Written evidence submitted by the Community Security Trust

• In recent years, Jewish communities in Europe have been repeatedly attacked by terrorists of European Muslim background, who are affiliated to global jihadist movements. This is the most acute manifestation of antisemitism in Europe today.
• Antisemitism is a core part of extremist ideology, whether Islamist or neo-Nazi, and is shared by violent and non-violent extremists. At the same time, there is increasing evidence that antisemitic attitudes are widespread in European Muslim communities.
• Antisemitic attitudes and incitement; involvement in anti-Jewish hate crimes; and involvement in violent anti-Israel protests are potential indicators of extremism, particularly if they occur in Islamist or neo-Nazi ideological or activist contexts.
• Extremist activity on campuses can inhibit the willingness of Jewish students to express their beliefs and ideas openly. Counter-extremist measures may limit the free speech of extremists, but in doing so they protect the free speech of those who are targeted by the extremists’ incitement.
• Efforts to block or remove extremist content online need to be matched by more, and better, counter-messaging and alternative messaging in the online spaces used by extremists.
• Extremism is best tackled by cooperation across communities and with civil society. Unfortunately there are organisations, including some with mainstream credibility, that seek to undermine such a strategy.

1.              This submission is from the Community Security Trust (CST), a charity that advises and supports the UK Jewish community in matters of antisemitism, extremism and terrorism. This submission will restrict itself to those areas of the Inquiry that relate to CST’s work.

2.              Since the Committee’s previous report into the roots of violent radicalisation was published in February 2012, jihadist terrorists have attacked Jewish targets in Toulouse, Brussels, Paris and Copenhagen, killing thirteen people.

3.              These attacks were perpetrated by European Muslims who were followers and supporters of global jihadist organisations. Mohamed Merah, who killed three people at a Jewish school in Toulouse in March 2012, had trained in camps linked to al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban. Mehdi Nemmouche, who allegedly murdered four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, is believed to have spent over a year with Islamic State (then known as ISIS) in Syria prior to the attack. Amedy Coulibaly, who killed four people at the Hyper Cacher supermarket in Paris in January 2015, had pledged his allegiance to Islamic State in a video made before the attack, although it is not thought that he had previously travelled to Syria or Iraq to join the group. Finally, Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussein, who murdered a volunteer security guard at the Great Synagogue in Copenhagen in February 2015, pledged allegiance to Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on the day of the attack.

4.              Since 2010, at least three potential terrorist plots to attack Jewish communities in London and Manchester have been prevented by Police action in the UK and overseas. In 2010, a group of Muslim men connected to Islam4UK (a successor group to al-Muhajiroun) were arrested, and later convicted, for planning a letter bomb campaign against a range of UK targets. One of the men was in possession of the names and addresses of two rabbis as potential targets. In 2011, al-Qaeda leader Fazul Mohammed was found to be in possession of plans to attack Jewish communities in north London when he was shot dead in East Africa. In 2012, Mohammed and Shasta Khan, from Oldham, were imprisoned for plotting to attack the Jewish community in Manchester; they had already identified potential Jewish targets and experimented with making explosives at home when they were arrested.

5.              In January 2015 the National Policing Lead for Counter Terrorism, Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley, announced an increase in the terrorist risk assessment for the Jewish community in the UK, an increase that remains in place at the time of writing. For all of these reasons, the work of government and Police to counter extremism is of direct and acute interest to British Jews.

6.              This anti-Jewish terrorism draws on the interplay between extremist ideologies, anti-Jewish incitement and antisemitic worldviews. Conspiracy theories that Jews (or ‘Zionists’) control global media and politics, or dictate the foreign policy of the United States and other Western powers, or encourage anti-Muslim hatred in order to subvert Islam, are commonly found in the writings of Islamist ideologues and in the propaganda of contemporary Islamist extremists; including those who deploy violence in pursuit of their aims and those who do not.

