[COR0151]

Written evidence submitted by Hacked Off (COR0151)

Summary

This submission is limited to addressing the terms of reference of the Committee’s Inquiry which relate to online harms.

Hacked Off has expertise and experience in looking at the role the unregulated press plays in online harms. That is not to diminish the problem of non-press social media actors, but rather;

• The role of the press is often overlooked as the blame is placed entirely (and thus wrongly) on social media – often by newspapers themselves to discredit their commercial competitor, and
• Because newspaper websites are edited (giving an impression of quality control), have brand loyalty, and can set broadcast news agendas, any disinformation they produce has more credibility and thus causes more misinformation and harm.

This submission finds the following, set out in response to the relevant terms of reference.

Term 1:

The nature, prevalence and scale of online harms during the Covid-19 period

1. Online harms have been committed directly by newspaper publishers, which have considerable reach.  This point is supported by Part One of the Appendix which provides evidence of disinformation and misinformation about Covid-19 published on 37 occasions by national newspapers.

2. Online harms have been committed on the social media platforms operated by national newspapers (“comment sections”).  This point is supported by Part Two of the appendix, which provides dozens of examples of disinformation carried on social media platforms operated by newspaper publishers.

Term 2:

Steps that could be taken to mitigate these concerns

3. IPSO, the complaints-handling association for corporate newspapers, is not taking action to remove disinformation from newspapers’ editorial content or social media platforms.

4. As a matter of urgency, action must be taken such that IPSO is replaced by an independent press regulator to address these concerns.

Term 3:

The adequacy of the Government’s Online Harms proposals to address issues arising from the pandemic, as well as issues previously identified

5. Newspapers’ online activity must not be exempted, as proposed, in the new Online Harms regime set out in the Government’s White Paper.

6. The Government currently has no strategy for tackling Online Harms insofar as they are instigated, enabled and/or promoted by news publishers.  The proposals published to date deal only partially deal with the problem and would fail to provide a solution to Online Harms.

These terms of reference are addressed in detail below.

Term 1:

The nature, prevalence and scale of online harms during the Covid-19 period

1. Hacked Off’s analysis, set out in Appendix Part One and drawing on the findings of Full Fact and other professional fact-checkers, details a sample of 37 inaccurate stories about COVID-19 which have been published by newspaper publishers.  The daily reach of each of these online publishers is up to 7 million people, and the weekly cumulative reach of the largest titles is 35m[1].  They include disinformation about 5G, disinformation relating to Bill Gates, and disinformation about the origins of the virus.  All have the potential to cause serious harm.
2. The 31 examples can be categorised as follows:

3. In most cases, these examples are verifiably false, as confirmed by a third party (usually Full Fact).
4. None of these examples are minor or careless inaccuracies.  They are serious and either deliberate or extremely reckless.  They meet any reasonable definition of disinformation.
5. Much of this disinformation follows similar themes to the conspiracy theories found on social media platforms, such as references to Bill Gates (examples 11 & 12, as set out in the Appendix Part One p5 and 6), origins of the virus (examples 3, 4 and 7: Appendix Part One p. 2-4) and the alleged link to 5G technology (example 15, Appendix Part One p. 7).
6. Other stories suggested either that the virus was more serious than the public has been told by relevant authorities or that it was less serious.  Either direction risks adversely influencing public behaviour.
7. The most serious examples of fake news – those relating to prophylactic medicinal interventions, and to treatments or cures – which have the potential for direct harm can be found in national newspapers. These would be taken down immediately by Facebook under its policy but when they occur on newspapers websites, they have not been taken down even after criticism from reputable fact-checkers.
8. The same newspapers that attack Facebook and other social media platforms for not acting quickly enough to deal with dangerous fake news, which has been a fair criticism to make, sometimes never take down the same hazardous misinformation on their own platforms.
9. In some of the most egregious examples, news stories rely on the body of an article to try to mitigate against a dubious headline.  Although this practice is common and has the potential to cause serious harm, only the worst examples were collected for the purpose of this submission. 

For example, the headline of example number 18 is

“Coronavirus cure: Does drinking warm water help cure coronavirus?”.

