Written evidence submitted by Averroes

Summary

1. This submission will focus on the Prime Minister’s Counter-Extremism Strategy, in particular the rationale for broadening the definition of extremism to non-violent forms, its definition and its effectiveness.

2. Averroes is an independent non-partisan think tank forming ideas that cut across traditional political boundaries with expertise in minority rights, Islamic law, healthcare policy and British Muslim related policy issues. We submitted evidence (oral and written) to the Committee’s 2011 ‘Inquiry into the Roots of Violent Radicalisation’ and in 2013 produced ‘A Response to the report, Tackling Extremism in the UK by the Extremism Taskforce’.[1]

Points of Agreement

3. Our ultimate aim should be to foster a Muslim identity that is committed to faith, while at the same time being proudly British. However these issues will not be resolved through the prism of countering extremism and terrorism. Such an approach will further alienate young British Muslims from mainstream society and democratic processes.

4. He is also right to accept that socio-economic disadvantage (unemployment and education) and Islamophobia (discrimination and hate-crime) need to be addressed and dealt with as well as other forms of extremism such as the far right and neo-nazism. Nevertheless the related policies proposed lack any detail or elaboration, and will attract accusations of tokenism to detract from the Strategy being viewed as targeting only British Muslims.

British Values v. Extremism: Elusive and Expansive

5. The Strategy defines ‘extremism’ as “vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”

6. The definition fails to establish a compelling link between extremism and violent terrorist acts and offers no supporting evidence. Its focus is now wholly on non-violent extremism rather than terrorism, which is seen as just a symptom. This constitutes a regression from previous policies, which focused on prevention of violent extremism and processes of radicalisation.

7. The Prime Minister said in Birmingham: “The fact is from Woolwich to Tunisia, from Ottawa to Bali, these murderers all spout the same twisted narrative, one that claims to be based on a particular faith.”[2] The undisputed commonality of such attacks was the murder of innocent people or members of the armed forces. It is only right then to maintain focus on how to prevent such acts and the ideology that underpins them rather than a rejection of ‘British values’.

8. The definition offered of extremism is too broad and indeterminate, to the point that employed terms themselves need elaboration and defining. The list is left open, meaning potential ‘fundamental values’ are not limited to the ones listed. Does opposition to democracy mean criticism of democratic structures or a preference for an alternative system? What exactly is meant by ‘rule of law’ and who is seen as opposing it? Does it refer to deference to religious law? Would anarchists be seen as rejecting the rule of law and democracy? Does individual liberty refer to human rights and if so, which ones? Does respect and tolerance of other faiths entail disagreeing with certain elements whether on religious or atheistic bases?

9. The definition is so ambivalent that the Government itself will be characterised as extremist by those seeking to reinforce the ‘us’ against ‘them’ narrative. They will cite the UK’s illegal invasion of Iraq, its acceptance of the military coup in Egypt, opposition to the Human Rights Act by some, Terrorism legislation targeting Muslims and successive Prevent policies limiting the freedom of religion and expression of Muslims making them a suspect community.

10. This anti-western frame of mind, the Prime Minister will argue is part of the extremist world view that seeks to skew and distort the minds of vulnerable young people. However it is also indicative of how malleable and unspecific the ‘fundamental values’ that the Strategy lays out are, that this perception already exists in a number of young Muslim minds and needs to be tackled.  

11. Peter Fahy, Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police states: “There is a concern that efforts to control extremist narratives will limit free speech and backfire if we don’t get the balance right. The efforts to control extremism and limit protest by those caught by too wide a definition may undermine the very rights and British values you seek to protect...At what point do you erode the British values you are trying to protect. Such as live and let live, and freedom of speech.” There is a risk of officers becoming “thought police...policing religion and not just Muslims”.[3]

12. Demos, a leading cross-party think tank noted: “the Government must ensure that its efforts to address radicalisation do not threaten the pre-eminence of free speech: one of the most critical foundations of the democratic, open and secure society that terrorism seeks to undermine...terrorist organisations such as ISIS can appear exciting and purpose-giving; without positive and non-violent outlets for dissent, we risk making extremism more exotic, attractive, and difficult to address through early intervention.”[4]

Can and should Government determine matters of religion?

13. The definition and its elaboration also seriously undermine the autonomous right of Muslims to decide what is legitimate and illegitimate religious belief. Government should be weary of deciding or attempting to be the gate keeper of what may be considered as acceptable forms of Islam. Supporting some voices and not others will create internal tension and conflict as well as discrediting those favoured, reducing their legitimacy and effectiveness.

14. Furthermore it is not the religious notions themselves that are problematic but rather their interpretation, framing and expression, and whether what underlies them is hatred of the ‘other’ or an attempt to live cohesive and peaceful lives with those who are diverse and different. It follows that solutions should not seek to stifle or push such views out of the public realm, forcing them underground. The only antidote to religious misunderstandings and distortions is the correct interpretation and framing of those issues cognisant of our British context.

