Written evidence submitted by Universities UK

 

About us

Universities UK is the representative organisation for the UK’s universities. Founded in 1918, its mission is to be the voice for universities in the UK, providing high quality leadership and support to its members to promote a successful and diverse higher education sector. With 132 members and offices in London, Cardiff (Universities Wales) and Edinburgh (Universities Scotland), it promotes the strength and success of UK universities nationally and internationally.

 

Executive Summary

 

 

 

 

 


Introduction

 

  1. UK universities recognise that they have an important role to play in preventing violent extremism. Institutions take this responsibility seriously, acknowledging that as communities where large groups of primarily young adults live, study and socialise, they are a potential target for those who seek to convert vulnerable individuals to violent extremism. At the same time, universities must also fulfil legal obligations to secure free speech within the law (Education (No.2) Act 1986) and academic freedom (Education Reform Act 1988), and ensure that they remain centres of research, learning and debate.[1]

 

  1. Universities are actively engaged with the government’s Prevent agenda and have been for a number of years. This includes training relevant staff, engagement with regional Prevent coordinators, working with local partners (police, local authorities, schools and community groups) and the development of cross-institutional strategies to prevent students being drawn into violent extremism.  In addition, universities are well-equipped to respond to the complex causes of violent extremism and terrorism in a variety of ways, as outlined below:

 

  1. Education: educating students with the skills to become rational and resilient citizens, skilled workers, and contributors to civil society. Research has shown that universities have a civilising effect, helping to increase political engagement, political knowledge and fostering democratic attitudes and opinions.[2]

 

  1. Provision of skills to challenge received ideas: universities are places where radical ideas belong and where different viewpoints, including those that are offensive or extreme, can be debated and challenged. Students are taught how to develop their critical skills, encouraging them to interrogate and challenge dangerous ideologies, not accept them. The legal protection of academic freedom and free speech allows universities to play this role.


 

  1. Support for the police and security services: liaison with and support for the security services in terms of responding to security threats.

 

  1. Research on terrorism and violent extremism: universities have a vital role to play in researching the causes of terrorism and violent extremism.

 

  1. Fostering tolerance: universities are diverse and international, enabling students to develop an understanding and experience of different cultures and faiths, a global outlook and alternative perspectives. Students who might otherwise be drawn into narrow extremist ideologies, are exposed to an environment where they are supported to broaden their horizons and develop tolerance and understanding. Under the Equality Act 2010, institutions also have a duty to promote good relations and work closely with their students to achieve this.

 

  1. Community partnership and outreach: universities play an integral role in the wider community through mentoring; outreach into schools; community volunteering; engagement with local faith communities, providing public access to cultural facilities, lectures and events etc. These activities help to create community cohesion and resilience, and allow universities to reach out to people and communities who might otherwise be disengaged.

 

  1. International collaborations: universities collaborate with many other countries including politically unstable nations and those where the values of tolerance, democracy and equality are less well embedded. UK  universities play a valuable role in strengthening civil society in fragile states, assisting in overcoming sectarian divides and addressing the causes of radicalisation abroad.

 

  1. Universities have much to contribute to the understanding and preventing of violent extremism. As set out above, their response to this problem is not only by way of explicit engagement with the Prevent agenda but through ongoing institutional activity and working with students and the wider community. Both government and wider public dialogue must appreciate this broad, far reaching role and support universities in fulfilling all of this activity.

 


Major drivers of, and risk factors for recruitment to, terrorist movements linked to extremism

 

  1. The drivers of extremism, and recruitment to these movements, are complex. Universities play an integral role in furthering understanding of violent extremism and terrorist movements. This is evident from the many academic centres focused on these issues, including the Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (St Andrew's), the Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies (Teesside), the Centre for Conflict Security and Terrorism (Nottingham) and the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (King's).

 

  1. Identifying vulnerable students requires knowledge and understanding of the major drivers and risk factors that can lead people to become involved in extremism. A significant challenge exists for universities in doing this as there is no agreed ‘pathway’ to violent radicalisation or single profile of a ‘terrorist’, and the characteristics or behaviour that staff may be advised to look for could be an indication of other problems, for example, mental health problems or substance abuse. The presence of the new statutory Prevent duty reinforces the need to share, wherever possible, the latest insights and expertise on what draws individuals into terrorism and what potential vulnerability may look like. The higher education sector has facilitated this already with the establishment of the Safe Campus Communities website in 2013 but further information sharing from within government would be helpful.  This should include where possible the sharing of information collected by the Home Office’s Extremism Analysis Unit, generic information on pathways to violent extremism and information on risks specific to an individual institution.

