Written evidence submitted by the UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (CLI0019)

1.  We structure this document according to the questions posed in the Call for Evidence.

0.1              Summary of recommendations

2.  These summary items are composed of the bold text in the indicated sections of the main text.

Recommendation A: FCO environmental diplomatic strategy should involve considerable consultation with UKOTs, ensuring that NGOs are involved, and address major global challenges, including those issues tackled by the UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee. (paragraph 20)

Recommendation B: FCO should provide legal draftspersons to expedite or ensure legislation does not stall, especially where these relate to international commitments. (paragraph 22)

Recommendation C: Liaison with and support to environmental NGOs experienced in working in UKOTs must be provided as these have been shown to strengthen HMG’s work. (paragraph 34)

Recommendation D: UK Government should facilitate and expedite any UKOTs requesting to join international agreements, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). (paragraph 56)

Recommendation E: UK Government should continue to take a global role in climate-change policy through its UK Overseas Territories, in which marine protected areas already cover 4 million square kilometres. (paragraph 59)

Recommendation F: UK Government should continue to ensure UKOTs and CDs are represented in COP meetings. (paragraph 62)

0.2              Introduction

3.  The UK Overseas Territories Conservation Forum (UKOTCF) is a UK-registered charity. It is the only organisation concerned solely with promoting good environmental governance and the contribution of biodiversity to the well-being of the people and natural ecosystems of all UK’s Overseas Territories (UKOTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs). Our 30 member and associate organisations include leading environmental bodies in UKOTs and CDs and several in Britain. Much of our work, over 30 years, facilitates mutual assistance between these and other bodies, including government departments in the UK and UKOTs and CDs. FCO leads for UK Government on UKOTs.

4.  The UKOTs boast some of the world’s most delicate and complex ecosystems and habitats. Collectively they hold a truly staggering amount of biodiversity, which provides them with many goods and services, e.g. fishing, tourism, storm-protection, renewable energy supply.  In terms of endemic species, proportions of other species supported, sensitive ecosystems and threatened species, they hold even greater importance than that of metropolitan Britain. In fact, an estimated 94% of the biodiversity for which UK is internationally responsible is in the UKOTs, rather than Britain and Northern Ireland – but UK Government spends several orders of magnitude less per endemic species in UKOTs than in Britain. This biodiversity has served to underpin sustainable livelihoods in the inhabited UKOTs for many generations and has the potential to underpin continued and raised living standards and employment in such areas, especially through, for example, sustainable tourism. These natural assets need both safeguarding and management, in order to support the features that provide the attractions on which sustainable tourism can be based, and which also maintain the quality of life and culture of local communities.

5.  As an indication the significance of these natural assets, about 90 endemic species (i.e. those which occur nowhere else) occur in mainland Britain, compared with 3300 known so far in the UKOTs[1]. We say ‘so far’ because there are still great unknowns and gaps resulting from understudied taxa such as invertebrates, which could be filled if sufficient funding and expertise were made available. About 75% of those formally reviewed are globally threatened, and most of those not yet reviewed are likely to be similarly threatened. By including the territories, the United Kingdom's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the fifth largest in the world, at 6,805,586 km2. The total reef area inside the UKOTs mapped by the Millennium Mapping Project is 4,712 km2, making the UK the twelfth largest reef nation of the World. UKOTs support more penguins than any other nation on earth, holding an estimated 36% of the world’s population of southern rockhopper penguins and 34% of gentoo penguins, as well as several other species. Terrestrial ecosystems include some of the rarest habitat types on the planet. Many are particularly biodiverse, including Montserrat’s Centre and Soufriere Hills, and Diana’s Peak on St Helena, which holds at least 119 endemic invertebrate species.

6.  Climate Change is likely to become one of the most significant drivers of biodiversity loss by the end of the century. Yet, biodiversity can support efforts to reduce the negative effects of climate change. [2] The significance of the UK’s involvement in the COP26 cannot be underplayed. There is an opportunity for the highest levels of environmental diplomacy and more importantly a chance for action to lead the way, particularly in efforts to reduce biodiversity loss in the UKOTs and CDs.

What is Environmental Diplomacy?

