Written evidence from Reprieve (DRO0017)
Contents
Executive Summary
Reprieve
Terminology
A Kill Policy Shrouded in Secrecy and Contradictions
A. Who are we protecting? The UK or Iraq?
B. Are we at war and if so, with whom?
C. Does imminent still mean imminent?
D. Is the Government making criminals of our service personnel?
E. Who makes the decision to kill?
F. What accountability and oversight exists to protect against abuse?
Prior Precedent: UK Complicity in the Broader US Drone Programme
Is the UK Kill Policy Making Us Safer?
Recommendations
Annex: Reprieve Client Profiles
Muhammad al-Qawli
Faisal bin Ali Jaber
The Rehman Family
Noor Khan
Executive Summary
The Prime Minister’s recent announcement that the UK has a policy of undertaking lethal drone strikes (the “Kill Policy”) is, in his own words, a “new departure” for the country. The announcement raised crucial questions.[1] Does the Government believe it has the power to kill anyone, anywhere in the world? Who makes the decision, and when? What legal framework governs this power to kill, and what tests regulate its application? What safeguards, if any, exist? What is, in essence, the Government’s Kill Policy?
These questions remain unanswered. Government commentary on the issue is ambiguous at best; and contradictory at worst. We know little to nothing about how the Government intends to act next but we know for certain that the Government is willing to strike again.[2] The Government must therefore answer key outstanding questions without delay.
The Kill Policy as currently laid out bears striking similarities to the US’ covert drone programme. The hallmarks of the US programme - secrecy, lack of accountability, legal ambiguity – seem to have been copied wholesale.
The US drone programme has faced rising criticism, even from within its own halls of power. Senior military and intelligence officials in the US openly call it a “failed strategy”. Two different UN Special Rapporteurs have launched investigations into US drone strikes. Both raised warning bells about the legality of the programme. One suggested the programme might rise to the level of war crimes. Reams of evidence from human rights organisations suggest it has caused a large numbers of civilian deaths, and had devastating and counterproductive effects. Recent leaked documents show that the drone programme – far from being a precision tool to root out individual targets – has killed hundreds who were not the intended target.[3] All these critiques suggest that the US’ drone programme has made us less, not more, safe.
In light of this, we must ask what, if anything, the Government has done to analyse the efficacy of the US’ programme, identify its flaws, and – if possible – mitigate them.
The similarities between the UK and US policies are not surprising. While a UK Kill Policy is new, our involvement in the US drone programme is not. For years, the UK has been complicit in the US’ own failed drone war. This includes the provision of locational intelligence in targeted killing in Pakistan and Yemen; the wholesale sharing of metadata for targeting; the use of UK bases in supporting drone operations; and embedding RAF pilots with US units. These actions, too, have already been subject of much criticism. Senior UK figures, including former GCHQ Director David Omand, have raised concerns about the need for “safeguards” to ensure that UK personnel “remain compliant with international law.”[4] But the Government has—yet again—failed to answer these criticisms.
As it stands, the Government appears to believe that a single minster can make life or death decisions, without judicial oversight, to kill anyone, anywhere in the world, including in countries with which parliament has explicitly voted not to go to war.
Secret policies and a secretive Government make it impossible for the public—and Parliament—to properly scrutinise Government conduct and hold it to account. This is profoundly undemocratic. It flies in the face of British values and undermines good governance. The Kill Policy must be made public, and must contain appropriate safeguards.
Reprieve believes the Government must answer these key questions, to allow for a proper democratic debate about the principles of the Kill Policy. In order to facilitate this debate Reprieve recommends that the Government:
- Clarify the scope and limitations of the Kill Policy;
- Publish as much of the Kill Policy as is possible without compromising national security;
- Put in place mechanisms to allow for independent post-strike investigation to determine whether any civilian casualties have occurred and whether the strike was effective from a security perspective; and
- Present the published Kill Policy to Parliament to allow for a full and informed frontbench debate on the matter.
Reprieve
1. Reprieve is a legal charity which seeks to uphold the rule of law and the rights of individuals around the world – with a specific focus on death penalty cases and abuses committed under the umbrella of the ‘War on Terror.’
