Hacked Off – written evidence (PRG0011)
IPSO is clearly not independent
Report in draft, Jan 2015 –please check http://hackinginquiry.org for latest version
One of the questions that the Committee has said it is exploring in its assessment of the current situation is whether IPSO is independent.
This cannot be determined by assertions from the press industry or from IPSO that it is independent, nor from assertions by Hacked Off, victims or other sceptics that it is not. It can only be judged based on an objective analysis according to rational and reasonable criteria.
Because regulatory independence (along with effectiveness, although the former is a pre-requisite for the latter) has been such a problem with all previous attempts at press self-regulation including latterly the Press Complaints Commission, Sir Brian Leveson devoted weeks of evidence-taking and several chapters of his report to this question.
The outcome was two-fold:
1) A set of criteria by which independence can be assessed (all of which are reproduced unchanged in the Royal Charter).
In establishing those criteria he made the natural assumption that a regulator which purported to be independent would be in control of its own rules and constitution. He rejected the IPSO model whereby the constitution, rules and regulations are entirely controlled by the industry, when he rejected the “Hunt-Black” plan during the Inquiry. IPSO is essentially the Hunt-Black plan. This has been set out by the Media Standards Trust in their analysis http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Could-Hunt-Black-pass-Royal-Charter-test-1-3-13.pdf.
2) An entirely independent body (the Recognition body), established with no links to industry or Government, tasked with auditing and evaluating a regulator according to those criteria.
Leveson recommended that that body be established by statute but as a concession to the press the Prime Minister instead proposed that it be established by a Royal Charter. The press industry accepted the idea of a Royal Charter (PressBof proposed a draft Charter and even went to court in the effort to have it accepted). It was also accepted by the Deputy Prime Minister and the leader of the Opposition. And it was accepted by leading victims of press abuse and their representatives (whom the main party leaders had all promised on oath at the Inquiry to consult), subject to the conditions that:
• The Charter faithfully reproduced the criteria from the Leveson Report with no cherry-picking, dilution, undermining or gold-plating, and
• That the Government had no power through the Privy Council to interfere without a Parliamentary super-majority (or legislation to remove that safeguard).
The fact that the Recognition Body is established by Royal Charter and not by statute makes no practical difference to the audit and recognition regime proposed by Leveson.
Leveson made the point that – given the history of press abuse and of regulatory failure – the public would never, and indeed ought never to, trust an industry self-regulator which was not subject to this independent inspection at the outset and then periodically.
Opinion polls – commissioned by by Media Standards Trust – bear this out overwhelmingly. This public, overwhelmingly in favour of meaningful reform from mid-2011, has shown no sign of changing its view despite the barrage of hostile propaganda in the newspapers about the Leveson Report and the Royal Charter (which are characterised as being assaults on press freedom), and about IPSO, which has been incorrectly presented as ‘truly independent’ and ‘fully Leveson-compliant’.
The Test of Independence
The criteria that Leveson set down for independence relate to
• the appointment process of the Board by an Appointments Committee,
• the membership of the Board,
• the membership of the Appointments Committee itself,
• how the Appointments Committee is itself appointed
• the arrangements for funding, and
• where responsibility lies for the Standards Code.
In his report Leveson made clear that the constitution, rules and procedures of the regulator should be in the hands of the self-regulator and not of an industry body such as PressBoF (which controlled the PCC).
In the course of the Inquiry PressBoF Chair Lord Black submitted industry plans for a new regulatory system and the judge found that these plans failed to deliver independence from the industry. The judge noted in particular the role of the proposed PressBof successor body, the ‘Independent Funding Body”:
‘The powers of the Independent Funding Body, which run throughout this proposal, undermine claims to independence of the regulatory system’ (p.1,630)
And for this reason the Hunt-Black plan:
‘fails to offer genuine independence from the industry’ (p.1,750).
Leveson could not understand why PressBoF (or the Industry Funding Body as it was called in Lord Black’s plans) retained so much power, or indeed why such a body was necessary at all.
‘In my opinion there is no need for such a body [as PressBoF] to exist at all’ (p.1,761-1,762).
He concluded that:
‘the extent of industry control within the proposed [Lord Black] system is a fundamental flaw’ (p.1,750).
In short, no one could be in any doubt that the judge presiding over the public inquiry concluded that the existence of PressBof, or any body like it, was not compatible with the independence of press self-regulation and therefore with its ability to deliver impartial service to the public.
Despite this, the leading newspaper companies behind IPSO have created the Regulatory Funding Company (RFC), a committee of senior industry figures very similar to PressBof, and the RFC actually enjoys greater influence over IPSO than PressBof did over the PCC.
The MST Analysis (http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/ 11/MST-IPSO-Analysis-15-11-13.pdf) sets out the vast range of powers invested in the RFC in clear breach of Leveson’s recommendations.
It should be noted that while this report identifies a few areas where IPSO arrangements are a modest improvement on those of the PCC, in this area - control by the industry - the position has deteriorated since the PCC.
The powers of the Regulatory Funding Company are as follows
Powers over funding
• Membership fee: the RFC decides what each regulated entity pays (Scheme Membership Agreement, Article 1.1 & Article 24)
• Membership fee collection: the RFC collects the levy from the participating news organisations (IPSO, Articles of Association, Schedule: 1.34)
• IPSO budget: the RFC sets the overall budget of IPSO annually, not by 4-5 year settlements as Leveson recommended (RFC Articles of Association 24.4)
• Initial budget: the RFC determines the initial budget of IPSO (RFC Articles of Association 24.4 & Schedule: 1.10)
• Increases in budget: the RFC decides on increases in the budget, and, in addition, any special funding required (RFC Articles of Association, 24.4)
Powers over appointments
• Regulatory Board: the appointment of the five industry members of the regulatory board of IPSO needs to be agreed with the RFC (IPSO Articles of Association 22.5)
• Pay of the Board: the RFC determines the pay of the directors of the Board (IPSO Articles of Association 24.2)
• Complaints Committee: the industry members of the Complaints Committee need to be agreed with the RFC (‘Regulations’ 34, and Articles of Association 27.4)
• Pay of Complaints Committee: the RFC determines the pay of members of the Complaints Committee (IPSO Articles of Association 27.6)
• Pay of Appointments Panel: the RFC determines the pay of the ‘independent’ members of the Appointment Panel (IPSO Articles of Association 26.8)
• RFC members’ independence: membership of the RFC (or a regulated entity) is not considered to compromise an individual’s independence (IPSO Articles of Association 19.5)
Control over the Standards Code
• RFC subcommittee: the IPSO Code Committee will, like the previous Code Committee, be a subcommittee of the RFC (RFC Articles of Association 2.2 & 10.9)
Control over the Regulations (and indeed over the IPSO articles and other matters)
• Regulations veto: the RFC has a veto over changes to the regulations (Scheme membership agreement Article 7.1)
Power over Investigations
• Funding investigations: the RFC determines the amount paid into the enforcement fund which pays for investigations (Scheme Membership Agreement Article 10)
Power over Sanctions
• Writing sanctions guidance: the RFC writes the Financial Sanctions Guidance which determine the amount of any fines (Scheme membership agreement Article 1.1)
Power over Arbitration
• Arbitration veto: the RFC has a veto over the very existence of any arbitration scheme (Scheme Membership Agreement 5.4.3)
Control of Voting
• Determining votes: rather than one publication one vote, the number of votes of each publisher is determined by how much it pays towards the RFC, which is determined by the RFC. The secretary of the RFC then has discretion over the allocation of votes, and the criteria by which this allocation is made
Sir Alan Moses, independence and the RFC
It follows from the above that so long as the RFC exists in anything like its present form, IPSO, despite its name, cannot remotely be described as independent of the industry. In fact it is less independent than the PCC was, and sadly the consequences of such industry control, in terms of the conduct of editors and journalists, are well known.