7.  Diplomacy is the management of the relationships between nation states. This can be bilaterally (e.g. UK/USA, UK/China), regionally (UK/EU) and internationally - UK representatives in the UN and all UN agencies and other bodies including treaties conventions and multilateral agreements.  “Environmental diplomacy” is, broadly, where the subject matter of bilateral or multilateral negotiations and agreements concerns activities by states and organizations and individuals within states and their sub-national jurisdictions. Diplomacy is conducted not only by ministers and career officials in foreign ministries and in each country’s diplomatic posts. In the UK, prime responsibility for trade and international aid is with other departments.  That limits the resources and tools (staff, budgets) directly available to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) – but not, of course, to HMG.  Creative friction between different departments is a common feature affecting how the FCO approaches many environmental (and other) issues.  On most international and regional environmental issues, the lead Department is Defra, but usually with participation at senior levels of diplomatic and legal staff from the FCO.  The huge cuts to both FCO and Defra budgets over recent years have been considerable constraints within which both departments have had to work. 

How does Environmental Diplomacy involve the UK’s Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies?

8.  The UKOTs and CDs are not foreign. Traditionally, however, constitutional matters concerning the UKOTs, including the appointment of Governors and other UK officials serving in the territories, have been managed from the FCO. On issues concerning the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man the lead currently lies with the Ministry of Justice.  The Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus are the responsibility of the Ministry of Defence.

9.  There are four ways in which Environmental Diplomacy can involve the FCO.  First, there are issues where the wishes and interests of the territories need to feature in the UK’s bilateral relations with other countries. Examples include Marine Protected Areas (MPAs); fishing rights (e.g. incursions into Gibraltar waters by Spanish fishing vessels); major infrastructure projects e.g. remaining pollution at the airport in Bermuda when control was handed back to HMG/Bermuda by the USA, St Helena airport; protecting the marine resources of the Falkland Islands and other UKOTs.

10.  Second is that it is only through the UK’s ratification of multilateral environmental agreements (such as the CBD, UNFCC, Ramsar, UNCLOS) that the UKOTs and CDs can participate in these agreements. Often the UKOTs have expert knowledge of ecosystems and species unknown in the metropolitan UK – tropical coral reefs, volcanoes, albatrosses and penguins and the myriad weevil species that Darwin found so distinctive on St Helena. Not all territories are signed up to all agreements for various reasons and so there remains a crucial role for HMG in setting a higher global standard for protection of the environment on the international stage. The Overseas Territories Department (OTD) of the FCO plays an important role in sign up to international agreements.[3] 

11.  Third, following the 1999 White Paper on the UKOTs, a series of Environment Charters were negotiated between the UK and the territories in recognition of the need for both to contribute to the good environmental governance of the territories, including funding from the UK in recognition that over 90% of the global biodiversity in UK sovereign territory is found in the islands and seas of the territories. At the time they were based on internationally established principles, which still hold true in 2020 and are also recognised by the Sustainable Development Goals to 2030.

12.  Fourth, while local environmental governance is a matter primarily for the territories (as the Environment Charters recognise), there are territories, which are effectively run from Whitehall (and Cambridge) - British Indian Ocean Territory, Ascension Island, British Antarctic Territory, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.  Furthermore, the small populations of Pitcairn, Tristan da Cunha and St Helena could not possibly be expected to be able to manage their rich natural habitats without budgetary and policy support from HMG.

0.3              Questions

Q1. What should the FCO’s environmental diplomacy strategy look like?

13.  It should be holistic. The FCO needs to consult widely with other departments and agencies, with companies (travel and tourism), natural and social scientists, environmental and human rights NGOs. Responsible global management of the earth’s natural resources is part of being good global citizens.

14.  We would expect the strategy to aim to tackle some of the major global issues such as invasive species, climate change, plastic pollution and for the UKOTs specifically, in many cases a lack of resources.

15.  In doing so we would expect to see recommendations of the previous evidence taken by the Environmental Audit Committee taken into account as they include submissions from the UKOTs. In 2019, their inquiries on invasive species[4] noted the significant threat they pose to native species. Most relevant to HMG and the FCO was the importance of vigilance during construction (notably the works taking place to repair the runway on Ascension Island overseen by the FCO) and adequate biosecurity measures including legislation. 