2. Since early 2011, Reprieve has been investigating the use of drones to carry out covert strikes outside of declared warzones – primarily, in Pakistan and Yemen. Reprieve’s investigations have included the role played by the UK in facilitating the covert strikes carried out by US bodies including the CIA and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). As part of its work, Reprieve also represents a number of relatives of civilians who were killed in such covert and illegal strikes.
3. Reprieve is supporting Caroline Lucas MP and Baroness Jenny Jones in their proposed legal challenge to the Kill Policy. Both are currently in legal correspondence with the UK Government about the Kill Policy.
4. On 23 September 2015 Ms Lucas MP and Baroness Jones sent a Letter before Action challenging the lack of clarity around the Kill Policy. The Letter before Action asked that the Government either a) formulate a clear policy regarding targeted killing abroad if it has not yet done so; or b) if it has done so, publish as much of the policy as is possible. Both of these legal obligations are enshrined in the common law.
5. The Government has provided a Letter of Response. Reprieve understands that Ms Lucas MP and Baroness Jones have already submitted copies of the pre-action correspondence sent between the parties to the Committee. These submissions by Reprieve are made independently of and without prejudice to any proposed legal action.
6. A number of Reprieve’s clients from Yemen and Pakistan wish to submit evidence to the Committee. Because of the complexities of communicating with our clients outside of the UK, we are still collating this evidence. We will provide copies of this testimony to the Committee as soon as possible. In the meantime, a summary of our clients’ profiles can be found in the Annex to this submission.
Terminology
7. Throughout this evidence, Reprieve refers to ‘drones’ where the Government prefers to use ‘Remotely Piloted Air Systems’ (RPAS). Where there is discussion of the ‘US drone programme,’ this is shorthand for the covert activities carried out by the CIA and US Special Operations, as opposed to the use of drones in conventional warfare.
A Kill Policy Shrouded in Secrecy and Contradictions
A. Who are we protecting? The UK or Iraq?
9. On 7 September 2015 David Cameron justified the Raqqa strike to Parliament solely on the basis of the UK’s inherent right to self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter. [5] He stated that the target posed a “direct threat” to the UK and he had “no way of preventing [the] planned attacks . . . without taking direct action.” The Prime Minister emphasised to Parliament that the UK is ‘not involved in a war’ in Syria stating categorically “that the strike was not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria.”[6] However, a letter sent on the same day to the UN Security Council by the UK Government provided the collective self-defence of Iraq as an additional justification.[7] The Prime Minister failed to mention this justification while speaking to Parliament.
10. The omission is significant. Striking in Syria on the basis of self-defence of Iraq would mean the Government is waging war in Syria—which Parliament explicitly voted against. It has not been subject to wider debate or Parliamentary approval, despite the Secretary of Defence promising as recently as July 2015 that no such action would be taken without Parliament first being consulted.[8]
11. Further, the two justifications are not interchangeable. The first requires an imminent threat of an attack on UK soil. In those circumstances, the military is effectively carrying out the role of armed police. The test of the legality of such action is the same as that which applies as to the use of lethal force by armed police. Indeed, on 8 September 2015 the Defence Secretary stated:
“The advice is absolutely clear that any country has the right to self-defence to protect itself against armed attack, that’s the same basis by the way on which our armed troops can use lethal force, the same basis on which armed police on our streets can use lethal force – if it’s absolutely necessary and there’s no other way of preventing loss of life.”[9]
12. The second justification, however, implies that the UK has joined the war against ISIS in Syria. This would engage a different and more permissive legal framework for the use of force. As highlighted above this justification would come as a complete surprise to Parliament.
13. The Government has yet to clarify whether this inconsistency means that the Government has expanded its war in Iraq across the border into Syria – despite Parliament voting against such action in 2013. The Letter of Response seems to indicate the Government believes the UK is at war with ISIS.
14. If the UK, as the Prime Minister suggested, is going to continue to carry out lethal strikes, it is imperative that we understand the scope of the Government’s purported powers. Is it limited to specific imminent threats against the UK or is the Government prepared to expand its war in Iraq to Syria and even Libya without Parliamentary approval? A lack of clarity on these issues could easily lead to an abuse of power.
