1. Libya is crucial to regional stability. It affects the security of the UK and our allies: its ungoverned spaces attract terrorist groups and it has emerged as a key transit route for illegal migration into Europe. It has Africa’s twelfth largest economy [1] and has Africa’s largest proven oil reserves.

2. The UK has longstanding, historical ties with Libya, from the UK’s involvement in the North Africa campaign during the Second World War, and its engagement in Libya’s transition to independence in 1951. Relations were strained during the Qadhafi years, but since 2011, the UK’s relationship with Libya is once again close. The vast majority of Libyans welcomed the UK’s pivotal role in the 2011 revolution and continue to view the UK as an ally.

3. Since 2011, the UK has demonstrated its ongoing support for the people of Libya and for progress towards their aspirations of stability and democracy in Libya. The UK’s provides significant political, security and economic support to a nascent democratic Libya on a cross-Whitehall basis, driven by the National Security Council (NSC) Strategy for Libya.

4. The UK’s overall objective is to support a peaceful post-revolution transition, resulting in a stable, open, accountable and democratic government in Libya that meets the needs of the people whilst contributing to wider regional stability and security. Decades of misrule mean it will take time for the Libyan people to rebuild their country.

5. Our immediate priority is to support progress towards a United Nations (UN) mediated ceasefire and a stable political settlement in Libya. A political settlement is essential to deliver broader HMG objectives on migration and counter-terrorism. UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 2174 (2014) and 2213 (2015) send a clear message that the international community will take action against parties who continue to use violence to pursue political goals.

6. This memorandum does not repeat, and should be read in conjunction with, previous evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), other parliamentary committees or material otherwise laid before the house relating to Libya. Hyperlinks to this material are at Annex A.

7. Annex B sets out developments in Libya from 2011-2015.

Intervention and Post Conflict

The 2011 decision by the UK Government to help to secure a UN resolution and play a leading role in the intervention to enforce the no-fly zone and protect civilians in Libya.

8. The UK decision to shape and secure UNSCR 1973, and then play a leading role in Libya was driven by the Qadhafi regime’s continuing violence against the Libyan people, and its disregard of UNSCR 1970. Qadhafi’s regime were preparing to assault Benghazi and it had begun airstrikes in anticipation of what Qadhafi had promised would be a merciless attack on the city. International opinion had looked to the UN Security Council (UNSC) to act; the Arab League had requested action, including the imposition of a no-fly zone; and the National Transitional Council (NTC) were actively calling for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention to protect civilians. Bold and early decisions by the UK and France ahead of others in 2011 prevented a wide-scale humanitarian crisis at the time.

The extent of strategic analysis undertaken prior to the intervention regarding the implications and consequences of the intervention.

The extent and effectiveness of post-conflict planning by the UK and its allies.

9. Significant strategic analysis was undertaken prior to the intervention covering: the humanitarian, political, economic, and security implications of intervention, with a particular emphasis on post intervention transition and stabilisation. There was recognition that there were a considerable number of risks in a post-conflict situation, and that these risks and their proposed mitigations should be kept under regular review.

10. The guiding principles of the UK’s response planning on stabilisation were that it should be Libyan-owned and coordinated by the UN. The UK worked closely with the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy on Post-Conflict Planning for Libya, Ian Martin, to co-ordinate the UN’s pre-deployment and stabilisation planning. The NTC provided a strong political direction from early on in the post-conflict planning process, and worked with the UN to co-ordinate bilateral activity. The NTC’s priorities included elections, security, and public financial management. They emphasised their desire for technical assistance from the international community, not aid.

11. Following the London Conference on Libya on 29 March 2011, the UK was a driving force behind the establishment of the Libya Contact Group. The Group first met in Doha on the 13 April 2011. It served as a focal point of contact with the Libyan people, coordinated international policy on Libya and was a forum for discussion of humanitarian and post-conflict support. The Group’s work was further reinforced by mobilising the FCO’s global network to influence partners and ensure effective implementation of UNSCR 1973.

12. The Second Contact Group on Libya in Rome on 5 May 2011 established an International Stabilisation Response Team (ISRT) to build a shared international understanding of Libya’s interim stabilisation needs. The ISRT was led by the UK. It visited Libya from 20 May to 8 June 2011. The ISRT’s report, produced at the end of June 2011, identified the immediate challenges to stabilisation in NTC-controlled areas; assessed the likely short-to medium-term challenges; and fed into an NTC Stabilisation Plan.