16.  Climate-change is undoubtedly having major effects on UK’s Overseas Territories, via effects such as sea-level rise (serious threat to several territories: Cayman, Turks & Caicos, Anguilla, BIOT; parts of British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Pitcairn); glacial retreat (South Georgia & South Sandwich Islands, British Antarctic Territory) and increased intensity and frequency of hurricanes (Caribbean Territories, Bermuda). There is limited potential for adaptation in most UKOTs. Much of it depends of maintaining in good condition – and not replacing by built development – the natural ecosystems which defend and buffer against storms: mangroves, reefs, forests, soils etc.

17.  Climate Change is a major challenge in that many UKOTs suffer the impacts but cannot significantly affect sources, because these come mainly from bigger countries. Nevertheless, several territories are working hard to reduce carbon-release (e.g. Gibraltar, Falklands, BVI and some other Caribbean territories).

18.  The UK is providing large sums of money to tackle Climate Change, e.g. via the International Climate Fund. However, this is not open to UK Overseas Territories. This is despite the UK having extended ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) to include several territories.

19.  Plastic Pollution is having an impact on the wildlife, well-being and economy of the UKOTs. It is likely to remain a challenge without considerable efforts to reduce the quantity and release of it into the oceans.[5] HMG recognises this problem and the difficulty in tackling it. FCO has supported some work in Pitcairn and notes how it can influence across the Pacific through the High Commission in New Zealand.[6] It is unclear if it does it do this through Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), which the UK pays a subscription to. Does it use this effectively?

20.  Recommendation A: FCO environmental diplomatic strategy should involve considerable consultation with UKOTs, ensuring that NGOs are involved, and address major global challenges, including those issues tackled by the UK Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee.

21.  FCO can help to address poor or out-dated Legislative Framework in the UKOTs. The FAC has been made aware of this previously.[7] Account needs to be taken of the limited local resources and competing demands for legislative drafting. Whilst there have been examples over several years of NGOs helping in drafting legislation, in some territories lack of draftsmen or other priorities have prevented for several years the taking forward of environmental legislation that has been agreed in principle and/or prepared by environmental personnel. A senior environmental official in one territory recently enquired whether UKOTCF had lawyers who could help.  We do not, but HMG does. However, the standard response from the FCO is usually on the lines of “We have told the territories that we are ready to help but what matters are their priorities.”  We are aware of one recent example where an international institute, working together with a UKOT, on sustainable management of marine resources has brought in their own legal draftspersons to ensure that legislation does not stall. This is in a UKOT, which receives financial assistance. Is it acceptable that, with the resources the UK has available, it is not providing what is needed? What aspirations does the HMG have for the UKOTs?  For example, the Ballast Convention.[8]

22.  Recommendation B: FCO should provide legal draftspersons to expedite or ensure legislation does not stall, especially where these relate to international commitments.

23.  The strategy should not include only targets for its marine areas, but also for conservation on land, which is where most endemic species[9] occur. Diplomacy is needed in areas of global importance, which include impacts on land, e.g. climate change and future invasions of invasive species. One example, where a variety of issues are in play and diplomacy is vital is the matter of illegal immigration in the Turks and Caicos Islands. They have an extensive EEZ, which they find difficult to patrol. Ultimately those that make the perilous journey from other poor conditions in other Caribbean states and arrive on land are having a direct impact on terrestrial resources, e.g. the destruction of rare native tropical dry-forest habitat.

24.  Marine Resources are likely to be comprehensively covered by other evidence. Perhaps most significantly, international diplomacy is part of fisheries management, particularly in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) for example, Gibraltar and illegal incursion from Spain.

25.  FCO has supported innovation with regards to policing large areas of the ocean through Pew and Oceanmind. It has a diplomatic role to play in investigating and prosecuting illegal activity in UKOTs waters. [10]

26.  The FCO, often supported by the armed forces, has a major role to play in Disaster Management and Mitigation against climate change, such as in respect of 2017 major hurricanes Irma and Maria. HMG should not loose the opportunity to maintain and build healthy ecosystems which increase resilience to the worst impacts of such events. To ignore this during rebuilding is shying away from its aspirations.   

27.  We would expect a strategy to include a space for the FCO to communicate its work to a wider audience.  As part of the strategy we would expect to see some element of outreach. There are examples where work funded by the FCO to external agencies has included good communication materials, e.g. for the Antarctic (by British Antarctic Survey) and for the Blue Belt Programme (by the by Marine Management Organisation). 

Q2. How effective is the FCO's current approach to environmental diplomacy? Does the UK use all available tools (sanctions, tariffs, trade negotiations, UN activity) to promote its objectives in this area.

