Memorandum submitted by Maurice Dixon

 

Executive Summary

 

01.              It is vital that the Nation and the Ministry of Defence has robust, wide-ranging, pan-department coherent, resilient, and adaptable assessment and preparation methodologies to deal with emerging and increasingly conventional, unconventional and asymmetric threats to the UK, its overseas dependent territories, its allies, its diaspora and ex-patriots, and its deployed Armed Forces. Military deterrence and response must always be one element of a pan-government national security threat pre-emption or post incidence response. Threats are like viruses and always surviving eradication attempts and re-appearing in new and unlikely guises and threat vectors.

 

Introduction

 

02.              The questions posed by the Inquiry notice illustrate the conventional, narrow focus, threat analysis and assessment approach that so badly failed the UK’s military and security threat assessment ability in the past.

 

03.              The UK requires a new threat assessment, Red Team threat war-gaming methodology, threat governance focal point, and a truly proactive Comprehensive Approach with all government departments directed and mandated to comply and provide high quality resources and adaptable capabilities to a central national security command and coordination organisation.

 

04.              It is recommend that national threat assessment and threat mitigation and adaption evolves as follows:

 

a.              From a UK Smart Defence and Security strategy generate a monthly reviewed threat assessment and threat adaptation action plan with designated department leads and designated supporting department action plans;

b.              The National Security Council be stood up and properly resourced to provide a permanent and proactive National Threat Assessment and Governance Centre, with the authority to direct and delegate threat activity to specific lead departments and individuals,

c.              Each threat to be properly assessed and the required ‘ends’, ‘ways’ and ‘means’ simply articulated, and a pan-department action plan outlined, so that each head of government department, agency and organisation knows their role, actions required, how they must cooperate with other departments, and the resources required of them.

d.              UK forces, equipment, tactics, and procurement to become more flexible, adaptable and rapidly reconfigurable to meet new threats – build new Capability with modular capability.

e.              UK forces to support national resilience tasks.

f.              Generate ‘Red Teams’ (of mavericks) to ‘think the unthinkable’ to articulate likely new threats and enemy tactics.

 

Submission

 

05.  What are the credible threats to the UK and its interests posed by?

 

  1.                 International terrorism; this will continue to morph like a virus and multiply like severed Hydra Heads if the Government continues to simplistically address, via stovepiped department actions, the symptoms, rather than the inconvenient truths of the causes. Populations and rebellious disaffected youths are radicalized by poor national governance; corrupt governments; discrimination by race, ethnic, creed or religion; sponsorship by vested interest groups and individuals; continued poor and childishly simplistic western ‘responsibility/guilt to act’ interventions; lack of coherent national and international attack and defeat campaigns on multiple centres of gravity/influence. Currently playing ‘splat the rat’ with knee-jerk attacking terrorism wherever it pops up its head, rather than a systemic approach to defeating the source intelligently and innovatively. Extremist attacks on military attack launch sites.

 

b.              Organised Crime with economic/social consequences; similar to international terrorism. Lax control over financial institutes; lax control over border movements; lax policy on deporting convicted criminals; too sensitive to charges of ‘discrimination’ when intelligence-led criminal identification points to obvious suspects; lax control on ceasing assets and properly funding anti-crime resources; fragmented national police forces, poor data and computer inter-operability, and poor international cooperation.

 

  1.                 Cyber attacks; this is the stealth standoff attack vector for the century. UK and its interests are highly vulnerable to cloaked cyber attack due to continued use of poorly designed and managed operating systems and infrastructure, vulnerable (cheap) corporate software applications, and not mandating cyber and encryption requirements in government and critical infrastructure systems (SCADA, finance, energy, utilities, transport, etc).

 

  1.                State on State military crisis; Likely between Russia, China, India and their neighbours as tensions rise. Potential conflict between Syria and Turkey may draw in NATO against Russia. Geneva Convention increasingly circumvented by use of irregular and asymmetric forces.

 

  1.                 CBRN attack; very likely asymmetrical CBRN ‘dirty bomb’ used by extremists and terrorists. Also, likely use by rogue State and irrational Actor State. Potential use of low-yield tactical localised impact radioactive/nuclear/EMP weapon calculated not to trigger disproportionate strategic nuclear response.