Sir Alan Moses, the IPSO chair, has spoken of his desire for changes to the organisation.
If he seeks genuine independence of the kind that is capable of commanding public confidence (and of the kind that was found necessary by leading judge at a public inquiry and endorsed by both Houses of Parliament), his first step must be the removal of RFC control of the IPSO constitution, standing orders, terms of the contract, and procedures. Full control of the IPSO articles, financial sanctions guidance, regulations and those parts of the contract which do not deal with the collection of subscriptions must be transferred to the IPSO Board (with the proviso that the articles are amended to require IPSO to consult the public and the industry on equal terms on any changes).
These, it must be stressed, are only the first steps that would be required. Others would have to follow.
Yet our understanding is that Sir Alan Moses and IPSO have not even suggested taking such action.
And the simple fact that, if he wants to change IPSO in any substantive way, Sir Alan must go cap-in-hand to the RFC, a panel of senior newspaper industry executives, is sufficient proof of his lack of independence. Such is the power of the RFC, moreover, that it would retain the power to reverse any concessions it made at some future date.
In the absence of that, Sir Alan Moses has suggested that what would be required is an agreement from the RFC to agree to changes in the constitution, standing orders, terms of the contract, and procedures/regulations sought by the board.
There are fundamental flaws in this approach:
• Sir Alan Moses has made clear that he has not been given any “carte-blanche” and is having to negotiate each and every change he wishes to see. This is the antithesis of independence from the industry and demonstrates the total control that the RFC exercises.
• There is nothing to stop the RFC from changing the rules again and imposing them on IPSO, or threatening to do so unless the board complies.
• It is likely that the RFC will concede a small number of minor changes and proclaim through the press “megaphone” that all is solved.
The criteria of independence
Beyond the matter of RFC power, clear tests exist which can be used to determine the independence or otherwise of a press self-regulator. These are the seven specific recommendations of the Leveson Report,which most closely relate to independence. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229039/0779.pdf). They are incorporated, in identical terms, in the Royal Charter that was approved by the House of Commons. (https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254116/Final_Royal_Charter_25_October_2013_clean__Final_.pdf) They are set out below. The highlighted areas are those in which IPSO falls short.
1. An independent self-regulatory body should be governed by an independent Board.
In order to ensure the independence of the body, the Chair and members of the Board must be appointed in a genuinely open, transparent and independent way, without any influence from industry or Government.
For the avoidance of doubt, the industry’s activities in establishing a self-regulatory body, and its participation in making appointments to the Board in accordance with criteria 2 to 5; or its financing of the self-regulatory body, shall not constitute influence by the industry in breach of this criterion.
2. The Chair of the Board (who is subject to the restrictions of criterion 5(d), (e) and (f)) can only be appointed if nominated by an appointment panel. The selection of that panel must itself be conducted in an appropriately independent way and must, itself, be independent of the industry and of Government.
3. The appointment panel:
a) should be appointed in an independent, fair and open way;
b) should contain a substantial majority of members who are demonstrably independent of the press;
c) should include at least one person with a current understanding and experience of the press;
d) should include no more than one current editor of a publication that could be a member of the body.
4. The nomination process for the appointment of the Board should also be an independent process, and the composition of the Board should include people with relevant expertise. The appointment panel may only nominate as many people as there are vacancies on the Board (including the Chair), and the Board shall accept all nominations. The requirement for independence means that there should be no serving editors on the Board.
5. The members of the Board should be appointed only following nomination by the same appointment panel that nominates the Chair, together with the Chair (once appointed), and should:
a) be nominated by a process which is fair and open;
b) comprise a majority of people who are independent of the press;
c) include a sufficient number of people with experience of the industry (throughout the United Kingdom) who may include former editors and senior or academic journalists;
d) not include any serving editor;
e) not include any serving member of the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the National Assembly for Wales, the European Parliament or the House of Lords (but only if, in the case of the House of Lords, the member holds or has held within the previous 5 years an official affiliation with a political party) or a Minister of the Crown, a member of the Scottish Government, a Northern Ireland Minister or a Welsh Minister; and
f) in the view of the appointment panel, be a person who can act fairly and impartially in the decision-making of the Board.
6. Funding for the system should be settled in agreement between the industry and the Board, taking into account the cost of fulfilling the obligations of the regulator and the commercial pressures on the industry. There should be an indicative budget which the Board certifies is adequate for the purpose. Funding settlements should cover a four or five year period and should be negotiated well in advance.
7. The standards code must ultimately be the responsibility of, and adopted by, the Board, advised by a Code Committee which may comprise both independent members of the Board and serving editors. Serving editors have an important part to play although not one that is decisive.
The Media Standards Trust (http://mediastandardstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/11/MST-IPSO-Analysis-15-11-13.pdf) has examined these matters in detail and demonstrated how IPSO fails to meet any of these criteria. This is a view shared by the editor of the UK Press Gazette, which is the industry trade journal.
The MST analysis was published in draft in July 2013 (based on draft IPSO articles and regulations) and in final form in November 2013, and circulated to all those in the industry, and it has never been rebutted by IPSO, the RFC or any of the industry’s lawyers.
The failure of independence in IPSO appointments
When the MST analysed IPSO’s paperwork in November 2013 it identified among the factors that led to the breach of recommendations 1 to 5:
• that the IPSO board would be appointed by a body, the Appointments Panel, over which the industry had too much influence, by virtue of the requirement that the RFC “vet” the “industry candidates”.
• That the RFC would have sole power over the pay of the Board and Appointments Panel.
Now that the appointments process has taken place, it is clear – despite the secrecy that has clouded the process - that the position is even worse, in four respects.
1. The problem of “Industry representatives” in the system
Leveson was clear that the self-regulator should include a minority of members who had industry experience, but they were not to be industry representatives as their responsibility is to the public, not to the industry. This was to apply to the Board, the Complaints Committee and the Appointments Panel. However throughout the process of establishing IPSO the members of these bodies with industry experience have been described as “industry representatives”. It is impossible for IPSO to be Leveson-compliant while its board contains any members who were appointed as “industry representatives”.
IPSO may protest that while the industry may consider such board members to “industry representatives”, IPSO does not consider them to be so and has argued that they make no distinction.
Yet the IPSO website states: (https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/whoweare.html)
The Board
The IPSO Board has twelve members including the Chairman. A majority of the members are independent (7) which means they have no connections with the newspaper and magazine industry. The other members (5) represent the newspaper and magazine industry.
The Complaints Committee
The IPSO Complaints Committee also has 12 members, again including the Chairman. A majority of the members are independent member (7) which means they have no connections with the newspaper and magazine industry. The other members (5) represent the newspaper and magazine industry.
While the significance of the word ‘represent’ in this context is apparently lost on IPSO, it is unlikely to escape the general public. They will see that almost half of both these bodies explicitly represent the interests of the industry they are supposed to “independently” regulate.
2. The problem of the industry veto on appointments
In the appointments process, the “industry representatives” on the appointments panel were given a veto on all appointments because the appointments had to be made by consensus – in practice, unanimity. Therefore the RFC – who nominated these members onto the Appointments Panel - had a veto on all appointments as well as being able to vet the “industry nominees”.
