Written evidence submitted by the Ministry of Defence

 

 

  1.                In light of the extremely broad set of questions, the Ministry of Defence’s approach has been to provide a broad overview of decision-making in Defence policy, to help the Committee direct necessarily more focused work. The Department stands ready to support the Committee with supplementary questions, to be covered in further written and/or oral evidence. This written evidence supplements a number of useful publicly available documents. These include:

 

    1.                 How Defence Works, which provides an outline of the Department’s new operating model and control framework. It can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-new-operating-model-how-defence-works.

 

    1.                The Cabinet Manual, which sets out the main laws, rules and conventions affecting the conduct and operation of Government, including the role of Ministers and officials. It can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cabinet-manual.

 

    1.                 Organising Defence's Contribution to National Strategy, which sets out how Defence is organising itself to better formulate and implement strategy. It can be found at: http://www.da.mod.uk/recommended-reading/organisation/documents/85_20121116-Organising_Defences_contribution_to_National_Strategy-U.pdf/view.

 

What are the processes for decision-making in defence policy?

 

  1.                The Government’s national security priorities are set through the National Security Strategy (NSS) and by Strategic Defence and Security Reviews (SDSRs). Within this framework, the primary cross-Government decision making body for security policy is the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC considers a broad range of domestic and international issues relating to UK national security. It brings together key Ministers and military and intelligence chiefs to cover: foreign policy; defence; international relations and development; resilience; and energy and resource security. Since its formation in May 2010, it has discussed a full range of issues including Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa and Counter-Terrorism.

 

  1.                The purpose of the NSC is to ensure that Ministers consider national security in the round, not as separate themes or issues. This discipline of systematic, weekly consideration of national security priorities in a Ministerial forum chaired by the Prime Minister is already driving a more coherent approach across Government departments. It also demonstrates the high priority this Government, and in particular the Prime Minister, gives to national security matters.

 

  1.                The Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) contribution to the formulation of national security strategy is a process led by the Director General of Security Policy (DG Sec Pol). Owned by the Secretary of State for Defence (SofS), defence strategy is the joint responsibility of the Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) and the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The Defence Strategy Group (DSG), supports the PUS and the CDS in formulating advice on defence strategy. This is in line with a key recommendation of Lord Levene’s ‘Defence Reform’ report, published in June 2011. Each SDSR generates direction for the next five years, which is then translated into strategic direction through the Defence Strategic Direction (DSD) document. In turn, DSD is then used to inform the annual Defence Plan and Command Plans.

 

  1.                The Defence Board is the Department’s primary decision-making body for non-operational policy matters. Chaired by the SofS, it also includes the Minister for the Armed Force, PUS, CDS, the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS), the Chief of Defence Materiel (CDM), the Director General of Finance (DG Fin) and four positions for non-executive board members. The Armed Forces Committee allows the CDS to gather the views of the Chiefs of Staff in preparing military advice to Ministers and the Defence Board on matters other than operations.

 

  1.                The CDS, VCDS and the PUS are responsible for providing sound and timely advice to Ministers to assist with operational decision-making. The CDS is accountable to the SofS for military success on operations. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is the main forum through which the CDS aims to gather the collective military advice of the Service Chiefs on operations. The PUS, supported by DG Sec Pol, is the SofS’s principal civilian adviser for operational matters, responsible for ensuring operational decisions are consistent with wider Government policy, compliant with domestic and international law, and appropriately resourced.

 

  1.                The Operations Directorate and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) are responsible for providing the formal written advice to the SofS upon which decisions on specific operational matters are based. This advice will usually be prepared by Current Commitments Teams (CCTs), which pull together the relevant military and civilian subject matter experts from across the MOD Head Office, PJHQ and the Front Line Commands. It will usually be endorsed by senior military and civilian officials, including the CDS or VCDS when appropriate. In addition to this formal written advice, the SofS chairs weekly operations-focused meetings, at which he and his Ministers are briefed on key operational issues by senior staff from the Operations Directorate and PJHQ, supported by other staff as appropriate.

 

What are the strengths and weaknesses of these processes?