 

  1. The use of social media as a recruitment tool by violent extremist organisations remains a concern of the sector. While institutions can control their own IT networks and determine what filtering and IT usage processes are necessary, it is impossible for them to know what material students are accessing outside of the institution’s network or what online communities they are part of. UUK’s written submission to the Committee’s inquiry in 2011-12 highlighted that university role cannot and should not extend into the monitoring of students’ private lives.[3]

 

  1. Universities recognise they have a responsibility to ensure that their students are not being drawn into violent extremism on campus and to provide a safe, secure community for staff and students. Yet, universities are large, diffuse organisations of independent adults and they do not function in isolation from the wider community. It is worth noting that only 19% of students live in university-owned or operated accommodation, with a further 6.38% in private sector halls: significantly lower than the 32% that live in the parental home or in their own residence. Many students never live in ‘student’ accommodation.[4] There may exist off-campus risk factors that contribute to a student becoming violently radicalised. It is neither simple nor appropriate to identify and monitor what students choose to do, and what groups they may be part of, off-campus.

 

  1. Understanding these risk factors and identifying proportionate ways in which public bodies can mitigate them remains a significant challenge.

 

 

How effective is the Prevent strategy and what have been the problems with it? Including:

    1. Responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat the UK faces from those who promote it
    2. Working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation
    3. Preventing people from being drawn into terrorism and ensuring that they are given appropriate advice and support

 

  1. Universities have engaged proactively with the Prevent strategy for a number of years. However, there remain a number of challenges that need addressing.

 

  1. There has been in-depth and generally constructive engagement between government departments and the higher education sector on Prevent. However, concerns persist about some of the official resources available to support universities.

 

  1. Material developed by government has not always been appropriately tailored to the sector’s circumstances. For example, the Workshops to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) are generic and do not reflect the context within which universities operate. Indeed these workshops are used across a range of public bodies meaning that NHS staff would be trained in a similar way to those working in higher education. The university sector would therefore welcome working with government and other agencies to produce training resources that are more applicable to the higher education and academic context.

 

  1. The government has published statutory guidance setting out what is expected of universities in complying with the new Prevent duty. This was the subject of a consultation in early 2015 and resulted in a move away from a prescriptive and bureaucratic first draft to an improved final version.

 

  1. However, we remain concerned about several elements of the published guidance – in particular its provisions around external speakers who hold ‘extremist’ views. The published guidance requires that universities do not allow any event to proceed where ‘the views being expressed, or likely to be expressed, constitute extremist views that risk drawing people into terrorism or are shared by terrorist groups’ unless the university authorities are ‘entirely convinced’ that these risks can be ‘fully mitigated’.[5]

 

  1. This requirement, for universities to be entirely convinced that the risk is fully mitigated, is potentially impossible to fulfil. There will always be a small element of risk in any event - the requirement to fully mitigate risks is unreasonable and suggests that universities will be unable to make proportionate decisions about individual speakers.

 

  1. UUK has previously expressed concerns that this constitutes a de facto ban on speakers on campus who might hold extreme views, even though those views are lawful and do not lead to violence or terrorism. The Minister for Security recently stressed that this is not the case stating that ‘once a university has assessed the risk it will be able to take measures; if it feels it has to cancel a meeting, it will, but there is no de facto ban as a result of these provisions.[6] While this provides some reassurance, it remains uncertain as to how an institution can ever be entirely convinced that the risk has been fully mitigated.

 

  1. Banning certain speakers from campus also has the potential to lead to the unintended consequence whereby extreme but controversial and offensive views that are within the law are driven underground where they may prosper unchallenged. Furthermore, being unable to host particular speakers on campus may also impact the research community. No distinction is made in the guidance between events organised by, for example, student societies and research centres.

 

  1. In addition to this, universities are in the temporary situation of having to comply with a new Prevent statutory duty but with no agreed monitoring framework in place (this remains the subject of consultation). This means that they are currently seeking to comply with the new duty where failure to do will have serious implications, but no confirmation of how compliance will be monitored. This adds to the sense of uncertainty within the sector. 

