Written evidence from Quilliam (ISI0023)

About Quilliam

• Quilliam is the world’s first counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world. It stand for religious freedom, equality, human rights and democracy.
• Quilliam seeks to challenge what we think, and the way we think. It aims to generate creative, informed and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.
• Founded by former extremists in 2008 and now employing extremists from across the spectrum of Islamism (including Maajid Nawaz [Hizb ut-Tahrir], Noman Benotman [Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and others], Sheikh Dr Usama Hasan [Afghan Mujahideen and others] and Adam Deen [Al-Muhajiroun]), Quilliam provides unparalleled insight into radicalisation, extremism and jihadist terrorism.
• Quilliam’s current research and programmes focus on Islamic State and its propaganda output and on counter-extremism strategy including how best to challenge the effectiveness of Islamist propaganda. See the following:
• The Virtual Caliphate (quantitative) http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf ,
• The Virtual Caliphate (qualitative)  http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf
• Islamic State One Year On http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/quilliam-strategic-assessment-is-one-year-on.pdf
• Islamic State http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changing-face-of-modern-jihadism.pdf
• Counter-Extremism Strategy http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf
• Countering Extremism Online http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf

Executive Summary

• Although Putin’s intervention in Syria is broadly in tension with the British approach, airstrikes against Islamic State, and thus cooperation – on some level – with Russia, is now an inconvenient necessity.

• The UK must consider long-term threats and avoid supporting other Islamist militant groups, like Jabhat al-Nusra, in an attempt to achieve short-term gains against ISIL. This will only create a more potent threat in the long term.

• While there is potential for coordination with Iran, without the cooperation of Saudi Arabia, this would lead to a further destabilisation of the region. This is not in the UK’s national interests, as it would threaten the stability of British regional allies.

• A key battleground in the fight against ISIL is the digital space. The UK and its coalition partners must work together with the defence and security community, and the academic and NGO world, in order to compete with the volume and originality of ISIL propaganda. The digital strategy must also be proactive, and focus on creating an alternative, as well as a counter, narrative. 

• The UK must ensure that there is consistency between its domestic counter-extremism efforts and its counter-terrorism policy abroad. This will involve addressing differences with regional partners on the funding of extremist groups.

• The UK will also need to work more closely with the EU on the threat of returning foreign fighters and the challenges of the refugee crisis. There is much more the UK can do to support the refugees in Europe, as well as those based in Arab countries.

• Extending UK airstrikes from Iraq to Syria is unlikely to have any practical benefit in the absence of a robust political strategy in the region. In all likelihood, the gains would be outweighed by the perception that the UK was intervening in Syria to assist Bashar al-Assad. Hence, any interventionist strategy must incorporate a wider international counter-extremism strategy to challenge the rise of Islamism worldwide.

Submission

1. ISIL is a key contributor to the conflict and instability in Iraq and Syria. Beyond those two states, its actions have created shockwaves that have been felt across the world. Whether or not ISIL poses a direct operational threat to the UK, the group’s ideology and its ability to galvanise and radicalise British is undeniably highly dangerous. In this sense, the greatest threat ISIL poses to the UK is internal, arising from the potential for bedroom radicals to engage in self-starter, “garage” terrorist activity. Despite this, the threats that ISIL poses to the UK’s national interests in the wider Middle East are significant, and responding to its rise is necessary.

2. Since its outset, the UK has been actively involved in the international coalition against ISIL, and any decision to change the level and nature of our contribution should be based on the current assessment of the landscape rather than past analyses. Regional dynamics have been complicated by Russia’s expanding role within Syria, which seems to be driven primarily by Putin’s desire for a strong ally in the Middle East. Putin’s intervention is partially driven by Russian assets and interests in Syria, and because his long term aim is to discredit NATO as a military alliance, it is in conflict with the UK approach.[1] Putin’s objective is currently being achieved – Russia’s bombing of rebel groups in Syria supported by the West has challenged the credibility of the US-led coalition.[2] The solution to this, however, must not be a knee-jerk adversarial reaction.

3. If the UK were to engage militarily against terrorist organisations in both Iraq and Syria, it would appear to be on the same side as Russia. Cooperation of this sort is an inconvenient necessity that must not be excessively opposed due to Russian action in other regions. While it is certainly an inconvenient necessity, it would be wrong to rule cooperation with Putin out as a fruitless exercise. For example, it is feasible that, one day, it may suit all parties involved to form of an agreement to establish a federal structure in Syria, one that facilitates the departure of President Assad. As well as this, shorter-term goals such as enforcing a ceasefire would be far easier to facilitate with Russia’s cooperation. With Syria already billions of dollars in debt to Russia, Putin is well-placed to pressure Assad into a ceasefire, something that would serve Moscow’s interests as well as the UK’s own.

4. The UK’s approach to defeating ISIL must also take into account the long-term threat from the global jihadist spectrum. It is detrimental to the long-term security of the international community to fund, train, or arm so-called ‘moderate Jihadists’ in order to defeat the immediate threat of ISIL. The UK must not be tempted to support al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates, Jabhat al-Nusra.  There must be no threat distinction made between the various AQ affiliates. Ultimately, AQ has a unified hierarchical command under one emir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and supporting certain affiliates will only strengthen the whole, thereby creating a more potent long-term threat.

