such it represented a direct challenge to the international rules-based system and the territorial integrity of a sovereign nation.

 

18. The human consequences of this have been severe. In its report of December 2015, the UN estimated that the conflict had resulted in the death of 9,098 people, the wounding of 20,732, and the displacement of over two million.  The conflict created the conditions for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, which killed all 298 passengers and crew on board including 10 British Nationals. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

19. By working with likeminded EU Member States and other international partners, the UK was at the forefront of efforts to ensure Russia was held accountable for its actions. We worked hard to ensure EU support for linking a robust sanctions package to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. With oil prices at a 12 year low and wider structural economic problems, international sanctions have added to the pressures on Russia’s economy. Sanctions are designed to have the maximum impact on the Russian leadership while minimising the impact on the UK and EU. 

 

20. More broadly, we worked closely together with international partners to send a firm and clear political signal to Russia about the unacceptability of its actions. The UK helped to secure UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 which reaffirmed international support for the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine. We worked with partners to support the suspension of all practical NATO-Russia cooperation, Russian voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and Russia’s OECD accession process

 

21. Following the illegal annexation of Crimea, we undertook a review of UK-Russia bilateral relations. We reached the following broad conclusions:

 

 

 

22. In light of this, Ministers were clear that it could not be business-as-usual in our bilateral relationship with Russia. This did not mean a “freezing” of bilateral relations: we recognise that we should engage Russia where it is in our interests to do so. However, decisions were taken in the Spring of 2014 to:

 

 

 

 

23. Russia retaliated to EU sanctions by banning agricultural imports from European countries, cancelling the EU-Russia human rights dialogue, and drawing up a “blacklist” of EU nationals (including several high profile British Nationals) prohibited from entering the country. We continue to believe that these retaliatory actions have no basis in international law. Although there has been a cost to the EU’s economy, the EU has been effective in reorienting its agricultural trade towards new markets. Total EU exports to third countries have increased, whilst Russia has seen food inflation reach 26 per cent.

 

Current UK policy

24. We wanted Europe to build a strategic partnership with Russia, but Russia has made clear it regards the West with mistrust and views NATO, and increasingly the EU, as a threat to its interests and what it considers to be its sphere of influence in its borderlands. A fundamental divergence of values and interests, combined with the unpredictability of Russian behaviour, has increasingly limited the scope for strategic partnership.

 

25. This is not just about Ukraine. Russia continues to interfere in the affairs of Georgia and show a blatant disregard for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, most recently with the signature of new treaties with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It continues systematically to undermine the sovereignty of Moldova through its support for the unrecognised regime in Transnistria. It kidnapped an Estonian official and imprisoned him illegally in Moscow. It has used military force and ‘hybrid warfare’ in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.  And its current Foreign Policy Concept (2013) asserts the right to defend the interests of Russian ‘compatriots’ abroad – the definition of which is worryingly elastic and opaque.

 

26. Russia continues to use rhetoric and high-profile exercising in relation to its nuclear forces, and has increased its military activity around the territory of the UK and our allies. Russia deploys submarines including in waters adjacent to the UK. Although they have never entered UK airspace, Russian military aircraft continue to probe around our area of interest, which has on occasion affected civil aviation routes.

 

27. Despite the strategic threat posed by Russia, its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the fact that it still represents a significant market for UK goods and services, create opportunities for cooperation to further foreign policy and national security goals and to enhance UK prosperity. Our historical, cultural and people-to-people links can also become even more important during times of political tension as channels of communication.       

 

28. The Government’s objectives in respect of Russia are therefore to protect UK interests and those of our allies and partners; to uphold the rules-based international order in the face of Russian challenges; to engage with Russia on global security issues and in key areas of shared interest; to promote our values, including the rule of law and human rights; and to build stronger links between the British and Russian people more widely.

 

29. This means that we are focused on: taking the necessary actions to protect UK national security; the full implementation of the Minsk agreements in Ukraine, including through the application of EU sanctions; working with NATO allies to deter Russian aggression and reassure our partners; keeping the pressure on Russia to adhere to its international obligations; persuading Russia to join international efforts to tackle the Daesh threat and find a political solution to the conflict in Syria; promoting UK prosperity via trade links within the constraints of sanctions; encouraging cooperation in education, culture and science; and supporting Russian civil society and human rights defenders.

Protecting UK national security

 

30. The conclusion of Sir Robert Owen that the Russian state was probably involved in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko underlines the seriousness of the threat we face from Russia. The report raises serious concerns, although they do not come as a surprise. In her statement to the House on 21 January 2016, the Home Secretary underlined that the tough measures that HMG took in 2007, and has maintained since, were premised on an assessment of probable Russian state involvement.

