Written evidence from David Campbell Bannerman MEP (ECR-UK) (EUM0028)
The European Union (EU), its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), High Representative and the European Extenal Action Service (EEAS) - created under the federalist Lisbon Treaty - act in practice to undermine, sideline and confuse the representation of the British national interest through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and its British Embassies.
The EEAS and its 'Ambassadors', once only termed Heads of Delegation, do not exist to represent the British national interest, pooled with other EU Member States, as is claimed, but in reality to represent the interests of the emerging European Union Superstate and the national interest of the EU itself.
The role of the EEAS is to sell the EU and the Commission's work to the rest of the world, glorifying and excusing failed and costly initiatives such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Eurozone.
By stepping back from this EU machine, the UK can safeguard the British seat on the Permanent Security Council of the UN, which the EU wants to take over. Nor will the UK be viewed as a subsidiary point of contact for international negotiation, as the EU will no longer talk for the UK in many international organisations.
The specific evidence and points I make on this are:
1. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Delegation to the UN has progressively assumed the role of the former rotating presidency, representing the EU in most areas of UN activity where consensus has been reached among all EU member states, under Article 34 of the Treaty on the European Union, “when the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be invited to present the Union's position."
The EU Delegation is also responsible for the day-to-day coordination of the EU common position, including the drafting of EU statements and the adoption of EU positions on Resolutions and other texts. In all, some 1,000 EU meetings take place annually in New York. Collectively, the EU Member States fund 38% of the UN's regular budget, more than two-fifths of UN peacekeeping operations, and about one-half of all specific programmes. The European Commission itself corporately bankrolls $1.35 billion. But having the controlling role in budgetary management however generates ambitions for greater involvement in policy development.
2. 1n 2011, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/65/276, upgrading the status of the European Union's participation in the UN. From this point, EU representatives could present common positions of the Union to the Assembly, make interventions during sessions and can be invited to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly. In other words, the EU is being treated as one of the UN's member states.
On an operational level, the Commission and the UN have signed a 'Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement', allowing for direct liaison in the management of UN programmes. This means the Commission, not nation states, is the key partner on a day-today basis for the operational aspects of running how money is spent in programmes run with the UN Secretariat.
This means that the UK has lost its voice over key international areas such as liaison with: the Department of Political Affairs, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (the United Nations Mine Action Service), the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the Office of the United Nations Security Co-ordinator, amongst many others. The full list can be found in my December 2014 book entitled ‘Time to Jump' (some copies supplied), and a 'Diplomatic timeline' in the book charts the march towards EU national embassies at British expense.
Thanks to bilateral agreements, this list in other areas includes a loss of influence now including the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; the International Atomic Energy Agency; the International Civil Aviation Organisation; the International Fund for Agricultural Development; the International Labour Organisation; the International Telecommunication Union; the United Nations Capital Development Fund; the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation; the World Health Organisation; and the World Meteorological Organisation amongst others. A full list can be found in 'Time to Jump'.
Indeed, columnists such as Christopher Booker have found that a large proportion of EU rules are in fact incorporating decisions first reached in international bodies of the UN and other international forums. This is because the EU asserts that decisions of the UN and other international forums must be introduced to member state law as an EU directive or regulation rather than abide by subsidiarity which seeks to keep powers to enact international legislation at national and local Government level.
A highly disturbing and illustrative example of attempted EU encroachment on UK foreign policy was the European Parliament's Väyrynen report on 'the role of the EU within the UN - how to better achieve EU foreign policy goals, and approved by the Parliament on 24 November, 2015 (by a vote of 488 in favour, 137 against and 42 abstentions). The report went as far to call on "... reform of the Security Council that would ensure a permanent seat to the European Union." This was justified to advocate "...for and defending the interests of the EU, based on a coordinated CFSP." In the Rapporteur's view, Britain and France as members of the Security Council were there to represent the EU's position, and were criticised for not doing a very good job in this regard.
The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) agenda is clear, to promote common EU interests, regardless of any key foreign policy differences from the UK and other Member States, and at the expense of both the British and French permanent seats on the UN Security Council.
3. As part of its burgeoning powers in international negotiations, the EU has quasi-member status at the OECD and it is a member of the OSPAR Commission covering the environment in the North East Atlantic. Many more examples can be found in the Foreign Affairs chapter of the 'Time to Jump' book.
This increasing EU interference in global foreign affairs is shown by an analysis of the draft EU budget lines which indicates an end policy total of €4.779.6 billion dedicated specifically to Common Foreign Policy, and an end bill of €5.266.8 billion - or approaching €5.3 billion for the new financial period (2014-2020). This contrasts with a comparable end budget of €3.9 billion as recently as 2008-9. This is also separate from the £ 1.2 billion provided by the UK's Department for International Development (DfID) for Development Aid.
The EU Delegations official mandate is to promote and explain EU policy. Consequently, a considerable amount of their activity is focused on building up a network of supporters who will back European integration amongst local elites, rather than selling the interests of member states.
4. A new development from the EU is 'Missions for Growth'. These are in essence a series of EU trade missions that 'involve political and business meetings tackling areas of mutual interest in the fields of enterprise and industry policies'. Businesses are brought on board via their EU lobbyists, with local embassies included almost as an afterthought. It is the Commission and the EEAS who are locally sold as the intermediary for such Continent-wide dealings.
The key element of the Aid budget, however, relates to its strategic intent. It provides a cornerstone of EU 'soft power' and of the EU's corporate influence internationally. The power that the €9 billion budget can bring is demonstrated by the special 'Zil' treatment given on EU junkets to donor recipients.
However, countries which have not 'pooled' their veto rights to an international organisation (of which the sole example is currently the EU) retain the ability to block these rules at source, or demand adjustments to suit their economy. Thus Norway, for instance, participates in UNECE meetings and so set rules on the manufacture of motor vehicles despite not having a car industry, and indeed chairs the fisheries committee of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation, while the UK is represented by the Commission.
This perhaps goes some way to explaining why so little EEA material requires a change to the law in EEA countries. A review of the EEA legislation up to 2005 found that, under their generous terms of EEA membership, EEA countries were required to pass just 6.5% of EU laws into domestic law.
5. The claim of great British influence in the European Union machine is delusory. In reality, British MEPs voted against 576 EU proposals between 2009 and 2014, but 485 still passed and became law. I can personally testify to the frustration of seeing the two leading Groups in the European Parliament - the EPP and S&D - controlling most major votes between them where they form an alliance, and where no real opposition exists in the manner of Westminster. According to Business for Britain, the UK has not managed to block a single proposal from the Commission passing through the Council in one term despite trying 55 times. In 1973, the UK had 17% of the votes in the Council of Ministers, now it only has 8%.
January 2016