13. HMG’s cross-Whitehall Stabilisation Unit (SU) was closely involved in policy development throughout the planning and implementation of the intervention and post-conflict response to Libya. In particular, the SU led on the UK contribution to the ISRT. The SU contribution is detailed further in Annex C.

The UK’s engagement with Libya in the aftermath of the fighting in 2011, including the adequacy and extent of the assistance offered by the UK bilaterally and through multilateral organisations to the transitional administration in Libya.

14. The Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for International Development visited Benghazi on 4 June 2011. The Prime Minister and French President Sarkozy made a joint visit to Tripoli and Benghazi on 15 September, accompanied by the Foreign Secretary. The Foreign Secretary returned to Tripoli to reopen the British Embassy on 17 October 2011. The Prime Minister visited Tripoli on 31 January 2013 to meet Libyan PM Zeidan and his key Ministers. In March 2013, the Prime Minister wrote to PM Zeidan setting out the UK’s support for Libya. The Minister of International Security Strategy visited Tripoli three times between November 2012 and September 2013. Successive Ministers for the Middle East visited Tripoli five times between December 2011 and November 2013.

15. Department for International Development (DFID) assistance to Libya in financial year (FY) 2011/12 focused on the provision of humanitarian assistance and stabilisation planning. Support included evacuation and repatriation of third country nationals; funding of medical supplies; food and non-food items to cover the urgent needs to those displaced by the fighting. Support was delivered solely through multilateral organisations : the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and International Medical Corps (IMC). It included the provision of humanitarian advisers to coordinate and mentor the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC) on humanitarian operations. Total UK humanitarian support to the Libya crisis was £17.2 million, £2.1 million of which was to UN agencies (UNHCR, UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO)).

16. DFID also provided £1.2m of support to clear unexploded remnants of war and landmines through the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). De-mining activities started in May 2011.

17. In FY 2011/12, the UK also provided significant core funding to humanitarian multilateral agencies such as the UN and the Red Cross Movement and to the EU’s humanitarian agency, ECHO, to enable them to respond to needs across the globe as appropriate. Full details of DFID’s contribution to Libya 2011-2015 are provided at Annex D.

18. In FY 2011/12, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) responded to direct requests for assistance from the Libyan authorities including advice on security sector reform and institutional capacity building. The MOD deployed a Defence Advisory Team (DAT) to Tripoli consisting of six staff, later supplemented by a civilian Defence Reform Advisor appointed in June 2012 and a Disarmament Programme Manager appointed in March 2012. The DAT worked with the Libyan Armed Forces, British Police Advisors, the EU and other nations and international organisations, including UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).

19. At the invitation of the Prime Minister, Prime Minster Zeidan attended the G8 Summit at Lough Erne in June 2013, where there was an agreement that Libya would fund the training of more than 7,000 troops by some G8 countries to help Libya disarm and integrate the militias and take the fight to the extremists.

20. Of those 7,000, the UK offered to train up to 2,000 Libyan armed forces personnel. They were to return to Libya as a General Purpose Force to support the democratically elected Libyan Government, to disarm and integrate militias, and to improve the security and stability of the country. The first phase of the training began in June 2014 at Bassingbourn barracks in Cambridgeshire with an initial 328 Libyan trainees. The majority of recruits responded positively to the training despite the ongoing political uncertainty in Libya but there were disciplinary issues, some of which impacted the local community, which was completely unacceptable and a matter of regret. Training was initially expected to last until the end of November but we agreed with the Libyan Government that it was best for all involved to bring forward the training completion date. Those Libyan trainees not in UK custody returned to Libya by mid-November. Through the Libyan Embassy in London we continue with efforts to secure reimbursement from the Libyan Government.

21. In 2013, Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) initiated the Security, Justice and Defence (SJD) programme of £62.5m of planned assistance over 3.5 years to increase UK support to the political transition in post-revolutionary Libya. The deteriorating political and security environment in Libya meant that only Phase 1 of the programme was delivered, with the DAT expanded to become a 32-strong Defence Advisory Training Team (DATT). Phase 1 focused on design and start-up, but was able to deliver practical engagement with the Libyan authorities on key security issues. Since the suspension of operations at the British Embassy Tripoli, the SJD programme has been scaled back significantly.