 

  1.                The creation of the NSC established a means of ensuring prompt, coherent, coordinated and informed decision-making on all strategic defence and security issues. Strategic all-source assessment, horizon-scanning and early warning feed directly into policy-making. The National Security Adviser’s review of central co-ordination and lessons learned from the Libya Crisis examined the first deployment of UK military forces since the creation of the NSC. It found that overall, the central co-ordination mechanism worked well and that the new NSC structures were effective in delivering a well-coordinated UK contribution. The review can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/193145/Lessons-Learned-30-Nov.pdf.

 

  1.                A central strength of the Department’s operational decision-making is the close collaboration between military and civilian staff at all levels of the process. The dual nature of the relationship between the PUS, as the Department’s senior policy adviser, and the CDS, as the senior military adviser, is mirrored at all levels within the Department.

 

  1.            The ‘Defence Reform’ report recommended that the Department should make ‘increased use of evidence in decision-making.’ In response to these findings, an initiative was launched in 2011 to improve Evidence-Based Decision Making (EBDM). Demand for good quality evidence to support decision-making has increased across the Department and EBDM has become a core feature of leadership and command training for both civilian and military staff.

 

  1.            The Department has made a concerted effort to professionalise the civilian policy function. In July 2012 it launched the Policy, Strategy and Parliamentary (PSP) profession. This has focused on recognising and developing the MOD’s cadre of policy practitioners through greater emphasis on professional development. Over 150 policy officials have already attended the six-day Defence Policy Base Camp course and a Defence Policy Guide has been issued internally. This initiative is part of the cross-government Policy Profession, which seeks to ensure that civil servants have the right skills, training and education to develop and deliver effective policy and strategy.

 

How is the relationship between Ministers and their advisers, the military and civil servants defined?

 

  1.            The roles of Ministers, special advisers and civil servants are outlined in Chapter 7 of the Cabinet Manual. Civil servants serve the elected government of the day, in line with the standards set out in the Civil Service Code, which is now enshrined in law under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act (2010). The Code sets out the standards of conduct and behaviour expected of all civil servants in upholding the core Civil Service values, and in carrying out their duties and responsibilities, and makes clear what they can and cannot do. Special advisers are employed as temporary civil servants to help ministers on matters where the work of government and the work of the party, or parties, of government overlap and where it would be inappropriate for permanent civil servants to become involved. The Code of Conduct for Special Advisers sets out the kind of work special advisers may do if their minister wants it, and their relationship with the permanent Civil Service.

 

  1.            The Ministerial Code sets out the responsibility of Ministers to Parliament, in line with a Parliamentary resolution approved on 19 March 1997. MOD civil servants support Ministers in discharging these responsibilities to Parliament and the public. They play a critical role in Defence, supporting Ministers in determining policy and strategy, managing the resources allocated by Parliament and maintaining key cross-government and international relationships. Ministers, accountable to Parliament, exercise civilian control over the Armed Forces. It is the role of civil servants in Defence to support Ministerial decision-making by ensuring that military advice is considered within the broader policy, diplomatic, resource and legal context. Targeting decisions are a prime example of where civil servants play this role. Defence policy involves identifying choices which will, generally, ultimately be made by Ministers but on which they rely on civil servants to provide objective advice. The PUS is responsible for ensuring that Ministers receive the support they need from the Department.

 

  1.            The defining elements of the relationship between Ministers and the military are laid out in the Letters Patent of the Defence Council, and other important sources such as the terms of officers’ commissions and the oath of allegiance. These are backed, for example, by elements of Queen’s Regulations which emphasise political neutrality. The Armed Forces also demand the highest standards of professionalism, individual behaviour and self-discipline. The service values emphasise: moral courage; physical courage; discipline; mutual and self-respect; integrity; loyalty; selfless commitment; and pride. The dual structure of the MOD and the framework for decision-making in Defence continue to be taught at Staff College courses.

 

How have processes for decision-making and the relationship between Ministers and their advisers, the military and civil servants changed over the last 10 years?

 

  1.            The processes and the relationship have not fundamentally changed in the last ten years. The MOD Head Office serves two functions: it is both a Department of State and a Military Strategic Headquarters. The Department answers to Parliament, and to the Prime Minister, through the SofS. Military strategy is a Strategic Headquarters function, owned by the CDS and led on his behalf by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff for Military Strategy and Operations (DCDS (MSO)). Military strategy is informed by policy which is led on the PUS’ behalf by DG Sec Pol.

