Written evidence submitted by The Henry Jackson Society

1. The Henry Jackson Society (HJS) is a London-based think-tank founded to support the global promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy and civil rights. HJS specialises in the study of international terrorism, counter-terrorism and radicalisation. This submission is a corporate view of the society, based on original research and institutional expertise.

How effective is the Prevent strategy and what have been the problems with it?

2. Prevent aims to “stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism”. While the strategy began in 2005 in the aftermath of the 7/7 terrorist attacks to address specifically the appeal of Islamist extremism, the coalition government’s 2011 Prevent review widened the scope of the programme to address “all forms of extremism” including far-right extremism and animal rights-related extremism.[1] As such, the strategy is now responsive to emerging threats, recognising, for example, the current primacy of Islamism-inspired terrorism based on independent threat assessments from the United Kingdom (UK) Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre.[2] It is also able to accommodate local priorities, with some stakeholders acknowledging, for example, the significant threat from far-right extremism in their communities.[3]

3. Previously, a lack of clarity regarding aims and evaluation procedures resulted in engagement that was at best unfocused and at worst counter-productive.[4] Local and central government were criticised for failing to appropriately vet Prevent partners and at times funding – and thereby legitimacy – went to extremist or sectarian groups who were institutionally ill-equipped or unwilling to counter extremist narratives.[5] This included British Muslim groups that are inspired and/or founded by Middle Eastern and South Asian Islamist parties and which promote a supremacist interpretation of Islam in the UK as well as the revolutionary Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir.[6] The 2011 review, however, defined British values and affirmed that the government will no longer engage with or fund groups that fail to support these values, through the introduction of “explicit controls to make sure that public money must not be provided to extremist organisations”.[7]

4. There is a developing consensus on the need to challenge both violent and non-violent extremism as a potential precursor to, or a conduit for, terrorism; and, in relation to Islamism-inspired terrorism, Western policy-makers and academics have focused in recent years on the need to provide an ideological response to global jihad.[8] Prevent now reflects this consensus by identifying ideology as one driver of radicalisation and defining Islamist ideology as one that “sets Muslim against non-Muslim, highlights the alleged oppression of the global Muslim community and which both obliges and legitimises violence in its defence”.[9] As a result, challenging extremism as part of a broader counter-terrorism strategy is now predicated on the belief that non-violent extremism can also legitimise terrorism, create an atmosphere conducive to violence and popularise views which terrorists exploit.[10]

5. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTS Act) has introduced a statutory duty on specified authorities to “have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism”. Prior to this, police forces nationally had taken the lead in implementing Prevent. As such, recent HJS research into the experiences of the North East Counter Terrorism Unit and the West Yorkshire Police provides examples of good practice for Prevent delivery which is relevant for all statutory partners. This includes: prioritising building sustainable relationships with communities based on mutual trust and confidence; proactively creating resilient partnerships on community-related or ‘quality of life’ issues rather than attempting to force a relationship in response to a counter-radicalisation-related issue; and recognising the need to be representative by engaging with a range of community organisations and responding to changing community dynamics.[11] In addition, it was suggested that a strategic mechanism for supporting the ideological challenge against extremism is promoting critical thinking skills and credible voices, which builds resilience against extremism and helps isolate extremists. [12]

6. HJS research also highlighted police efforts to promote Prevent as a safeguarding issue as well as a counter-terrorism tool in order to generate community support separate from the negative associations with the strategy. For example, a local campaign on internet safety is designed to relate not only to Prevent and online radicalisation but also to safeguarding children against issues such as grooming and criminality more broadly; and it is through such de-politicised channels that the police reported they were able to communicate well with stakeholders, in this case parents. [13] Detective Chief Superintendent Alan Lyon, National Co-ordinator of Prevent within the National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters, has acknowledged that the focus on safeguarding is a recent development and one that, in relation to the risk of travel to Syria, “is emerging as a key part of every investigation in terms of the impact on the broader family and young children”.[14] As such, understanding Prevent as safeguarding effectively emphasises its focus on early intervention and the non-criminal space as well as appropriately reflects existing risk management structures within and across statutory partners which Prevent delivery should utilise.