7.              Contemporary political grievances, such as the ongoing conflict in Israel/Palestine, are used to fuel incitement against Jews, but they do not, on their own, explain this terrorism. Most people who oppose Israeli policy, even those who feel anger towards Israel, do not express that opposition through violent antisemitism. Extremist ideology plays an essential role in converting such anger into attitudes that justify the murder of European Jews. It is important to recognise that antisemitism is an ideology, not a grievance against perceived Jewish or Israeli wrongdoing.

8.              Terrorist organisations that target Jews use antisemitic language and imagery as part of their propaganda. This applies to national-focused organisations, such as Hamas and Hizbollah,[1] and to global jihadist movements. Islamic State magazine Dabiq often includes derogatory references to Jews alongside calls for attacks in the West.

9.              Islamist leaders and movements that do not themselves use violence also use antisemitic rhetoric that has the potential to incite hatred of Jews. For example, Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi has written that “every Jew in the world” is an enemy of Muslims, and has predicted an apocalyptic battle “between the collective body of Muslims and the collective body of Jews i.e. all Muslims and all Jews.”[2] Similarly, the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir has written that “The Jews are cowards, they are a people of money and not a people of fighting… Know that the Jews and their usurping state in Palestine will, by the Help and Mercy of Allah (swt), be destroyed”.[3] In another statement, hosted on a website based in the UK, Hizb ut-Tahrir wrote: “O Muslim Armies! Teach the Jews a lesson after which they will need no further lessons. March forth to fight them, eradicate their entity and purify the earth of their filth”.[4] There are many similar examples.

10.              The potential for such language to incite antisemitism amongst British Muslims is of clear concern. There is anecdotal and research evidence that antisemitic attitudes are more prevalent in some Muslim communities in Western Europe, including in the UK, than in wider society. This is partly related to tensions over the Israel-Palestine conflict, but research suggests that it goes much deeper and that anger over Israel is only one of several drivers of antisemitism amongst some young Muslims in the UK and other European countries. Antisemitism in European Muslim communities is also, in part, a replication of classical antisemitic ideas from wider European society; and in part an expression for some of their Muslim or Islamic identity.[5]

11.              Antisemitic hate crime data shows a clear correlation between antisemitism in the UK and increased tensions in the Middle East, particularly those involving conflict between Israel and its neighbours. In July and August 2014, for example, CST recorded more antisemitic incidents than in the whole of 2013, largely due to antisemitic reactions to the fighting in Israel and Gaza in those months. As a result, 2014 saw the highest ever number of antisemitic incidents recorded by CST in a calendar year.[6] The previous record high had come in 2009, due to similar antisemitic reactions in the UK to a previous outbreak of fighting in Israel and Gaza.[7] During periods of increased conflict in Israel/Palestine, the proportion of antisemitic incident offenders described to CST by victims or witnesses as being of ‘south Asian’ or ‘Arab’ appearance tends to increase.

12.              A number of people who were present on anti-Israel demonstrations in London in January 2009, some of whom were arrested and/or convicted of offences as a result, have later gone on to become involved in global jihadist activity in Syria and Somalia. These include Mohammed el-Araj, Abdullah Deghayes, Mohammed Sakr and Walla Eldin Rahman.

13.              Britain’s neo-Nazi movement has also revived its interest in targeting Jews over the past two years, having previously focused most of its attention on Muslims. Smaller groups such as National Action and the New Dawn Party have used social media and other internet forums to organise activities and incite hatred of Jews.

14.              So far this year there have been two specifically anti-Jewish demonstrations by far right organisations, targeting the Jewish communities in Stamford Hill and Golders Green (the latter demonstration was moved to Whitehall on the instruction of the Metropolitan Police). Orchestrated online campaigns of antisemitic harassment by far right activists have also been seen, most notably targeting Labour MPs Luciana Berger and John Mann.

15.              Consequently we welcomed the Prime Minister’s reference to antisemitism as part of the ideological package of extremism in his speech of 20 July 2015. We would encourage the Committee to view antisemitic attitudes and incitement; involvement in anti-Jewish hate crimes; or involvement in violent anti-Israel protests as potential indicators of extremism, particularly if they occur in Islamist or neo-Nazi ideological or activist contexts.