 

Is there a case for codifying the relationship?

 

  1.            We do not see a case for codifying the relationship between Ministers and their advisers, the military and civil servants beyond existing governance documentation. A formal code risks introducing unnecessary bureaucracy and weakening the current collegiate and collaborative approach to decision-making. The development and enforcement of a formal code would consume limited resources which would be better employed elsewhere in Defence. While the Department does not favour codifying the relationship, it does however recognise that there is always more that can be done to explain roles and responsibilities, particularly in the context of operational decision-making. For this reason, the Department is currently in the process of expanding the material on this matter in ‘How Defence Works’. We expect to conclude this work by April 2015.

 

What pressures have been placed on this relationship in the last 10 years by changes in the Government’s relations with the media?

 

  1.            A lesson learned from the Libya conflict is that the conduct of modern conflicts – which require simultaneous consideration of political, humanitarian and military strands and are conducted in a 24 hour media context – requires Ministers to be abreast of the tactical as well as strategic issues. The Directorate of Defence Communications (DDC) recently underwent a major transformation, making it easier for stakeholders to engage at the earliest opportunity to ensure communications are embedded within policy formulation from the start. In line with other Government departments and public bodies, the Department also employs a number of professional and politically impartial communicators. These communicators work with Ministers and their advisers, the military and civil servants to promote the work of the Department, the Armed Forces and their personnel to the public through the media, while safeguarding its reputation. Pressures on this work can take many forms such as the need to protect the security of military operations and ensuring propriety with relation to party political matters. These pressures are governed by a number of resources including the Civil Service Code and Government Communications Service Propriety Guidance.

 

What effect has the House of Commons vote on intervention in Syria had on this relationship?

 

  1.            We do not assess that the vote on Syria has had any significant effect on the relationship between Ministers and their advisers, the military and civil servants. Indeed, the period preceding the vote demonstrated that these groups clearly understood their roles in the decision-making process and were able to carry them out at speed and with a minimal degree of friction. This was also the case ahead of the vote on supporting the Government of Iraq, including the use of UK air strikes, against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in September 2014.

 

Who makes the decisions on the deployment of UK troops on combat and other operations?

 

  1.            Decisions to commit to military intervention are taken by the Prime Minister in Cabinet, informed by the NSC and with advice from the SofS and the CDS. SofS is responsible and accountable to Parliament for the conduct and resourcing of operations. Under SofS’s oversight, the CDS, is responsible for planning and directing all military operations. Strategic direction, force levels, resources and other guidance is recorded in a CDS Directive. A more detailed overview of how military operations are directed is given in paragraphs 70-77 of ‘How Defence Works’.

 

  1.            This Government has acknowledged that a convention has developed that before troops are committed to conflict the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter, except where there was an emergency and such action would not be appropriate. This convention is referred to in the Cabinet Manual and the Government’s commitment to it was most recently demonstrated by the decision to request the recall of Parliament on 26 September 2014, to debate the role the UK should play in supporting the Government of Iraq, including the use of UK air strikes, against ISIL in Iraq.

 

  1.            Military Operations in the UK are, in peacetime, limited to support to civilian authorities and are accordingly placed under the overarching title of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). MACA is subdivided into Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC) and Training and Logistic Assistance to the Civil Power (TLACP). The provision of MACA is guided by three pre-conditions: the Armed Forces should only be used as a last resort, where the other responders lack capability and there is a demonstrable urgent need to act. MACA requests need Ministerial approval:

 

    1. The provision of MAGD requires the use of emergency powers and can only be undertaken with the explicit authorisation of Ministers and the Defence Council.

 

    1.                MACP requests need Ministerial approval to ensure that the provision of support is both reasonable and soundly based in law.

 

    1. MACC Category A (risk to life) allows individual units to provide support under the 1983 Defence Council order. However, authorisation should be sought from Ministers where possible. Category B (routine assistance) and Category C (attachment to volunteers) may be authorised at individual unit level.

 

  1.            Reservists may be employed under a number of sections of the Reserve Forces Act 1996, including being called out into permanent service under the provisions of the Act (and amended under the Defence Reform Act 2014) for any task for which a Regular may be used for any purpose, including activities and operations in the UK and overseas.

 

October 2014

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