Many screen-scrolls later, article eventually states:

“However, the claims quickly came under question and Kalpana Sabapathy, a clinical epidemiologist at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine told BBC Future drinking water doesn’t kill coronavirus.”

But even this seemingly unchallengeable fact is set against the views of another person who claims (without evidence) that drinking warm water does provide a cure.  Nowhere does the article report the scientific consensus that warm water does not cure the virus.

Furthermore, the reader has to read 652 words, pass through two page-width videos, three page-width images (two of which feature people drinking water), three advertisements and eleven prominent links to other stories before reaching the accurate rebuttal.  For many readers, the headline and opening sentences are all they will read.

10. Many other articles also falsely raise hopes of a “cure” (see examples 28 & 30: Appendix pp 12-14).  It has already been reported that sales of the drug chloroquine (or hydroxychloroquine), referenced in both of those articles, are believed to have increased on the “dark web”.[2]  Taking drugs without the supervision of a medical professional carries significant risks.
11. The 5G conspiracy theory, which is believed to be the reason for acts of vandalism carried out against 5G equipment, has also been reproduced in newspapers without rebuttal (example 15: Appendix Part One p 7).
12. In contrast with harmful content posted by users (examples of which are set out later in this submission), the potential for harm to be caused is much greater when it features in the editorial output of an established media outlet.

This is for the following reasons:

• Large publishers are perceived to be more credible than individuals.  They have access to significant resources to confirm the veracity of content and are assumed by some readers to have deployed pre-publication.
• Everything published is an active editorial decision, subject to legal and other forms of review. 
• Research shows that readers are more likely to believe information published by a well-established newspaper or its online site – especially one that they choose to read regularly - than information which appears on social media.[3]
• Newspapers have a news agenda setting power with broadcast media through TV newspaper reviews (often carried out by the newspapers’ own journalists)
• The online reach of national newspapers is vast.  The cumulative weekly reach of the largest newspaper websites in the UK is over 35m.[4]  On a typical day the reach of The Sun’s website is 7.2m, the Telegraph’s is 2.3m, the Mirror’s is 4.7m and the Mail’s is 4m.[5]  Of the ten most read news websites in the UK, eight are newspaper websites.[6]

13. For the reasons of their reach and their perceived credibility, newspaper disinformation has far greater potential to cause harm than any UGC.  Newspapers have repeatedly published disinformation throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

Conclusion 1:

Online harms have been committed directly by newspaper publishers, which have considerable reach.  This point is evidenced by Part One of the Appendix which provides evidence of disinformation and misinformation about Covid-19 published on 37 occasions by national newspapers.

14. Many established newspapers operate popular social media platforms on their websites, which are accessible to users who wish to leave comments under individual stories. These are often referred to as “comment sections” or “below the line”.  They provide an opportunity for readers to engage with stories and interact with other readers through the newspaper’s own platform.  The content of these sections is entirely user generated.  Unlike editorial coverage these are, by definition, social media platforms and their content would naturally be expected to fit within the Government’s online harms approach.  As set out in more detail later int his submission, however, the government recently indicated that these social media platforms will, uniquely, be exempt from the regime.
15. Four of the largest newspaper websites which operate these platforms were reviewed by Hacked Off: The Sun, The Telegraph, The Mirror and The Mail.  Five example stories from each website with disinformation (“fake news”) in the UGC “comment” sections were captured, with screenshots showing each case of disinformation.
16. The evidence gathered is set out in full in Part Two of the Appendix.  It is a snapshot of the problem rather than an exhaustive survey of all newspaper UGC disinformation since the Covid crisis started.