16.              We welcome the new Prevent Duty Guidance for Higher Education institutions. We recognise that the free exchange of ideas, including controversial and potentially offensive ideas, is central to campus life and should be restricted as little as possible. In doing so, we make a distinction between speech that is controversial or offensive, and speech that incites hatred or encourages support for extremist movements. Prevent should be focused on the latter.

17.              The Prevent Duty Guidance relating to external speakers and events; the recommendation for risk assessments; and staff training for the HE sector are important tools in ensuring that students remain free to explore a wide range of different political and religious ideas without being left vulnerable to radicalisation, or to victimisation by those who have been radicalised. This should include education for HE and Student Union staff about antisemitism as part of the extremist mindset and ideological worldview.

18.              CST works to ensure that Jewish students can express their Jewish identity in confidence and safety, while fully engaging with the whole spectrum of campus life. This goal is harder to achieve if external speakers and organisations that incite hatred of Jews are allowed to operate on campus. Extremist activity and hate speech on campus can inhibit the willingness of Jewish and other students to express their opinions and beliefs but the impact of this ‘chill factor’ on free speech is often overlooked in debates about Prevent and free speech on campus, especially by those who are critical of Prevent. This should not be the case. It is particularly disappointing that NUS officers appear to support this ‘anti-Prevent’ agenda[8] without fully considering their responsibilities to Jewish students.

19.              We welcome the creation of the Extremism Analysis Unit to provide reliable, evidence-based assessments of extremist activity. It should go without saying that government needs such evidence in order to make policy decisions about engagement with a range of organisations. The centralised role of the EAU means that such decisions have greater consistency across departments and other public bodies, and gives civil servants greater confidence in making their decisions regarding engagement with external organisations.

20.              There remains an inconsistency across sectors that undermines the logic of counter-extremism. Zakir Naik was excluded from the UK by the Home Secretary in 2010 for unacceptable behaviours that included support for terrorism. However, Naik remains the de facto licence-holder of an Ofcom-licenced TV channel, Peace TV. He also remains the director of a UK-registered company and the trustee of a UK-registered charity (both called Islamic Research Foundation International), both of which exist solely to raise money to fund his Peace TV channel. Meanwhile, although Naik is banned from appearing in person in the UK, he can speak via video link which facilitates a live interaction with his UK audience that is almost the same as if he were present in person. The ability of the Home Secretary to exclude unwanted individuals from the UK is an important counter-extremist tool, but it may lose its effectiveness if these loopholes and inconsistencies are not addressed.

21.              Social media has become a central arena in which extremist ideas are promoted, exchanged and challenged. We share the government’s frustration that social media companies are not as responsive in combating extremist content as they are in removing, for example, content relating to child sexual abuse. However, while blocking and removing content has value, it cannot be the sole approach to the problem: the technical and legal challenges are too great, the internet is too large and widespread and the extremist content is too easily replicated. Meanwhile with modern social media, extremists outside the UK can directly target individual British citizens to radicalise them at a one-to-one level. More thought and resource needs to go into generating and disseminating credible counter-messaging and alternative messaging in the same online spaces used by extremists.

22.              CST believes firmly that extremism, and the hatred that emanates from it, need to be challenged within and across communities. We work with partners in Muslim communities, anti-racist groups and civil society to promote shared values and oppose extremist narratives. Our work with Tell MAMA, a Muslim organisation that combats anti-Muslim hatred, offers a positive model of Muslim-Jewish counter-extremist cooperation and has been praised by UK government, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency and by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

23.              Unfortunately not everybody shares this collegiate approach. For example, a Muslim lobbying organisation called MEND, which regularly engages with mainstream political parties, has criticised Tell MAMA for its association with CST, on the basis that CST is “Zionist”. At the same time, MEND endorses the conspiracy theory that “Zionists” are partly responsible for encouraging anti-Muslim hatred. MEND also criticises Tell MAMA for working with activists from the LGBT community. We hope that the Committee welcomes CST and Tell MAMA’s model of cooperation across communities, and rejects those who risk increasing prejudice and suspicion between British Muslims and British Jews.[9]