15. The Prime Minister in Birmingham stated: “we’re now going to actively encourage the reforming and moderate Muslim voices.” Constant reference and emphasis on ‘reform’ and moderate ‘reformists’ gives the impression that there is something wrong with Islam. The tone and approach is accusatory and alienating. It reinforces the narratives of a religion under attack. Any perception of an ideological war against Islam rather than a struggle for security must be avoided. The Government cannot and should not inadvertently determine what is moderate or extreme Islam. Nor can the Prime Minister assert “let’s remember that it’s only the extremists who divide people into good Muslims and bad Muslims”, when that is what the Strategy risks doing.

16. The Prime Minister also stated in Birmingham that “to deny it has anything to do with Islam means you disempower the critical reforming voices; the voices that are challenging the fusing of religion and politics”.  Why would a counter-extremism strategy seek to stem any form of faith-based politics, no matter how noble and admirable its aims may be, such as those of social justice, equality and democracy? Factually, religion and politics coexist in the minds of many young Muslims. If that linkage is distorted or ill-informed, it can only be rectified with the right interplay between religion and politics not its omission from the public realm.

17. Dr. Chris Allen, a leading expert on Islamophobia stated that this criterion will be used to “demarcate between what it believes to be extremist and non-extremist forms of Islam. Consequently, Muslims who practice more conservative expressions of Islam will be inaccurately targeted as being non-violent extremists irrespective of whether the evidence exists to support such a view.”[5] 

18. Ali Soufan, former FBI agent and Director of The Soufan Group, in his evidence to this Committee in 2011 warned against the shift in focus to non-violent extremism. He emphasised it would inevitably lead to the conflation of religious conservatism and non-violent extremism as well as undermining the former being a “good asset” to combat radicals.[6]

Other Facilitators of Violent Radicalisation

19. Averroes holds that there is no single path to terrorism, nor is there a linear spectrum of extremism or radicalisation that one travels on eventually becoming a violent extremist referred to as the ‘conveyer-belt theory’, which has been widely criticised for conflating religiosity with susceptibility to violent radicalisation.

20. Averroes submits that there are a number of facilitating factors of which distorted religious ideology is only one and which is discerned by its willingness to harm civilians and British and allied armed forces rather than opposition to an inadequately defined notion of British values. Others include Islamophobia, discrimination, socio-economic disadvantage, unemployment, grievances and perception that there is a war on Islam, foreign policy and sense of transnational solidarity with co-religionists around the world.

21. Some of these issues have been mentioned in the Strategy, but the overwhelming importance and focus remains on ‘extremism’. They need to be addressed as distinct and serious issues rather than as subordinate to ‘extremism’. While the acknowledgement of Islamophobia is welcome, it is mentioned as a type of ‘extremism’ rather than a source of radicalisation. The review by Louise Casey of the relevant socio-economic dimensions is a welcome proposal.

The International Dimension and ISIS

22. There has been much contestation whether foreign policy grievances should be included within the framework of preventing terrorism. A more nuanced view is required here. What has been overlooked in such polarising discussions has been the transnational dimension rather than foreign policy per se. The crucial facet that helps us understand the psyche of some, who choose to take up arms or violence has been a sense of brotherhood and religious solidarity with other Muslims globally.

23. While in Iraq and Afghanistan the grievance had been against foreign policy which aggressively targeted two Muslim majority countries in the aftermath of 9/11, resulting in huge loss of civilian life. In Syria now, the radicalising factor may actually be international inaction and more importantly the scale of human suffering.

24. It is this aspect alone, which explains the rise and popularity of ISIS and why 700+ Britons are said to have joined. If it was not for the spectre of human suffering in Syria, a distorted ideology and interpretation of Islam could not alone have recruited such numbers to their ranks.

25. When ISIS first came to the world’s attention, they appeared to be the loudest voice and the most effective force aided by their well oiled propaganda and social media machinery. The initial outflux of Britons was not to any specific armed group in Syria. Most indigenous Syrian rebels were highly averse to foreign recruits with no combat experience and weary of the risk of their armed struggle being painted as instigated by foreign jihadists. Conversely ISIS and other extremist groups such as Jahbat al-Nusra welcomed foreign recruits, themselves already having high numbers of foreign fighters. 

26. The Strategy’s preoccupation with ideology is challenged by the view that the prevalent terrorist ideologies have been imported, none emerging from the UK context. Al Qaeda was born of the idea of corrupt Muslim leaders and western occupation of Muslim countries. ISIS, especially in light of Blair’s apology[7], is a direct consequence of the fall out and failures of governance and sectarian rifts in post-Saddam Iraq. ISIS is essentially an Iraqi group that has capitalised on the instability in Syria.

