EHS0082/EAC/14-15

Ampthill Square Tenants and Residents Association—Written evidence

Counting the Costs: An assessment of the extent of social and environmental impacts resulting from High Speed Two terminating in Euston

SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to highlight a range of significant negative impacts accruing to communities in the locality of Euston, its approach and the cutting northwards to Parkway – the HS2 Ltd Community Forum 1 (CF1) area - as a result of the construction of HS2

Time and resource constraints have resulted in the authors concentrating their efforts on just some of the many impacts, delineating the extent and duration of imposed resultant disruption and the likely catastrophic impacts these will have on the well-being of local people.

The report also urges that the social and environmental impacts to the reluctant ‘host’ communities accruing from the construction of the HS2 terminus at Euston are properly evaluated and quantified and that these significant costs to LB Camden and its communities, which are estimated to be in the region of £1bn and indeed could exceed that amount, are properly accounted for and incorporated into the debit side of the business plan for HS2.

The report aims to highlight the extent of costs externalised to individuals such that they are subsidising the costs of railway construction through significant personal financial losses and reductions in wellbeing to levels that are completely unjustified.

Fundamental to our argument is the belief that HS2 Ltd have failed to properly evaluate the costs of bringing HS2 into Camden, a densely populated high value area of Central London.  Intrinsic in this belief is that the very real needs of many thousands of individuals living within reluctant ‘host’ communities have not been considered and their concerns treated as irrelevant.

The arguments set out in the submission are supplemented with custom-generated maps, charts and tables within the Appendices together with a clear underlying methodology for data collection.

Ampthill Square Estate is situated directly north-east of Euston station and shares is western boundary with the cutting wall to the Euston Approach.   Its geographical location makes residents of the 365 housing units particularly vulnerable to negative impacts from the construction of HS2.

About the authors

Since moving to Ampthill Square Estate twenty-five years ago, Fran Heron has been a community. She has been active in the local Tenants and Residents Association for many years and currently chairs the Camden Town District Management Committee, an umbrella group of elected TRA representatives working in partnership with LB Camden to improve all housing related services and the quality of life of residents.  Fran has no formal qualifications apart from long experience and enthusiasm.

Louise Fletcher, an Ampthill Square resident of three years, worked for 30 years as an Earth Scientist.  In her professional acquired many years experience in working and analysing map data. 

The authors wish to acknowledge the invaluable help provided by John Fletcher for patiently proof reading, editing and formatting this document.

1. Background

1.1.  The origin and progress of plans for High Speed Two (HS2) will be familiar to the Committee and will not be repeated here.  It is, however, appropriate to mention that, since the announcement by the then Secretary of State for Transport, the Rt Hon Justine Greening, on January 10th 2012 that the Government had made the decision to go ahead with Phase One of HS2, a long shadow has been cast over many lives in Camden.  This escalating gloom is most acutely felt by communities living in closest proximity and radiating outwards from Euston Station, the station approach and the railway cutting northwards to Parkway tunnel.

1.2.  Intervening years have compounded fear and uncertainties within communities with regard to the future.  With passing time and as the scale and duration of the proposals become clearer this anxiety has become more profound.  Large numbers of people will have their property and lives blighted.  The authors will attempt to illustrate the extent of just some of these.

2. Costs v Benefits

2.1.  The Government claims that HS2 ‘is the most significant transport infrastructure project in the UK since the motorways were built in the 1950s and 1960’ and is driving the project relentlessly forward into the centre of our lives.  The scale and duration of the works are unprecedented and the HS2 juggernaut proceeds inexorably with minimal democratic accountability.  The London Borough of Camden unanimously believe that the negative impacts and disadvantages flowing from HS2 far outweigh the limited future benefits and have consistently opposed plans for Euston.  This view is widely shared by communities in the Borough.

2.2.  It is also widely held that HS2 Ltd. has failed to properly assess the costs of bringing HS2 into Euston, a high density high value urban area of central London.  In so doing they have completely failed to count the considerable resultant social and environmental impact on communities in Camden. 

2.3.  The benefits that will accrue from HS2 are so far in the future as to be considered irrelevant.  Homes and jobs will not be delivered for over a decade at the earliest and probably considerably longer.  Most construction jobs will not be filled by local people (who will bear the brunt of construction) but will be imported.