The UN

UN process: the UK’s participation in negotiations to bring about a National Unity Government in Libya, including the work of the UK’s Envoy to Libya Jonathan Powell and the UN Special Representative Bernardino Léon, and the prospects for success.

22. The UN has remained actively engaged on Libya since 2011, with regular Security Council discussion of the situation on the ground. Successive UK Ambassadors to Tripoli have been involved in talking to participants in the process on all sides, and have attended sessions of the UN-led talks at SRSG Léon’s invitation. UK officials have also worked closely with the UN to promote a coordinated international effort to support the UN process. SRSG Léon is now hoping to reach agreement between the participants of the political dialogue in time to allow a new Government of National Accord (GNA) to be formed by 20 October. On 21 September, SRSG Léon announced the final text of the proposed agreement. He is hoping get the final text agreed in order to form a Government of National Accord (GNA) by the end of October.

The UK Special Envoy to the Libyan Political Transition

23. In the autumn of 2013, the FCO undertook a review of its policy towards Libya to assess whether support provided was having the desired effect on progress towards peace and security. As a result of that review, in April 2014 the Prime Minister appointed Jonathan Powell to reinvigorate political negotiations and resolve competing visions between Libyan groups on the future of Libya. Jonathan Powell began work in May 2014, developing relationships with military and political figures on both sides of the divide. He has worked throughout 2014 and 2015 in support of the UN-led process. In September 2014, the UN appointed Bernadino Léon as SRSG to lead a political process to end the escalating violence. At the request of SRSG Léon, Jonathan Powell is currently working on the UN’s security track, promoting dialogue between militia leaders and supporting ceasefires on the ground. He travelled repeatedly to Libya in 2014, focusing his efforts on Benghazi and Tripoli. In 2015, the security situation has made it more difficult for him to travel to Libya. Instead he has held meetings with Libyan contacts in the region and Europe and has continued to focus on promoting engagement in Tripoli and Benghazi. He works closely with other international envoys and the UK Ambassador.

The diplomatic and political consequences of the interpretation and implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973.

Impact of UNSCR 1973

24. We do not judge that UNSCR 1973 has made any significant difference to UNSC decision-making across the board. But it has been added to the narrative of those who oppose further UNSC activity on Syria such as UN sanctions or an International Criminal Court (ICC) referral. Russia also claims that international intervention in Libya to avert a humanitarian disaster is an example of double standards when compared to Russia’s illegal annexation of part of Ukraine. In the case of Syria, the UK continues to work for a political settlement to deliver a transition from the Assad regime to a more inclusive government better able to meet the needs of the Syrian people. In the case of Ukraine, the UK does not agree there is any equivalency between Libya, where our intervention was based on the need to avert a humanitarian crisis, and Ukraine where Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea was in breach of international law and in breach of commitments Russia had made to respect the independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum signed in 1994 and other agreements.

International/ regional actors: the UK’s position on calls for further international action in Libya, and its approach to action taken by actors in the region in Libya.

25. HMG believes that the international community has an important role to play in supporting the aspirations of the Libyan people to build security, stability and a return to prosperity. These international efforts must be led by the UN, supported by the work of other regional organisations such as the Arab League and African Union. Although there are different perspectives across the international community, it is united behind the UN’s work to promote a political settlement, and to reach it quickly.

26. HMG and its diplomatic network regularly discuss developments with a full range of international interlocutors with interest and influence in Libya, including neighbours and regional actors. We consistently encourage all sides to engage with the UN-led process in a constructive manner. UK officials have worked closely with the UN, EU, US, France, Italy, Spain and Germany to promote a coordinated international effort to support the UN process, and to ensure the international community is ready to provide support for a GNA when formed.

UK engagement since the suspension of operations at the British Embassy Tripoli

The UK’s withdrawal from Libya in 2014, and its engagement with the two competing administrations and various militias in Libya since, including the extent to which it is still seen as an ally in Libya.