27. Furthermore we submit that religious factors play a greater part post-radicalisation. For example in relation to ISIS, the initial trigger that motivates someone to flee to join have included convoluted responses to human suffering; being convinced of a lack of belonging; exploiting of prevalent identity crises; and the affirmation of the narrative that Muslims are in fact hated and will never live in peace, have the same opportunities or be allowed to practice their faith freely in such a society.

28. It is only once they are recruited, that distorted religious perspectives are employed to maintain and sustain their allegiance and membership to groups such as ISIS and ultimately prevent them from returning owing to potential disillusionment. Seldom have propaganda videos sought to change religious views of those in the west. It is the thrill and just cause, which is offered as an exciting prospect rather than religious devoutness. 

The Real Extremists

29. There are certainly those who the vast majority of Muslims would agree are extremists, especially in the contempt with which they view British and western society, celebrating the death and denigrating the memory of members of the armed forces and operating just within the law. An epitomisation of this is the radical self-appointed cleric Anjum Chaudary and members of his proscribed organisation Al-Muhajiroon.

30. A number of those who have committed terrorist offences have had some link to the group, most notable of which are the murderers of Drummer Lee Rigby. The Present Strategy repeats the mistakes of the subsequent Report by the Taskforce on Extremism on ‘Tackling Extremism in the UK’,[8] which failed to analyse sufficiently the specific experiences of the murders.

31. However the problem is not the religious notions they espouse, but their misappropriation and misapplication to justify their misguided view of religion and identity in Britain.

32. The solution is not to shift the boundaries of law on freedom of expression and religion as essentially that is what they aspire for in exposing the alleged hypocrisy of western liberal democracy. The only effective and valid response is not to succumb to the temptation to erode freedoms and risk fuelling the false narrative that such limitations on rights are specific to Muslims.

33. Responsibility falls on ordinary Muslims, religious leaders and the media to tackle such extremist individuals and organisations. They are already ostracised from all mosques, universities and public institutions. However while physically relegated to the street and protest, they may operate on the internet and they seek out and target those in prisons. 

34. The amount of attention and time Mr. Chaudary has received on mainstream media outlets has done little to increase his support base. Unfortunately it has created fear amongst non-Muslims as to a Muslim threat within their midst that hates them but seeks to benefit from the generous and liberal system of the UK. He has increased anxieties against Muslims as he claims to speak for the religion yet has a negligible constituency. People such as himself should have the freedom to express their views but should not be allowed a platform to propagate their hate, which rather than convert any to his cause, turns many against or fearful of Muslims.

Recommendations

35. The Muslim Engagement Forum (MEF) must not be limited to those seen as toeing the Government line or in receipt of Government funds. It should rather seek to engage with a broader spectrum of Muslim voices representative of sections of the community. Those who may have been critical of the Government’s approach are especially useful to contribute to meaningful dialogue and debate on key issues.

36. A wider consultation must be embarked upon, owing to allegations non-inclusiveness in arriving at the current strategy and criticisms already levelled against it from across the of fields of law, politics, policing and community. It must seek to come to a common understanding of what ‘extremism’ really is and the best means to tackle it.

37. A far more comprehensive strategy must be adopted with distinct components that reflect the potential facilitators. In matters where an alleged distortion of faith is seen to be a contributor to radicalisation, it can only be countered and neutralised with cogent faith-based solutions and responses to often hateful and separatist perspectives. Such an approach with broad based support also mitigates accusations of state interference in internal matters of religion. Any such counter-narratives and faith-based perspectives cannot attain the required level of legitimacy and credibility if they cannot satisfy the litmus test of Islamic scholarship. Hence what is required is engagement and dialogue with those who may be able to do such work. Emphatic and public backing for any group or individual and funding would only undermine their effectiveness and independence.

38. Coupled with an indeterminate definition, the measures proposed are draconian and far reaching. They risk fuelling the very resentment and alienation the Strategy seeks to counter. Of particular concern is the attempt to prevent entryism. It is not clear beyond the three examples cited in the Strategy (which may also be disputed), why it warrants a review of all public services and bodies. The very premise that such people may exist is a highly divisive and volatile starting point. Such measures should be omitted from the Strategy entirely.

39. Given the noble aims of strategy, but its complete misunderstanding of the correct means, strongly suggests that the Government has solicited and relied heavily on advice from a very narrow cross-section of Muslims, who rather than address the problem of terrorism have instead used the opportunity to silence those who they differ with ideologically and religiously. The MEF must be made public – their advice to date opened to scrutiny, a much broader spectrum of Muslims and organisations allowed to participate in the determination of these matters. It is vital for Government not to stride into the deep waters of combating thoughts and ideas based on misinformation.