7. Despite continued opposition to the strategy, there have been some improvements in the willingness of sectors to accept the need to engage with counter-radicalisation efforts. Regarding schools, for example, the West Yorkshire Police acknowledged that the ‘Trojan Horse’ affair has most likely galvanised schools to work more closely on Prevent-related programmes: “[I]n the last year it’s accelerated into a buy-in now from the schools themselves, because of Ofsted, because of the government stance, whereas before, at the beginning if you go back six years, it was a very, very slow process. You’ve suddenly got more a corporate buy-in from education”.[15]

8. The government has acknowledged that the statutory duty is intended to help improve the patchy nature of Prevent delivery.[16] Currently, however, the strategy is not being delivered effectively, manifested either as a failure to achieve stated aims or through the continued lack of engagement or continued opposition to the strategy in a number of key sectors, including in particular higher education institutions.[17] HJS research identifies two major barriers to success: strategic and operational problems that impede delivery; and reputational challenges, including a sustained extremist effort to delegitimise Prevent and a government failure to respond to such accusations.

9. In the last eighteen months, as the conflict in Syria and Iraq has worsened and the threat from Islamism-inspired terrorism has risen to unprecedented levels,[18] Prevent has faced strategic and operational criticisms. In its 2014 report into the killing of Drummer Lee Rigby, for example, the Intelligence and Security Committee criticised “the relatively low priority (and funding) given to Prevent in the [counter-terrorism] programme as a whole”.[19] During the last Parliament, the then Labour MP Hazel Blears, criticised her former department, for Communities and Local Government, for failing to develop a complimentary counter-extremism strategy;[20] while the Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper MP, criticised Prevent’s narrowness  and overreliance on the police.[21]

10. Balancing freedom of speech with the misuse of charitable and publicly-funded premises remains a significant operational challenge for Prevent, particularly in relation to managing external speakers at further and higher education institutions or at publicly-funded or charitable local facilities, such as community centres or places of worship. The government’s forthcoming counter extremism bill is expected to contain measures designed address this longstanding abuse of public spaces and civic premises by extremists, including Banning Orders and Extremism Disruption Orders for preachers and/or groups whose speech falls short of the law as well as new related powers to close premises where extremists seek to influence others. The proposals, which legally extend restrictions on free speech, have been widely criticised as illiberal with significant risk of backlash from the general public and affected communities.[22]

11. Instead, HJS research suggests that the government should prioritise maximising the statutory Prevent duty to utilise existing legislation and regulation, standardise responses and develop best practice. Public service providers and registered charities – including universities, community centres and other local authority venues, as well as many mosques and student unions – already have legal duties to protect against extremism, notably a responsibility under the Equality Act 2010 to provide environments free from discrimination and a requirement under charity law to protect the organisation from reputational damage. Institutional pushback, however, remains high – meaning that these avenues have not always been adequately explored. Such institutions need better training, support and political will to better adhere to their existing regulatory frameworks. The closure of religious premises should be a last resort. Instead, greater legal advice and financial assistance should be provided to help to institutions looking to challenge extremist preachers

12. The Prevent strategy has also failed to adequately respond to the developing tactics of extremists who seek to influence at-risk sectors. Islamists in the UK, for example, target Muslim communities to create a monolithic bloc sympathetic to their political ideology, while simultaneously asserting their values as representative in order to mainstream Islamist demands as normative Muslim practice. Recent evidence shows a direct use of schools and political structures as a form of entryism. Throughout 2014, the independent education regulatory body, Ofsted, found that the governing bodies of some state schools had been infiltrated by Islamists;[23] while, Yusuf Patel, the founder of an anti-sex education lobby group SREIslamic appeared before the Education Select Committee in 2014 purporting to represent the views of socially conservative Muslim parents while failing to disclose his longstanding links to Hizb ut-Tahir.[24]

13. Despite Prevent’s focus on supporting sectors where there are risks of radicalisation, many regulatory bodies continue to demonstrate limited abilities to effectively identify and challenge institutions which foster extremism. Currently there is no legal mechanism to prevent individuals who have been convicted for terrorism-related offences or who have been excluded from the UK on terrorism-related grounds from becoming a trustee of a charity. Indian cleric Dr. Zakir Abdul-Karim Naik, for example, was excluded from the UK in June 2010 on the grounds that some of his public comments “justif[ied] terrorist violence and foster[ed] hatred”, yet he continues to act as a trustee of a charity registered in the UK whose primary purpose is financial support for an international satellite TV channel which Naik hosts and which holds a UK broadcasting licence.[25]

14. Police involvement in delivery has also proven problematic from both an operational and a reputational perspective. Throughout the strategy’s history there have been accusations of police heavy-handedness, spying and the conflation of counter-terrorism policy with integration efforts;[26] while other so-called ‘hard’ counter-terrorism work, particularly police raids and intelligence-led activities, can impede community relations and trust.[27] HJS research in the higher education sector, for  example, found that  Prevent delivery has not fully succeeded in developing as an integrated and multi-agency model, which has led to further identification of Prevent as a police-led programme. Such a perception can be due, for example, to poor personal relationships between representatives of different agencies, over-stretched staff or even a mistrust of Prevent delivery within a local-authority administration. As a result, Prevent officers can find it difficult to arrange meetings and training sessions, and that those which do go ahead have often been set up on an ad-hoc basis.[28] Such problems – relating to partnership-building, public sector capacity and stakeholder trust – are transferrable to other statutory partners.