27. Since the suspension of operations at the British Embassy Tripoli in August 2014, Libya Office Tunis has maintained an extensive network of contacts in Libya and the region, through regular phone contact, social media, meetings outside Libya, and the work of the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy. It has used these contacts to build the UK’s understanding of the situation on the ground, encourage broader representation and inclusion and identify practical ways in which HMG can contribute to supporting an end to the conflict and building a stable and democratic new Libya. UK Ministers continue to speak to and meet their Libyan counterparts and HMG is recognised by Libyan political, military and militia leadership as a trusted interlocutor.

Security

Security: the implications for the UK and the surrounding region of the breakdown of the security situation and current conflict in Libya, and the presence of ISIL in parts of Libya, and the wider consequences of weapons proliferation.

Counter Terrorism

28. Terrorist groups operating in Libya pose a threat to regional neighbours and – by extension – to UK interests in the region. Political instability in Libya has led to a permissive environment for terrorist groups in which to operate, including ISIL affiliated groups and al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). UNSCR 2214 expresses grave concern about the impact of the presence of terrorist groups in Libya.

29. Since May 2015, ISIL has been able to consolidate its position in Sirte and the surrounding area. However, there is significant opposition within Libya to ISIL from across the political spectrum. ISIL in Libya has suffered recent setbacks, most notably in Derna in eastern Libya.

30. A lasting and inclusive political settlement and the establishment of a GNA is the best way to tackle the terrorist threat in the long term. We will support a new GNA on security issues, not least tackling ISIL. We are working closely with international and regional partners, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to support the Libyans to tackle terror groups. We support the use of existing UNSCRs to sanction terrorist groups in Libya, including groups affiliated to ISIL. On 19 November 2014 the UN Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee listed Libyan terrorist groups Ansar Al-Sharia Benghazi (AAS-B) and Derna (AAS-D). Separately, a domestic UK Proscription Order for AAS-B came into effect on 28 November 2014.

Weapons Proliferation

31. Under Phase 1 of the SJD programme, UK advisers started to address the huge issue of arms and ammunition stockpiles by supporting and facilitating local council and militia agreements to build and secure five temporary weapons storage facilities. The UK led international efforts to tackle weapons proliferation in 2013 and 2014, including through hosting international conferences at Wilton Park and planning meetings with the UN in New York. The UK committed £1 million to the UNMAS Trust Fund for Arms and Ammunition earmarked for Libya.

32. In spring 2014, HMG agreed a contract with a provider to establish a Libyan Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training school. Although the contractor was not able to deploy due to the deteriorating security situation, they remain ready to mobilise at short notice when the security environment improves. In addition, the SJD programme supported non-government (NGO) EOD trainers.

Migration

Migration: the FCO’s role in addressing migration and people trafficking through and from Libya, and the security implications for the UK.

33. The vast, indistinct, and porous borders between the countries in North Africa and the Sahel region pose significant challenges with consequences for the security of the region and Europe. Weak border controls allow markets in arms, people, and narcotics to thrive, alongside everyday trafficking in fuel and goods, and allow terrorists to move freely and exploit ungoverned areas.

34. In 2014, over 170,000 migrants were detected entering the EU via the Central Mediterranean route (a new record and a fourfold increase on 2013). The majority of these are believed to have departed from Libya. IOM estimate that 1,700 migrants died crossing the Mediterranean between January and April 2015. This is thirty times their estimate for the same period in 2014.

35. Libya is not a significant source of Mediterranean migration itself, but is the major point of exit from Africa towards the EU. The trafficking networks operating across Libyan territory are mostly criminally controlled and have thrived in the absence of strong central authority. People smuggling is currently perceived within Libyan political circles as a low priority, and is seen by many Libyans as a “Western” problem. The migrants themselves are often subject to violence and abuse, and arbitrarily held in detention centres.

36. We urgently need to end the loss of life of migrants at sea and on land routes. Our approach in Libya sits within our wider approach to the migration crisis in Europe. It combines: (i) working to bring stability to Libya in order to make it a more difficult operating environment for smugglers and traffickers; (ii) providing operational assets to support Italy and Frontex Operation Triton and the EU’s Naval Forces Operation in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med); and (iii) engaging with source and transit countries to stop the flow of migrants reaching Libya in the first place, including through development aid, humanitarian support, addressing conflict, and to tackle the exploitation of vulnerable people by smugglers and traffickers.