 

  1. The political rhetoric around countering extremism is not aided by the interchangeable use of terms including extremism, non-violent extremism, violent extremism and terrorism. The Prevent duty requires that universities have due regard to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism yet the statutory guidance extends this to extremism, which includes both violent and non-violent extremism, the latter being within the law. An individual may develop extreme views without being drawn into violent extremism or any acts of terrorism. The sector continues to be concerned about the inclusion of ‘non-violent’ extremist views as well as violent extremist views, particularly as non-violent views do not sit outside the law. This again creates tension with universities’ legal obligations to secure freedom of speech within the law and ensure academic freedom.

 

  1. An additional concern shared by universities and students’ groups alike (including the NUS and FOSIS) has been the focus on Islamic extremism. Universities recognise the serious threat posed to national security of Islamic State and other terrorist groups but fear that the current narrative risks alienating particular groups and inhibiting engagement with specific communities. In certain regions and institutions, a greater risk of violence is posed by other types of potential extremism including the Far Right and animal rights extremism. The placing of Prevent on a statutory footing has generated some concerns that specific groups will be targeted.

 

  1. Finally, there is often a mismatch between the political rhetoric and the reality of the situation within institutions. This has led to accusations that universities are a breeding ground for extremism. It has also resulted in a tendency that where an individual has current or historic links to higher education and has been drawn into terrorism, their higher education experience is identified as a causative factor. This does not appear to be supported by evidence.[7]

 

  1. The Prevent strategy highlights that more than 30% of people convicted for Al’Qa’ida-associated terrorist offences in the UK between 1999 and 2009 are known to have attended university or a higher education institution. What this data does not indicate is whether their higher education experience was any factor in their path to terrorism. Indeed, this figure is in line with the 29.7% of the working-age population found in the 2011 Census to hold a degree-level qualification, and is significantly lower than the current rate of higher education participation among young people[8]. These figures indicate, if anything, a negative correlation between attendance at higher education and being drawn into terrorism.

 

 

How effective is the Channel programme at:

 

    1. Identifying individuals at risk
    2. Assessing the nature and extent of that risk
    3. Developing the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned?

 

  1. Universities have a duty of care to their students and communities. They have a wide range of services in place to assist students who may be potentially vulnerable to various difficulties (including mental health problems, alcohol/ substance abuse, financial difficulties) and are well equipped to refer students to appropriate support. Supporting individuals who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism requires a sensitive and proportionate response. The Channel programme must therefore be used carefully as it relates to individuals who have not committed any criminal offence.

 

  1. Students who are vulnerable often present with a range of different issues (for example domestic issues, financial issues, mental health problems, academic concerns). The difficulty therefore lies in identifying those individuals who need referral specifically to the Channel process. This is compounded by a lack of clarity and understanding as to who leads on the Channel process in different parts of the country; feedback from our members suggests that it is not the same in each region.

 

  1. Institutions are keen to obtain greater clarity on the Channel process, including how it relates to other forms of support that universities might need to seek for vulnerable people. The Channel process can seem inflexible and ignorant of the ongoing engagement between student support services and the vulnerable individual. Some UUK members report that they are keen to see this included in the training and awareness programmes delivered by the BIS Prevent Coordinators.
  2. There is also a concern about the damaging impact that referrals to Channel may have on the relationship between the university and an individual student. There is a lack of clarity over what the long-term consequences of a referral are for the students involved including whether their data is kept on record and for what purpose. Greater clarity around this, and information sharing in this context, would be welcome. Increased transparency of the Channel referral process could help to improve the sector’s trust in its appropriateness and proportionality. If Channel is perceived as a primarily punitive process associated more with national security than individual support, this may have the impact of limiting its effectiveness and uptake.

 

  1. UUK also believes that the wording of the Prevent statutory guidance is contradictory in relation to Channel referrals. Paragraph 19 states that ‘wherever possible the consent of the person concerned should be obtained before sharing any information about them’. However, other parts of the guidance suggest that individuals may be referred to Channel without their knowledge and without contravening the law. The Minister for Security addressed this in a recent parliamentary debate, stating that he was confident that it is consistent with the Prevent strategy as published in 2011 but that he would ‘…look at that closely again’.[9] UUK welcomes this further examination to clarify rules around information sharing.