 

31. Since the report’s publication, an asset freezing order has been made on the two prime suspects. We continue to demand that the Russian Government account for the role of the FSB in this case, cooperate with Crown Prosecution Service’s extradition request, and provide assurance that such a crime will never be repeated. We have called on our international allies to be vigilant against such threats and enforce the warrants out for Lugovoy and Kovtun’s arrest. And we will continue to take every possible measure to protect the UK from hostile Russian activity.

32. Our commitment to collective defence and security through NATO remains as strong as ever. The 2014 Wales Summit, under UK leadership, delivered an effective and united response to Russian behaviour. NATO’s commitments include the Allies’ defence investment pledge and the Readiness Action Plan, which respond to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications, as well as to risks and threats to the south of Europe.

 

33. Our defence spending commitment will ensure that we remain NATO’s strongest military power in Europe. In 2017 the UK will lead the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, formed in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and we will make a significant contribution to the force every year of this Parliament. As well as providing Typhoons to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission, we have provided ships and Army units to NATO exercises to reassure our Allies against the threat from Russia, and we will continue to do so. We are joining the German-US Trans-Atlantic Capability Enhancement and Training initiative in the Baltic States and Poland, sharing our military expertise.

 

34. The Royal Air Force protects our airspace and is ready at all times to intercept aircraft where necessary, as they have done on several occasions over the past year. The Royal Navy protects our waters. Our NATO Allies provide us with early warning of approaching ships and aircraft, or deal with them before they reach our territory or airspace, as we do for our Allies. Our investment in Maritime Patrol Aircraft will significantly improve our ability to maintain our maritime security.

 

35. NATO’s approach is open and transparent. NATO exercises are announced publicly well in advance. In line with international commitments, including the provisions of the Vienna Document, Russia has been invited to observe those exercises. There is value in increased dialogue on risk reduction, to ensure that accidents and misunderstandings are avoided. Good progress is being made in the OSCE in considering new proposals on transparency and risk reduction. We are supporting these efforts. The UK is open to NATO resuming dialogue with Russia, subject to agreement among NATO members, and provided it is clearly in our interests and those of the Alliance. But it must not in any way represent a return to business as usual.

 

36. European countries import large volumes of Russian natural gas, coal and nuclear fuel. The European Commission has adopted a robust energy security posture through its ‘Energy Union’ policy framework which seeks to promote greater diversification of supply, improved interconnectivity between EU Member States, and legislative measures against market dominance. The UK supports this and the development of a single EU energy market. We are also supporting European countries (including Ukraine) to reduce their reliance on Russian energy supply through developing indigenous production, improving interconnecting infrastructure, and sharing UK best practice.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Engaging with Russia

 

37. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have had a significant impact upon the bilateral relationship. The findings of the Litvinenko Inquiry, although not surprising, have raised serious concerns and inevitably caused tension in the bilateral relationship. However, the successful outcome of the Iran nuclear negotiations demonstrates that, where necessary, we can find ways of working with Russia. The UK attaches continued importance to cooperating with Russia in addressing global challenges on a mutually-beneficial and pragmatic basis.

 

38. We maintain senior-level contacts with Russia, including at Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary level, through officials in London and Moscow, and at events commemorating our shared history. The Prime Minister spoke to President Putin on four occasions in 2015 and held a bilateral meeting in the margins of the G20 Summit in Antalya. The Foreign Secretary held two bilateral meetings with Foreign Minister Lavrov. The National Security Advisor visited Moscow on 24 June 2015 and hosted a visit by Presidential Advisor Yuri Ushakov on 2 November 2015.  The Minister for Europe visited Moscow from 21-22 December 2015 for talks with his counterpart First Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov.

 

39. Our first priority has been to use these channels to make clear our position that Russia must meet its commitments under the Minsk agreements in order to secure a political settlement delivering restored Ukrainian sovereignty over the Donbas. These include maintaining a comprehensive ceasefire and ensuring the separatists pull back heavy weapons from the contact line; allowing access to OSCE monitors; withdrawing its troops, weaponry and mercenaries from Ukraine; stopping the supply of weapons and equipment to the separatists; and the re-establishment of Ukraine’s sovereign control over its internationally-recognised eastern border. We also make clear our firm rejection of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.

 

40. On Syria, the UK and Russia have a shared interest in a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the defeat of Daesh, but it is clear that Russia’s military intervention has so far been aimed primarily at shoring up the Assad regime rather than defeating Daesh. The vast majority of Russia’s attacks are not against Daesh but against non-extremist opposition groups. This has allowed Daesh to consolidate its influence in some parts of the country. We are also deeply concerned by the repeated and well-evidenced reports that Russia’s bombing raids have resulted in extensive civilian losses.