5. Taking a values-based approach towards working with Islamists will necessitate finding other partners in Syria. A new initiative is needed to restructure and revive the moderate, non-Islamist opposition within Syria, so that it constitutes a realistic, unified challenge to ISIL. Other non-Islamist partners, such as the Kurds, are an option, but one that would be met with opposition from key allies such as Turkey. It is critical to understand that UK national interest is different from that of regional allies, and that diplomatic power will be necessary to convince partners not to support Islamists in Iraq and Syria.[3]

6. Turkey, with its strategic location, is a key regional partner. It plays an important role within Iraq and Syria, and the strengthening of the Turkish border will ultimately be crucial in stemming the flow of foreign fighters into the region. Turkey does not entirely share the UK’s goals and strategy for defeating ISIL, preoccupied as it is with neutralising the restive Kurdish population. Furthermore, its tacit alignment with, and support for, jihadist groups must be addressed.

7. Looking beyond coalition partners, there is potential to develop a working relationship with other players in the region, like Iran. However, a truly productive collaboration with Iran would require sophisticated cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is unlikely to materialise in the near future. The prospect of Iran taking a leading role in the fight against ISIL without Saudi involvement is particularly dangerous, because it runs the risks of exacerbating the already fragile relations between the region’s Sunni and Shia Muslims. This could result in increased instances of sect-based reprisals in the region, like the attacks on the minority Shia population of Saudi Arabia. It would also detract and distract from the more important message that Sunnis and Shias alike have been brutalised by the ‘caliphate’.

8. Diplomatically, the UK must emphasise the long-term risks to regional partners of supporting jihadists in this conflict. The potential for destabilisation of the entire region is not in the UK’s national interest. Aside from its broader interest in countering terrorism as whole, the UK also needs to consider its regional allies – particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – and minimise their vulnerability and exposure to terrorist groups. This will be impossible in the long run without accounting for conflicting dynamics in the region, for example between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Turkish government and the Kurds, and Russia and its periphery. When approaching these actors, their threat perception must be taken into consideration.
9. The fight against ISIL is not just military or political, it is also a war of information. ISIL relies heavily on its propaganda to wage psychological warfare, which has, in the past, facilitated military victories – for example, before Mosul was captured, the city’s soldiers and residents were threatened with death. In the wake of a given city’s capture, intimidation tactics make it easier for ISIL to subdue populations and consolidate territorial control.[4] The coalition must understand the nature of ISIL propaganda and coordinate its efforts to respond. As well as engaging in this as a domestic approach to countering the foreign fighter phenomenon, challenging ISIL’s information operations locally would have key strategic benefits.

10. ISIL’s monopoly of the digital space is crucial to its attracting a continuous stream of foreign recruits to the ‘caliphate’. While propaganda is not the only factor behind radicalisation, it does facilitate and expedite the process, and is a known catalyst for an individual’s transformation from tacit supporter to active member.[5] ISIL’s media strategy is unprecedented. It has been highly sophisticated in disseminating its ideology and message, generating an average 38 unique units of propaganda a day. The quantity and quality of the content it produces has dwarfed counter-narrative efforts to date. Its propaganda is highly varied, enabling it to appeal to a broad cross-section of consumers.[6]

11. The coalition is held back by its size. The rigid formalities of its bureaucracy makes it impossible for states to meaningfully compete with ISIL in creating large quantities of original, effective propaganda. In light of this, a cross-sector approach involving cooperation with NGOs, activists, and civil society is key to combat ISIL’s narrative.[7] Currently, the international coalition consists of local governments (reacting to realities on the ground), international governments (doing what they can within the parameters of their political process), the defence and security community (limited by the previous to actors in what it can achieve), and the academic and NGO world (full of ideas but unable to translate this into policy). These various actors need to be able to operate from within a bespoke information architecture that will enable them to align and pursue a cohesive communications strategy to attack ISIL on all fronts.[8]

12. This strategy must be proactive. ISIL propaganda is actually introduced online by a small number of accounts which have strict privacy settings and few followers. Once online, this content is then disseminated by self-appointed ISIL supporters, rather than the leadership. If these elite accounts can be targeted and repeatedly challenged, it would have a greater impact on ISIL’s online footprint than blanket bans.[9]

13. In the long term, rather than relying on social media companies to censor extremist content and accounts, which is a reactive measure, we also need to contest the virtual battleground on the basis of alternative, as well as counter, narratives. Convincing alternative narratives do exist in local communities – the key is to package and transmit these with the same ferocity and know-how as extremists.