2.4.  The authors concur with a growing body of concern that the benefits of HS2 have been grossly overstated while the opportunity costs and debit side of the equation have been largely ignored.  This study aims to highlight just some of the externalised social and environmental costs heaped onto the people of Camden.  The Pan Camden HS2 Alliance has stated “We have always urged that a project of this size and claimed importance should be subject to scrutiny and testing in a properly independent and public inquiry. We are increasingly dismayed by the extent of potential patronage that could be exercised by HS2, the Department for Transport and by other bodies.  We believe this is damaging and corrosive to our democracy.”

3. Opportunity Costs

3.1    Many local people are sceptical of the stated benefits of HS2 as a concept and believe the overall cost of around £50bn is totally inappropriate for just 330mls of new railway that will benefit only an estimated 0.26% of the population.  The annual statistics of Office for Rail Regulation show that the large increase in passenger loads (predictable following the significant investment in extensive upgrading of the WCML) is slowing down and demand now appears to be flat-lining. HS2 Ltd.’s business case is predicated on a 2% year on year increase in passenger loads for long distance services which looks increasingly less likely.  With the cost of fares being prohibitive to many and the rapid evolution of media technology, video conferencing and the like, the demand trend for long distance travel may well reduce in future years.

3.2    The figures below illustrate the disproportionate amount of the annual rail budget dedicated to the construction of HS2.  Given the size of the National Debt, the austerity regime of the present Government aimed at significantly reducing public spending, on-going cuts to council budgets translating into loss of services and what many would consider more vital spending priorities for the benefit of the many rather than the relatively few, the prioritisation of HS2 is questioned by significant numbers of the population.

Fig 1. Statistics illustrating disproportionate rail spend on HS2

*Statistics quoted from HM Treasury document “Investing in Britain’s Future CM 8669 June 2013

3.3    The table above shows clearly that HS2 will consume almost half (42%) of the total annual rail budget, including London Transport, for the next five years.  As HS2 annual projected spend increases with time, this proportion of spend is likely to be repeated or indeed increased for the foreseeable future

3.4    While the UK is planning what many consider to be an over-specified over hyped high speed line, less than half the UK rail network has been electrified, a large proportion of its stations are not fully accessible and many stations are unmanned and have no public conveniences or adequate shelter or seating for the use of those waiting for trains. This is a national disgrace.

4. The Camden Setting

4.1     Camden is a thriving, bustling, dynamic and vibrant place to live, work and visit. It is home to over a quarter of a million people within the 22 sq. km of the borough.

4.2     The economic health of Camden is good with an annual GVA of some £21bn and is growing from strength to strength such that it is currently the third largest economic driver in London; with only the City and the London Borough of Westminster demonstrating stronger economic prosperity.   In achieving this level of economic prosperity the tourism industry is a significant factor.  Camden is packed with visitor attractions, the British Museum, the British Library and Camden Lock Markets being amongst the most popular.  In short, Camden is a great place to live, work and play.

4.3     Camden also has a long and glorious history built on railway development and boasts three of the ten mainline termini in London, Kings Cross, St Pancras International and Euston are all situated within a 1km stretch of Euston Road in the heart of Camden.

5. This train will terminate at Euston

5.1     So said Justine Greening when, as Secretary of State for Transport, she visited King Cross to cut a ribbon and beat a hasty retreat.  But not before she told a journalist that ‘the decision to terminate HS2 at Euston is set in concrete’.

5.2     The well-respected Institute of Economic Affairs has published several papers critical of HS2.  In their critique ‘HS2:  the next government project disaster?’ Which they published in 2011 the authors discuss the cost implications of the termination of HS2 in Euston.

5.3     ‘................  the decision to terminate HS2 at Euston has very negative cost implications. The last five miles (just 4% of the total length will incur hugely disproportionate share of the scheme’s overall costs. While the time savings will be negligible. The combined cost of expanding and rebuilding Euston station and tunnelling to Old Oak Common will constitute an estimated 22.5% of the base construction costs (DfT, 2010b)

5.4     “At the time of writing” the authors suggested “the share of additional costs such as compensation to property owners, is likely to be at least as large, suggesting an overall cost for the last five miles of around £4bn.”