 

41. The Vienna process has helped to secure a degree of support from Russia for the international process leading towards political transition in Syria, including Russia’s approval of UNSCR 2254 (2015). But there is much further to go. We will continue to work through the International Syria Support Group, which includes Russia, to bring about a transition in Syria to a government which can represent all Syrians, and with which we can work to defeat Daesh.

 

42. The Metrojet flight 9268 tragedy underlined the shared interest we have with Russia in tackling the terrorist threat from Daesh and its affiliates.  The Prime Minister spoke to President Putin twice following the crash to offer his condolences and share the UK assessment of the cause of the crash and the actions we had taken as a result. The Foreign Secretary also spoke to Foreign Minister Lavrov. We have followed up at senior official level on several occasions, including via a recent delegation to Moscow for exploratory talks on enhanced cooperation on aviation security.

 

43. Ongoing Russian military activity near UK airspace and territorial waters has highlighted the need to establish reliable communications between the UK and Russian militaries in order to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. To this end, with particular reference to air and maritime safety, senior officials visited Moscow in December 2015. Initial links have been established, which we will seek to develop further.

 

44. We have a shared interest with Russia in tackling threats from organised crime, including cyber-crime, drug trafficking, financial crime, and child sexual exploitation. Unfortunately, restrictions imposed by Russia upon engagement with the relevant law enforcement agencies have severely limited the potential for cooperation, although some contact does occur in international fora. We continue to work towards the re-establishment of a National Crime Agency (NCA) presence in Russia.

 

45. The diplomatic visa exchange is an important aspect of the bilateral relationship, but has proved problematic in the past. The UK and Russia have a mutual interest in a positive and constructive visa relationship that meets the operational requirements of both sides. We remain committed to improving the efficient management of the diplomatic visa relationship while protecting our national security. We engage in regular diplomatic contact with the Russians on this. The Minister for Europe discussed the issue most recently with First Deputy Foreign Minister Titov during his visit to Moscow on 22 December 2015 and made clear the UK’s desire to resolve outstanding issues.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

46. The UK and Russia can and do cooperate on legal matters, including through Interpol. All requests for judicial cooperation from Russia are considered on their own merits, on a case by case basis, in accordance with UK policy and legislation.  However, concerns in the UK courts about the judicial system and prison conditions in Russia have prompted them to reject extradition requests for a number of Russian nationals. This has been a cause of tension in the past, as has the provision of asylum in the UK to several high profile Russian nationals. Russia appears to believe that decisions taken in the UK on extradition and asylum applications are politically influenced. Citing constitutional prohibitions, Russia has refused to extradite the main suspect in Litvinenko’s murder – frustrating UK efforts to pursue justice in this case.  Successive Governments have expressed profound disappointment at Russia’s failure to cooperate.

 

Advancing UK prosperity

 

47. The Inter-Governmental Steering Committee on Trade and Investment, which was designed to advance mutual economic interests, resolve bilateral market access issues and provide a platform for businesses to conclude deals and sign contracts, was suspended following the Ukraine crisis. This has limited the scope for economic interaction with Russia. The Government will keep this under review, but Russia will need to make substantial progress in implementing its Minsk obligations before consideration can be given to reinstating a structured Ministerial dialogue in this area.

 

48. UK Trade and Investment (UKTI) is represented in all three of our Russian posts. Advising companies about areas which are, and are not, affected by sanctions is an important part of UKTI Russia’s work. Despite the challenging political and economic context, UKTI Russia secured £408.5m of Business Wins in 2014 and has achieved £149m so far this financial year, across a wide range of sectors including consumer goods, global sports, creative and media, healthcare and advanced engineering.  UKTI has a significant ‘High Value Opportunity’ (HVO) in the FIFA World Cup 2018 and estimates the potential benefits could be worth up to £200m to the UK. Russia is also part of the ‘Experience Economy’ HVO, with opportunities in development of markets, museums, heritage and leisure attractions.

 

49. The Government continues to support TheCityUK’s financial and related professional services initiative, working with the Moscow International Financial Centre Taskforce. This area of collaboration has not so far been directly affected by financial sanctions and for now continues to provide an opportunity for practical cooperation in a range of related areas and for UK firms to develop business relations.

 

50. The UK’s status as a global financial centre makes it vulnerable to money laundering threats from other countries; the significant amount of Russian private and corporate investment therefore represents both opportunities and risks for the UK economy. As the Prime Minister set out in his Singapore speech, the Government is committing to ensuring that there is no place for illicit finance in the UK.