 

  1.                 Instability, insurgency, civil war overseas; more and more likely due to pressures of climate change, energy, food, water and resource scarcity and population inequality – e.g. foreign governments buying African resources for home consumption and benefits not cascading within target countries.

 

  1.                Disruption/attack of satcom; highly likely as equipment and skills widely available commercially. Also, western forces have been lulled into a false sense of cyber superiority due to the limited satcom denial capability of adversaries over the last 20 years.

 

  1.                Large-scale conventional attack on UK; only if Russia invades through Europe – unlikely. Plenty of small-scale asymmetric attacks on highly vulnerable, fragile and ageing UK infrastructure likely. The UK has no national Air Defence or coastal defence capability beyond a few aircraft and AD capable ships - easily circumvented due to the paucity of numbers, range and coverage.

 

  1.                  Conventional attack on NATO or EU member; likely from Russia using ‘ambiguous’ forces – Baltic states, Finland/Sweden/Norway, Turkey, Cyprus, to test resolve of NATO/EU collective defence, etc.

 

  1.                  Attack on UK overseas territory; Potential direct or indirect (supply chain siege) against FI, Gibraltar, Cyprus SBAs, Brunei (dispute with neighbours and China over offshore energy resources).

 

06.              What are the credible threats to the UK and its interest from:

 

  1.                 Europe; Only Russia, could have border force clashes in France, Belgium, Holland, Eire with regard to refugees and asylum seekers if points of attempted entry spread and get overwhelmed with MENA refugees who transit their reported ‘preferred States’ such as Germany, Sweden, etc, heading for UK.

 

  1.                The Middle East; Ongoing unconventional threat. Potential threat to energy supply lines from Iran, Yemen, and Horn of Africa instability. Potential disruption of energy and trade if Suez Canal is disrupted due to local population reaction to new canal work, or closure by extremists. 

 

  1.                 North Africa; On-going attacks on tourists, workers and ex-pats, and increasing attacks on energy and other critical resource supply lines. Potential attacks against Gibraltar Strait shipping and increased refugee and terrorist transit via Straits of Gibraltar. This will increase if projects like DESERTEC in MENA come on line sending HVDC solar energy to Europe at the expense of populations in MENA countries due to corruption and poor governance.

 

  1.                Sub-Saharan Africa; Export of terrorists as refugees, attacks on western critical resources: energy, minerals, etc. May be an African, impoverished population, backlash against China and others buying up vast tracts of land and resources to keep growing middle classes at home in the improving lifestyle they wish to have.

 

  1.                 The Far East; Potential conflict between Brunei and neighbours over offshore energy resources. China’s ambitions to move to a Blue Ocean capability in its backyard and to protect extended supply routes to Africa and South America to bring home resources may result in clashes with USA, Japan, Indian, and Pacific nations. UK armed forces should be equipped and trained to operate in the Pacific and China Seas.

 

  1.                 The High North; Conflict with Russia due to resource wars and ship passage rights as Arctic ice diminishes. After decades of operating in hot, dry and dusty, UK armed forces have lost the doctrine, personnel and equipment operating skills to operate in cold, ice and freezing conditions.

 

  1.                The Low South; Conflict with South American nations as Antarctic and FI resources are viewed with envious eyes. After decades of operating in hot, dry and dusty, UK armed forces have lost the doctrine, personnel and equipment operating skills to operate in cold, ice and freezing conditions. Lack of resilient extended sea LOC provision and protection is an operational risk.

 

  1.                Climate Change; Increasing border tensions as populations migrate away from food, water and resource scarcity and head towards more affluent Europe. The UK is vulnerable to climate change impacts such as flooding, dry land fires, drought, heat waves, increased health stresses, and disruption to critical infrastructure: the armed forces should be trained and practiced to assist with national resilience to climate change impacts.

 

  1.                  Growing populations; populations will move to more numerous mega-cities, which if not properly designed and expanded as smart, sustainable and resilient cities will generate ghettos within ghettos requiring completely different urban jungle warfare fighting doctrine, tactics and capabilities.

 

  1.                  Immigration and refugees; if European countries keep sending the ‘all displaced persons welcome’ message, communities will react against newcomers who overwhelm services, don’t integrate, and expect host nations to change to meet their needs, religious demands and cultural incompatibilities. UK armed forces must be prepared and practiced to support border control/integrity activities to minimise UK national security risks.