B. Are we at war and if so, with whom?
15. The ambiguity highlighted above means the Prime Minister has effectively obscured whether the UK is at war or not. As a result, we have no idea which legal framework governs the Kill Policy or which legal tests are being applied. The difference is significant. If the UK was acting purely in self-defence against an imminent threat to the UK, then the very restrictive laws on article 51 of the UN Charter apply. This would mean, among other things, that every single strike must be justified by an imminent threat to the UK. If, however, the UK has joined the armed conflict in Syria, despite Parliament’s refusal to grant permission to go to war, then strikes are potentially governed by the laws of war (International Humanitarian Law).
16. The Government’s own contradictory and conflicting statements on this point have only further muddied the waters and raised questions about whether it knows which legal test it is applying. To date, it has invoked various bodies of law. The Prime Minister has claimed that we are ‘not involved in a war in Syria’ but that strikes pursuant to the Kill Policy follow “specific military rules of engagement” suggesting the laws of war apply.[10] However, when speaking to the BBC Today Programme on 8 September 2015, the Defence Secretary claimed that action pursuant to the Kill Policy is taken on the “same basis on which armed police on our streets can use lethal force”, indicating international human rights law applies and not the laws of war.[11] In a further flip-flop, on 15 September 2015 the Attorney General explained to the Select Justice Committee that the laws of war do apply, without providing any justification for that claim, or any explanation for the discrepancy between the comments of three senior Government figures.[12]
17. The laws of war only apply if the UK is engaged in an armed conflict with another party. Reconciling the Attorney General’s statement with that of the Prime Minister can only lead to one inescapable yet disturbing conclusion: the Government believes the UK is engaged in a global armed conflict with a non-state actor, ISIL. This would be a “new departure” from any other conflict in Britain’s history, mirroring the position adopted by the US. The US Government says that it is at war with Al Qaeda. This version of an armed conflict, one not limited by geography or time, is a hallmark of the US ‘War on Terror’. It is one that has been highly criticised and which threatens to undermine one of the foundational principles of the UN Charter – the prohibition on the use of force against the territory of another. Former Foreign Secretary David Miliband has said that “the whole strategy [of the War on Terror] has been dangerously counterproductive, helping otherwise disparate groups find common cause against the west” adding that "democracies must respond to terrorism by championing the rule of law, not subordinating [it].”[13]
18. The laws of war are far more permissive in who can be killed and in what circumstances. For this reason they apply in armed conflicts only. If the Government says that there is no armed conflict then it must comply with international restrictions on the use of force and international human rights law. Both legal standards cannot apply to the Kill Policy. It is either one or the other. The absence of clarity in the legal standard applicable is deeply troubling. What standard is applicable determines whether and in what circumstances, the Kill Policy and any strike pursuant to it are lawful. The reigning confusion makes it impossible to determine with certainty whether the Kill Policy is lawful or not.
C. Does imminent still mean imminent?
19. Per Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, all States must “refrain . . . from the threat or use of force.”[14] The only exception to this is the right of self-defence when a state faces an armed attack. In such instances, the use of military force must be seen as a last resort and the threat posed must be “imminent”. Imminence, as defined under the Caroline test, requires that the threat be “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”[15]
20. Imminence has been at the centre of much of the controversy surrounding the US drone programme. Like the UK, the US claims it is acting in self-defence when it takes targeted strikes in places such as Pakistan and Yemen. However, a leaked US Department of Justice White Paper in 2013 demonstrates the US redefined “imminence”.[16] The White Paper states:
“[T]he condition that an operational leader present an “imminent” threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.”[17] (emphasis added)
The Caroline test requires both clarity and urgency to justify the use of force. But according to the US definition, it can take strikes even when no “clear evidence” of a specific threat exists and even when it is not clear whether an attack will take place in the “immediate future”. In effect, imminence under the US standard is not imminent at all.
21. Since announcing its new policy, the UK Government has made troubling and contradictory statements, raising questions about its own interpretation of the “imminence” requirement.
22. On 7 September 2015, the Prime Minister qualified the threat as one of “people who are producing … potential terrorist attacks”.[18] On 8 September 2015, the Defence Secretary was clear he “wouldn’t hesitate to do it again” if he knew an armed attack was “likely” and he referred to “potential threats” and “plots”. [19] “Potential” and “likely” does not mean “imminent”. It is therefore unclear what standard the Government applies to justify executing a strike under the Kill Policy.