3. The problem of the lack of a susbstantial lay majority
The Leveson criteria specify that the Chairman as well as the Board need to be appointed by an appointments panel with “a substantial majority of members who are demonstrably independent of the press”. IPSO and RFC claim that the Board was so appointed because Sir Alan joined the Panel for the final stage, thus the Panel comprised four “independent members” and two veto-wielding “Industry representatives” and that this was a substantial majority. However the Chair was appointed by a Panel with the smallest possible majority of 1 (3 to 2) which cannot conceivably considered to be “substantial”.
4. The problem of the secret “dis-application” of the Nolan principles of merit, fairness and openness in the appointment and operation of the IPSO Appointments Panel
It has become clear that the Appointments Panel was constituted in a wholly unsatisfactory way. Their posts were not advertised, nor were they appointed transparently, as would be normal in accordance with the Nolan Principles.
The body which appointed the Appointments Panel was hand-picked by the industry, published no records of its meetings, far less any register of interests, and was itself awash with conflicts of interests in relation to those they appointed to the Appointments Panel.
The Appointments Panel itself published no records of its processes, nor any register of interests of its members so any conflicts of interest of its members were never made public.
Article 26 of IPSO’s published articles (https://www.ipso.co.uk/assets/1/IPSO_Articles_of_Association.pdf) required the appointments panel to be appointed in accordance within the “Appointments Principles” appended to the Articles (these included Merit, Fairness and Openness). Yet this requirement was secretly ‘dis-applied’ when it came to the appointments of the “Initial” Appointments Panel – a manoeuvre that only came to light thanks to research at Companies House.
They have never published this change – which was approved by the 3 interim directors of PCC-IPSO (Lord Hunt, Lord Grade and Peter Wright) – but it can be found only if any member of the public or of this Committee searches at Companies’ House and pays the requisite fee.
- Neither RFC nor IPSO, despite its protestations of transparency, have ever been willing to answer questions on this matter.
- Interviews they have given in the media, and in oral evidence to select committees, have wrongly given the impression that the Nolan principles applied to this part of the process
- The press – which would consider this unacceptable in any other regulator, has failed not to publicise the true position
- IPSO have failed to publish the “special resolution” on its website.
The details are set out in the Appendix.
In consideration of these four points, three facts should be borne in mind.
First, none might be fairly characterised by its defenders as minor or technical.
Second all four have exactly the same effect: they add to the control over IPSO and its activities that is enjoyed by senior industry figures. Not one of them tends to reduce that control. This is no accident.
Third, they fly in the face of both the spirit and the letter of the recommendations of the Leveson Report. Those who designed IPSO have no contrition in relation to the wrongs of the past, and no desire to give the public meaningful protection against a repetition of those wrongs. Instead, right down to the minutest point of detail, they seek to obstruct change and retain their control.
Summary on independence of IPSO
In summary, the MST analysis puts it well:
IPSO falls far short of many of Lord Justice Leveson’s recommendations, particularly with respect to:
· Independence
At almost every level the regulator is dependent on the industry, such as to give the industry significant influence and even control over the regulator. This control and influence is exercised through a new company called the ‘Regulatory Funding Company’ or RFC. The RFC has a substantial role not just in funding but in appointments, regulations, investigations, sanctions, arbitration, and voting. It is not clear why the RFC should have any functions beyond calculating, gathering and distributing membership fees
….
The most substantial failings of IPSO are with respect to its lack of independence – especially from the newspaper industry – and its failure to provide access to legal redress for ordinary people. IPSO will be reliant on, and directed by, the largest publishing groups in the industry – through the Regulatory Funding Company (RFC). IPSO’s budget, its rules, its code, its sanctions, its investigations, will all be controlled by the RFC. It will not be able to offer an arbitration service, or make changes to the system of regulation, without the agreement of the RFC. This does not constitute independence from the industry. Rather, it constitutes acute dependence on the industry.
It has been rightly said that the Independent Press Standards Organisation breaches its own supposed requirement for accuracy in the very first word of its name.
Appendix
The secret changes to the IPSO appointment rules which remove the application of the Merit, Fairness and Openness
The Special Resolutions (submitted privately to Companies House by the PressBof/RFC/PCC/IPSO in November 2013) do three things
1. They set up a “Initial Appointments Panel” to appoint the first board (the articles provide that the Appointments Panel should nominate members to the board for them to appoint)
2. Disapply some of the rules that would apply to the establishment, composition and functions of the Appointments Panel from applying to the Initial Appointments Panel
3. Re-apply some of the rules governing the establishment, composition and functions of the Appointments Panel to the Initial Appointments Panel, while taking care not to reapply others. Among those not reapplied are the need for the Initial Appointments Panel to be established in line with the Appointments Principles (Merit, Fairness, Openness) as well as any requirement to declare, authorise and register conflicts of interest.
Contents
A) The Special Resolutions with analysis
B) The effect of the Special Resolutions on Articles 26 and 22 of the IPSO constitution
C) The Appointments Principles – which have been disapplied to the process of appointing of the Initial Appointments Panel
A) Special Resolutions
1 That the name of the Company be changed to "Independent Press Standards Organisation C I C"
2 That the Company become a community interest company
3 That the Company's Articles of Association be altered to take the form of the Articles of Association set out in Annex 1 to this resolution (the 'New Articles') which are hereby adopted by the Company in substitution for and to the exclusion of all previous Articles of Association of the Company
That, notwithstanding the provisions in the new Articles
4.1 The initial Appointment Panel on adoption of the New Articles ('the Initial Appointment Panel') shall not be appointed in accordance with Article 26 of the New Articles but shall be appointed by Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers. The Initial Appointment Panel shall be deemed to have been appointed as the Company's Appointment Panel in accordance with the New Articles
This disapplies the whole of Article 26 to the appointment of the Initial Appointments Panel, including critically (26.1) the requirement to comply with the “Appointments Principles” (merit, fairness and openness). Unlike other elements of Article 26, the Special Resolution does not reapply it. The 6 members of the Foundation Group (Trevor Kavanagh, Simon Jenkins, Lord Chris Smith, Lord Robin Butler, Lord Nicholas Phillips and Sue Tinson) can appoint the Initial Appointments Panel can do as they wish.
4.2 The Initial Appointment Panel shall appoint a Chair of the Board in accordance with the Appointment Principles, as defined in the New Articles
This changes nothing. This rule already applied to the work of any Appointments Panel (from Article 22.2 for example) and this merely applies this to the work of Initial Appointments Panel which is invented in this resolution.
4.3 The salary and other terms of appointment of the Chair shall be decided by the principal funder of the Company on the advice of the Initial Appointment Panel
It is not clear who the “principal funder of the Company” is, as this is not defined in the Resolution or in the Articles. But it makes clear that IPSO is not in charge of its own salary and terms but rather this is in the hands of the “principal funder” which we assume to be PressBoF until RFC is formed. This undermines the independence of IPSO.
The PressBoF/RFC even gets to decide how long the Chair is appointed for whereas the Articles (22.3) provide that the Board decides the length of appointment of future chairs.
4.4 The newly appointed Chair shall be deemed appointed in accordance with Article of the New Articles
This merely enables the Initial Appointments Panel to appoint the first Chair rather than nominate it to the Board (which does not exist).
4.5 On appointment of the new Chair, the current Chair of the Company shall cease to hold that office (unless reappointed by the Initial Appointment Panel) but shall remain a Director of the Company.