28.  It is difficult to separate those aspects, which relate to distinctive FCO approaches and those of other government departments and agencies.  The FCO has an effective network of environmental attachés through which to gather information about how other countries approach key environmental topics.  However, the FCO’s work is diverse and the environment has to compete with many other areas. 

29.  The OTD Polar Regions department is well-established and has retained its technicians despite the turnover of staff within the OTD. It attends all meetings of the Antarctic Treaty and helps to set the agenda. Underpinning this diplomacy is sound scientific evidence, which it acquires through the work of the British Antarctic Survey. The FCO is able to use their expertise in territories not part of the BAT, but are UKOTs in their own right e.g. South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands and the Falkland Islands.

30.  However, in other areas, we regret how FCO has reduced its previously strong relations with environmental NGOs, on which it could depend for advice. For example, for 20 years, until ended unilaterally by FCO in about 2008, UKOTCF and FCO chaired jointly a twice-yearly meeting between environmental NGOs working on UKOT/CD environments, and those government departments and agencies also involved. This had been an effective way of identifying and sharing expertise. From the 1990s, recognizing the high cost-effective nature of NGO work, FCO, and later other departments also, made grants available to NGOs to support important projects. In the earlier years of the availability of these funds for UKOT conservation, there was a presumption that the fund would not normally grant HMG’s own departments and agencies, which receive funds through the government’s internal system. However, this expectation has gradually been eroded, thereby reducing the amount going via NGO umbrella bodies. For example, the average annual UK Government support to conservation in the territories going via UKOTCF was cut by 84% from 1999-2008 to 2012-2016, and by 100% by 2019.  There has been a shifting of grant funding from NGOs/territory bodies to several UK Government agencies (which previously did not apply to this source). This is probably a consequence of cuts in the core budgets of these bodies. However, it is quite wrong for NGOs and UKOT bodies to be squeezed to replace funding via other HMG budget lines to HMG’s own agencies. The novel funding to support the Blue Belt Programme and GB Non Native Secretariat work is welcomed, but this is not essentially open to applications and UKOT administrations and NGOs have complained that they have little say in how the funds are deployed

31.  UKOTCF’s review of its first 30 years[11] noted: “It may have been, at times, a UKOTCF failing in that we have not always ensured that equal credit was publicised between NGOs, [UKOT] Government Departments and UKOTCF. This was because it was a founding practice that local partners should take the highest profile of the credit. However, this means that it was easy to overlook UKOTCF efforts when often they were so crucial in instigating the work and getting it off the ground, as well as co-managing it in many cases. Also, with the passage of time, is becomes easy to say that UKOTCF had no involvement at all – and we have heard that from some partner organisations in UK and the territories, expressed with genuine sincerity, simply because current personnel of those bodies were never told of the full story.” 

32.  This may be a contributory reason for UKOTCF being ignored at times by some (in a few cases, senior) UK Government officials, especially when HMG handovers are known to be inadequately resourced. Over the first two decades of the Forum, we worked closely with FCO (as, for most of that, the only two UK bodies coordinating in this area). Shortly after FCO ended almost all its environmental staffing in 2006, and new staff took over (distant) responsibility, FCO tried to undermine UKOTCF (as later confirmed by Freedom of Information releases to another body). We have strived to restore good relations, with some successes, and we look forward to moving towards the earlier warm and productive relationship. Throughout, we have made clear that the wide pool of expertise of our extensive network remains available to help HMG, but this has been less called upon. Instead, HMG has tended to call mainly on its own agencies. These too are under increasing pressure of resources (despite the redirection to them of some funding previously dedicated to NGOs, noted above). Whilst these agencies hold a range of deep expertise in some areas, they are less so in others, and most have very limited knowledge and links with UKOTs.  This was very evident in one recent case where FCO sought advice from one of its agencies on an urgent conservation issue raised by a UKOT. Unfortunately, and in contrast to the practice of earlier years, it did not seek wider advice even though the agency lacked local knowledge and the particular technical area – and did not notice that international quality research had been conducted in a neighbouring major country. Eventually the UKOT itself had to partly overrule the UK agency and allowed the urgent conservation work to be conducted at least in part.