23. Moreover, anonymous sources indicated that the Raqqa strike was retaliation for foiled attacks pre-dating the Raqqa strike by several months with the Prime Minister approving the target for killing as early as May 2015.[20] Past, failed attempts can in no way be classified as “imminent” under any standard.
24. The Attorney General, however, has indicated a desire to redefine the Caroline standard. On 15th September 2015, he told the Justice Select Committee that “what we probably need to think about as a society in any event is what imminence means in the context of a terrorist threat”.[21] He said Caroline “goes back to the 19th century, and we are talking about very different circumstances now.”
25. It is not for the UK Government to change the law retrospectively to validate its unlawful conduct. Moreover, changing the international requirements for an attack in self-defence would allow other nations to do the same, enabling them to take military action whenever and wherever they please as long as they can show some kind of threat. How would the UK react if Russia or China redefined “imminence” to suit their needs? The US War on Terror as a paradigm has already led to disastrous results and has set dangerous precedents. We should think very carefully about the consequences of further entrenching such precedents.
D. Is the Government making criminals of our service personnel?
26. The inconsistent positions outlined above could have serious consequences for the British personnel executing the policy. Questions have already been raised about the potential criminal liability of UK personnel for their involvement in lethal strikes in non-war zones. Senior RAF commanders have raised doubts about the legality of such strikes.[22]
27. In the case of Noor Khan it was argued that by sharing locational intelligence with the US for use in unlawful drone strikes in Pakistan, UK personnel would be aiding and abetting murder.[23] In such circumstances, UK personnel would most likely not benefit from the defence of combatant immunity which protects soldiers from liability for killings in an armed conflict. There was no armed conflict in Pakistan which left open the possibility of criminal liability for UK personnel.
28. The Court of Appeal did not rule on the issue but accepted that it is “certainly not clear that the defence of combatant immunity would be available to an UK national who was tried in England and Wales with the offence of murder by drone strike.” It is, therefore, absolutely vital for the protection and peace of mind of UK service personnel that the legal underpinnings of the Kill Policy are crystal clear. Only then can it be determined what standards our personnel should follow.
E. Who makes the decision to kill?
29. The Government has disclosed little to no information about the decision making process under the Kill Policy. Some sources suggest that decisions on who to target appear to be made by the National Security Council[24] (“NSC”) which ultimately has its decisions ratified by the Cabinet.[25] The Foreign Secretary has stated that there is “a very robust process for authorisation”[26] without supporting his claims. No details of that process have been disclosed, despite there being no legitimate national security concerns preventing such disclosure in general terms. It appears that, once the NSC has agreed that “should the right opportunity arise, then the military should take action”, the Defence Secretary - one single individual - may authorise an actual strike operation.[27]
30. Much like the UK, the US has refused to disclose any information on the criteria by which people are targeted. Leaked documents, however, show the US’ Kill List has extended far beyond just senior leaders of Al Qaeda. The list now reportedly includes drug dealers,[28] low level militants, and frequently even just telephone numbers.[29] In February 2014, a drone pilot told The Intercept: “People get hung up that there’s a targeted list of people. It’s really like we’re targeting a cell phone. We’re not going after people – we’re going after their phones, in the hopes that the person on the other end of that missile is the bad guy.”[30] One month later, former NSA Director, General Michael Hayden, said it much more succinctly: “We kill people based on metadata.”[31]
31. Recently leaked slide presentations[32] about the US drone programme (the “Drone Papers”) show that targets in Yemen and Somalia are identified based on limited signal and human intelligence which are admitted to be inferior forms of intelligence. Moreover, much of the scarcely available information appears to come from local partners who are acknowledged as having their own agendas in providing certain information and withholding other information.[33] This lack of reliable intelligence means that many innocent people may be wrongly considered targets.
32. At present, we have such limited information on the UK’s own targeting process that it is impossible to tell whether we have crossed the same Rubicon. We know, at the very least, that the secrecy shrouding the US programme has reduced checks and balances on lethal operations, lowered the threshold for killing and ultimately resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties.[34] The UK Government is now hiding behind that same secrecy in relation to its own ‘Kill Policy’.