So Lord Hunt stays on as a director of IPSO until the whole board is appointed at which point he goes (as per Special Resolution 5). This stay of execution is worth £15,000 per month to Lord Hunt (he is paid £180,000 pa) so it is no surprise that he signed this resolution. It is a surprise that this was permitted given his financial vested interest.
4.6 The Initial Appointment Panel, together with the newly appointed Chair, shall appoint eleven more Directors of the Company in accordance with the Appointment Principles who, together with the newly appointed Chair shall comprise the 'New Board'.
[This changes nothing. This rule already applies to the work of the Appointments Panel (from Article 22.2 for example) and Special Resolution 4.6 merely applies this to the work of Initial Appointments Panel which otherwise has no rules since it is invented in this resolution]
Four of the eleven Directors so appointed shall be appointed for initial terms of one year, four shall be appointed for initial terms of two years and three shall be appointed for initial terms of three years.
[This provides that the terms of Article 22.7 are applied to the Initial Appointments Panel which otherwise has no rules since it is invented in this resolution].
Advertisements for candidates may be published by the Initial Appointments Panel before appointment of the new Chair.
4.7 Before appointing Industry Directors, as defined in the New Articles, the Initial Appointment Panel shall take account of the views of the principal funder of the Company as to the suitability of candidates and shall seek to ensure the matters described in Article 22.5 of the New Articles
This ensures that the industry influence over the board – specifically prohibited by Leveson – is retained for the work of the Initial Appointments Panel as it is for the Appointments Panel.
It is not clear who the “principal funder of the Company” is. One assumes it is the RFC but why not say so as the Articles do?
It is noteworthy that the Special Resolutions are careful to re-impose the industry influence on the IAP, but not the requirement to work on the basis of merit, fairness and openness.
4 8 The New Board shall be deemed to have been appointed in accordance with the New Articles provided that its composition is in accordance with the provisions set out in Articles 22.1, 22.5 and 22.6 of the New Articles
This applies Article 22.6 to the Initial Appointments Panel which means that they must be appointed by consensus. Because there are two “industry” members of the Initial Appointments Panel, they have a veto over who is appointed to the board. It is again noteworthy that the Special Resolutions are careful to re-impose the industry veto on the IAP, but not the requirement to work on the basis of merit, fairness and open-ness.
4 9 The Directors who are in office on the date on which these special resolutions are passed ('the Interim Board') shall continue to hold office as the Company's Directors until the date on which the New Board is appointed Article 15 of the New Articles (Quorum for Board meetings) and Article 22 of the New Articles (Methods of appointing Directors) shall not apply to the Interim Board. The quorum for board meetings of the Interim Board shall be two or one third of the total number of Directors of the Company, whichever is the greater
5 That upon the appointment of the New Board any Director who is a member of the Interim Board but who has not been appointed to the New Board by the Initial Appointment Panel shall resign as a Director of the Company, but he or she may continue to hold office as a PCC Commissioner if so requested by the New Board
6 That no term of office served by any person before adoption of the New Articles shall be a term of office for the purposes of the New Articles
7 That the New Board shall, as soon as practicable, appoint a Complaints Committee in accordance with New Article 27. Advertisements for Complaints Committee members may be published by the Initial Appointment Panel before appointment of the New Board
8 That the Editors' Code of Practice set out in Annex 2 to this resolution is hereby adopted on behalf of the Company and shall be deemed adopted by the Directors of the Company in accordance with paragraph 1 22 of Schedule 1 to the New Articles. This resolution shall not prevent the New Board from adopting any amended version or replacement of that code
B) Articles 26 and 22 of the IPSO articles and how they are impacted by the Special Resolution
https://www.ipso.co.uk/assets/1/IPSO_Articles_of_Association.pdf
APPOINTMENT PANEL AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE
26 Appointment Panel
26.1 There shall be an Appointment Panel established in accordance with the Appointment Principles
Disapplied by Special Resolution 4.1 and very carefully not reapplied.
26.2 The Appointment Panel shall comprise
26 .2.1 3 Independent members (one of whom shall be appointed chair of the Appointment Panel),
26.2.2 2 members who have recent senior experience in publishing, of whom one shall be a serving editor of a body that is or could be a Regulated Entity, and
26 2 3 the Chair of the Board, other than when the Appointment Panel is appointing the Chair of the Board
The whole of this section was disapplied for the establishment of the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Spec Res 4.1. And it was not replaced by any new rules, so it seems Trevor Kavanagh, Lord Phillips & colleagues were simply told or decided what numbers to appoint.
26.3 Members of the Appointment Panel shall be appointed by the Board for terms of up to 6 years and may be appointed for different terms with a view to ensuring that not all members of the Appointment Panel retire at the same time. Notwithstanding Article 17, no member of the Appointment Panel shall be appointed unless the decision on his or her appointment has been reached by consensus
Disapplied for the establishment of the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Spec Res 4.1 so the Foundation Group has the freedom to do as it chooses with regard to how long members are appointed (and potentially paid for).
26 4 A retiring member of the Appointment Panel may be reappointed in accordance with the Appointment Principles
Disapplied for the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Spec Res 4.1.
26 5 No member of the Board shall serve on the Appointment Panel except the Chair of the Board when nominating other Directors
Disapplied for the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Special Resolution 4.1. But special resolution 4.6 provides that the Chair to join the Initial Appointments Panel when nominating other Directors”.
26 6 No serving member of the House of Commons, the United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly, the Welsh Government, the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Northern Ireland Executive shall serve on the Appointment Panel
Disapplied for the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Special Resolution 4.1.
The Foundation Group could have appointed the Prime Minister
26 7 The proceedings of the Appointment Panel shall be governed by the provisions of the Articles governing the proceedings of the Board so far as applicable and not superseded by regulations made by the Board
The fundamental rules of process for any organisation found in Articles 12-21 are disapplied for the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Special Resolution 4.1. So Sir Hayden Phillips and his colleagues can do what they like in respect of procedures (except of course for ensuring the “industry representatives” have a veto and that the Industry is consulted on appointments of some of the Directors). There are thus no quorum requirements and no requirements for calling meetings. Crucially there are no rules for the Initial Appointments Panel on declaring or authorising conflicts of interests, and there is no requirement for a register of interests.
26 8 The members of the Appointment Panel (other than any that are Connected with one or more Regulated Entities) are entitled to such remuneration as may be approved by the Regulatory Funding Company in respect of their service as members of the Appointment Panel provided that no relationship of employee and employer shall be created between any of the members of the Appointment Panel and the Company
Disapplied for the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Special Resolution 4.1 and provided for again, so it is entirely opaque as to who decided that Hayden Phillips should be paid £1,000 per day (and his colleagues £500 per day) by the industry and who paid him before 29th November (when the RFC was founded), and after 29th November 2013.
APPOINTMENT AND RETIREMENT OF DIRECTORS
22 Methods of appointing Directors
This is not disapplied per se, but because the power of appointment (rather than just nomination) is given to the “Initial Appointments Panel”, the Special Resolution needs to cover some of these items.
22.1 The Board shall comprise 12 Directors of whom
22.1.1 7 (including the Chair of the Board) shall be Independent Directors,
22.1.2 5 shall be Industry Directors,
22.1.3 none shall be serving editors of bodies that are or could be Regulated Entities, and
22.1.4 none shall be serving members of the House of Commons, the United Kingdom Government, the Scottish Parliament, the Scottish Government, the Welsh Assembly, the Welsh Government, the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Northern Ireland Executive
This is reapplied to the “Initial Appointments Panel” by Special Resolution 4.8
22.2 The Chair of the Board shall be nominated by the Appointment Panel in accordance with the Appointment Principles
This is not reapplied to the “Initial Appointments Panel” in order that it can appoint rather than nominate the first Chair.
