Written Evidence from Dr Victoria Honeyman (LIB0006)

Libya: Examination of Intervention and Collapse and the UK’s Future Policy Options

1. Brief Introduction

My name is Dr Victoria Honeyman and I am a Lecturer in British Politics at the University of Leeds. My specialism is specifically British Foreign Policy.  I have written on the foreign policy aims and objectives of both the Conservative and Labour parties, speaking and writing on these issues domestically and overseas, as well as writing on the post-1997 foreign policy of Britain for British Politics journal. I am the Convenor of the British International Studies Association Working Group on Foreign Policy. I have spoken at a closed Conference at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 2015, where I spoke about the future of British Foreign Policy, and have a piece under consideration for the Royal United Services Institute Journal.

2. Short Summary

• The use of no-fly zones to protect civilians is a well-trodden strategy, being used in numerous nations across the world, perhaps most obviously in Iraq between the 1990/91 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War.
• While these zones do offer some protection for civilians, they are used as a way of external nations influencing events on the ground without having to commit ground troops to the theatre of war or having to justify such action to the public.
• The situation in Libya, with the rise of the Arab Spring in that nation, was not significantly worse than in other nations, but Libya did have a contested history with numerous Western and Arab nation, perhaps indicating why it was selected for airstrikes in 2011.
• The action in Libya was co-ordinated by the US, UK and France, which demonstrated a new kind of working arrangement. This tri-lateral agreement might indicate Britain is more willing to work outside NATO with several large nations, as opposed to the traditional ci-lateral arrangements of coalitions of numerous other nations. This could be a way in which Britain can proceed overseas as the UK’s international position as a ‘great power’ is challenged by other nations.
• There was a certain degree of inevitability about the collapse of Libya once Gaddafi was removed. The democratic, grassroots movements in nations like Libya (or Iraq or Afghanistan for example) are not developed enough to survive the inevitable power vacuum which follows the removal of an authoritarian dictator, such as Gaddafi.  Instead, the nations often dissolve into civil war, internal strife or another strong, usually authoritarian, individual finds their way to power, often by using the military.
• There is no easy way to fix the issues in Libya, but more involvement from the African Union and perhaps surrounding nations might be a way forward. This runs the risk of the new Libya becoming a country that does not reflect Western wishes for it. Unless the US, UK and France are wiling to send billions more in Libya and put forces on the ground, neither of which is likely, then we will have to accept the development of Libya in a way which is shaped by its people and external forces from the region. This may not be palatable and may lead to a state that is no better than the Gaddafi regime.

3. Written Evidence

3.1 The use of ‘no-fly zones’ in peacekeeping and enforcement has become an established way of protecting vulnerable civilians on the ground. This approach has a number of advantages, particularly for the external forces. A no-fly zone does endanger the lives of those pilots enforcing such measures, but the casualty rates amongst those enforcing the zone is considerably lower than would be found if ground troops were deployed. This allows governments to paint no-fly zones as less invasive, less dangerous, even less serious than the introduction of ground-troops and the inevitable public debate, which surrounds military action, is accordingly reduced.

3.2 This was very much the case in Libya in 2011. Obviously, Libya was a nation with very few friends amongst the British public or the media. The impact of the Lockerbie bombing and the long rule of Gaddafi had made Libya a rouge state in the 1980s. The attempts of the Blair government to bring Libya back into the fold in 2004 did little to alter the traditional views of Libya as a repressive state with an erratic leader. The Blair government argued that its work in 2004 allowed a new oil deal to be struck with BP, encouraged Libya to drop any plans it had for nuclear research and would draw Libya into the fight against terrorism. When the Arab Spring movement began to spread across the Middle East in late 2010 and early 2011, Libya was a likely candidate.  However, it was not the only nation to experience uprising, nor was it the only nation to respond in a repressive way. The response of the Libyan authorities was fairly similar to that of other nations in the region, such as Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. What differed was the response of the international community. While other nations, such as Yemen and Bahrain, were largely ignored in real terms by the international community, Libya was pinpointed as a case where a no-fly zone was required to protect the residents of that nation. The reasons for this are difficult to establish. There is no doubt that the Gaddafi regime was cruel, violent and oppressive, but it was not the only regime within the region to act in this way. Nor was it the only nation to respond violently to the uprisings it experienced. It was, however, the only nation which had a no-fly zone implemented in the light of the Arab Spring.