 

  1.                Foreign ownership of UK companies and critical infrastructure; the UK is sleepwalking into being foreign owned and controlled by stealth if it continues to allow its best companies and critical infrastructure to be bought by foreign companies and wealth funds for short-term investment and political news benefit. It is baffling why a Chinese company is being allowed to build and potentially operate UK nuclear power stations, or that a Russian company was being considered for the same before sanctions were imposed. Not only is this a physical security and nuclear risk to the UK, but, foreign entities syphon taxes and other revenues offshore that then undermine funding of the UK critical safety and security services including health, education, the police and armed forces. This is the ironic recycling of exported UK money, sent offshore when we out-sourced manufacturing to the Far East, being used to buy up our assets, to move even more of our money offshore to the benefit of foreign entities, and the long-term financial detriment of the UK. The UK must stop and reverse the selling off of the family silver and undermining national security and national skill, self-sufficiency and financial resilience.

 

  1.                  Lack of a coherent UK energy strategy; the current ‘the market will provide’ idealistic approach to UK energy security is unsustainable as we enter a decade of retiring fossil fuel and nuclear power stations prior to replacing them with equivalent clean energy technologies. The random commencement and cessation of feed-in-tariffs and subsidies for stove-piped clean energy technology, and not storage, is also undermining long term investment and confidence in transitioning to a resilient energy footing. Reducing indigenous energy resources (coal, oil and gas) and increasing reliance on imported energy from volatile parts of the globe undermines national energy security. MOD’s lack of energy resilience is both an organisational and national security risk and concern. MOD’s inability to function, even a minimal operating configuration, for extended periods of national power disruption must be urgently addressed.

 

07.              What are the credible threats to the UK and its interests posed in:

 

  1.                 The maritime domain; the skeleton and unreliable RN inventory of a few expensive ships and submarines cannot meet any concurrent serious and enduring maritime security demands and provides no attrition resilience. It is unlikely that the RN could properly protect its carrier against any serious maritime and multi-vectored threat with the minimal surface, sub-surface and air assets stated as being assigned to carrier group protection: relying on a US protective cloak doesn’t meet national needs. Protection against the many long-range air, surface and sub-surface standoff  ‘carrier busters’ in operation and being proliferated is inadequate. The lack of strategic reach of F35-Bs and no on-board fixed wing AEW and AAR assets severely limits the maritime strike impact of UK carriers. Growing maritime military and asymmetric threats include unmanned air, surface and sub-surface systems, smart mines and torpedoes, electric submarines, and anti-access/area denial weapons. Air, surface and sub-surface swarm strategies are a growing threat to limited self-protection RN assets that are likely to be quickly detected and overwhelmed by any competent adversary.

 

  1.                The land domain; adversaries will continue evolving ‘combat-at-arms-length’ tactics such as IEDs, shaped charges, and other route disruption/denial weaponry, plus, suicide and unmanned attack systems are likely to nominate. Localised chemical and low yield/radioactive/EMP weapons and low technology swarm approaches are likely to be used to overcome perceived technical superiority of fewer western systems. The yield and effect will be calculated to stay below any ‘trip-wire response’ levels of strategic response weapons, thus, neutering nations with only one strategic deterrence/response option. Deterrence and strike capability needs to be at appropriate levels and be able to be escalated – a one size stick fits only one extreme scenario option has no credibility or effectiveness and is just political vanity and not military sanity. Traditional armour and long range artillery will be neutered by the need for more warfare in urban areas such as mega-cities, slums, etc, as ‘combat within the population’ with ambiguous forces becomes more the norm – less close-quarter State on State military force on force encounters.

 

  1.                 The air domain; greater use of UASs and multi-spectrum ISTAR systems will neuter any 1990s devised ‘stealth’ technologies or tactics/doctrine. Swarms of UASs and long-range and cheap air-to-air, air-to-ground and ground-to-air missile, projectile, and energy weaponry will overcome the few, expensive, and limited footprint air systems being procured. Many average capable systems are more effective than a few expensive systems. There will be a need for self-protected air transport to undertake insertions into contested air and landing areas.