22.3 The Chair of the Board shall be appointed by the Board for terms of 3 years and may serve only two terms unless the Appointment Panel and the Board authorise one or more further terms
This is not reapplied to the “Initial Appointments Panel” so the power to determine the term of appointment of the Chair is (by virtue of Special Resolution 4.3) now claimed by the “principal Funder” of IPSO.
22.4 All other Directors shall be nominated by the Appointment Panel (incorporating the Chair of the Board) in accordance with the Appointment Principles
This is not reapplied to the “Initial Appointments Panel” in order that it can appoint rather than nominate the first board
22.5 In nominating Industry Directors, the Appointment Panel shall take account of the views of the Regulatory Funding Company as to the suitability of the candidates and shall aim to ensure
22.5.1 that there are at all times at least five Directors who have recent senior experience in publishing, and
22.5.2 that each of the following publishing sectors is represented on the Board by virtue of at least one Director having recent senior experience at a publisher operating in the given sector
(a) national mass circulation newspapers
(b) national broadsheet newspapers
(c) Scottish newspapers
(d) Regional newspapers
(e) magazines
This industry influence (prohibited by Leveson) over appointments is reapplied to the Initial Appointments Panel by Special Resolution 4.7 and (just to make sure) 4.8. In contrast the requirement for the Initial Appointments Panel to work according to Appointments Principles of merit, fairness and openness is NOT reapplied.
22.6 No person shall be nominated by the Appointment Panel unless in the view of a consensus of the members of the Appointment Panel
22.6.1 he or she is a person who can act fairly and impartially in the decision-making of the Board and,
22.6.2 if he or she is to be an Industry Director, he or she has a genuine understanding and knowledge of the press industry, gained though working in it at a senior level
This rule which gives the “industry representatives” (a term which breaches Leveson) a veto over appointments (another breach of Leveson) is reapplied to the Initial Appointments Panel by Special Resolution 4.8. In contrast the requirement for the Initial Appointments Panel to work according to Appointments Principles of merit, fairness and openness is NOT replied.
22.7 The Appointment Panel shall only nominate as many individuals as there are places on the Board and the Board shall appoint each nominee as a Director.
This is not reapplied to the “Initial Appointments Panel” that it can appoint rather than nominate the first board
22.8 Except as provided by Article 22 9, Directors shall be appointed for terms of 3 years
22.9 The Board may make some appointments of Directors under Article 22.7 for terms of between 1 and 4 years in order to ensure that there is sufficient continuity on the Board
Special Resolution 4.6 (2nd sentence) applies this to the “Initial Appointments Panel”
22.10 No Director (other than the Chair of the Board) may serve more than two consecutive terms of office and no Director who has served two consecutive terms may be appointed for any subsequent term of office until at least 12 months after the end of his or her last term
C) The Appointments Principles (secretly disapplied to the appointment of the IPSO Initial Appointments Panel).
Schedule (to Articles)
‘Appointment Principles’ means
Merit: successful candidates shall be those whose skills, experience and qualities have been judged best to meet the needs of the Company in respect of the relevant post,
Fairness: the selection process shall be objective, impartial and applied consistently to all candidates. Each candidate shall be assessed against the same published criteria, and
Openness: information about the requirements of the post and the selection process shall be publicly available and all appointments shall be advertised publicly in a way that is designed to attract a strong and
IPSO: Governance Issues
Report in draft, Jan 2015 –please check http://hackinginquiry.org for latest version
1) IPSO’s board was appointed by an Appointments Panel which was not appointed fairly, openly or on merit. See separate briefing on Independence of IPSO.
2) The Appointments Committee failed to publish a register of interests or any record of its proceedings.
3) Prior to IPSO’s launch, IPSO’S board (or a sub-group) appointed the Complaints Committee of IPSO. There is no record of how this was carried out (whether the industry representatives had a veto due a requirement for consensus), and no record of what interests were declared by the IPSO board in respect of personal or professional relationships they had with successful or unsuccessful candidates for these important and remunerated posts.
4) The IPSO register of interests only requires board members to declare “any remuneration from newspaper/magazine within the last five years”. It does not require the publication of any remuneration prior to this, nor any previous, recent or current roles representing the industry on an unpaid basis.
The previous roles of Peter Wright and William Newman (see below), which are mentioned in their biographies, may not be noticed from an inspection of the Register of interests by the public, by complainants, or possibly by their colleagues at IPSO.
5) The former managing Editor of the Sun, and Hillsborough coverage apologist, William Newman, was appointed to the Board of Ipso – a body supposed to serve the public.
Mr Newman was specifically named, as the then Managing Editor of the Sun under Kelvin McKenzie, in the Report of the Hillsborough independent Panel in September 2012 for an unsigned and impersonal letter he sent in 1989 a few days after the tragedy to bereaved families and survivors of the disaster, rejecting their complaint about the infamous “The Truth” front-page of “The Sun”. One extract reads:
Mr Newman’s letter arrived at the homes of the bereaved as funerals were being arranged. It defended the ‘substance’ of the published allegations as factual, patronised the judgement of the bereaved as ‘clouded by grief’ and presented the newspaper as a truth seeker with a public interest ‘responsibility ... beyond the city of Liverpool’. There was no apology other than a dismissive comment that the presentation of the story could have caused offence.
The relevant passages are set out in full at Appendix A.
Even the Sun’s own Ombudsman criticised the article.
This was the reaction of Margaret Aspinall, chair of the Hillsborough Family Support Group (http://www.liverpoolecho.co.uk/news/liverpool-news/hillsborough-campaigners-former-sun-mans-7196744):
“Given what the families - and indeed the city of Liverpool - have gone through at the hands of some of the press, HFSG fully supported Lord Justice Leveson’s original recommendations for a fair, independent and effective system of press regulation.
“For the Hillsborough families now going through the ordeal of the new inquest, this feels like a fresh insult. It tells us that lessons have certainly not been learned by the press, despite their claims to the contrary.
“Mr Newman had a key role in defending the outrageous coverage of the Sun of the Hillsborough Disaster and in the abject failure of the newspaper to properly apologise when it was clear they had printed hurtful lies and not ‘the truth’.
“That is why his appointment to the board of the new regulator is totally unacceptable to us and we believe will undermine public confidence in it.
“The HFSG believes that the Appointments Panel which put this name forward needs urgently to reconsider its decision if this new body is to have any credibility.”
IPSO will not say whether the Appointments Panel were aware of this and appointed him anyway, or whether he failed to disclose it.
6) IPSO appointed Peter Wright to the Complaints Committee. IPSO has not disclosed the extent of his links with the RFC or the industry.
Mr Wright’s biography is set out by IPSO here https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/whoweare.html and his entry in the register of interests is here https://www.ipso.co.uk/assets/1/Register_of_interests_for_Complaints_Committee.pdf
Mr Wright was an interim director of the PCC and IPSO. So when he was appointed by the Board of IPSO (the directors) they were appointing one of their predecessor directors. This hassnot been made clear. In addition, in that role he was party to the private changing of the appointments rules of the IPSO appointments panel (see (1) above and the paper on IPSO independence). None of this is mentioned in his declaration of interests or biography., which mention only a role at Associated Newspapers.
