Written evidence from Chris Woods

The Situation in Iraq and Syria: Transparency and accountability in UK and allied kinetic air operations

Submission by Chris Woods, a London-based investigative journalist and researcher focused on defence issues, notably air power. Mr Woods maintains an open-source data resource on the present allied air campaign, and his analysis of the air war and the potential risks to non-combatants has appeared in Foreign Policy.[1]

Executive summary

With twelve allies operating in the Iraq and Syria campaigns under individual national mandates, there is a clear need for the greatest possible transparency from all parties, particularly on the sensitive issue of non-combatant casualties. As such, the author respectfully suggests that the Select Committee make the following requests of the MoD:

• A clear statement from the Ministry of Defence as to whether it is operating a similar ‘zero expectation of civilian casualties’ policy to that recently employed by the RAF in Afghanistan.
• A clarification from the MoD as to whether compensation will be paid to affected non-combatants in the event of deaths or injuries from UK airstrikes.
• An improvement in UK public reporting of airstrikes in Iraq, including clear details of locations and targets of attacks.
• An open and transparent investigative approach to reported civilian casualties from UK airstrikes, and full disclosure of any findings.
• A clarification as to whether UK Reapers operating in Syria are providing potentially lethal targeting information to the US and its allies (including the laser designation of targets.)
• If the UK is indeed providing potentially lethal targeting information in Syria, an explanation of how this relates to the Parliamentary vote of September 26th 2014, which refers only to kinetic operations in Iraq.

The present situation

Since the United States began lethal targeting operations in Iraq on August 8th 2014, more than 1,000 US and allied airstrikes have taken place in both Iraq and Syria.[2] This represents a sharply escalating tempo, with almost eight times more munitions released in Iraq and Syria in October 2014 than in Afghanistan, for example (see Figure 1.)

The United Kingdom is one of eleven international allies of the US directly participating in the air war, commencing its own airstrikes in Iraq on September 30th. To date, the MoD has reported some 28 kinetic events involving both manned Tornado aircraft and remotely-piloted Reapers.[3]

Only Western allies are presently bombing within Iraq. Alongside the US and UK, France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Australia have all carried out kinetic operations. According to both Centcom and the MoD, all allied airstrikes are cleared in advance with the Iraq Defence Ministry.[4] The allies also operate at the express invitation of the Iraqi government.

Within Syria, only the US and Arab allies – Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain – have carried out kinetic operations. Both US and British military sources have informed the author that, in part, this is because Iraq has denied permission for its Arab neighbours to conduct air strikes on its territory. The Assad regime does not consent to allied aerial operations over its territory, though to date has not intervened militarily.

Although the UK has not carried out airstrikes in Syria, the Defence Secretary announced on October 21st that RAF Reapers would be used for Syrian ISR operations.[5] It remains unclear whether such RAF missions have provided potentially lethal targeting information to allies - and if so, whether this might be covered by the recent UK Parliamentary vote.

Given that a key aim of the allied air war is to liberate the peoples of Iraq and Syria from Islamic State, there would appear to be an imperative upon allies to restrict non-combatant casualties wherever possible. An examination of the frameworks in place which govern the air war – and any specific measures being taken to limit civilian deaths – is therefore of value.

Figure 1: Air-only weapon releases in Iraq/ Syria and Afghanistan, 2014[6]

National rules of engagement

Allied air strikes in both Iraq and Syria are not being carried out under any United Nations or agreed international framework or mandate. Instead, according to a senior US Defense official, this is more a loose ‘coalition of the willing.’[7]

Given this situation, the author has sought clarification from the United States and allies on the protections in place for civilians caught up in allied air strikes – and the mechanisms for accountability and transparency in place.

As the responses of Centcom, the MoD and other allies to this author make clear, significant operational differences exist between the allies, which have implications both for policy-makers and for planners in the UK.[8]

Potentially lethal operations are assigned to allies by Centcom, for example, ‘with a full awareness of each nation’s national caveats and capabilities.’ Britain’s Rules of Engagement – driven by both political and military imperatives - therefore have a direct bearing on the battlefield.

In Afghanistan, UK forces recently applied a rigorous standard of ‘a zero expectation of civilian casualties’ for airstrikes. It remains unclear whether this same policy applies to Iraq – with potentially lethal implications for non-combatants. There would appear to be no operational barrier to a full MoD disclosure on whether this ‘zero expectation’ policy is presently in place.

Mitigating the risk to non-combatants

As with all air operations, UK and allied airstrikes in Iraq represent a risk to civilians on the ground. In Afghanistan for example, monitors UNAMA consistently report that airstrikes have been the primary source of civilian deaths caused by the US and its allies.[9] Present air operations in Iraq alone are already at an operational tempo not seen since the Surge of 2007, raising concerns at the potential risks for non-combatants (see Figure 2.)