6. HS2 Cost Exclusion and lack of supporting evidence

6.1     Aizlewood and Wellings consider the case for HS2 is ‘fatally flawed’ and that significant costs have not been factored into the cost-benefit analysis  They cite as just one example, an estimated £68 million will be paid to the main train operating companies (TOCs) as a result of disruption (DfT, 1010b).

6.2     Aizlewood and Wellings go on to warn that ‘a further flaw is the under-developed framework for considering risk ... (and)  No attention has been paid to the impact of pricing policy on levels of uptake in demand for HS2’  (Comment on pricing policy addressed later).

6.3     The gross over-valuation in assessing business time ‘lost’ while travelling  on long distance rail journeys underpins the business case (such as it is) for HS2.   The premise travel time is wasted time has been debunked thoroughly as it is clear that a great many rail travellers use their journey time productively.  Following criticism of the unrealistic hourly rate (equivalent to a salary in the region of £70K per annum) used in calculating ‘lost time’, the exaggerated hourly rate was subsequently significantly reduced.  However, this reduction did not alter the business case one iota since HS2 Ltd. roughly doubled their estimated forecasts of potential business travellers generating barely a ripple radiating outwards to suggest either gross incompetence in HS2 Ltd.’s forecasting methods or alternatively a deliberate attempt to deceive by creative accounting.

6.4     It is worth pointing out here that the supporting research for much of HS2’s analysis and costing in the Environmental Statement is either missing or partial.  The Environmental Statement was also badly referenced so that finding one’s way through the many volumes comprising the ES was time-consuming and frustrating.  Compared with supporting documentation produced by Transport for London relating to the Northern Line extension and the Crossrail Hybrid Bill the Environmental Statement for HS2 demonstrates the lack of appropriate rigour applied to supplementary research by HS2 Ltd.

6.5     In 2011 the estimated cost of £34bn to construct HS2 was said by the IEA to be equivalent to £1000 per UK income-tax payer, the majority of whom will derive no benefit from it (p4 Exec Summary).

6.6     With the significant and ongoing increase in costs to £50bn this now equates to approximately £1,600 per UK income-tax payer.

7. Old Oak Common to Euston

7.1     The table below attempts to set out the disproportion costs associated with the last five mile stretch of HS2 into Euston:

Fig 2. Cost related to OOC to Euston via various options for Euston station  

*The IEA estimate that it will cost in the region of £4bn - almost a quarter of the Phase 1 budget – to construct the last five miles from Old Oak Common to Euston

** Headline costs of land/compensation, road/utility works, including London Underground station and over station deck, track works (including dive-under) and risk contingency in the region of £6bn.  Tunnelling works to OOC around £50m per km per tunnel, plus additional £100m for each portal, plus risk/contingency in region of £2bn giving a total or around £8bn.

7.2     This disproportionate sum should be cause for concern and appears to reinforce the widely held local view that the decision to terminate HS2 in Euston is based not on sound economic rationale but rather on a speculative land grab from which platform HS2 Ltd/Network Rail and/or the Department for Transport can generate optimum profits. Pan Camden HS2 Alliance summarised these concerns “We are concerned that Section 47 of the Hybrid Bill provides for extraordinarily wide ranging powers of land acquisition in connection with development opportunities.  We consider these to be excessive and unjust.   Exercise of these powers could inflate the apparent economic benefits of HS2, as its costs would be depressed by expropriation without adequate compensation.”

7.3     Similar calculations for Option 8 contained in the Hybrid Bill reduce costs by £0.8bn but as later discussed this option is felt to represent the worst scenario for Camden and its communities.

7.4     Attempts to extrapolate IEA’s estimates to the proposed Level Deck Plus scheme would suggest that the costs from OOC to Euston will rocket.  But even this figure, in the region of £8bn, does not capture the enormity of social and environmental impacts that will ensue.

8. Link to HS1 abandoned

8.1     Until March of this year when the Secretary of State for Transport, Patrick McLaughlin, announced his intention ‘... to take the necessary steps to remove the link from the Bill and withdraw the safeguarding of this section of the route ... ‘, it was widely accepted that Camden would face as much as 80% of the negative impacts associated with the construction of Phase One of the HS2 project

8.2     Since the proposals for the HS2-HS1 Link proved to be unfit for purpose and have bitten the dust, the scale of impacts to Camden need to be revised down from the 80% figure.  However negative impacts remain concentrated on Camden and it seems likely the Borough will still suffer between 70%-75% (educated guesstimate!) of all negative impacts associated with HS2 Phase 1.  HS2 Ltd. have saved around £1bn by scrapping the current Link but it is likely that a more suitable future Link replacement between HS2 and HS1 will prove more expensive.