 

51. The Government has taken a number of steps to improve its Anti Money Laundering (AML) and Counter-Terrorist Financing (CTF) regimes including: launching the Economic Crime Command in the National Crime Agency (NCA) in 2013, which leads the UK’s response to economic crime; publishing a UK Anti-Corruption Plan in 2014; establishing a new specialist international corruption unit in the NCA; legislating through the 2015 Serious Crime Act to strengthen the confiscation regime under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and creating a new offence for participation in organised crime.

 

52. The Home Office and HMT recently completed a National Risk Assessment (NRA) to identify any remaining threats and vulnerabilities, and the Government will publish a comprehensive Action Plan in the coming months in response. The priorities of the Action Plan will be to: work in closer partnership with the private sector; to fill intelligence gaps, particularly those associated with ‘high end’ money laundering; to enhance the law enforcement response to tackle the most serious threats; to address inconsistencies in the supervisory regime; and to increase international cooperation.

 

53. 2016 marks the Centenary of the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce (RBCC). The British Embassy in Moscow works closely with the RBCC to promote trade between the UK and Russia. HRH Prince Michael of Kent, as Patron of the RBCC, visited Moscow in a private capacity as guest of honour at the RBCC’s Russia Talk Forum in October 2015.

 

Promoting cultural, scientific and people-to-people links

 

54. Cultural, scientific and people-to-people links remain an important aspect of the bilateral relationship. There were nearly a quarter of a million visits by Russian nationals to the UK in 2014. It is the Government’s firm belief that cultural diplomacy should continue at a time of political differences. Engagement in the cultural, education and science spheres and continued people-to-people links between the UK and Russia can promote better understanding between our two countries.

 

55. The UK has worked hard to facilitate cultural cooperation even during difficult periods for the bilateral relationship. For example in 2007 we worked hard to ensure sufficient legislative arrangements were in place to allow The Royal Academy’s “From Russia” exhibition to proceed despite this being a period in which the British Council in Russia was being subjected to intimidation and harassment.

 

56. The 2014 UK-Russia Year of Culture celebrated the rich and diverse cultural relationship. The British Council-led programme consisted of 340 events across the arts, education, language, sport and science. Held in 13 cities, it reached out to 1 million Russians face-to-face and nearly 13 million overall. It helped to build long term cultural exchanges, increase the flow of ideas and develop stronger relationships between people and institutions.

 

57. 2016 sees a reciprocal Year of Language and Literature in the UK and Russia. Led for the UK by the British Council, it builds on the success of the 2014 Year of Culture and previous initiatives to ensure sustained collaboration in the cultural sphere between the UK and Russia. A series of events, supported by Visit Britain and UKTI, will be held across Russia throughout 2016. As the Year coincides with the 400th anniversary of Shakespeare’s death, many events will celebrate the enduring influence of the playwright’s works on global and Russian culture, and aim to increase interest in studying English and British literature among Russian audiences.

 

58. The Science Museum’s ‘Cosmonauts: Birth of the Space Age’ exhibition is a remarkable achievement displaying the most significant collection of Russian spacecraft and artefacts ever to be shown outside Russia, and many items never seen in public before. It is an excellent example of the continuing work by British and Russian institutions during this challenging period. The strong support of both governments for the exhibition has also helped see it realised. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Olga Golodets opened the exhibition and held talks with Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, John Whittingdale. Ian Blatchford, Director of the Science Museum, was personally awarded the Pushkin Medal (which celebrates achievements in arts and culture) by President Putin in December 2015.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

59. Russia has a strong scientific base.  While this has suffered from under-funding and needs modernisation, it still offers traditional strengths particularly in physics and mathematics. The last Ministerial meeting of the UK-Russia Joint Committee on Science & Technology Cooperation which met in October 2013 was suspended following events in Ukraine.    Non Ministerial engagement on science continues, including through recent visits to Russia of the Government Chief Scientific Advisor, the FCO’s Scientific Advisor and by the Royal Society’s Foreign Secretary Martyn Poliakoff.

 

60. British astronaut Tim Peake’s launch to the International Space Station in December 2015 was another highlight of scientific cooperation. He is living in the International Space Station with Russian and American astronauts for six months.  Tim’s mission and wider space industry co-operation in areas such as global communications satellites illustrate the importance of UK and Russia continuing to work together on matters of mutual interest.

 

61. On climate change, Russia played a constructive role at the UN Conference of the Parties in Paris. There is strong UK interest in Russia meeting its obligations under the Paris agreement. Russian interest in climate issues is growing, especially with regard to energy efficiency, and there is scope for the UK to work with the Russian Government and companies, including through scientific co-operation to ensure that Russia plays its part in tackling global warming which could also open commercial opportunities.      