F. What accountability and oversight exists to protect against abuse?
33. The lack of transparency surrounding even basic details of the UK Kill Policy makes any form of accountability almost impossible. Months reportedly elapsed between the initial decision to carry out the Raqqa strike and the actual operation. Yet, the Government only informed Parliament two weeks after the event. Parliament was kept entirely in the dark, even though there were no legitimate national security reasons to withhold general information, or prevent a discussion in principle of the Kill Policy. The entire Kill Policy up to that point was designed and adopted only with sign-off by select members of Government. At no stage was Parliamentary approval or debate sought despite the existence of a Parliamentary convention obliging the Government to disclose plans to deploy military assets and personnel. Nor does it appear that there was there any form of judicial oversight to the process.
34. The Prime Minister has indicated he will carry out further strikes. Yet, he has failed to provide Parliament with all the necessary information to determine whether the course of action he proposes is lawful, will incriminate British personnel, or is the right one for Britain. It is imperative that Parliament be allowed to debate the issue, particularly where the political and security risks involved in running a counterproductive global killing programme may make us less, not more, safe.
35. Yet the Government appears intent on blocking any robust oversight of the Kill Policy. When asked what role the secretive Intelligence and Security Committee – itself the subject of extensive criticism[35] in respect of its adequacy as a supervisory body – would have in overseeing the Kill Policy, the Prime Minister responded: “I am not going to contract out our counter-terrorism policy to someone else”.[36] The Government’s unwillingness to allow even the ISC to scrutinise the Kill Policy suggests a desire to hold itself above all oversight and accountability.
36. Oversight is sorely required. On 8 September 2015, the Defence Secretary told the Today Programme that the Prime Minister had “overall authority” over Kill Policy strikes “on behalf of the whole government”.[37] Much like the US programme, under the UK Kill Policy, one person in Government can decide who lives or dies.
37. On 9 September 2015 the Foreign Secretary was asked whether independent monitoring of strikes would be put in place. He failed to answer the question stating instead he was “not sure what was meant by independent monitoring.”[38] With regards to individual strikes under the Kill Policy, he stated that a “rigorous process for monitoring” existed within the Ministry of Defence, without providing any details of that process.[39]
38. Further, the Government has not given any indication of what accountability mechanisms exist if strikes result in civilian casualties. The Prime Minister appears to shoulder overall responsibility for the Kill Policy but we do not know who gets to decide if there are “no civilians” when a missile is fired. The Drone Papers make clear that the US President only approves the target and not an actual strike.[40] This means he does not take any responsibility for civilian deaths or the quality of the intelligence on which a strike is based. Obama has only apologised once, when a drone killed two Western hostages in Pakistan, despite evidence of thousands of civilian casualties.[41] If a UK strike conclusively results in civilian casualties will the Government publicly admit to it and apologise to the victims?
39. Accountability is crucial for any effective counter-terrorism policy. A lack of accountability in the US has led to the acceptance of an ineffective and counterproductive drone programme. According to the Drone Papers, as of June 2012, only 16 individuals were being targeted in Yemen.[42] However, from 1 June 2012 until 1 January 2013 public source reporting identified 15 confirmed US drone strikes with a further 7 possible drone strikes. These strikes killed between 159 and 230 individuals.[43] Further research done by Reprieve shows that the targeting of 41 individuals in Pakistan and Yemen resulted in the death of 1,147 people. One target, Baitullah Mehsud, was reported killed on seven different occasions and some targets are still alive today.[44]
Prior Precedent: UK Complicity in the Broader US Drone Programme
40. The UK’s use of drones for targeted killing did not start with the Prime Minister’s announcement on 7 September. For years, the UK has been complicit in the US’ own failed drone war. Investigations and leaks to the media have revealed:
- The UK regularly provides “locational intelligence”[45] to the US for use in targeted killings in places, such as Pakistan[46] and Yemen.[47]
- GCHQ collects metadata at home and abroad[48] which is shared with NSA which uses it for targeting in drone strikes.[49]
- US bases in the UK play a crucial role in supporting drone operations. Investigations by Reprieve and Computer Weekly revealed that BT (a British company) provides a cable link between RAF Croughton (a base on UK soil) and Camp Lemonnier, a key drone base from which the US launches strikes in Yemen.[50]
- The UK regularly embeds its personnel with US forces, allowing them to “operate as if they were the host nation’s personnel, under that nation’s chain of command.”[51] This practice has led to serious concerns that UK personnel may be covertly engaged directly in the US drone programme in places like Pakistan.