8.3     With the demise of the much reviled and ridiculed proposals for the Link, among a range of negative impacts, the over-hanging dark shadow threatening the viability of the Camden Lock Markets has been lifted as has the predicted travel chaos that would have ensued, for this we are truly grateful. 

9. Station Design

9.1    Since 2012, HS2 Ltd. have produced two entirely different station designs and a third is in the process of evolution and scheduled to be launched for consultation early in December 2014.  This is likely to result in another bout of ‘indigestion’ over the turkey for a second year as the consultation period is likely to extend over the Christmas and New Year holiday period once again. 

9.2    The first variant of station design, Option 1, known as the ‘baseline’ option, was launched with great fanfare in January 2012. 

9.3    In July 2013, the Rt Hon Patrick McLaughlin, Secretary of State for Transport, scrapped the Option 1 (baseline scheme) for Euston station on the grounds that (1) it was too expensive at £2bn (up from £1.2bn in January 2012) and (2) it would not be completed in time for the opening of Phase 1 scheduled for 2026 (though a putative completion date is not known)

9.4    The Baseline option was substituted by the variant Option 8 contained in the Hybrid Bill now under consideration.  This design is locally dubbed the ‘Cheapskate Option’, retaining part of the old 1960’s station structure with the new HS2 extension bolted on to the side. 

9.5    Both these options require a similar large land-take of almost 7 hectares and significant levels of demolition of residential and commercial premises.   Both LB Camden and local communities have complained bitterly that the current station solution is the worst of all worlds causing all of the harm and providing few benefits.  The costs to the community in social and environmental terms are similar but of less duration with Option 8.  However Option 8 is technically little more than a glorified canopy above new platforms  thus preventing significant compensatory  over station development - a ‘plus’ benefit providing much-needed homes and jobs. 

10. Level Deck Plus

10.1     As late as March 2014, yet another scheme was launched and is currently under development.  At the behest of and Integral to the ambitious plans envisaged by Sir David Higgins, Chairman of HS2 Ltd, is a massive over-station and over-slab commercial and mixed use development to ‘maximise’ opportunities at Euston.  Few of these are likely to accrue to the local communities.

10.2     In answer to a direct question at the initial meeting with community representatives on Regents Park Estate in 2012, Alison Munro, the then chief executive of HS2 Ltd, estimated just 3% of jobs created would be filled by people from local communities.  HS2 is an Engine for Unemployment rather than Growth, at least in the short to medium term in the Euston area.  According to the HS2 Ltd.’s Environmental Statement relating to Community Forum 1 (CF1)  3090 jobs will be lost or relocated in Euston alone (ES CF Area p. 171 10.04.31).Although differing greatly, all three design options require a similar ‘land grab’ and thus a similar level of disruption.  The key factors are the scale and duration of the construction works

10.3     The table below (Fig 3) illustrates the key issues related to several station alternatives. 

10.4     NB.  The authors have made every effort to be accurate but it is not easy to obtain definitive figures so that those used in the table are indicative only and subject to amendment.

10.5     The authors also support the suggestion of the Pan Camden HS2 alliance that “Alternative means of accessing Euston have been proposed (notably by Lord Berkeley). We urge that an independent body should carefully and dispassionately examine such alternative options along with the case for not building a link into Euston (but rather having the main London hub at Old Oak Common).”

Fig 3. Comparative criteria and indicative costs re Euston station alternatives

11. Comparable large infrastructure projects?

11.1     St Pancras International is often cited as an example of an iconic terminus and comparable with HS2. St Pancras station was constructed on the existing width footprint and constrained by far less urban development since the site was adjacent to the Kings Cross largely derelict railway lands and therefore easier to construct.  Work started in 2001 and St Pancras International was completed in 2007 (6 yrs) at a cost in the region of £800m (up from an initial £310m) (Wiki).