 

62. The shared history between the UK and Russia is another area of constructive engagement. Sir Nicholas Soames MP (Sir Winston Churchill’s grandson) represented Her Majesty’s Government at the commemorations marking the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Moscow on 9 May 2015. Both the UK and Russia continue to remember more than 3,000 British and Allied servicemen who died serving in the Arctic convoys.  2016 will mark the 75th anniversary of the first Arctic convoy, codenamed ‘Dervish’ to Arkhangelsk. This will be an important moment for veterans and families, and the Government plans to mark the anniversary appropriately.

 

Promoting UK values

63. The human rights situation in Russia has deteriorated since President Putin’s return to power in 2012.  The Ukraine crisis and worsening economic context have further accelerated the squeeze on civil liberties and created a ready environment for restrictive policies.  The shrinking space for freedom of expression and increasing pressure on civil society are issues of particular concern. Further details can be found in Annex D.

 

64. The Russian State exercises a strong degree of control over political life. Parliamentary opposition parties make up 47.1% of the Russian Duma but they, in reality, are able to provide little challenge to government.  The political opposition face significant obstacles, with increasing restrictions on their activity and limited channels for communication with the public.  Pressure on the opposition is likely to grow over the coming months ahead of Duma elections in September 2016.

 

65. Within this context the UK continues to prioritise the promotion and protection of human rights in our relationship with Russia.  We make our concerns clear in bilateral interactions at all levels, including through Ministerial statements and meetings. Most recently, the Minister for Europe met human rights defenders and raised our concerns about human rights in a meeting with First Deputy Foreign Minister Titov during his visit to Moscow on 22 December 2015.  

 

66. UK Government messaging on human rights issues is direct and often public in order to raise the profile of issues of concern.  We are not alone in this and have stood alongside our international partners in condemning violations. We continue to engage with Russia through multilateral bodies, including the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe and call on Russia to respect the principles of international law enshrined in their membership of these organisations.  There are signs that such international pressure can have a positive impact. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

67. The UK also contributed funding of £750,000 to support a number of projects to champion human rights, civil society and democracy in Russia.  UK funded projects run by Russian and international NGOs promote progress in human rights in five priority areas: civil society and democracy; freedom of expression; stability in the North Caucasus; rule of law; and equality and non discrimination.  We are also exploring new ways of supporting vulnerable human rights defenders and activists. Russian partners have repeatedly stressed the importance of the UK’s financial and public support for civil society in Russia.  In the context of increasing pressure on civil society (particularly those that work with foreign governments), officials maintain a close dialogue with NGOs to ensure that UK support is not counter-productive.

 

68. At the heart of the deteriorating environment for human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Russia is the problem of corruption. Russia is widely criticised for having a high level of corruption within its state institutions and judicial system. In 2015, Transparency International ranked Russia 119th out of 168 countries in its annual Corruption Perceptions Index. The UK will host a global anti-corruption summit in May 2016 to generate commitments and resources to end impunity, strengthen the ability of international institutions to tackle corruption, and develop ways for citizens to challenge corruption.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resourcing and Expertise

 

69. Russia will remain a key foreign policy priority for the long term and this underlines the importance of continued development of regional expertise within Government. Over recent years the Government has sought to align its expertise with the complexity of issues relating to Russia, and we now have dedicated resource across government focussed on Russian defence, energy, and national security issues.

 

70. Since 2010 we have increased the number of Russian-language speaker positions in our Russian posts and the former Soviet Union by 30% and increased the minimum duration for Russian-language training from 11 to 14 months. The FCO’s Eastern Research Group (which forms part of the FCO’s Research Cadre) is a formidable body of long-term Russia analytical expertise in Whitehall, with wide-ranging reach into UK and international academic and analytical communities. It plays a crucial role in informing policy.

 

71. Following the Ukraine crisis, the FCO’s Eastern Europe and Central Asia Directorate (EECAD) was reinforced through the appointment of an SMS1 Additional Director and a range of roles in the delegated grades to reflect the new business need. 

 

72. In 2015 the FCO launched an Eastern Europe and Central Asia cadre of officials, already counting 400 members. This “EECADre” is designed to pool experience and ensure that we continue to strengthen our capacity and skills over the long term and that officials working on this region have the support and skills to lead first class foreign policy towards Russia and the region. It is also intended to strengthen the message that Russian expertise can serve as a rewarding career anchor within the FCO.

Conclusion

73. The West’s efforts to bind Russia into the international system have not succeeded. President Putin has demonstrated clearly that he is prepared to use force to maintain and expand Russia’s influence in its near abroad, which has posed a direct threat to European and UK security.