For Iraq and Syria, the United States asserts that no claims of civilian casualties from allied airstrikes have yet been ‘confirmed.’ Yet credible monitoring groups suggest that more than 100 non-combatants (approximately 50 each in Iraq and Syria) may so far have died in allied air operations.[10]

These represent only a small proportion of civilian deaths in the present environment. The respected UK-based monitoring group Iraq Body Count estimates, for example, that more than 5,800 civilians have died since August 2014. At least 2,000 of those deaths can directly be attributed to Islamic State, with the Iraqi security forces reportedly responsible for 600 more civilian fatalities – mostly in Sunni centres of population which have been shelled and bombed by the Government of Iraq.[11]

Nevertheless, non-combatant deaths from allied airstrikes present a potentially strong propaganda tool for Islamic State, and also risk undermining domestic support for the air campaign in allied home nations. Prompt and transparent engagement with claims of allied-inflicted casualties would therefore appear crucial. Yet it is not clear that the lessons of recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are being taken on board in the present campaign.

The United States has declared, for example, that it will not be paying out ‘no fault’ compensation to affected civilians in Iraq or Syria. According to Human Rights Watch, a similar policy in the early years of the Afghanistan campaign ‘created a backlash, and handed a recruiting card to groups like the Taliban.’[12]

It is also not clear what compensation policies are in place among the US’s eleven allies. Centcon insists that ‘if a claim of civilian casualties were found valid, that claim would be processed in accordance with the laws of the nation that conducted the strike.’

Yet the MoD presently refuses to say whether it will pay out compensation for any civilians accidentally killed or injured in RAF airstrikes, informing the author that ‘any allegation would be investigated, and the response would be dependent on the specific circumstances; we are not prepared to comment hypothetically.’[13]

The Ministry of Defence should be urged to state clearly whether compensation will indeed be made available in the unfortunate event of UK-inflicted non-combatant casualties in Iraq. The Australian Defence Force has stated to the author, for example, that it ‘has the capacity to make no-liability payments to persons who suffer loss or damage as a result of ADF activities.’[14]
 

Figure 2: Comparison of present 3-month Iraq air campaign with previous years[15]

A need for greater transparency

Analysis by this author has found that eight of the twelve allies carrying out airstrikes presently refuse to disclose where they are bombing. In Syria, none of the Arab allies will say where or when they strike. In Iraq, the Netherlands, Denmark, Australia and Belgium are all refusing to say where they strike. The US practice of naming which allies assisted it on any one day, in either Iraq or Syria, also ended October 20th.

Combined, these two factors create a potentially serious accountability issue. There are presently ten dates since October 20th where no ally has claimed responsibility for airstrikes in Iraq and/ or Syria, despite the US having declared that ‘partner nations’ participated.[16]

Justifying Denmark’s position, a military spokesman recently told the daily newspaper Dagsbladet Information that ‘One particular attack on one particular area could lead directly back to Danish aircraft. We would rather hide in the crowd.’[17] And an Australian Defence spokesperson told the author that the ADF withholds information on where it bombs in Iraq because this ‘could be distorted and used against Australia in ISIL propaganda.’[18]

Given the increase in operational tempo in both Iraq and Syria, partner nations now participate almost daily alongside the United States in lethal operations. As many as seven allies have been involved in airstrikes in Iraq on any one day, according to the MoD. In these circumstances, correctly attributing responsibility is vital. Yet of the 12 allies, only the UK, France and Canada alongside the United States are regularly disclosing where they bomb.

Even so, British reporting can on occasion be weak. In the latest MoD daily brief, a Reaper airstrike on November 19th 2014 is described as taking place ‘elsewhere in Iraq.’ An October 8th strike by a Tornado is likewise said to have taken place somewhere ‘in Iraq’ – one of three allied airstrikes declared by Centcom that day in Ramadi, Mosul and Kirkuk.

A senior Baghdad-based reporter with an international news agency told this author that the Mosul airstrike of October 8th could be of particular concern, since local sources report potential civilian casualties.[19]

The MoD asserts that ‘We have not received any allegations of civilian casualties in Iraq arising from UK strike activity.’[20] Yet it is not possible at present to determine, at least from the public record, whether the United Kingdom participated in this potentially problematic operation in Mosul. The MoD must be more vigilant in reporting where it strikes in Iraq – and where necessary, to follow up promptly on potential civilian casualties.