The evidence shows:

• 15 examples of UGC disinformation under stories in The Sun
• 13 examples under stories in the Telegraph
• 12 examples under stories in the Mirror
• 12 examples under stories in the Mail
• These examples break down into the following subcategories:

18. In several of these examples, one user who cites a conspiracy theory or inaccurate story prompts others to respond similarly.  For example, in The Telegraph, Story 1, Comments 1, 3 & 4 (see Appendix Part Two p 13 & 14), several users suggest that sunlight and UV rays are a viable means of killing the virus.
19. The consequences of such disinformation can be serious.  Reportedly, at least 20 5G phone masts are believed to have been vandalised in connection with the conspiracy theory that 5G is linked to COVID-19.[7]  Many disinformation comments alleging that the virus was developed deliberately in China, often as a “bio-weapon”, were laced with racism (see The Sun, Story 5, Comment 1 in Appendix Pt 2, p 10).
20. Conspiracy theories about “world elites” and the alleged involvement of Bill Gates are not only damaging to the work of his Foundation, but are commonly linked to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (George Soros, often the subject of such theories, is referenced in Telegraph Story 2, Comment 1: see Appendix Pt 2, p 16).  They sometimes also reference other conspiracy theories, such as vaccine safety (Mirror Story 1, Comment 7; Mail Story 1, Comment 3: see Appendix Pt 2 pp 25 and pp 32).
21. These comments, set out in full in the Appendix, are similar to and no less damaging than the conspiracy theories circulating on Facebook and Twitter.
22. Many of these comments remained published and accessible for days and even weeks after they were published (a situation that these same newspapers have vehemently criticised other social media platforms for allowing).
23. These platforms enjoy the same online reach as their publishers.

Conclusion 2:

Online harms have been committed on the social media platforms operated by national newspapers (“comment sections”).  This point is evidenced by Part Two of the appendix, which provides dozens of examples of disinformation carried on social media platforms operated by newspaper publishers.

24. IPSO is ultimately responsible for handling complaints in respect of both editorial content and social media content which appears on national newspaper websites, where those newspaper titles are members of IPSO (most of the national press, with the exception of the Financial Times, The Guardian and The Independent, are members).

25. IPSO has steadfastly refused to address online harms of any kind.  It has never taken any action in respect of newspapers’ social media “comment” sections, and rarely acts on editorial disinformation.  When it does act, it does so only on a reactive basis, its complaints-handling process is attritional and slow, the sanctions it has are rarely deployed, and any remedy it provides is almost always inadequate.

26. Although the press and IPSO describe IPSO as a regulator, by dint of its Standards Arm (which has the power to launch investigations and impose pecuniary sanctions), it has – in its 5-year history – not carried out any investigations nor imposed any fines. This is because it is controlled by the press itself and the industry has the power to veto the launching of any such investigation.  Its policy and practices on both editorial and UGC disinformation are entirely reactive: disinformation is only addressed (by a mediation or adjudication process, not by an investigation) if a complaint has been brought forward (and only then after a delay while the publication considers it – with editorial content this is up to 30 days).  This causes significant problems in tackling disinformation:
• Blatant and damaging disinformation, having been published as UGC or editorially, will remain accessible indefinitely if no one complains.
• Damaging disinformation, even if the subject of a complaint, can sit on the newspaper’s social media platform for some time (we assume 30 days, if treated the same as editorial content, although IPSO does not explain its policy) while the publication considers a complaint.
27. There are many more structural obstacles which prevent IPSO from acting as an independent and effective regulator in respect of disinformation about COVID-19.  These include, for example, excessive industry influence in the body, inability to change the standards for which it is responsible, and inability to change its own rules without industry agreement.  These are set out in the most recent independent assessment of IPSO against the Leveson Recommendations from the Media Standards Trust.[8]
28. Even when a complaint is considered and ultimately upheld in a complaints adjudication, the timescales IPSO works to leaves any remedy nugatory.  Typically, around 100 days elapse between the publication of an article and an IPSO adjudication[9].  Often this is longer.  In that time, many millions of citizens could have been misled.  Any remedy, usually a correction of far weaker prominence, is  seen only by a small fraction of those who will have seen, and were possibly misled by, the published disinformation when first published 3 months previously.
29. When it comes to the User Generated Content published in newspapers’ social media “comment” sections, IPSO has never taken any action at all.  This is despite the fact that IPSO has claimed that it is handling complaints about content on the social media platforms operated by member publishers.[10]  Indeed, in oral evidence to the Committee on 13th May 2020[11], Minister for Digital and Culture Caroline Dinenage confirmed that the Government was intending to rely on IPSO’s alleged regulation of comment sections as reason to exempt the corporate press from the online harms regime:

“The Secretary of State wrote a letter to the Society of Editors and this was about the below the line comments sections. They were concerned that that might be regulated. I think what the Secretary of State is saying is where there is already clear and effective moderation of that sort of content, we don’t intend to duplicate it. So for example, there are IPSO and IMPRESS activity on moderated content sections.”