7) IPSO appointed Peter Wright to the Complaints Committee despite evidence that he withheld information about phone-hacking from the PCC when he was a member.
Mr Wright was a member of the PCC when it published a report in 2009 criticising the Guardian for its articles which alleged that there was more than one rogue reporter (the then Royal Editor Clive Goodman) involved in phone-hacking, and more than a handful of cases. It has since been revealed that, prior to that report, Mr Wright had been told by Mail on Sunday and Daily Mail journalists that their phones had been hacked by the News of the World. This was clear evidence and a very big story for a newspaper, given that these targets would have been of no interest to the Royal Editor of a rival newspaper. Mr Wright and the journalists, including Dennis Rice, the then Mail on Sunday investigations editor, chose not to publicise this information until Mr Rice sued the News of the World in 2011.
These concerns were raised by Nick Davies in his book when it was published in July 2014, and was covered by the Guardian on 1st August 2014 and subsequently that month.
IPSO will not say whether they appointed Mr Wright to the Complaints Committee in the knowledge of this or whether Mr Wright failed to disclose it to them.
8) Peter Wright has been able to participate in a complaint in which he had multiple vested interests.
Dennis Rice was recruited by the then Mail on Sunday Editor, Peter Wright, to be the newspaper’s Investigations Editor in 2005 and worked at the paper until 2008. Between 2008 and 2012 (when Mr Wright stood down as MoS editor) Mr Rice worked for Associated as a freelance reporter.
Mr Wright and Dennis Rice are both leading opponents and critics of the Leveson Report, the Royal Charter and of Hacked Off.
Mr Rice recently submitted a complaint against the Press Gazette, related to an article that dealt with the dispute between Mr Rice and a journalist involving the circumstances under which Mr Rice’s phone was hacked by the News of the World.
Mr Wright failed to recuse himself from the Committee, which decided in favour of Mr Rice, either on the basis of his relationship with Mr Rice or on the basis of the recently publicised question of his conduct over the phone-hacking scandal.
It is further believed that Mr Rice’s complaint against the Press Gazette engaged the activities of those, such as Hacked Off, opposed to the “anti-Leveson” lobbying activities of the Press industry, including obviously of Mr Wright. If this is the case, it is not clear how it could have been felt appropriate for Mr Wright to assist in determining the complaint.
The minutes of the meeting record that Mr Wright merely “noted that he had formerly employed the complainant but had not been in contact with him for several years.”
According to the minutes the Committee “agreed that this did not constitute a conflict of interest that should prevent his consideration of the complaint.”
That is a remarkable decision. No other serious regulator would allow someone to sit in judgement on a complaint submitted by a former employee, or which involved a complaint involving parties well known to be opponents of a Complaints Committee member’s lobbying activities.
This link had been published in Nick Davies’ book Hack Attack in July 2014, and in the Guardian articles of August 2014. The substance of those allegations are that in 2006, he knew that Mr Rice’s phone had been hacked by the News of the World, that this brought into doubt the News of the World’s assertion that it was only their Royal Reporter who was involved; and that Mr Wright hid the extent of hacking from the public and from IPSO’s predecessor, the PCC in 2008-11. Mr Davies, and Roy Greenslade both allege that Mr Wright should have disclosed to the PCC the fact that the extent of phone-hacking went well beyond “Royal targets” before the PCC published a 2009 report defending the News of the World “One Rogue Reporter” line, and criticising the Guardian for suggesting otherwise.
The Guardian articles are set out in Appendix B.
Appendix A
Hillsborough
The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel
September 2012
http://hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/report/HIP_report.pdf
Excerpts
Summary of Chapter 12 – page 24-5
Chapter 12. Behind the headlines: the origins, promotion and reproduction of unsubstantiated allegations
In the days after the disaster the media, particularly the press, published allegations and counter-allegations apportioning blame. This came to a head on 19 April when a number of newspapers, The Sun being the most prominent, reported serious allegations about the behaviour of Liverpool fans before and during the unfolding tragedy.
…
- On 19 April, four days after the disaster, The Sun newspaper published a front-page story under the banner headline, ‘THE TRUTH’, alleging that Liverpool fans had assaulted and urinated on police officers resuscitating the dying, stolen from the dead and verbally sexually abused an unconscious young woman. Although less prominently, and often with a lesser degree of certainty, other regional and national newspapers published similar allegations.
- In a letter revealed to the Panel, within days of The Sun’s article its Managing Editor [William Newman] wrote to people, including bereaved families, who had complained about the allegations. While regretting the presentation of the article, he refused to apologise for its ‘substance’, claiming it was factually accurate. Subsequently the coverage was condemned by the Press Council.
“The Truth” (page 344)
….
2.12.31 The greatest prominence given to the story was in The Sun whose editor, Kelvin MacKenzie, cleared the front page and under the banner headline ‘THE TRUTH’ published three bullet points: ‘Some fans picked pockets of victims; Some fans urinated on the brave cops; Some fans beat up PC giving life kiss’.
2.12.32 The Sun’s coverage was unequivocal:
Drunken Liverpool fans viciously attacked rescue workers as they tried to revive victims of the Hillsborough soccer disaster, it was revealed last night.
Police officers, firemen and ambulance crew were punched, kicked and urinated upon by a hooligan element in the crowd.
Some thugs rifled the pockets of injured fans as they were stretched out unconscious on the pitch.
In one shameful episode a gang of Liverpool fans noticed that the blouse of a girl trampled to death had risen above her breasts. As a policeman struggled in vain to revive her, the mob jeered: ‘Throw her up here and we will **** her’ ...
One furious policeman who witnessed the disaster on Saturday stormed: ‘To paint all the Liverpool fans lily-whites is wrong.
‘As we struggled in appalling conditions to save lives, fans standing further up the terrace were openly urinating on us and the bodies of the dead.’
2.12.33 According to a ‘high ranking police officer’, the ‘fans were just acting like animals. My men faced a double hell – the disaster and the fury of the fans who attacked us’.
The Sun’s response
2.12.34 The Sun’s publication was immediately condemned at many levels, particularly on Merseyside. Bereaved families and survivors wrote letters to the newspaper challenging the veracity of the story and its presentation as the definitive version of events. Within days the Managing Editor, William Newman, replied to bereaved families. His letter was neither personalised nor signed.
2.12.35 Mr Newman stated that the newspaper had ‘received many letters from Liverpool regarding our follow up story to the Hillsborough tragedy’.
He continued:
We are sorry that, possibly clouded by grief, many have not understood that it is The Sun’s duty as a newspaper to publish information, however hurtful and unpalatable it may be at the time.
On reflection, we accept the way in which the article was displayed could have given cause for offence. For that we apologise. For the substance we do not.
We cannot possibly apologise for facts and to do so would be an abdication of our responsibility to a wider public beyond the city of Liverpool. If the price of a free press is a boycott of our newspaper, then it is a price we will have to pay.
2.12.36 Mr Newman stated that ‘not for the first time’ The Sun had been ‘singled out’ and he referred to ‘identical reports’ in three other newspapers. Claiming the moral high ground he stated that ‘only by revealing the full truth ... we can try to make sure that such a terrible tragedy never happens again’ thus ensuring that ‘95 innocent men women and children will not have died in vain’.
2.12.37 He offered ‘heartfelt sympathy’ to the bereaved and the injured, noting that the Press Council was investigating newspaper coverage of Hillsborough and The Sun would ‘accept and publish their findings’.