 

 

How successfully is the Home Office collaborating with international allies, social media companies and civil society organisations to counter online extremism?

 

  1. As part of civil society, the university sector engages across government in relation to the counter-extremism agenda including at ministerial level and with government officials, particularly those within the Home Office and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. This engagement is generally constructive although there can be a failure to recognise the diversity and autonomy of the higher education sector.

 

  1. Universities are not schools and students are adults and not children. Any collaboration between the Home Office and the sector must recognise this and support the multi-faceted ways in which universities produce graduates who are tolerant, engaged and critical thinkers.

 

  1. The 2012 Home Affairs Committee report highlighted the impossibility of entirely eradicating violent extremist material online and recognised the complex, fast-paced challenge of attempting to monitor social media activity.[10] The report recommended a partnership approach to prevent the internet and social media being used for terrorist activity. Universities continue to be concerned about social media and the extent to which they will be expected to monitor and filter online activity. It is unreasonable to expect that institutions will be aware of students’ and staff members’ online activity when not using the campus network. This highlights the need for government to continue to collaborate with social media companies and internet service providers to counter online extremism. Universities must separately remain spaces where academics and researchers can access security sensitive material to further understanding of what draws individuals into terrorism.

 

 

Conclusion

 

  1. Universities fully accept that they have an important role to play in tackling the threat of violent extremism and they remain engaged with the Prevent agenda. However, concerns persist over the potential conflict with universities’ legal obligations to allow freedom of speech and to secure academic freedom, as well as their ability to identify and support potentially vulnerable students in the most appropriate way.

 

  1. Universities are large, diverse communities of adults and, unlike schools, do not operate in loco parentis. Government must regard them in this way to ensure that guidance and training to support institutions in their compliance with the Prevent duty is appropriately tailored to their context and particular challenges. Where possible, government should draw upon the expertise that exists within the higher education sector and see universities as part of the solution to countering violent extremism.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] The Education (No.2) Act 1986 requires that any person involved ‘in the governance of institutions shall take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students, employees and visiting speakers. This includes a particular duty to ensure (where reasonably practicable) that the use of university premises in not denied to an individual or group on the basis of their beliefs, views, policy or objectives. In addition to this, under the Education Reform Act 1988, there is a duty on universities ‘to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions’, to provide education, promote learning and engage in research, and to apply the principles of justice and fairness.

[2] NEF and UUK, Degrees of value: how universities benefit society (June 2011), p.13.

[3] Universities UK, Submission to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the roots of violent radicalisation, January 2011.

[4] Higher Education Statistics Authority. Term time accommodation of all full-time students, https://www.hesa.ac.uk/content/view/3312, accessed 7 October 2015. Figures relate to 2013-14 academic year.

[5] Prevent Duty Guidance: for higher education institutions in England and Wales (July 2015), p. 4, paragraph 11.

[6] Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Guidance) Regulations 2015, Deb 10 September 2015 c12

[7] A former UCL student, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was arrested in the US in December 2009 on suspicion of attempting to bomb a US civil aircraft. Following this, an inquiry panel was set up in January 2010 to explore the nature of Abdulmutallab’s time as an undergraduate student and President of the student Islamic Society. Though some of the media reporting implied that UCL had in some way helped to contribute to this event, the review concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that Abdulmutallab was radicalised while a student at UCL, or that conditions during that time or subsequently were conducive to the radicalisation of students. More recently, the University of Westminster published an Independent Panel report following a review of policies and procedures around freedom of speech, brought about by concerns around the influence of the university over former student Mohammed Emwazi (referred to as ‘Jihadi John’ in much of the reporting). Again, no evidence was found of radicalisation taking place at the university. These examples display the willingness of the sector to ensure their policies are fit-for-purpose but that ultimately these former students had not been radicalised because of their university experience.

[8] Office for National Statistics, Local area analysis of qualifications across England and Wales (March 2014), p. 7,

[9] Draft Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Guidance) Regulations 2015, Deb 10 September 2015, c12

[10] Home Affairs Committee, Roots of violent radicalisation, Volume I (January 2012), p.25.