 

74. It remains essential to pursue a sustained and principled approach on Ukraine, including through ensuring sanctions are linked to the full implementation of the Minsk agreements. Sanctions represent a vital form of leverage on the Russian leadership.

 

75. The threats of both state-sponsored and non-state actors undermining the security and stability of the Eastern neighbourhood are likely to endure. We will continue to work with NATO and the EU, as well as bilaterally, both to protect UK national security and build greater resilience in countries of the former Soviet Union.

 

76. The Ukraine crisis and the Litvinenko Inquiry have underlined the profound challenges in the UK’s bilateral relationship with Russia. We expect that it will be a long time before it will reach its full potential: our strategy must be as much about protecting our security and constraining Russian aggression as it is about engaging in support of UK interests. We will continue to advocate a balanced approach, working in lock step at all stages with key partners and allies, with a view to maintaining Western unity.

 

77. We have had some success in developing the necessary channels of dialogue and will continue to explore how these can advance UK interests and values. Our immediate priorities will continue to be to sustain pressure over Ukraine, to draw Russia into international efforts to secure a political transition in Syria, and to develop guarded dialogue on issues relating to UK national security.

 

78. If Russia changes course, then its relations with the UK and the West can improve. But the immediate prospects for this are not promising. Our future relations with Russia must be based on a hard-headed assessment of our core interests and a clear-eyed understanding of the Russia we are dealing with – and are likely to be dealing with for some time to come.

 

79. EU and Western unity will continue to be essential in managing the challenges and threats that Russia poses. Over the longer term the EU and NATO will need to articulate their visions for their future relationships with Russia, based on a sober assessment of their core interests. The UK will continue to work with our partners to ensure our approaches are aligned.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANNEX A: PREVIOUS MATERIAL LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT

 

 

National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015:

 

<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478933/52309_Cm_9161_NSS_SD_Review_web_only.pdf>

 

 

Evidence submitted to the House of Lords to help inform its debate on EU-Russia relations:

 

< http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-c/EU-Russia/EU-Russia-EvidenceFINAL.pdf>

 

The Home Secretary’s statement to the House on the Litvinenko Inquiry on 21 January 2016:

 

<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm160121/debtext/160121-0002.htm#16012124000003>

 

ANNEX B: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS IN UK/RUSSIA RELATIONS

 

December 1991              UK-Russian diplomatic relations established, following the formal dissolution of the USSR.

 

October 1994                            State Visit to Russia by HM The Queen.

 

June 1997                                          Russia joins the G8.

 

March 2000              UK Prime Minister Tony Blair visits St Petersburg for talks with acting President Putin (the first major Western leader to visit Putin since his ‘anointment’ as Russia’s new ruler).

 

May 2002              Establishment, at UK instigation, of the NATO-Russia Council, a formal mechanism for dialogue and confidence-building between NATO and Russia.

 

June 2003                                          State Visit to the UK by President Putin.

 

September 2003              BP establishes landmark joint venture (TNK-BP) in Russian oil sector.

 

2003              Russia fails in its attempts to secure the extradition from the UK of two high-profile opponents of the Putin regime, businessman Boris Berezovsky (now deceased) and Chechen separatist Akhmed Zakayev.

 

November 2006              Murder in London of Alexander Litvinenko, former Russian intelligence officer.

 

July 2007              Tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomatic staff from Russian Embassy in London and British Embassy in Moscow, following Russia’s refusal to extradite to the UK the main suspects in the Litvinenko murder case.

 

September 2011              Prime Minister David Cameron visits Moscow.

 

March 2013              BP sells its stake in the TNK-BP joint venture to Russia state-owned oil giant Rosneft, in which BP simultaneously acquires a 19% stake.

 

March-July 2014              UK joins with EU partners in imposing economic sanctions on Russia in response to Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine.

 

ANNEX C: ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND UK PROSPERITY

 

  1. The commercial relationship between the UK and Russia is important to both countries. UK exports of goods and services to Russia grew by over 75% between 2009 and 2012, when Russia became the largest market for UK goods exports outside of the US, the EU and China. The Russian domestic market has in recent years become increasingly attractive for UK banks, retailers and exporters of goods and services, despite the relatively high levels of political risk that still prevail.

 

  1. With a population of 150 million, the demand for British brands and expertise present good long term opportunities across a wide range of sectors, including business services, healthcare, education, engineering, creative and consumer goods (at its pre-crisis peak, Russia’s car market was the second largest in Europe).    The UK is one of the leading providers of foreign direct investment into the Russian economy.  UK-owned assets in Russia at the end of 2013 totalled £71.4 billion (£16.6 billion of which is FDI). This investment makes an important contribution to the UK’s current account: income from UK investments in Russia totalled almost £2bn in 2014.