33.  It is possible that, in a few cases, the recent FCO approach may work in remote oceanic UKOTs without permanent human populations or very small ones. For example, in marine environment, the FCO, by moving agencies such as MMO and Cefas into activities in certain UKOTs, has acquired expertise effectively ‘in-house’. It is engaging on issues relating to marine protected areas management, fisheries, IUU in those territories, which are part of the Blue Belt Programme. [12] However, this may be less well suited to more inhabited territories, and we know of several complaints from such UKOTs that HMG agencies do not consult them adequately or understand local conditions.

34.  Recommendation C: Liaison with and support to environmental NGOs experienced in working in UKOTs must be provided as these have been shown to strengthen HMG’s work

Q3. How does it ensure lasting and concrete achievements in this area?

35.  We have not always found it particularly easy to find out information on FCO’s work in relation to environmental diplomacy in the UKOTs. Clearly through the work of the Governors and advisors to the desk officers in London are fulfilling a diplomatic role on many issues including the environment.

36. We commend Recommendations 7 and 8 from FAC’s 2019 Inquiry Report on Global Britain and the British Overseas Territories: Resetting the relationship.[13]

Q4. How does the FCO work with departments such as BEIS and Defra on this issue?

37.  Three UK government departments are primarily responsible for providing support to the UKOTs on environmental issues: the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Department for International Development (DfID) and the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC). However, all these sit within the Foreign & Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) overall policy responsibility for UKOTs (except for Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas, where this lies with the Ministry of Defence). The way in which these planned to collaborate was set out in a UK Government Biodiversity Strategy for the UKOTs. (However, as we have pointed out on several occasions, initially in UKOTCF Seminar on UK Government’s UKOTs Biodiversity Strategy (2009)[14] (this is actually an inter-departmental agreement on roles, rather than a strategy in the usual sense of the word.) 

38.  The Joint Nature Conservation Committee (JNCC), an agency of Defra, is HMG’s statutory adviser on environment issues at a UK and international level. Since about 2008, it has developed an Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies Programme.

39.  The Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy clearly has a role to play in terms of climate change. As part of its reporting it includes information from the UKOTs signed up to the UNFCCC.

40.  We have not had the opportunity to observe FCO work with BEIS that has a bearing on promoting the good environmental governance of the overseas territories.

41.  Defra matters considerably since it is usually the lead department for the UK’s participation in COPs and scientific meetings of environmental MEAs such as the CBD, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of Global Significance and the UNFCCC.

42.  Together with FCO, Defra also manages the dedicated fund for biodiversity, Darwin Plus. Following on from the recommendations made in the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report in 2018—Global Britain and the British Overseas Territories: Resetting the relationship a three-fold increase in Darwin funds was announced as a result in the Spending Review. However, we – and many partners in the UKOTs – have made recommendations to improve the decision making by this fund, which is not generally well related to the strategic needs on the ground.[15]

43.  As the FCO is responsible for the overall relationship between the UK government and the OTs they have a role to play in bringing all Whitehall Departments together as they have done previously as part of a Inter Departmental Biodiversity Group. It is unclear what opportunities there are for civil society to engage with this group if it still exists, as we describe above in relation to the reduced joint working with NGOs.

Q5. Does it have sufficient expertise in this area?

44.  Defra has a range of technical expertise particularly on international agreements but how it links across government, particularly with FCO is unclear. We have commented above on the need for restored links with experienced NGOs.

45.  On environmental issues, which matter for the overseas territories staff appointed by the FCO to be Governors or their staff officers, Administrators or Commissioners usually make time for UKOTCF and other environmental NGOs to brief them; and in turn they generally are active in reporting to the FCO and Defra on environmental issues.  It is a pity that for most of the past decade DfID, while providing budgetary support for such major and environmentally significant projects as the new airport in St Helena, has removed the post of Environmental Adviser to DfID’s Overseas Territories Department. 

Q6. How do the UK’s environmental & decarbonisation goals interact with other diplomatic priorities, such as the pursuit of new trade deals?

46.  This is not an area where UKOTCF has much expertise.  However, Guiding Principle 4 of the Environment Charters agreed with the overseas territories in 2001 sets out a key principle: “To seek expert advice and consult openly with interested parties in decisions affecting the environment.”

Q7. Does the FCO effectively use environmental diplomacy to deal with the polar regions?

47.  See above

Q8. How will Antarctica be governed after the Antarctic Treaty System expires in 2048?