11.2     Crossrail 1 (XR1), the 73-mile east-west rail line across London and currently under construction, is another example of a huge rail infrastructure scheme.  XR1 was commenced in 2009 and is due to be operational in 2018 (9 yr construction).  Over a third of its length is in tunnels under central London thus having far less impact on surface urban fabric.  XR1 is cited as one of Europe’s largest railway and infrastructure projects and is expected to cost f £14.9bn. Unlike the very limited connectivity of HS2, XR1 will enable a vast rail network to operate seamlessly through the capital.

11.3     Neither of the above rail infrastructure schemes are in reality comparable, in terms of duration nor scale of disruption, to HS2 which is unprecedented in the UK.

11.4     Among others, Transport for London and the Greater London Authority consider Euston station has insufficient capacity to cater safely for the additional passenger throughput forecast due to HS2. To satisfy safety and capacity needs for onward dispersal of increased passenger volumes by London Underground both TfL and the Mayor of London state that Crossrail 2 is vital in this respect. Thus, not only do communities face several decades of station construction followed by an unknown number of years extended disruption generated by construction above/around the station, but on the back of HS2, Crossrail 2 cometh causing yet a further period of disruption to residents and businesses, the latter largely in the St Pancras and Somers Town ward.  Given the levels of congestion witnessed around Euston, especially on Friday afternoons, it is difficult to see how the road network will cope with the volume of traffic generated by construction of HS2.

12. Illustrating the extent of impacts

12.1     The authors have identified key impacts associated with construction of HS2 in Camden. These fall into two main categories:  tangible and intangible. While the former attract recognised mechanisms for calculating financial loss the latter, although nonetheless significant to health and wellbeing, are obviously more difficult to quantify.

12.2     Although not an exhaustive list the following have been identified as key criteria many of which are considered in the document referred to below:

• Loss of residential and commercial property ASK DAVE
• Loss of land permanently through CP and temporarily, albeit for decades through HS2 Ltd.’s use for construction compounds
• Lost time via travel delays on all modes of transport particularly in and around the Euston area (outside the scope of this document but subject to be researched via a future study)
• Loss of amenity, parks, open space, playgrounds and sports facilities
• Health and wellbeing – (outside the scope of this document but subject to be researched via a future study)
• Costs to Camden – (not currently available but opportunity costs translate into lack of in excess of £1 million of service provisions)

12.3     LB Camden commissioned an analysis of HS2’s cost to Camden –which estimated costs of £1.1bn in 2013.  The costs associated with the removal of the Link and those outside of CF1 need to be disaggregated from this total which cannot be easily undertaken as individual costs are not itemised.  However this colossal sum provides a ball park figure of the level of costs incurred in Camden. 

13. Affected wards

13.1     It is unlikely that any ward of Camden will totally escape a level of impact from HS2.  Bloomsbury is directly impacted due to its proximity south of Euston Road as is adjacent Kings Cross ward.  Camden Town with Primrose Hill, Hampstead and Kilburn wards will be impacted as a direct result of construction of the significant structures misleadingly named ‘vent shafts’ which conjure up little more than a large ‘chimney-type’ structure when in fact they are huge complex buildings

13.2     The three most severely impacted wards facing significant multiple negative impacts from HS2 construction are (in order of maximum impact):

• Regents Park ward
• St Pancras and Somers Town ward
• Camden Town with Primrose Hill

13.3     A map showing expanded Euston footprint, construction compounds, utility diversions and HGV routes is appended as Appendix 1.

14. Measuring impacts – the ‘zone’ approach

14.1     In many of their calculations the authors have used as measurements zones of 60m, 120m and 200m from the station, cutting wall, similar to those used in rural areas, in order to allow a certain amount of comparative analysis. In our calculations we have estimated impacts up to approximately 200m either side of the station, approach and cutting walls.  This would compare with measurements used to attract a level of compensation within rural areas. 

14.2     Methodology The authors have taken Euston and its approach and the Camden Cutting as epicentres from which multiple adverse impacts will radiate outwards across the Borough. It is likely that impacts will be experienced in adjacent Boroughs but this study has confined itself to looking at some of the impacts on Camden communities within the CF1 zone.  Data from HS2 Ltd. and Office for National Statistics (ONS) were loaded into QGIS, a Geographical Information System program.  Using the shape files from HS2 and additional base map information, 60m and 120m buffer zones were constructed.  The Census data from the ONS is summarised into tables covering geographic areas called Operational Areas (OA).  By calculating the area of the OA that intersected the Buffer zones, estimates of population and households within each of these zones were calculated and the census data could be calculated within each of the buffer zone.  Please see Appendix 2 for more details on methodology and Appendix 3 for a compilation of charts and tables.