 

  1.                The space domain; western forces have become complacent to the perception of ‘space and spectrum supremacy’ in the last 30 years or so. GPS, GSM, RF spectrum and satcom link jammers, spoofers and compromisers are openly available commercially and only need to be near the ground station or target forces/systems to be effective. China has demonstrated its ‘satellite killer’ weapon and has significant spectrum disruption and denial technology. The UK armed forces need a deployable ‘cyber defence/offence’ capability for deployments as well as at home.

 

  1.                 The energy supply chain domain; modern societies and militaries are totally reliant on energy both at home and on deployment. Loss or denial of energy and fuel to a nation and its static and deployed forces neuters any military capability or superiority. Thus, the UK armed forces must become less reliant on extended supply chains for fossil fuels, and become more energy self-sufficient using a wide variety of energy harvesting, energy generation/storage and alternative fuel technologies to counter national power emergencies, and when deployed.

 

  1.                 The food and water supply chain domain; a nation that is highly reliant on foreign imports and foreign technologies to feed and water itself is highly vulnerable to supply chain disruption and thus increases national vulnerability.

 

  1.                The resource and manufacturing domain; a nation that has allowed its resources to be run down and become uneconomic to extract and process, has outsourced its goods and services manufacturing capabilities and soul, and relies on imports has a significant national risk issue, vulnerable to conventional and unconventional supply chain attacks and disruptions.

 

08.              What is the Government’s ability to evaluate credible threats to the UK and its interests:

 

  1.                 To think the unthinkable; the Government and armed forces seem to be constantly ‘taken by surprise’ to changing tactics of enemies who are rapidly adaptable, not shackled by doctrine (dogma), or institutional thinking, change inertia, and delusions of adequate military prowess. Why did the UK military not anticipate the asymmetric IED and suicide bomber tactics of the under-dog in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the ‘technicals’ quickly and effectively deployed across MENA, or use of submarines by organised drugs, people and weapons smugglers, etc. There seems to be an inability, or lack of intellectual freedom/capability to Red Team and find innovative cheap and effective tactics against our Capabilities, doctrine and tactics. UK defence needs to be more proactive and forward-looking, and less reactive – UK needs a central pan-department ‘PJHQ’ based within the NSC. Checklists engender myopic thinking - only be used as guidance to trigger innovation and creativity.

 

  1.                Be flexible in thought process; UK security risk assessors and planners need to think outside the box, allow people to exercise ‘commander’s intent’ innovatively, and to rapidly develop new tactics, new threat-adapting capabilities (from small base capability elements), and rapidly action both the tactics and procurement OODA loops to meet/beat a changing threat environment. Defence procurement must have an OODA/CADMID loop of weeks/months not years for the majority of equipment and capabilities, especially rapidly evolving technologies: ICT; alternative energy/fuels; ISTAR; smart clothing; UASs, etc. 

 

  1.                 Be imaginative in planning; doctrine seems more like dogma. The lack of any Afghanistan or Iraq campaign success factors and long-term campaign plans beyond the 6-month plan of the next brigade deployment, and bombing of ISIL demonstrates a critical lack of standard planning let alone imaginative planning. Smart defence and security effect needs truly pan-government department coherently actioned campaigns against multiple centres of gravity and leverage/influence: diplomatic actions; fiscal actions; development actions; military actions; social media actions, etc.

 

  1.                Be able to rapidly build and adapt Capability; the operational and procurement cycles need to meet/beat the rapidly evolving tactics of the enemy. Procurement of the majority of building brick capability elements needs to be in weeks/months based on the UOR process. Otherwise the enemy will be continue procuring the latest technology off the Internet, whilst UK forces continue to be equipped with obsolescent equipment bought over years/decades. Equipment must be designed and procured with maximum inter-operability, in a modular approach to allow rapid reconfiguration and technology refresh: common missiles; common fuel; common ICT; common ISTAR; common family of sensors; etc. Platforms with silos for mission configurable weapons systems, etc.

 

  1.                 Be able to expand the armed forces. There is no surge recruiting, conscription, or training capability. Complex systems will extend the time to get a recruit to combat readiness, and experienced military trainers will be pulled forward as attrition replacements against any competent enemy, thus, further reducing training capability.

 

6 October 2015