48.  From the perspective of 2020, it is likely that the biggest scientific presences in Antarctica will be the USA and China.  The UK will, we hope, still be a major player; and one that can help the world to find a way to leave Antarctica un-fracked and largely free of unwelcome invasive organisms.  What Antarctica is like physically will depend to a great extent on whether COP 26 and subsequent Climate Change negotiations manage to turn around the current dramatic loss of ice-thickness on many parts of a White Continent that is increasingly green round its edges and freeing many tonnes of water to raise sea-levels throughout the world.

Q9. How will the COVID-19 pandemic affect the UK’s approach to environmental diplomacy?

49.  There will be three different areas in which Covid-19 will impact on how the FCO conducts environmental diplomacy.  First will be the extent to which the UK is seen as having coped well or poorly with the political, social and economic problems as they affected the UK. Second will be the extent to which UK scientific and medical institutions are seen as having contributed to whatever solutions are found.  Third, and most important, will be whether civil, commercial and political institutions and individuals in the UK are able to develop visions - and not just one totalitarian vision - of a better future for the world.  

50.  International travel is likely to impacted and large gatherings are likely to be more carefully considered than ever before. This will have a significant impact on those territories which rely on the travel sector to generate income. Where these are environmental sustainable, loss of these will negatively impact environmental conservation. It is a time to be vigilant in terms of decisions made in haste to overcome challenges, e.g. major developments, which could have a detrimental impact on the environment. The FCO has a role to play in achieving the highest standards of best practice for example in highlighting the need for environmental impact assessments. In areas where the FCO has more of a hands-on role, e.g. polar regions, it can have a major influence over the actions of the tourism sector, e.g. cruise ships in South Georgia. This is evident from their annual stakeholder meeting, which usually takes place in September in London.

COP 26

51.  The UK Climate Act (2008) requires that the UK provide annual statements of all domestic UK green-house gases emissions to UK Parliament. [16]

52.  Internationally, the United Kingdom as part of its obligations under the UN Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCC) must provide annual reports of greenhouse-gas emissions on behalf of Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, for which it has signed, ratified and to which the UK’s ratification has been extended. These include: Guernsey and Isle of Man, since 4 April 2005; Gibraltar, since 2 January 2007; Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands, Jersey, since 7 March 2007

53.  The UK Government acknowledges that the UKOTs will be some of the places worst affected by the impacts of climate change.[17].

54.  It has supported some regional work in the Caribbean, via DFID through the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC). The Capacity for Adaptation to Climate Change (ECACC) project, established National Climate Change Committees in Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, and Turks and Caicos Islands as well as education programmes and policy documents. However, the cooperation through links with the European Union afforded a much larger pool of resources and opportunities, which it may now be excluded from.

55.  The UK, through its International Climate Change Fund, could provide significant additional support to its UKOTs (particularly those in receipt of ODA: Montserrat, St Helena and Pitcairn) for which it is responsible under international conventions; that could replace resources lost from the EU. UK Government could, through this fund earmark some proportion for meeting UK Commitments under UNFCC. Furthermore, there could be provisions made for those UKOTs not currently signed up to the UNFCC, but have been progressing towards it, for example the British Virgin Islands.

56.  Recommendation D: UK Government should facilitate and expedite any UKOTs requesting to join international agreements, including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

57.  The UK can maximize future opportunities to cooperate with international partners to retain its standing as a hub for low carbon innovation by continuing to provide support for its UKOTs. With them, it can retain an influential voice in international climate negotiations and future changes to EU rules and regulations. It should welcome the experience of its Crown Dependencies in this regard, e.g. Isle of Man and Jersey.

58.  The UK still has a significant role within the United Nations climate-change process, as it has responsibility to its Overseas Territories to negotiate on their behalf. In its network of marine protected areas (MPAs), recently expanded and now cover 4 million square kilometres[18], it has responsibility to protect a significant area of the world oceans, which will largely be impacted by climate change. As such they still will remain a major stakeholder, and should promote this important relationship, standing side-by-side with the UKOTs and CDs. This could be an opportunity to maintain a voice in the international community and continue to be a global ambassador on the world climate change stage.

59.  Recommendation E: UK Government should continue to take a global role in climate-change policy through its UK Overseas Territories, in which marine protected areas already cover 4million square kilometres.