41. The dangers of this kind of military partnership with the United States were described very clearly in a recent Birmingham Policy Commission report, The Security Impact of Drones: Challenges and Opportunities for the UK. [52] The commission was chaired by Sir David Omand, former director of GCHQ, and included in its members Sir Brian Burridge, former Commander-in-Chief of Strike Command in the Royal Air Force, and Sir Paul Newton, a retired Lieutenant General in the British Army who served in the Iraq War.
42. Among the Commission’s main conclusions was the need for the UK Government to implement “safeguards” to ensure that UK drone personnel “remain compliant with international law.”
43. Citing the “sinister cultural and political salience” of US drone operations, the commission recommended that measures be taken to ensure that where intelligence is shared with the US, “the UK Government does not inadvertently collude in RPA [drone] actions contrary to international law.” The report went on to urge that “the UK simply does not accept the specific US legal justification for using RPA [drones] for the targeted killing of AQ-related terrorist targets.” Where UK forces are embedded with the US military, or where the US is making use of UK drones, “assurances need to be maintained that their use is in accordance with UK legal guidelines.”
44. In November 2014, Sir David and several MPs, including Tom Watson and David Davis, wrote to the Secretary of Defence asking him to disclose the “Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel applicable to the passing of intelligence relating to individuals who are at risk of targeted lethal strikes.”[53] The Government refused, despite having disclosed similar guidance in relation to torture in 2010.
Is the UK Kill Policy Making Us Safer?
45. 
From the very little we know, Reprieve believes that the UK’s Kill Policy carries many of the hallmarks of the US drone programme. The evidence of the failures of the US drone programme cannot, therefore, be ignored.
46. The US drone programme has not only been ineffective, but senior US military figures have also said it has been counterproductive. General Michael Flynn, former head of the US Defence Intelligence Agency, described it as a “failed strategy.”[54] In July 2015, he said: “When you drop a bomb from a drone … you are going to cause more damage than you are going to cause good.”[55] General Stanley McChrystal warned that drones create “a tremendous amount of resentment” towards “American arrogance.”[56] He said, “[w]hat seems like a panacea to the messiness of war is not that at all.”[57]
47. The Drone Papers confirm these assessments. They also show that drone strikes “significantly reduce the intelligence available from detainees and captured material”[58], as potential sources of information are killed and intelligence is destroyed. This is described as the most significant reason for the delay in identifying new leads which are crucial to conduct an effective campaign against legitimate threats.[59]
48. The Stimson Commission, a group of prominent military, intelligence and foreign policy experts found that a strategy that relied on the use of armed drones to kill terrorism suspects overseas “rests on questionable assumptions and risks increasing instability and escalating costs.” The group found that “blowback” from civilian casualties was serving as a “potent recruiting tool for terrorist organisations.” They concluded that “[t]he United States should not conduct a long-term killing programme based on secret rationales.”[60]
Recommendations
49. Reprieve is deeply concerned that the UK Kill Policy, which closely mirrors the US model, may in future lead to the same mistakes being made – resulting in the deaths of civilians and increased resentment towards the UK; and ultimately making the country less safe. To avoid similar mistakes it is important that there be robust, independent scrutiny and oversight of the Kill Policy at all stages of its execution.
50. As set out above, the Government’s statements regarding the Kill Policy have been at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory. In the absence of any substantive information, it is impossible to provide workable and concrete recommendations.
51. The Government should therefore clarify the exact scope and limitations of the Kill Policy. This should include, but may not be limited to, the questions set out in sections 8 to 39.
52. The UK should publish its Kill Policy without delay, including as much detail as possible without compromising national security. At a bare minimum, the following details must be included:
- The domestic and international legal basis for the Kill Policy,
- The legal tests applied to determine whether someone is a threat,
- The scope and limits, if they exist, within which this new policy is operating,
- The process by which such strikes are ordered, including
- identification of who in Government has authority for making such a decision, and;
- what safeguards are in place to prevent abuse,
- The robust oversight and accountability mechanisms that are in place to ensure mistakes are acknowledged and lessons are learned.