Appendix A:
Detailed Centcom briefing, with direct relevance to UK operations in Iraq

On October 22nd 2014, the author submitted a list of questions to Centcom regarding the conduct of allied air operations in both Iraq and Syria. A detailed, on the record response was received from a senior spokesman on November 5th 2014. Given their relevance to UK operations, the exchange is reproduced here in full.
 

• In recent US air wars (eg Afghanistan and Libya) over-arching rules, eg ISAF/ OEF or NATO, have governed the actions of allies. How are the kinetic actions of the 10 or so allies operating over Iraq and Syria presently governed?
• Are all partner allies operating under the same Rules of Engagement? If not, how are individual national ROEs being managed, given Centcom's core role? I'm thinking in particular of a mission involving assets from two or more nations - how will differing ROEs play out practically?

Centcom response: Coalition air operations are governed by existing international law, coalition rules of engagement, and other guidance transmitted from U.S. Central Command through the supported Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) and the supporting Combined Forces Air Component Commander to the units conducting airstrikes. Among other functions, this guidance establishes coalition standards on targeting and the appropriate use of lethal force, which always must account for the possible risk of civilian casualties or collateral damage.  

As with air operations supporting the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan or any other multinational military effort, each nation participating in the coalition may modify or supplement this coalition guidance, including rules of engagement, with its own “caveats,” and each nation executes operations in accordance with its own legal requirements.  Coalition missions are planned and executed with a full awareness of each nation’s national caveats and capabilities.  The work of matching multinational forces to appropriate missions is done in the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC), which is staffed by military personnel representing each nation supporting air operations.  Actions directed from the CAOC are in turn coordinated in real time with the CFLCC and forward operations centers.

• In the case of potential civilian deaths, what safeguards are in place to limit civcas where possible? And again, how does this work when two or more allies are involved in missions?

Centcom response: In regard to your questions about civilian casualties, including with respect to mitigation measures, allegations, and investigations, I'd say up front that no other military in the world works as hard as we do to be precise in our targeting. Without going into specifics, U.S. and partner nation forces, coordinating through the subordinate units, have implemented significant mitigation measures within the targeting process and during the conduct of operations to reduce the potential of civilian casualties and collateral damage.  In Iraq, for example, all strikes are coordinated and cleared by Iraqi Security Forces in advance. Although we strive to avoid civilian casualties in this extremely complex operating environment, we recognize the continued risk inherent in these strikes.

• Where credible claims of civcas from a strike are made, what follow-up is presently being conducted? 

Centcom response: When an allegation of civilian casualties caused by U.S. forces is determined to be credible, we investigate it to the best of our capability and, as necessary, take appropriate corrective measures.   We strive to learn from every mission so we can replicate success and prevent civilian casualties. We determine the credibility of each allegation based on the information reasonably available, including information provided by third parties, information such as the proximity of the location to an airstrike, and any other corroborating information presented.  If the information is determined to be credible, we use all available means at our disposal to further the investigation, including intelligence, imagery, after-action review, and, if possible, information gathered from personnel on the ground.

• With the recent air war in Libya, there was a particular credibility issue regarding civcas. NATO claimed zero non-combatant deaths at the end of operations, while five independent inquiries found that up to 80 civilians had in fact died in NATO airstrikes. That difference was due to an absence of follow-up inquiries - including on-the-ground - by NATO. How do the US and its allies plan to avoid such a situation during Iraq/ Syria air ops?

Centcom did not respond to this question. 

• If civilians are believed killed or injured during US and allied airstrikes in Iraq or Syria, (a) How will relatives be able to determine which force(s) is/are responsible and (b) what compensation will be paid, if any - and crucially, how?

Centcom response: Additionally, if a claim of civilian casualties were found valid, that claim would be processed in accordance with the laws of the nation that conducted the strike. For U.S. forces, claims would be processed in accordance with the Foreign Claims Act, which generally does not authorize compensation for damage or injury caused in combat operations.  In meritorious cases, however, the United States has approved ex gratia payments using applicable authorities.

• To the best of my knowledge, six or possibly seven incidents have so far had claims of civilian deaths attached to them by credible parties. What investigations are presently underway into these events - and what conclusions if any have so far been reached?
• What are Centcom's present estimates of civilian non-combatant fatalities from US and allied strikes to date? 
• If you don't have such numbers, why not?

Centcom response: We continue to have no operational reporting or intelligence indicating U.S. or coalition airstrikes have caused civilian casualties in Iraq or Syria.  We are aware of claims of suspected civilian casualties related to U.S. airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, and we continue to evaluate them.  To date, none of the claims of suspected civilian casualties has been confirmed.

November 2014