60.  We welcome the return to a more inclusive situation with regards to representation of UKOTs at COPs[19]. We would like this go further in so far as UKOTs and CDs are part of the preparations and organisation of the COP. 

61.  There are important commitments as set out by the Commonwealth and the UKOTs, which the FCO can help deliver. They played a significant role in the organisation of the Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in 2018. It paved the way for Blue Charter[20]. Ministers from the UKOTs have also signed the Blue Island Charter[21].

62.  Recommendation F: UK Government should continue to ensure UKOTs and CDs are represented in COP meetings.

Q10. What role should the FCO have in preparing and setting objectives for COP26? How well is it performing to date?

63.  To some extent, the basis of monitoring Environment Charter progress has been done by the work of the UKOTCF, in out “Review of performance by 2016 of UK Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies in implementing the 2001 Environment Charters or their equivalents and moving towards the Aichi Targets and Sustainable Development Targets”,[22]

64.  The UK’s primary role should be to act with Italy as an effective co-Chair of COP 26, with cross-party support from the UK Parliament and the active participation of as many countries as possible. That should include scientists, commercial sectors - especially energy production and use – and environmental and human rights NGOs. FCO could have a significant role in connecting Whitehall to the UKOTs when objectives are being set.

Q11. What lessons can be learnt from the experience of previous COP hosts, particularly the French experience preparing for COP 21?

65.  This is not an area where we have relevant experience.

Q12. What does the FCO need to do to ensure that COP 26 is a success?

66.  The outcome of the COP26 will partly depend on UK leadership. That will include its record in implementing current national commitments under the UNFCCC and related multilateral environmental agreements. One legal scholar[23] has drawn attention to climate change issues also being part of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, "States have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment"(Article 192) and " States shall take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from any source..." (Article 194, paragraph 1).

67.  The UK's international responsibilities for the good governance of its UKOTs (addressed above) includes protecting the unique biodiversity of the Chagos Archipelago. Whatever developments there may be in bilateral and multilateral disputes about the UK's exercise of sovereignty over BIOT, the UK does in practice have direct responsibility (and domestic and international accountability) for how it governs the whole archipelago. That terrestrial and marine environmental management involves not just the Chagos Marine Protected Area and the outer islands but also whatever conditions HMG requires the US to observe when using parts of the main atoll of Diego Garcia and its surrounding waters as a major defence facility.

68.  That provides the framework for the UK to agree targets with the USA for reducing emissions of pollutants (including atmospheric CO2) produced by the joint defence facilities. Since HMG has itself no doubt about its entitlement fully to exercise sovereignty throughout BIOT, the fact that the USA takes a different view from the UK on some aspects of climate change is no reason for the UK to take a less strict view of its obligations in BIOT than in the metropolitan UK. Although it may not matter to the USA, the UK – as chair of the UNFCCC's COP 26 – has a clear interest in facilitating responsible management of the environment throughout all the UKOTs and CDs, including BIOT.

69.  In addition, it must make sure that its own reporting on emissions takes adequate account of its contribution (via imported goods and services) to emissions from other countries.

Second, as far as possible, do not entangle our joint chairing of COP 26 with our bilateral trade negotiations with the USA and other countries.

70.  Could FCO encourage further sign-up of its UKOTs and CDs to the UNFCCC? What would be required for them to do this? Do they have adequate resources and are the reporting requirements possible?

Q13. Which countries should the FCO be prioritising for their diplomatic efforts in relation to COP 26?

71.  This is largely outside UKOTCF’s areas of experience.  The USA is of course a prime and tricky target for intense diplomatic work.  That should include making sure that the military facilities used by the USA in Diego Garcia and other UKOTs are managed in ways that minimise emissions and damage to the rest of the Chagos Archipelago.

Q14. How should the FCO be engaging with these countries?

72.  We suggest that, as part of sharing experience with other countries, we should at least compare notes with France, the USA, the Netherlands and Denmark on how we are all seeking to engage our Overseas Territories in the good management of the global environment and minimising the risks and damage of climate change.

Q15. How should the UK seek to ensure that outcomes are delivered after the summit?

73.  In relation to the UKOTs and CDs, the UK should ensure that their experience of the effects of climate change and their own contributions to global data on emissions and on the use of renewable energy resources are integrated into the UK’s reporting mechanisms following COP 26 and in preparation for COP 27.

May 2020