37. On 22 June, the EU Foreign Affairs Council agreed to launch Phase 1 of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, which focuses on understanding the criminal networks behind the boats attempting to make the dangerous crossing. The UK is currently contributing HMS Enterprise and a Merlin helicopter to Phase 1, and has offered to provide an additional frigate, alongside HMS Enterprise, as the mission moves forward to Phase 2. This phase, expected to begin in early October, will conduct operations on the high seas to disrupt the smuggling gangs before the winter when migrant crossings traditionally decrease. Our contribution to the CSDP mission followed our initial deployment of HMS Bulwark and three Merlin helicopters in support of the Italian-led Search and Rescue mission. Two Border Force patrol vessels continue to support FRONTEX’s Operation Triton.

38. The UK launched an Organised Immigration Crime task force in June 2015, bringing together officers from the National Crime Agency, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). The task force will pursue and disrupt organised crime groups profiting from the people smuggling, and address the plight of migrants at each stage of their journey It will also support the Europol information fusion facility JOT MARE.

Current Assistance

39. Since 2011 there has continued to be sustained and high level Ministerial engagement on Libya. The Foreign Secretary most recently met with Libyan Foreign Minister Mohammed al-Dairi on 21 August 2015. The FCO Minister for the Middle East and North Africa, Mr Tobias Ellwood met Libyan political leaders and actors on two separate visits to the region in 2015, as well as holding regular telephone contacts with Libyan interlocutors and SRSG Léon.

40. In FY 2015/16, HMG committed £10m to a new Conflict Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) programme in Libya focused on providing support for a political settlement and preventing further conflict and decline. To date, we have struggled to spend programme funds due to the difficulties operating in Libya and worsening security environment since the CSSF bid was approved. We keep the programme under review and HMG maintains the flexibility to increase and adapt its support should there be progress towards a political settlement. .

41. In line with needs on the ground, the UK has not provided humanitarian assistance directly to Libya since 2011. However, as the situation has deteriorated in 2015, there is now a need for humanitarian support again. DFID Minister of State, Desmond Swayne recently approved £2m for ICRC for assistance to vulnerable populations in Libya, including migrants and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

42. Since the conflict in 2014, both sides in Libya have been vying for unilateral control of financial resources, threatening to further exacerbate the conflict and undermine a successful future recovery. The UK believes that the independence and proper functioning of the Central Bank of Libya, the National Oil Corporation and other key financial institutions must be preserved and protected. We condemn action against Libya’s national assets, financial institutions and natural resources, which risk undermining the sustainable development of the Libyan economy.

Future UK policy towards Libya

Recommendations for future UK policy towards Libya.

43. We are working across HMG to deliver the UK’s vision of an increasingly stable Libya over the next four years, with an accountable new government that is making progress on tackling terrorism and irregular migration, addressing human rights and rule of law concerns, and using oil money effectively and transparently to provide services to its citizens. HMG will work with the Libyan authorities, the UN and our partners in the region to reduce the threat to UK interests from terrorism and ungoverned spaces, and increase regional security and stability. Our activities will focus on five thematic pillars: political settlement, improving security under state control, reducing the threat from terrorism, an inclusive economic recovery, and a reduction in irregular migration. We will keep this work under regular review.

44. The Libyans have made it clear that they share our commitment to resolving the crimes of the Qadhafi era, which left victims both in Libya and in the UK, such as the Lockerbie bombing and the murder of WPC Fletcher. Addressing these issues has formed an important part of our bilateral relationship with Libya for some time.

45. We also want to see a just solution for all of the victims of Qadhafi-sponsored IRA terrorism. HMG considers compensation claims by the victims to be private matters, best pursued directly with the Libyan Government. Although HMG is not involved in any negotiations on securing compensation payments, the FCO provides facilitation support to victims, their families, legal representatives and campaign groups, where it has been requested and is appropriate. On 24 July 2015, the House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee launched an inquiry into HMG support for UK victims of IRA attacks that used Qadhafi-supplied Semtex and weapons, links to FCO evidence to this Inquiry are at Annex A.

46. We continue to keep the factors associated with restoring a UK diplomatic presence in Libya under close review. We will look to reopen our Embassy in Tripoli as soon as conditions permit. This will allow us to provide advice and support to a new Libyan government and re-start commercial engagement by UK companies.