14. The external threat posed by ISIL is intricately linked with the domestic environment in the UK, and the group will not be defeated unless the UK’s foreign policy supports internal counter-extremism efforts. Meaningful bilateral engagement with regional partners will be crucial in this respect. The government must actively engage in public diplomacy to explain UK foreign policy decisions to the general public and highlight the complexity of regional dynamics, with a view to reducing the impact of Islamist narratives on vulnerable populations. An important part of this is avoiding inconsistency in strategies, for example, denouncing terrorism while funding AQ affiliates. The UK must project counter-extremism abroad in allied countries with significant foreign fighter populations, and key differences with regional partners on funding extremist groups must be addressed.  Decision-makers must be aware that Britain’s actions on the international stage, and the actions of its allies, will have an impact on the reception and therefore effectiveness of its counter-extremism message. Therefore, the policies of internal and external branches of government must complement each other in order to be effective in the long run, and must maintain human rights norms and international law as red lines.

15. The UK will also need to work more closely with EU partners to mitigate the threat of returning foreign fighters. Open borders and freedom of movement within the EU makes it very difficult to keep track of potential sources of threat. As such, information and intelligence sharing structures must be improved and synchronised in order to adequately meet it.

16. Another key challenge facing the EU is demographic displacement. The UK has announced it will take 20,000 refugees over five years (this is an average of nine Syrians per local authority per year),[10] and the EU finally agreed to resettle 120,000. This figure is meagre in comparison to the 800,000 Germany has pledged to take, and the estimated 11 million Syrians displaced in total.[11] The UK needs to be much more proactive in its approach to the crisis, by working more closely with the EU and exploring opportunities to increase the number of displaced persons it can admit. There is also much greater scope to support refugees in other countries by contributing to the resources required to provide shelter, healthcare and education. The latter is particularly important because of its ability to undermine, in the long-term, the ideological claims made by ISIL and other extremist groups. It is also important to remember that these refugees are not just numbers on a page – they are people who have been traumatised by a brutal conflict, and contributing British expertise to post-trauma care is another sustainable measure with long-term benefits. Moreover, such contributions would serve to challenge the victimhood narrative upon which many jihadist groups are predicated. 

17. One area of general agreement within the coalition has been the air campaign against ISIL in Iraq. The Baghdad government maintains that it is seeking to resolve the crisis through a political process, with air-strikes representing only a facilitating measure that attempts to bolster the Iraqi Security Forces and other pro-government elements in their fight against ISIL. There is not the same consensus regarding Syria, where there is little prospect of a near-term political solution.[12]

18. In both cases, a military campaign alone will not mitigate the ISIL threat. Thus, although the UK has been involved in striking targets in Iraq and is looking to extend them to Syria, the end result if it does is unlikely to drastically differ from a situation in which it does not. As well as this, air-strikes could serve to worsen the perception of the UK in the region, because – rightly or wrongly – it would inevitably appear that the British government was prioritising the fight against ISIL, rather than addressing the root causes of the unrest that sparked the Syrian Civil War in the first place.

19. In the Syrian context, exclusively targeting ISIL would send the message that the UK is willing to intervene against an entity that threatens its own interests, but is not moved when Syrian civilians are attacked with chemical weapons and barrel bombs, even if these are in direct contravention of our international humanitarian imperatives.[13] With some sources claiming that the Assad regime has been responsible for 95 percent of all civilian deaths in Syria since 2011, the shift in focus towards ISIL will not necessarily serve coalition interests in the long run.[14] From the perspective on the ground, while people may dislike ISIL’s intolerant views, and chafe under its restrictions, ISIL is regularly viewed as the lesser of two evils and the more it seems that ‘the West’ only cares about its own interests, the greater ISIL’s longevity in the region.[15] Thus, the emergence of ISIL – while the threat it presents is more provocative – should not soften British attitudes towards the Assad regime, whose brutality and repression precedes, and supersedes, that of the ‘caliphate’. In light of this, coordination with Assad – whether overt or covert – would certainly worsen the long-term threat presented by ISIL.

20. To truly bring stability to the region, the military approach must only be viewed as an enabler, something to be combined with a strong political strategy. Until normative, sustainable civil governance is reintroduced in Iraq and Syria, local tribes are unlikely to rise up and risk their lives in fighting ISIL, which has brought with it a measure of law, order, and security to the areas under its control. ISIL is a symptom of problems in Iraq and Syria, not the cause. So, instead of further militarising the insurgency by arming or training of local militias and rebel groups, it would be more prudent for the UK government to redouble its efforts towards building a strong, inclusive central government in both Iraq and Syria.[16] In order to achieve this, while also avoiding the pitfalls of sectarianism, regional partners must be involved to a high degree.

21. The UK’s approach in Syria and Iraq must form part of a wider FCO approach to tackling Islamist extremism globally. There needs to be clarity on the FCO’s priorities to tackle Islamist extremism in the long-term, and short-term decisions must bear this in mind. There must be consistency in the UK’s approach to Islamist extremism around the world, one that precludes treating different Al Qaeda branches in different ways and should diplomatically encourage allies to take similarly consistent approaches to extremism domestically. Sharing counter-extremism best practice and funding counter-extremism efforts in foreign countries is a recommended course of action to achieve peace and stability and, in the long run, protect British national interests.

November 2015