30. IPSO states that it will apply the Editors’ Code when considering complaints about UGC[12].  The Code’s Clause 1 covers accuracy.[13] Yet to date no action has been taken against any publisher in respect of the examples of disinformation and “fake news” contained in Part Two of the Appendix of this submission, or indeed any publisher in respect of any UGC at all.
31. IPSO’s policy (as yet unimplemented in any case) in respect of UGC is that it will handle complaints either if comments have been pre-moderated, or after a complaint has first been made to the publication.  This broadly mirrors its policy on handling complaints about editorial content, which requires complaints to be made to the publication in the first instance.
32. When the same disinformation has been spread on other non-news media platforms, those platforms have often responded proactively. They have been heavily scrutinised, and their early efforts have been rightly criticised, but they can point to a growing number of active initiatives to resist the spread of disinformation.[14]  Only recently, on 16th April 2020, Facebook announced it was taking action to notify readers of disinformation in response to a report from Avaaz.[15]
33. IPSO’s lack of action, on the other hand, shows that it both lacks the necessary powers and the will to hold its members properly to account.  Any approach to UGC regulation which either exempts IPSO members or delegates regulatory responsibility to IPSO, will fail.
34. Even if IPSO were to begin to act on newspaper hosted UGC, precedent suggests that breaches will not be remedied promptly with a correction or adjudication of similar prominence to the original disinformation[16].

Conclusion 3:

IPSO, the complaints-handling association for corporate newspapers, is not taking action to remove disinformation from newspapers’ editorial content or social media platforms.

Terms 2 & 3:

Steps that could be taken to mitigate these concerns;

The adequacy of the Government’s Online Harms proposals to address issues arising from the pandemic, as well as issues previously identified

35. Had newspapers been regulated by a body which was sufficiently independent of the industry, possessed effective regulatory powers and used these powers, these examples would have been remedied.  An independent regulator would have been committed to ensure that disinformation was not only corrected, but that the correction was published with the appropriate prominence and placement such that those most likely to have read the disinformation would be most likely to read the correction.  Effective sanctions would also result in publishers taking more care to avoid serious and dangerous inaccuracies.  The genuine threat of a standards investigation would have also contributed to this deterrent effect.

36. Rather than the public, NGOs or Parliamentarians needing to speculate on what constitutes satisfactory press regulation, the Leveson Inquiry addressed the question comprehensively. Part One of the Inquiry’s recommendations, which set 29 criteria for regulators to meet to prove their independence and effectiveness, should be adhered to.  Parliament endorsed this system on a cross-party basis and enshrined it in the Royal Charter in 2013.

37. Those criteria include, for example, the requirement that the regulator is autonomous, that it sets standards itself, and that it is independent of the state.  In contrast, IPSO’s rules are controlled by a committee of newspaper executives, the standards it claims to enforce are set by a committee of newspaper editors, and its Chair is a Member of the House of Lords who, until recently, was not only a working peer but also a Government minister.

38. IPSO has failed to protect the public from newspaper editorial and UGC disinformation.  IPSO must be replaced or reformed such that major publishers are members of a system of regulation which meets the Royal Charter requirements, as recommended in Part One of the Leveson Report.

39. Legislators could effect this reform in one of several ways.  Publishers over a specific revenue threshold, or which benefit from relevant tax and other legal advantages, could be compulsorily required to be a member of a regulator which meets those criteria.  Incentives could be introduced to encourage publishers to sign up.

40. Any new legislation should be developed on a cross-party basis in consultation with representatives of personal victims of press abuse (who were promised reform by the Prime Minister and all the Party Leaders in 2012 and 2013), the National Union of Journalists, and Sir Brian Leveson himself.