3.3 The reasons for this go much further than humanitarian concern. Unlike other Middle Eastern nations, which have long-standing relationships with, for example, former colonial powers in the region, such as France and the UK, or those who have good relationships with the US, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya did not have many international friends. This was largely based on its troublesome history under the Gaddafi regime. However, Libya is an oil-producing nation and has a geographically important location on the northern coast of Africa. This means that Libya is within fairly close proximity of the EU borders, and that several EU nations purchased Libyan oil prior to 2011, such as Italy and France who were two of Libya’s biggest customers.  Additionally, while Libya had been welcomed, somewhat luke-warmly, into the international community in 2004, it had not developed the market might of other nations, meaning that its weakening would not have a massive market impact.  Libya was an excellent nation for Western powers to demonstrate their willingness to defend civilians in a weakened, repressive state, in a way that would have minimal impact domestically. This would allow maximum impact for minimal risk.

3.4 UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which authorised the defence of the people of Libya, was fairly typical for UN resolutions in that it appeared strong worded while offering few specifics which might cause issue for UN Security Council Permanent members. The resolution called for a ceasefire, a no-fly zone and all action short of foreign intervention on the ground.  This wording, while fairly typical in type, was influenced no doubt by the actions in the run-up to the war in Iraq in 2003. There would definitely be a need for a second resolution in Libya were ground troops to be committed, not that that would have been likely due a lack of appetite for such action in France, the UK or the US.  This allowed the governments of China and the Russian Federation to abstain from the vote without fear of the use of ground troops from the other permanent members.  The use of the no-fly zone, plus additional measures which aided the rebels, allowed them to become resurgent and begin a fight back against the governmental troops, which ultimately led to the overthrowing of Gaddafi and his death.

3.5 The reconstituting of government after civil war is never easy. It is even harder when the state has been dominated for decades by a dictator. After the lurid revelations of Gaddafi’s practices, there was the practical business of government to begin. In such times of upheaval and uncertainty, people continue to be frightened and look for ways to protect themselves and their families. With no functioning government, people look to other forces and individuals to protect them, often leading to the rise of warlords and regionalism.  Religious or ethnic groupings can rise to prominence, as people flock to them for the security they lack, or are intimidated by them into becoming supporters against their will. The rise of ISIL in Libya was something that should, perhaps, have been anticipated, although the exact group which would rise might have been more difficult to spot.  Into any vacuum will come powerful groups and individuals, and groups such as ISIL pray on unstable, weakened nations which will allow them the space to grow and the freedom to intimidate without fear of reprisal.

3.6 The future of Libya is difficult to predict. While some predict that ISIL are growing in strength, others argue the group is on the edge of disaster and will collapse before the year is out. Inevitably, with such a covert group, few hard facts are available to the public. In terms of Libya, its fait is bound up, temporarily, with that of ISIL. Were ISIL to be driven from Libya, Syria and Iraq, which would certainly required airstrikes, if not greater military action on the ground, then Libya would still be facing many challenges. Its infrastructure is weakened, the scale and influence of its democratic movement is unknown and there would be fears over the undue influence of individuals within the country and the influence of external nations. It is possible that a movement within Libya would be able to gain power and introduce democratic measures, as we have seen in some developing nations, such as Botswana. However, it is even more likely that Libya will need to defend itself from the inevitable influences of other nations within the region, who may well wish to see Libya developing in a way which suits their own needs, such as Iran.

3.7 There is also the threat of the Western world. While we like to view ourselves as a benevolent force, it is possible that influences from the developed world would be at odds with the wants of the Libyan people, and it might be that the developed nations are faced with a new Libyan state that is not developing as they would wish. That would largely bring us full-circle, something that no one wants to see. The use of development aid and the work of multinational organisations and companies in the country might encourage a more pro-Western approach to be taken, but this is all largely speculation. The UK is currently investing in Libya and offering support where it can, and this is really the only practical way in which Britain can support Libya without being accused of unfairly influencing the nation. Libya is currently a very weak state and is vulnerable to extreme forces, largely internally, but also more regional movements, which could easily unsettle its progression. The introduction of a no-fly zone and the removal of Gaddafi did not cause this instability; it simply removed the cork from the bottle and allowed this instability to be seen in the open.

September 2015