15. Rural and Urban – All together in the HS2 soup

15.1     Whilst it is clearly not reasonable to make direct comparisons with rural areas, within Camden communities there is a deep sense of righteous indignation and indeed fury at the scale of injustice being perpetrated on urban dwellers. The sheer amount and duration of disruption is unprecedented.  Urban communities do not expect to enjoy the same levels of peace and tranquillity nor rustic idyllic landscapes as country dwellers.  However, people in Camden (and other urban areas) will face at least comparable (if not more) disruption in many instances: e.g. from  traffic congestion and delays, potential loss of trade, businesses and jobs, increased air pollution (already breeching EU regulations in Camden), noise, vibrations, light pollution, etc.

15.2     The authors feel that it is necessary to highlight the gross injustice being perpetrated on urban dwellers.  While three ‘buffer’ zones (60m, 120m and 200m) exist in rural areas which attract differing levels of compensation, none exist in urban areas.  Compensation is only paid to those whose homes or businesses are being compulsorily purchased.   Significant impacts to property values and quality of life over a protracted period literally count for nothing since they attract a zero level of compensation.  This effectively means that individuals are being forced to subsidise the construction costs of HS2 through personal financial loss and/or reduction in their overall health and well-being. 

15.3     These losses are compounded as thousands of Camden citizens are simultaneously robed of valuable public amenities including sports facilities, playgrounds, parks and open space which all contribute to the health and well-being of local people. 

15.4     Indeed, Kier Starmer, former Director of Public Prosecutions, considers that the failure of HS2 Ltd.to assess the cumulative impacts of HS2 breeches human rights legislation.

15.5     The authors will attempt to illustrate the extent of impacts and externalised costs involved in Camden although time constraints will not allow this assessment to provide a monetary value.

16. Community Issues

16.1     From its inception there has been no effort made to balance the needs of various HS2 Stakeholders.  Corporate needs have been viewed as paramount; HS2 Ltd. and DfT have all configured their land, platform and functionality requirements in the various briefs issued; Network Rail has identified its requirements in terms of minimising disruption to present and potential future passenger services with an enhanced ‘passenger experience’ offer and the maximisation of profit from retail and food outlets.

16.2     Meanwhile, the social, environmental and financial ‘needs’ of reluctant ‘host’ communities are treated with impunity.  Attempts to minimise harmful impacts have been conspicuous by their absence. The detrimental impacts on thousands of lives are viewed as irrelevant. Pan Camden HS2 Alliance has described this as “realisation of the economic benefits claimed will impose health and other costs on some of the poorest sections of society (particularly around Euston) and these costs should be accounted for properly.”

16.3     Local communities have been incensed that throughout the limited discussions between HS2 Ltd. and various communities, the ‘passenger experience’ trumps all other considerations while the very real impacts to the host communities are ignored in any cost benefit analysis.  Tangible and intangible costs do not figure in any debit calculations.

16.4     There has been no attempt to quantify the social and environmental impacts associated with terminating HS2 at Euston.  The authors are attempting to make reasonable assumptions with regard to costs related to property and land loss and, crucially, the uncompensated losses incurred by externalising costs and impacts onto individuals who then effectively subsidise the building of HS2 through personal loss. The Pan Camden HS2 Alliance has summarised these concerns as “The Strategic Case is silent on the community impacts: in the main these are adverse impacts of the construction and operation of the railway on the host communities.  A study carried out on behalf of Camden Council highlighted costs in excess of £1bn to the Borough and its businesses.” 

16.5     One could question the rationality of intent to run normal services in and out of Euston throughout the construction period.  HS2 Ltd. and the DfT have conspicuously failed to properly assess social and environmental costs of railway expansion in Euston. To add insult to injury, the DfT have consistently refused to even contemplate reimbursing communities most seriously impacted.  In their own words, the DfT describe HS2 as the largest infrastructure project ever undertaken.  Its cost and duration are of a scale unknown in the UK.  There is no precedent for just compensation.  Camden people should not be sacrificed on the altar of questionable national interest (the business case remains unproven).  If the nation cannot afford to compensate personal losses incurred, then the nation cannot afford to build HS2.