2.12.38 Mr Newman’s letter arrived at the homes of the bereaved as funerals were being arranged. It defended the ‘substance’ of the published allegations as factual, patronised the judgement of the bereaved as ‘clouded by grief’ and presented the newspaper as a truth seeker with a public interest ‘responsibility ... beyond the city of Liverpool’. There was no apology other than a dismissive comment that the presentation of the story could have caused offence.
2.12.39 On Tuesday 9 May 1989 The Sun published a brief commentary from its followed what it claimed had been ‘a major inquiry into the coverage of the Hillsborough disaster after complaints from readers’.
2.12.40 Mr Donlan had inquired into the ‘circumstances of the reporting and presentation of the story’, finding against its presentation. His report stated:
The Editor is on record as saying that the newspaper had a duty to publish the facts about supporters’ misbehaviour, no matter how hurtful and unpalatable at the time.
This is accepted, but it must be pointed out that the report – similar material appeared in other papers – did not justify the headline The Truth. Allegations can never be projected as facts. It is for Lord Justice Taylor’s inquiry to examine the evidence and decide what happened at Hillsborough.
It should not have been published in the form that it appeared.
2.12.41 Mr Donlan’s report, while accepting the ‘form’ of the coverage and challenging the use of ‘The Truth’ banner headline, did not comment on the factual accuracy of the allegations, nor their origins. Mr Newman sent a photocopy of its Ombudsman’s
The Press Council
2.12.42 The 36th Annual Report of the Press Council, The Press and the People, provided a seven-page review of coverage of the disaster under the broad heading
2.12.43 This followed a ‘general inquiry into the photographic coverage of the tragedy in the press’ derived from ‘349 written complaints from a total of 3651 signatories’ naming ‘35 newspapers’, national and regional. There were also complaints from MPs and five organisations including the FA and Liverpool City Council.
2.12.44 The Press Council extended the scope of its inquiry to ‘embrace all press coverage’, responding particularly to the coverage in The Sun. Editors were informed of the complaint to solicit replies. The Press Council ‘accept[ed] the assurance of many editors that they considered carefully how far it was right to publish photographs that might serve the public interest ... but would also distress survivors and the families and friends of those who were killed and were likely to be offensive to other readers’. In most cases, however, ‘editors were justified in publishing’ the photographs.
2.12.45 While acknowledging that many fans compressed against the perimeter fence ‘were recognisable and in attitudes of distress’, and there was ‘no means of telling how many of those shown died’, the publication of these photographs was ‘justifiable’ on the basis that ‘serious public interest was served by their publication ... despite the added distress it would cause’.
2.12.46 Photographs that focused on ‘a single individual or a very small group crushed against the fence’ were an ‘intrusion into personal agony and grief too gross to be justifiable’. There was no justification ‘for publishing individual pictures of men or women who were known or thought to be dead or dying’.
2.12.47 In a section of the report entitled ‘On TRUTH’ the Press Council addressed the multiple complaints received about the 19 April edition of The Sun. It found the coverage ‘generally one-sided, offering no counter to the allegations it included’. It was ‘unbalanced and its general effect misleading’.
2.12.48 The front page, ‘THE TRUTH was insensitive, provocative and unwarranted. The Sun’s own ombudsman declared that the article should not have been published in the form in which it appeared’. The Press Council condemned its publication.
2.12.49 Given The Sun’s unwavering defence of the facts on which its ‘Truth’ edition relied, and the comparable coverage in other newspapers, the Panel sought access to documents that would add to public understanding of the origins and presentation of the severe, generalised allegations made against Liverpool fans.
Conclusion: what is added to public understanding (page 366)
- On 19 April, four days after the disaster, The Sun newspaper published a front-page story under the banner headline, ‘THE TRUTH’, alleging that Liverpool fans had assaulted and urinated on police officers resuscitating the dying, stolen from the dead and verbally sexually abused an unconscious young woman. Although less prominently, and often with a lesser degree of certainty, other regional and national newspapers published similar allegations.
- In a letter revealed to the Panel, within days of The Sun’s article its Managing Editor wrote to people, including bereaved families, who had complained about the allegations. While regretting the presentation of the article, he refused to apologise for its ‘substance’, claiming it was factually accurate. Subsequently the coverage was condemned by the Press Council.
Appendix B
Mail did not reveal to PCC or Leveson that News of the World hacked staff
Four Mail on Sunday journalists were told by the police in 2006 that their mobile phones had been hacked
DMG Media editor-in-chief, Paul Dacre, says he cannot recall whether he knew about hacking of staff member's phones. Photograph: Chris Ratcliffe/Rex Features
Roy Greenslade
Friday 1 August 2014 19.56 BST
Vital evidence about phone hacking was withheld from the Press Complaints Commission when it held its inquiries into the News of the World's interception of voicemail messages.
The PCC was not informed by the Mail newspaper organisation that four of its Mail on Sunday journalists had been told by the police in 2006 that their mobile phones had been hacked.
Peter Wright, the then Mail on Sunday editor, was made aware of the hacking but did not publish the fact at the time, and it remained a secret for eight years until it emerged in evidence at the recent hacking trial.
Wright, personally a member of the PCC from May 2008, took over the place held by his boss, the Daily Mail's editor-in-chief Paul Dacre, who had served on the body from 1999 to April 2008. Two reports about hacking issued by the PCC in 2007 and 2009, which reinforced News International's "rogue reporter" defence, were compiled in ignorance of crucial information from the Mail group. Nor was the hacking of the four staff mentioned in evidence to the Leveson inquiry given by Wright and Dacre in 2012.
Guardian journalist Nick Davies, in his new book Hack Attack, explores the implications of the long silence, which he maintains was in effect supportive of "the lies" told by Rupert Murdoch's organisation.
It allowed Murdoch executives to get away with their cover-up by pretending that hacking was restricted to just eight victims, who were identified at the original trial of the News of the World's royal editor, Clive Goodman, and the paper's contracted private investigator, Glenn Mulcaire.
Three of them were royal aides. The other five were model Elle Macpherson, publicist Max Clifford, MP Simon Hughes, football agent Sky Andrew and Gordon Taylor, chief executive of the Professional Footballers' Association.
But the Mail on Sunday kept quiet about the four staff who were hacked – investigations editor Dennis Rice, news editor Sebastian Hamilton, deputy news editor David Dillon and feature writer Laura Collins.
The paper's managing editor, John Wellington, spoke to Rice and Collins in October 2006 – two months after Goodman and Mulcaire were arrested – about the police having informed him that their mobile phones had been hacked between April and July 2006. Wellington then told his editor, Wright, what had happened.
Rice recalls that he was first called by the police, who told him he had been hacked 80 times, before he discussed it with Wellington. He later discovered that his office computer had also been hacked. Collins, in a 2011 article about the incident, wrote: "We were advised to change the security settings on our phones … It was a shocking revelation."
But the four were not required to be prosecution witnesses against Mulcaire. Wellington, who remained unaware of the computer hacking, said the police approached the paper so that its staff could change their mobile pin numbers.
In his book Davies argues that the Mail's silence "was particularly weird" because of Dacre's being a PCC member when the commission's first report was compiled. And Wright was on the commission when the 2009 report was written, a report that was critical of the Guardian's revelations of widespread hacking and which was later withdrawn when the paper's reports proved to be true.
During his evidence to the Leveson inquiry, Wright said: "The PCC did ask News International whether it went beyond Clive Goodman. They assured the PCC it didn't. We didn't have really a proper means of testing whether there was any substance to that assurance."