15. In addition to this lack of engagement, some student unions are actively working to hinder Prevent delivery,[29] in line with an NUS resolution passed in April 2015 to “not engage with the PREVENT strategy”.[30] Student critics cite poor communication or operational decisions made during Pursue investigations when they involve a Prevent-related sector as evidence of the prejudice inherent in the strategy. One prominent example is the high-profile arrest and detention of the University of Nottingham student Rizwaan Sabir, in May 2008, after concern was raised about al-Qaeda-related material which he had been using as part of his PhD research (Sabir later brought a civil case against Nottinghamshire Police, which was settled out of court).[31] Other instances have involved student-union political posters being photographed by police officers,[32] and the investigation of a left-wing activist from the University of Birmingham, which led to accusations that Prevent referrals were being used as a “political move”.[33]  It is likely, therefore, that recent examples of inappropriate Prevent-related activities by statutory partners will be exploited by extremists who seek to delegitimise the strategy. Staffordshire University’s recent letter of apology to a Muslim student for an unnecessary referral, for example, has already been widely publicised by the pro-terrorist prisoner lobby group CAGE.[34] 

16. Grievances and negative perceptions of Prevent within British Muslim communities were identified by the government consultation on the statutory duty as weaknesses “extremists purport to identify” and subsequently exploit.[35] Recent HJS research into extremism in Bradford, as well as the activities of CAGE, has identified campaigns which seek to delegitimise both investigations into extremism-linked activities and counter-radicalisation policy more broadly, instead presenting them as racist and Islamophobic. Such campaigning can entrench the widespread perception that British Muslim communities are under attack, which, in turn, bolsters support for extremist groups and individuals who claim they are the only people defending Muslims and Islam.[36]

17. Recent HJS research into the higher education sector, for example, shows that Prevent’s poor on-campus reputation is a barrier to successful delivery and that this stems not only from misunderstandings of the strategy but also from malicious narratives perpetuated by extremist groups.[37] Among the most commonly heard criticisms of Prevent in higher education is that the strategy will diminish freedom of speech and academic freedom on university campuses, and that this stems from the government’s desire to stifle political protest and dissent.[38] Anti-Prevent student activists also argue that the strategy is racist; that it deliberately targets Muslims;[39] and that the strategy considers mental health issues to be a potential indicator of radicalisation and that those with mental health issues will be stigmatised as a result.[40]

18. However, this is not how Prevent delivery works. Prevent guidance requires institutions “balance [their] legal duties in terms of both ensuring freedom of speech and academic freedom, and also protecting student and staff welfare” and provides mechanisms by which institutions can ensure this balance is struck. Ignorance of the safeguarding processes involved in Prevent delivery can be seen in many of the on-campus claims made about how the strategy monitors students, with criticism implying lecturers will be expected to keep notes on students’ views, and that those who express radical opinions will become the subject of criminal investigations.[41] The reference to mental health issues comes from the vulnerability assessment framework used in the government’s de-radicalisation programme Channel, which specifically states that it: “should not be assumed that the characteristics [listed] necessarily indicate that a person…may become a terrorist”.[42] This on-going student concern suggests a sector failure to effectively communicate Prevent, its remit, what is expected of university staff and what will happen in the case of a referral.

19. Recent HJS research also found crossover between student critics of Prevent and the language and strategy used by extremists. In March 2015, for example, a senior figure in the Federation of Student Islamic Societies (FOSIS), spoke at a CAGE event stating that: “what CAGE does is we actually create a broad coalition of organisations, of activists on campuses, to say that Prevent in itself is a racist agenda; it’s an Islamophobic agenda; an agenda that’s based on no evidence”.[43] In addition, allegations that Prevent demonises people with mental health issues were also raised in a 2011 CAGE report on the strategy. [44] Other extremist groups which appear to have influenced on-campus responses to Prevent are the Islamic Human Rights Commission and Hizb ut-Tahrir.[45] These groups perpetuate the view that extreme Islamist beliefs are normative Muslim views, and argue that by defining them as extremism the government is targeting the beliefs of the UK’s Muslim communities rather than the political ideology of a small minority. That student groups continue (in the academic year 2015-2016) to campaign alongside extremist groups against the statutory duty evidences a government failure to robustly address accusations of Islamophobia and push back against extremist claims that countering extremism is criminalising Islamic thought and practice.[46]