17. Uncompensated loss

17.1     In Camden it is likely to be less traumatic to have one’s home compulsorily purchased than to live in close proximity to decades of disruption.  While neither option is attractive to most people who ‘invest’ much time and effort into ‘home-building’ the former attracts financial compensation while the latter does not.

17.2     The Home Loss Payment is an extra sum (up to £47K) paid in recognition of the trauma involved in home loss and is payable only to home-owner living in rural areas. This is bizarre.  

17.3     In Camden hundreds of council tenants with security of tenure face losing their homes.  These families could reasonably expect to remain in their homes for life if they so wished and now face being forced to move, often against their will, in fear of the future, away from their strong community ties and social networks.  They will receive a home loss payment of up to £4,700 – an absolute pittance which will probably not even cover the costs of replacement floor covering and curtains.

17.4     Natural justice would seem to dictate that any home loss payments should be based on how long one has lived in one’s home rather than one’s tenure.  It is equally (if not more) traumatic for poor people to be forced out of their homes as it is for more affluent owner-occupiers who are likely to have more options to cushion the loss.  A number of tenants facing home loss have lived in their homes for forty of more years and planned to spend the rest of their days there.

17.5     Compensation is based on outdated 19th century case precedent and is largely inapplicable to 21st century living. 

18. Demographics

18.1          Key statistics

• >11,000 - the number of people living within 200m of the railway.              

ZERO - The number of people eligible for any compensation.             

Fig 4. Approximate number of persons in the vicinity of HS2

• 136 local authority tenants will be eligible for the sum of up to £4700 as a Home Loss Payment irrespective of the length of time they have lived in their homes

• 46 lease holders will face a shortfall of around £200,000 each to purchase replacement properties.
• This represents a total of £920,000 of externalized financial loss.

• Homeowners could be eligible for the Exceptional Hardship Scheme, but to date very few applications have been successful.

• Those aged 60+ in the 2011 Census will be 75+ for the completion date of 2026 and 83+ for the completion date 2034.   All those aged 60+ can expect the remainder of their lives to be seriously impacted this will be applicable to approximately 824 persons who live within 120m of the proposed rail.

• Those aged 0-4 in the 2011 Census will be 14-18 for the completion date of 2026 and 23-27 for the 2034 competition date.  This means that all of their formative years and education will take place in the shadow of HS2.  Approximately 403 persons aged 0-4 live within 120m of the proposed railway.

• There are approximately 1511 persons under the age of 20 who live within 120 m of the proposed HS2 railway.  These children and young adults will lose access to local play and sports facilities.

• By multiplying the number of persons living with 120 meters of the track by the duration of the construction we can calculate the man years impacted by the continuous disruption of their lives, see Fig 5 below:

Fig 5. Population Negatively Impacted by HS2 Construction

This represents a staggering figure of over 100,000 man-years (or 1.26 million man-months) of disruption for people living with 120m of the proposed railway.

19. Employment and Business

19.1     In the Environmental Statement HS2 Ltd. states that over 3000 Jobs in Euston alone will be lost or relocated.  HS2 is trumpeted as being an Engine for Growth.  Much increase in employment opportunities is scheduled much further down the line.  If HS2 Ltd. or another body has not carried out a route-wide analysis of job losses attributed to the construction of HS2 the authors recommend this should be done.

19.2     Small businesses in and around the Euston area will almost certainly be hit by loss of passing trade during construction.   This is particularly apposite to small businesses and other associated traders in Drummond Street who estimate up to 80% of their turnover relates to passing trade related to Euston station.  The viability of Drummond Street unique Curry Quarter serving delicious and affordable Asian cuisine is at stake.

19.3     At least sixteen businesses, many of them with a long history of serving the local community are affected.  It is estimated by one restaurant owner that between 150-200 people, mainly Asian, are employed in these businesses (approximately 50% full time and 50% part time).  Most have families dependent on their wage packets. If not already produced, a full assessment needs to be undertaken to determine the likely economic impacts and viability of Drummond Street’s unique Curry Quarter.  Drummond Street Curry Houses are famous across London and the UK.