But Wright did not mention the phone hacking of his own staff, which was itself suggestive that hacking went beyond Goodman, who was interested only in royal stories. In fact, the hacking involved both royal and non-royal stories.
It is understood that Wright cannot recall whether or not he informed Dacre about the hacking at the time. For his part, Dacre cannot recall whether he knew of it and therefore cannot remember whether or not he spoke about it to his PCC colleagues.
Two Mail group executives said they could not understand why the silence was considered to be strange. They both said the fact that five of the people named at the trial of Goodman and Mulcaire were non-royals showed that hacking went wider than Goodman's royal brief. Therefore, the hacking of their own staff was not of special significance.
They strenuously denied claims that Wright and Dacre had purposely withheld information, arguing that it was an inconsequential matter. The then PCC director, Tim Toulmin, is adamant that he was not informed by Dacre or Wright about the hacking of their staff's phones. He said: "I am clear that it wasn't mentioned. You telling me is the first I've heard of it."
It is broadly accepted that for the Mail on Sunday to have gone public in 2006 about the hacking by Mulcaire might have prejudiced his trial. But once Mulcaire and Goodman were sentenced to jail in January 2007, the sub judice rules no longer applied and there was no reason for the story not to be published.
The three Mail on Sunday victims contacted by the Guardian – Rice, Collins and Hamilton – appear unsure why the truth did not emerge. One suggested that the Mail on Sunday and the News of the World often made joint bids for stories and the Mail would not wished to have imperilled that relationship.
Another argued that the Mail editors were concerned not to add to what they considered to be an anti-popular journalism furore around the hacking scandal.
One former Mail on Sunday staffer, speaking on a confidential basis, said he was "not greatly surprised" that the paper managed to keep the lid on the truth. He said: "At the Mail, we were expected to keep quiet about things."
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Peter Wright was wrong to have stayed silent about his staff being hacked
Roy Greenslade
Tuesday 12 August 2014 17.16 BST
Peter Wright's letter to the Guardian - as published today - contends that I was wrong to say he withheld vital information from the Press Complaints Commission and the Leveson inquiry.
But I cannot let that pass, especially since it has gained him a headline on the Press Gazette's website. He is wrong about me being wrong.
Consider first his defence for keeping quiet about the fact that he knew in October 2006 that at least four of his staff had been the victims of hacking by the News of the World.
At the time, the NoW's royal editor, Clive Goodman, and its contracted investigator, Glenn Mulcaire, were on bail on charges of intercepting mobile phone voicemail messages.
Fleet Street was alive with gossip about the possible extent of phone hacking. Were there other hackers? Who had been hacked? How often had it occurred? There were plenty of rumours but few incontestable facts. Hard evidence was in short supply.
The PCC was under pressure to find answers to those questions. Its chairman, Sir Christopher Meyer, and director, Tim Toulmin, understandably felt they could do no more than keep a watching brief until the Goodman/Mulcaire case had concluded.
Once Goodman and Mulcaire admitted their guilt in November 2006, Meyer issued a statement announcing that the commission would "examine any material relevant to the industry's code of practice that has come to light as a result of the prosecution."
Surely, a newspaper editor knowing what the world did not then know - that his reporters had been hacked - should have understood that he was party to "relevant material."
In his letter, he excuses his failure to go public with the information because "it was already known" that Mulcaire had hacked the phones of five non-royals (the presumed interest of royal editor Goodman). So, he continues: "It was hardly surprising he should have hacked phones of staff on a rival newspaper."
Really? Does anyone agree with that? At a time of massive speculation about the scale of hacking, an editor with knowledge of it thinks it reasonable to keep mum. This, remember, is the Mail on Sunday, a paper that during Wright's editorship trumpeted its commitment to fearless disclosure in the public interest.
Even if you accept Wright's version of events, it is clear that he made a judgment call in refusing to go public about the hacking of his own staff. And that judgement call was wrong.
Now let's turn to another belief-beggaring matter. Wright was not on the PCC at the time. But his immediate boss, the Mail group's editor-in-chief, Paul Dacre, was.
Why did Dacre not mention the hacking to Meyer and Toulmin and his fellow commissioners? According to what I was told by the designated spokesman for Dacre and Wright when writing my article, Dacre cannot remember whether Wright told him about the Mail on Sunday staff being hacked. And Wright, for his part, cannot remember whether he told Dacre or not.
Does anyone who knows the close relationship between Wright and Dacre readily accept that Wright kept that information to himself?
If he did, it was an extraordinary decision to withhold such an astonishing turn of events from his boss (and friend). Astonishing because, at the time, no-one knew that Mulcaire had hacked other journalists. It was therefore hugely relevant material.
If, in fact, Wright did tell Dacre, then it was Dacre's duty to inform the PCC for the same reason - it was germane to the PCC's inquiry.
On 30 January 2007, after Mulcaire and Goodman had been sentenced to jail, Toulmin wrote to all the PCC's commissioners to ask for their comments on the hacking affair. Dacre would have had an opportunity at that point to enlighten his colleagues of the Mail on Sunday hacking.
The PCC investigation was foiled because the NoW's editor, Andy Coulson, resigned immediately after Goodman and Mulcaire were jailed and the PCC agreed that he would no longer be required to answer questions.
One question he would have been asked concerned the extent of hacking, about which the PCC was in the dark. The chairman, director and commissioners were entirely unaware of the fact that other journalists had been hacking victims and they were to remain in ignorance for years afterwards.
On 2 May 2007, at a routine PCC meeting attended by Dacre, the draft report was discussed in some detail and amended after comments. At least one commissioner evidently asked whether Coulson should have been contacted despite his resignation. Toulmin explained why this had not been done and others agreed it would not have been reasonable to do otherwise. Still, there was no mention of the other examples of hacking.
In April 2008, Dacre stood down as a commissioner to become chair of the editors' code committee and the following month the silent Wright joined the PCC.
He may well have thought it unnecessary to mention hacking at that time. But matters changed in July 2009, when the Guardian's Nick Davies revealed that News International had paid £1m to gag phone-hacking victims.
That led to the infamous PCC report of November 2009 in which the commission - with Wright on board - stated:
"The PCC has seen no new evidence to suggest that the practice of phone message tapping was undertaken by others beyond Goodman and Mulcaire... It follows that there is nothing to suggest that the PCC was materially misled during its 2007 inquiry. Indeed, having reviewed the matter, the commission could not help but conclude that the Guardian's stories did not quite live up to the dramatic billing they were initially given."
In his letter to the Guardian, Wright argues: "Had it occurred to me, when the PCC was discussing the fresh allegations made by the Guardian in July 2009, that the hacking of our journalists' phones was anything other than a minor part of the series of offences for which Goodman and Mulcaire had already been convicted, I would happily have shared it with other commissioners."
Again, even if we accept that he is right to deem the Mail on Sunday hackings "a minor part", they were surely a relevant part. They were additional proof that hacking not only extended beyond royals, but involved the message interception of other journalists' phones.
They were, most importantly, extra proof of the veracity of Davies's articles throughout the months of 2009 about the scale of hacking, which was then being so vehemently denied by the News of the World.
Now for the contemporary point. Wright, as emeritus editor of the Mail group, has been the leading light in the foundation of the PCC's replacement, the Independent Press Standards Organisation (Ipso).
So a man who spent years withholding significant information from one regulatory body is now the architect of another (much disputed) regulatory body. Does his record really suggest a willingness to shed light into the dark corners of Fleet Street?