Written evidence from Professor Paul Rogers, Department of Peace Studies,
Bradford University

A Note on the Origins, Evolution and Prospects for the Islamic State Movement

Introduction

  1. This note addresses the issue of the threats posed by Islamic State (IS) in the context that this underlies many of the Committee’s further questions in its current inquiry, especially the nature, intention and possible outcomes of military action.

 

  1. It seeks, in particular, to understand how close supporters of the movement see its role, and how this relates to their attitude towards opponents, especially the military coalition now being developed by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, other Western states and some regional partners.   It should be understood that any such a process of viewing the conflict from the position of the movement, and indeed of a wider support base, in no way implies the condoning of the policies and actions of Islamic State, a singularly extreme and brutal entity.

 

  1. The memorandum initially summarises the origins and evolution of the movement, its relationship to al-Qaida in Iraq and the “shadow war” in Iraq between 2004 and 2007, especially Operation Arcadia. It then looks at recent developments during 2014 and the present situation before seeking to understand current intentions, strengths and weaknesses of the movement, and the extent to which it actively wants military confrontation, especially with the United States and its close European allies.

 

Origins and early development

 

  1. Islamic State has its origins in al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), which was developed as an adjunct of al-Qaida after the termination of the Saddam Hussein regime in March/April 2003 and the subsequent occupation of Iraq.   The origins of al-Qaida itself go back to the late 1980s and the end of the successful mujahidin actions against the Soviet Union.  Within a decade it had evolved into a small but potent jihadist entity with a series of aims encompassing the termination of the unacceptable regimes in the region (the “near enemy”) especially the House of Saud, and the establishment of an Islamist Caliphate in the Middle East, a bitter anti-Zionism and support for like-minded groups in Chechnya, Southern Thailand and elsewhere.  

 

  1. Al-Qaida’s longer term aim was to extend the Caliphate beyond the region but even its regional ambitions required the severe weakening of the “far enemy” of the United States, the world’s sole superpower after 1991 with major interests in the region and enduring support for Israel.   One of the most important features of the movement was its eschatological dimension, looking beyond this life.   This alone has made it an unusual transnational revolutionary movement with a timescale for success measured in many decades and possibly a century or more.

 

  1. Although the plans for the 9/11 atrocities may not have been originated by the al-Qaida leadership they were most likely supported for two reasons – to demonstrate to the wider Islamic world the movement’s ability to strike at the heart of the far enemy and to provoke and incite the United States to occupy Afghanistan and eventually be worn down, much as had the Soviet Union nearly two decades earlier.   While this latter aim initially failed, a lengthy war did eventually ensue which may now be diminishing with the substantive retreat of western military forces from the country.   However, the extension of the war on terror and the designation of an axis of evil was followed by the occupation of Iraq which led directly on to the evolution of the present day Islamic State movement, with the likelihood that the war on terror may now extend into a third decade.

 

  1. While Islamic State as a major and defined movement is a feature just of the past three years and partly a consequence of opportunism during the Syrian civil war, it is helpful to understand the transition from AQI to Islamic State.  Within a few months of the termination of the Saddam Hussein regime and the start of the western occupation of Iraq, a substantial insurgency was under way arising primarily among Baathists, especially those in the four Special Republican Guard brigades and the security and intelligence services own battalions that took scarcely any part in resisting the coalition advance to Baghdad in March/April 2003.   While the conflict also developed into a violent inter-confessional Sunni/Shi’a conflict, by 2004 the rebellion against western forces was hugely serious, with the core element being the development of AQI under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

 

  1. A major if unpublicised response, under General Stanley McChrystal, was the development by the US Joint Special Operations (JSOC) of a network-centric model which used four highly trained and well-armed Special Forces groups to seek out and destroy elements of AQI and related groups across central and north-western Iraq.  Commonly known as Task Force 145, the four Task Force groups each had a regional focus, with the personnel drawn from three US formations - SEAL Team 6, a Delta Squadron and a Ranger battalion - and an SAS squadron from the UK.
  2. These Task Forces had access to a wide range of intelligence but operated with considerable independence, undertaking up to 300 raids a month to kill or capture suspected insurgents, the latter frequently subject to intense physical interrogation in order to gain information leading to further raids.  This element of the conflict peaked in 2006, not least with Operation Arcadia, and Zarqawi was killed in October 2006.  Over a three-year period to late 2007 some thousands of suspected insurgents were killed and tens of thousands detained, 20,000 of them in Camp Bucca near Basra, both by the JSOC teams and in other operations.   Detainees were mostly held without trial, some for several years, but many were ultimately released by the time the US withdrew its combat forces in 2011.
  3. The view from the Pentagon was that JSOC operations and the funding of Sunni militias opposed to Zarqawi’s brutal activities, coupled with a surge of US forces in 2007, were the core factors that led to an easing of the war by 2009.  That may have been the case, but what is now clear is that the core paramilitary leadership of Islamic State is heavily dependent on Iraqi paramilitary survivors from that period.   Indeed, as the movement took shape one of the earliest endeavors was to mount a series of attacks on Iraqi prisons to release hard line detainees, many of whom had been handed over by coalition forces to the Iraqi authorities by 2011.