53. Mechanisms should also be put in place to allow for independent investigation following a strike to determine whether any civilian casualties have taken place and whether the strike has been effective from a security perspective.
54. Such a task cannot be entrusted to the ISC which has been described as “essentially a creature of the executive.”[61] The ISC has a poor track record of holding the Government and the intelligence agencies to account. In 2007 it gave them a clean bill of health regarding their involvement in US torture and rendition despite considerable and mounting evidence of British complicity.[62]
55. The Kill Policy should be presented to Parliament to allow an informed frontbench debate to take place. Nothing less will suffice when the Government grants itself licence to kill.
Annex: Reprieve Client Profiles
Muhammad al-Qawli
Muhammad al-Qawli’s brother Ali and cousin Salim Jamil were killed in January 2013 by a US drone strike.
Muhammad is a consultant for the Yemeni Ministry of Education and works additional hours as a mechanic to support his family. Since the attack, he reached out to other devastated families to advocate for their cause.
Ali Al-Qawli was a father of three and a primary school teacher whose students adored him. He was well-known in his village for his energetic personality and sharp sense of humour. Salim Jamil was a university student, who also ran a taxi service. He used the income from his small business to support his ill parents and siblings.
Ali and Salim were killed along with several other passengers when a missile from a US drone hit their car on the evening of 23rd January 2013. Muhammad has received neither an apology nor any compensation from the US or Yemeni Government, beyond a letter from the Yemeni Ministry of Interior two weeks after the strike, affirming that Ali and Salim were innocent.
After the strike, Muhammad rushed to the scene to find unimaginable bloodshed. The car was still on fire, and Muhammad recalls horrible hours working with other villagers to gather the victims’ body parts. They had to travel to another village to get enough water to put out the fire, which continued to burn.
They took the body parts they collected to the local hospital and planned the funerals for the following day. However, the next day, the bodies had disappeared, and they were told that government officials had taken them. Muhammad and his loved ones were outraged – it felt like the Yemeni Government was trying to cover up a horrible crime in which it had been complicit. They organised a protest, and the next day the bodies were returned to the family for burial.
Prior to the attacks, Muhammad was preparing his Masters degree. But the attack changed his life and his priorities. His family took in Ali’s children. Ali’s students were particularly shocked and affected by the strike.
With what little time he had left, Muhammad sacrificed his Masters to support other drone victims. Many are left in abject poverty after the loss of the family breadwinner to drone strikes; in addition, children and adults alike are often severely traumatized by the experience of the strikes, and by the constant presence and noise of drones circling overhead. Shocked at the devastation that has been wreaked on families similar to his own, Mohammed realized that he needed to formalize his efforts.
Last year Muhammad set up the National Organisation of Drone Victims, a support NGO has reached out to other families of drone victims in Yemen. With Reprieve’s support, Muhammad undertook investigative field trips and campaigned heavily to defend the rights of drone victims. Muhammed’s struggle to bring drones within the rule of law continues.
Faisal bin Ali Jaber
Faisal bin Ali Jaber is an environmental engineer from Yemen. His brother-in-law Salem and nephew Waleed were killed by a US drone strike in 2012.
Salem was an imam known for speaking out against al-Qaeda in his sermons, and Waleed was a local policeman. Salem is survived by a widow and seven young children and Waleem a wife and infant child.
The Friday before he was killed, Salem visited Khashamir for a several day celebration of Faisal’s son’s wedding. While there, he took the opportunity to give a guest sermon at the village mosque in which he denounced al-Qaeda’s ideology.
A few days later, strangers arrived in the village, demanding to speak with him. Salem eventually agreed to meet them, and took Waleed with him for protection. The two men went to meet the strangers near the local mosque, where they had parked their car. The whole group was then hit by a US drone missile, killing all of them on the second day of the wedding celebrations.
Faisal formed a committee to pursue justice in the case, campaigning in Yemen, the United States and Germany. Above all, he wanted the governments involved to apologise for their wrongdoing. The Yemeni Government confirmed in writing that the US carried out the drone strike, and that the deaths of Faisal’s relatives were “a mistake”. But the US stayed silent.