 

  1. BP own 19.75% of Rosneft (Russia’s national oil champion), a stake valued at $13.7bn in 2013. In 2014 BP received dividends from Rosneft of $693m. Shell also has major investments in Russia. It owns 27.5% of Gazprom’s Sakhalin LNG plant – which generated $3.1 billion of profits in 2014, implying a $850m dividend for Shell. AstraZeneca opened a new $224m manufacturing and packaging facility in October 2015 – which will produce 850 million tablets a year. AstraZeneca’s sales in Russia totalled $116m in the first half of 2015.

 

  1. According to ONS figures the stock of Russian assets in the UK at the end of 2013 totalled £34bn. (£5bn of which is direct investment into UK companies). Russian companies also own a number of assets in the energy sphere. Gazprom’s trading arm and European retail operations are headquartered in the UK, employing a total of 700 people. Gazprom’s retail operations supplies 7% of gas in the UK’s non-domestic retail market. There are smaller Russian investors across a range of sectors – including retail and restaurants.

 

  1. There is now an estimated 300,000-strong community of Russians living in the UK (primarily in London), which generates significant private and corporate investment, particularly in the education and property sectors, as well as sourcing professional services such as law and accounting. Russian individuals own a number of high profile assets in the UK, including Premier League football clubs, a national newspaper and book retailer. There is significant investment in London’s property market. One survey over a six month period in 2014 found that 21% of London properties sold for over £10m were bought by Russian buyers.  

 

  1. The Russian economy has been hit hard by the fall in the oil price and international sanctions and GDP is widely assessed to have contracted by between 3-4% in 2015. Figures for 2015 show that UK goods exports fell by 40%; however, total imports to Russia also fell by 40% which is consistent with the devaluation of the rouble and Russia’s economy entering recession. Over $600bn in capital has flowed out of Russia since 2009, much of it to offshore tax jurisdictions.   

 

  1. Financial sector sanctions have had the most significant impact on the Russian economy, effectively cutting Russia off from international capital markets and prompting significant capital flight from Russia. Over the longer term, this has potential to impact on financial cooperation between the UK and Russia.  London remains a key centre for global financial services. Over the last decade Russia has become an ever more important source of business for the UK financial sector, with several major Russian companies having listed on the London Stock Exchange over this period. 

 

  1. More broadly, sanctions have increased the calculation of political risk for businesses trading with and operating in Russia, and we have seen evidence of some firms “overcomplying” with sanctions measures. The Russian Government introduced retaliatory sanctions measures against EU agricultural imports, affecting specific UK producers such as Scottish mackerel as well as requirements to buy Russian in some import dependent sectors.  UKTI continue to work closely with UK business to advise them about the implications of sanctions.

 

  1. Energy is another area affected by sanctions. The global oil price collapse has so far limited the impact of energy sanctions on Russia – expensive arctic, deepwater and shale exploration has largely been rendered financially unviable in an era of very low prices.  But licensing for non-shale/arctic/deepwater exports remains a burden on major IOCs and their subcontractors. Russia remains a major supplier of oil and gas to global markets, and thus represents a key factor in the UK Government’s deliberations regarding how best to ensure the UK and EU’s long-term energy security. Unlike some of our European partners, the UK’s sources of energy are highly diverse, and Russian gas comprises less than 2% of the UK’s imports. However, given the risk of future sanctions being imposed, we must scrutinise carefully commercial transactions involving Russian entities and individuals to ensure that UK national infrastructure is protected.

 

ANNEX D: HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW

 

Recent legislative changes

  1. A number of new laws have been introduced in Russia which limit the space for civil society.  In June 2014, an amendment to the 2012 “foreign agents” law allowed the Ministry of Justice to designate NGOs that receive international funding for vaguely-defined “political activity” as “foreign agents”, without a court order.  Over 100 NGOs are now operating under this label and, as a result, must mark all their materials with the words “foreign agent” and comply with excessive reporting requirements.  Some state institutions are forbidden from interacting with them.  Non-compliance by the NGOs can result in large fines.  Many NGOs have had to close, or find alternative ways of operating.

 

  1. In May 2015, President Putin signed a law that allowed for foreign and international NGOs operating in Russia to be labelled “undesirable” if deemed to pose a threat to Russia’s constitutional order, defence capability or national security.  “Undesirable” organisations are prohibited from operating in Russia and are unable to disseminate information, hold public events or use bank accounts for anything other than paying fines incurred under the law. Russian individuals and organisations that cooperate with “undesirable organisations” risk fines and up to six years in prison. The legislation is seemingly an attempt to starve NGOs of international funding.  Organisations labelled “undesirable” to date include the US-based National Endowment for Democracy and the Open Society Foundation.