Recent Developments

  1. From 2011 onwards the developing movement was much aided by the policy of the Nouri al-Malaki government in Baghdad and its marked preference for the Shia majority and its marginalisation of the Sunni minority.  This raised particular anger among Sunni clans in Anbar Province as well as Baathist elements across central and northern Iraq.   The movement then benefited from the development of the civil war in Syria, especially the Assad regime’s loss of control of much of northern Syria.  The two combined to give the movement considerable control of the city of Raqqa and surrounding districts of northern Syria and much influence across north-west Iraq including the city of Mosul.  In the early months of 2014 the movement went on the offensive, rapidly gaining control of much of Anbar Province, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declaring himself the Caliph of the new “Islamic State”, in Mosul on 5 July, the formation of the Caliphate having been announced on 29 June.

 

  1. It is probable that much of the current leadership is composed of people detained for long periods in close confinement, often subject to harsh treatment and also in an environment where they could be further radicalised.  It should be emphasised, though, that by no means all of the paramilitary leadership is composed of dedicated Islamists motivated by religious conviction.  Many remain Baathists, with a pan-Arab if more secular perspective but motivated by a deep anti-western resentment coupled with experience of urban insurgency and survival against elite western Special Forces.  They should be considered resilient, competent and formidable.

 

  1. Since the start of air operations against Islamic State, first in Iraq and subsequently in Syria, and in combination with the actions of Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, the further progress of Islamic State has been halted.   The situation is changing rapidly but five recent developments at the time of writing (18 November 2014) are relevant:

 

 

 

  1. All of these elements indicate that a military response to IS will be a long drawn-out operation stretching over a number of years.   It is in this context that the strengths and weaknesses of IS might best be considered.

 

Current Strengths

 

Potential Weaknesses

 

Conclusion - the Response Dilemma

 

  1. One of the primary elements of the Committee’s investigation is the question of whether military intervention is the appropriate response to Islamic State.   This note concludes not be presenting a clear answer but by pointing to the probable attitude of the Islamic State leadership to this issue.   This, in turn, bears on the view that the original 9/11 attacks by al-Qaida constituted a deliberate provocation for the United States to entice it into Afghanistan.

 

  1. It should at least be considered that from the perspective of Islamic State strategists the movement is in the early stages of a decades-long confrontation with the near and far enemies and that it actually seeks a serious military confrontation.   The widespread killing of Iraqi and Syrian security forces, often in a barbarous fashion, may be designed to spread fear and encourage desertion, but the killing of western hostages must be seen as an incitement, designed both to increase community tensions in multi-confessional societies and also to encourage strong military action.

 

  1. This is very much in line with the need for IS to present itself as the vanguard movement in the global defence of Islam and forms part of a wider propaganda representation of Islam under attack.   Such an approach has multiple elements but points, for example, to Afghanistan and Iraq as major examples of western military offences against Islam leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Moslems.  It characterises Libya as a further example, as well as the armed drone and Special Forces operations in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan and it also points to the close relationship between western states and autocracies that do not speak for “true Islam”, the most important being the House of Saud - the Guardian of the Two Holy Places.   It points to other features of the war on terror including the detention of tens of thousands of Moslems in Iraq and Afghanistan over many years, the practice of rendition and torture of Moslem suspects and the indefinite detention without trial of suspects in Guantanmo.

 

  1. It also highlights what it represents as the constant Israeli assault on Islam, not least through its encroachment on and control of the Third Holy Place.  Indeed Israel is represented as little more than an arm of the United States with Israeli helicopter gunships and strike aircraft  seen as US warplanes in Israeli markings.   It highlights the deaths of over 2,000 people, including over 400 children, in the recent Operation Protective Edge in Gaza.

 

  1. To repeat what was stated at the outset of this note, this is in no way to support these statements but is presented as a reminder of the necessity of seeing how Islamic State views and expresses itself.

 

  1. It may be a view rejected by the overwhelming majority of Moslems right across the world, yet it will be received positively by a small minority.  With the war with Islamic State now approaching a stalemate, it should be recognised that the movement needs many more recruits from abroad and needs to be able to increase its financial support.

 

  1. From its perspective, to succeed in this will be greatly aided by a much-enhanced Western military intervention.  Indeed, what would be really useful would be if the Western operations evolved to encompass significant numbers of ground troops.  From an IS perspective, the prospect of capturing, detaining and subsequently beheading western soldiers in orange jumpsuits would be singularly effective propaganda.

 

  1. Overall, the problem of how to respond to Islamic State raises very difficult issues for western political and military leaders and it leads to an admittedly cautious conclusion that there may be an urgent need for a serious reconsideration of current policies that looks towards alternatives to what appears now to be a steady escalation in the extent of military intervention.

 

This note draws on two briefings written for Oxford Research Group:

The Islamic State and its Potential, October 2014

The Evolution of the Islamic State Conflict, November 2014

November 2014