In 2013 Faisal travelled to Washington D.C. and met with Senators and White House officials to discuss the strike. Many of the individuals Faisal met offered personal regrets for the deaths of Faisal’s relatives, but the US Government has refused to publicly acknowledge or apologise for the attack. This despite leaked intelligence reports indicating US officials knew they had killed civilians shortly after the strike.
Months later Faisal’s relatives were given a bag containing $100,000 of freshly minted US dollar bills as compensation. Current and former US intelligence officials later confirmed that the payment was consistent with the way the CIA handles such matters.
Undeterred by the US Government’s refusal to apologise, Faisal filed a lawsuit in the US courts. The claim does not ask for monetary compensation but requests that the court issue a declaration that the strike that killed Salem and Waleed was unlawful.
Last year, Reprieve helped Faisal take legal action in the German administrative courts after discovering that German military bases were being used to facilitate drone strikes in Yemen – including the strike that killed Faisal’s relatives. The claim asked that the German administration stop the use of German territory for illegal actions by the US in Yemen.
In response to mounting pressure, the German Federal Prosecutor’s office – Germany’s highest prosecuting office –launched a “monitoring process”, which will investigate possible violations of international law involving Ramstein.
The Rehman Family
In 2013, Nabila, Zubair and their father Rafiq ur-Rehman were the first victims of US drone strikes to give evidence at a congressional hearing. They gave detailed accounts of the drone strike that killed their 67 year old grandmother, Mamana Bibi. Mamana was the only midwife in the village, and on the day the missiles struck, she was preparing to celebrate Eid.
As she picked vegetables that day, she was accompanied in the field by her nine grandchildren, aged 3 to 17. The younger children were playing when the first missile struck. As the elder children ran to help their grandmother, the second missile struck, severely injuring them.
The children awoke to the news that their grandmother had died. Kareem was taken for special treatment at Mirali hospital. His three year old sister, Asma woke up with irreparable hearing damage. Nabila, aged nine had treatment for serious shrapnel injuries to her arm whilst Zubair’s injuries were so severe he was transported to Ali Medical hospital several hundred kilometres away in Islamabad. The first operation was unsuccessful, and additional laser treatment proved too expensive so Zubair had to return home with shrapnel still in his leg. His father spent the following months borrowing money from those in the community for Zubair to have his leg operated on. He will likely be unable to repay the money.
Mamana Bibi was married to the retired headmaster of the Government High School in Miranshah. Her son, Rafiq ur-Rehman is a primary school teacher. He was away from the field when the missiles hit and arrived as his mother’s grave was being dug. He was told by his brother, Atiq not to look at the body of his mother as it was in pieces that had been collected from across the field. He says that his mother was ‘the string that holds the pearls together’ in the village of Tappi. He says his family are scared, and no longer gathers as it did when his mother was alive.
Nabila, aged 9, only had one simple question for Congress. She wants to know “What did my grandmother do wrong?” Zubair now prefers grey skies, as drones cannot fly in such weather. It is only when the skies return to their usual blue, that he becomes fearful and anxious.
Noor Khan
Noor Khan’s father, Malik Daud Khan, was an important local tribal leader in Northern Waziristan. He was a well-respected member of the community, and had been decorated by the Pakistani Government for offering assistance to the Pakistani armed forces. He was also commended for actively assisting the construction of a road through his village.
Malid Daud Khan supported the empowerment of women, and established the Women Skills Development Centre in his village. In fact, so esteemed was he, that he was frequently invited to participate as an esteemed guest at the ‘passing out’ parades of local army recruits.
On March 17, 2011, Malik Daud Khan was presiding over a dispute, attempting to resolve tension amongst local landowners over a chromite mine when he was attacked and killed by CIA operated drones. The drones attacked the Jirga at the height of the meeting, killing 50 people alongside Daud.
His son, Noor Khan, then a 25 year old man studying for an MA in Political Science, has stressed the long term effects of the killing of his father in the local area. He says that children in the area are no longer able to attend school and there is a feeling of constant fear that drones will attack. This has limited everyone’s movement and discouraged community events which used to be prominent.
In 2012 Reprieve brought an action for judicial review on behalf of Noor Khan against the UK Government for its role in sharing locational intelligence with the US for use in drone strikes. The court refused permission for the case to continue, finding that any decision on GCHQ’s role would necessarily involve condemnation of the US’ actions in Pakistan
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