 

  1. In December 2015, President Putin signed a law allowing Russia’s Constitutional Court to overrule judgements by the European Court of Human Rights where they are deemed to contradict the Russian constitution.  In failing to implement European Court rulings, Russian officials have previously sought to justify their position by likening their stance to that of the UK on Prisoner Voting Rights.  We continue to reject this comparison and assert the distinction between our approach to a difficult case and those of member States such as Russia who make no real attempt to engage. Russia has for some years been the Council of Europe Member State with the highest number of claims brought against it to the European Court of Human Rights. 

Other areas and cases of concern

  1. The rule of law in Russia remains inconsistent and arbitrarily applied.  Concerns about the impartiality of courts, politically motivated prosecutions and judicial corruption are ongoing.  There have been several high profile cases of illegal detention and unfair trial, including Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko, who was abducted from Ukraine in June 2014, and Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov and his co-defendant Oleksander Kolchenko. In August 2015, Sentsov and Kolchenko, who opposed the illegal annexation of Crimea, were sentenced to 20 and 10 years in prison respectively for terrorism. The trial was widely seen as politically motivated, and was in part based on testimony allegedly obtained under torture.

 

  1. Prominent opposition politicians also come under pressure as a result of their work.  Many have labelled the 2014 convictions of opposition figure Alexei Navalny and his brother, Oleg, as politically motivated.  While Alexei Navalny’s sentence was suspended and his house arrest lifted, his brother remains in prison.  On 27 February 2015, Boris Nemtsov, a Russian opposition leader and former Deputy Prime Minister, was shot and killed in central Moscow. The investigation is expected to be complete in early 2016. So far, five Chechen men have been charged with his murder. There are significant doubts about whether the investigation will get to the bottom of why Nemstov was murdered or at whose behest.

 

  1. Despite attempts by the Russian Government to carry out prison reform, media and NGO reports of law enforcement personnel and prison staff engaging in torture, abuse and excessive violence are widespread, indicating that torture is a systemic practice in the Russian penal system.  Poor training and a culture of impunity are key contributing factors.

 

  1. The situation in the North Caucasus region remains unstable and tense, with reports of grave human rights violations committed by state security forces.  Allegations include reports of extrajudicial killings, torture and disappearances.  We continue to have significant concerns about the use of collective punishment in Chechnya, including the burning down of houses of the relatives of suspected militants. NGOs and journalists in the region continue to come under pressure. According to online news outlet ‘Caucasian Knot’, 191 people were killed and 34 injured in the North Caucasus in January-November 2015 as a result of security-related incidents.  

 

  1. The situation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) people has deteriorated since the introduction in June 2013 banning the promotion of “non-traditional” sexual relations among minors.  We judge that the law risks increasing the legitimacy in Russia of homophobia and, indeed, a December 2014 report from Human Rights Watch documented an increase in violence and harassment of LGBT people.  

 

  1. We are also receiving reports that some forms of religious freedom are coming under increasing attack, most notable the Jehovah’s Witnesses.  On 30 November 2015, 16 Jehovah’s Witnesses were found guilty in Taganrog, southern Russia, of organising and participating in extremist activity.  The community has found itself under attack in several parts of the country, often through similar misuse of extremism legislation.

 

  1. We are concerned about the deteriorating condition of freedom of expression in Russia, particularly in the media. Events in Ukraine have contributed to a tightening of freedom of expression and Russian disinformation has undermined this fundamental right further. The Russian Duma has adopted legislation restricting media freedom and freedom of expression in an attempt to control information in the cyber sphere. Laws limiting foreign ownership of media entities to 20% of shares have led to widespread structural changes in the media environment, as ownership of major titles has shifted. Russian media outlets are also impacted by a warning system that can result in them being taken out of operation on their third warning from media watchdog Roskomnadzor. Although there is still some space for independent reporting, including by a small number of printed media and online, the overall picture continues to deteriorate.

 

  1. We are concerned that Russia was ranked 152 out of 180 countries in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index (Reporters Without Borders). We are also concerned that impunity for past attacks on journalists in Russia remains a major problem. Investigations into the murders of independent journalists Akhmednabi Akhmednabiyev (2013) and Natalia Estemirova (2009) have not produced conclusive results. And there has been no investigation into the death of journalist and human rights defender Timur Kaushev, who was found dead in August 2014, despite claims that he was murdered on political grounds.

 

  1. Within this negative context, there have been some positive developments in human rights, most notably in the area of disability rights.  The Russian Government has introduced legislation to prohibit discrimination based on disability and was praised for raising awareness of disability rights and transforming Sochi into a barrier-free ahead of the 2014 Winter Paralympic Games.