Conclusion 4:

As a matter of urgency, action must be taken such that IPSO is replaced by an independent press regulator to address these concerns.

41. The Government’s strategy to date on Online Harms deals exclusively with User Generated Content.  This is unnecessarily narrow and would expose the content of private citizens to a more stringent regulatory regime than that published by media corporations.  Media publishers already benefit from significant advantages in law, and enjoy extraordinary reach.  It is inappropriate to exempt them from the new regime in this way.

42. Despite IPSO claiming to regulate newspapers’ social media platforms, there is no evidence of this taking place.  The Government cannot rely on IPSO to ensure the public are protected from Online Harms committed in newspaper comment sections.

Conclusion 5:

Newspapers’ online activity must not be exempted, as proposed, in the new Online Harms regime set out in the Government’s White Paper.

Conclusion 6:

The Government currently has no strategy for tackling Online Harms insofar as they are instigated, enabled and/or promoted by news publishers.  The proposals published to date deal only partially deal with the problem and would fail to provide a solution to Online Harms.

May 2020

[COR0151]

Appendix Part One: Disinformation published by established media outlets

The table below sets out 37 examples of disinformation published to millions of readers by the largest newspaper publishers in the UK.

The publishers are members of IPSO. None of them have (as yet) been subject to any remedial action from the complaints-handler in respect of any of these articles.

The rebuttal to the disinformation is included in the relevant column; where FullFact (or another fact-checking body) has verified the inaccuracy, this is made clear.

Please note that in many cases, the newspaper published these false claims on its social media accounts (on Twitter and Facebook for example) where they have large followings and are amplified across the internet by reposting, linking and re-tweeting. Any proposals for tackling online harms must not allow these fake news stories on social media to be excluded from the reach of any regulator or policy, while those of ordinary citizens with far less impact are subject to the regime. 

20

[COR0151]

Appendix Part Two: Disinformation on established newspapers’ social media platforms

Please find below some of the most egregious examples of disinformation published on the social media platforms operated by four of the largest newspapers:

1. The Sun
2. The Telegraph
3. The Mirror
4. The Daily Mail

Five stories from each publication are recorded, with screenshots of users sharing disinformation in the social media (“comment”) sections set out below.  The date that the comment was recorded is also noted, which shows that in many cases the public had been exposed to these comments for days without any action being taken by the publisher.

The review was carried out over a two-week period, from 6th to 20th April.

An audit on 20th April shows that many of the comments were still accessible on that date (this is noted below).

Some have still not been removed, more than a month later.

All four of these newspapers are members of IPSO.  At time of submission, IPSO had not taken action in respect of these comments.

Publication: The Sun

Story 1: 

BAT ATTACK Coronavirus may have started in Wuhan lab where HUNDREDS of bats ‘attacked and peed on scientists’, experts say

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/10973774/coronavirus-wuhan-lab-bats-attacked/

This story was debunked by FullFact - it is editorial disinformation published by The Sun newspaper.  The comments below show disinformation also being spread in the comments.

Comment 1 (09/04/2020):

A user states that a cure already exists for the virus, and it is controlled by “elites”.

Comment remains visible, accessed 20/04/2020.

Comment 2 (09/04/2020):

The conspiracy theory that the virus was engineered and accidentally leaked.

Comment remains visible, accessed 20/04/2020.

Story 2:

VIRUS RAGE Coronavirus fury as wet markets across Asia STILL selling wildlife to eat despite ‘sparking deadly pandemic’

https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11271765/coronavirus-wet-markets-still-selling/

Comment 1 (09/04/2020):

A user repeats the conspiracy theory that the virus was engineered.

Comment no longer accessible.

Comment 2 (09/04/2020):

Again, the conspiracy theory that the virus was engineered.

Comment remains visible, accessed 20/04/2020.

Comment 3 (09/04/2020):

Disinformation that the virus is a bioweapon. It received 39 “likes” at time of being recorded, and had been published for over a week.

Comment remains visible, accessed 20/04/2020.

Comments 4 & 5 (09/04/2020):