19.4     No financial assistance is being provided to small businesses and restaurateurs whose livelihoods are under threat as are the jobs of a significant number of Asian employees.  The Drummond Street cluster of Curry Houses has a value over and above the financial business assessment there is also a social and cultural dimension.  The authors recommend that Drummond Street Traders should be the subject of an in-depth study which would surely highlight externalisation of significant financial costs to individual small businessmen and their employees. 

19.5     If all the properties within the safeguarded area are demolished the value of commercial premises lost could reach £335 million (HS2’s cost to Camden page 13) this figure relates to Euston and its surroundings only.

20. Housing

20.1     Time constraints have prevented the intended inclusion of additional statistics relevant to buffer zones extending to 200m and 300m distance from the station, approach and cutting. These are in the process of production and will be available on request.

21. Property Blight

21.1     Quantifying the level of property blight directly attributable to HS2 is complex and clearly outside the scope of this study. However, such losses will plainly be considerable and that due to the proximity and duration of HS2 represent significant individual personal loss that is externalised to home-owners should they wish or need to relocate.

22. Housing Tenure

22.1     Housing tenure across Regents Park and to a less extent St Pancras and Somers Town ward has quite a strong north south split with the majority of social housing concentrated in the south of both wards with private housing being by far the predominant tenure in the north of the wards, particularly so in Regents Park ward with some fine Nash housing located to the west of the cutting along Park Village East and three and four storey mainly Victorian terraces and semi-detached properties in streets running parallel to the cutting along its east flank.

22.2     It is in the southern part of Regents Park ward where all demolition is scheduled to take place.  With the exception of Stalbridge House, a block of 32 privately owned homes and small pockets of private housing in and around the Drummond Street area, the tenure south of Granby Street Bridge is almost universally council stock.  The majority of households rent their homes from LB Camden while 25% are leasehold, former council housing properties being purchased on a long lease. A proportion of these are landlords who rent out their properties privately. 

22.3     The owner occupied and privately rented stock is largely north of Granby Terrace Bridge on both sides of the cutting up to Parkway although a number of former council homes are privately owned which are sub-let

22.4     Some interesting statistics emerge from the tables and charts (Appendix 3).

23. Loss of housing

23.1     Many thousands of families needing affordable homes are on the Camden Housing waiting list.  While LB Camden have made efforts to increase social housing stock, lack of finance and space to build makes this difficult.  As a result, the loss of any social housing units in Camden has serious implications for those in housing need. 

23.2     HS2 plans the demolition of 215 homes with a further 250 being at risk.  Of these 136 are council tenants, 46 are leaseholders while the remainder social homes and the remaining 32 are privately owned.  Of the 46 leaseholders as previously a number of these are landlords who sub-let their properties privately. 

23.3     LB Camden continues to argue with HS2 Ltd. that the proximity to highly disruptive construction works for the proposed duration renders an additional five housing blocks uninhabitable including one of the twenty-storey tower blocks on Ampthill Square.  HS2 Ltd. refuses to agree a definition of ‘habitability’.  The reticence of HS2 Ltd. to agree such a definition is not about their lack of understanding of the impacts which they themselves describe in many cases as ‘significant negative impacts’.

23.4     Despite what some would describe as profligate spending on premises and taxis for their own staff, the emotional safety of those facing demolition falls into the category of minimising mitigation costs.   Accepting a widely agreed national definition of ‘habitability’ to which LB Camden subscribe would likely require re-housing 250 additional households. Alternative accommodation would be required for at least the period of the more disruptive works likely to be a large proportion of the build duration.

23.5     To their credit, LB Camden have insisted that all replacement homes must be built in the local area to minimise the disruption to individuals and their social networks.  This is to be applauded.  However, of necessity rebuilding in west Euston and nearby will further reduce the areas of green space in the locality.  At best the reductions in housing stock due to demolition can be accommodated nearby but the opportunity to increase stock and reduce the misery of a corresponding number of families on the waiting list is removed.  The latter results in financial costs to the public purse for temporary housing costs.  Additional less quantifiable but often considerable emotional costs accrue to families in terms of extending personal hardship from unsuitable housing.  Together these ongoing costs are likely to be considerable.  Because of time constraints, calculation of these is not possible at this time.  While some or all of these costs may or may not be included in other assessments, the authors consider there is a need to clearly set out the costs incurred by the public purse and opportunity costs associated with demolition and replacement of homes locally and an attempt should be made to quantify loss of well-being and resultant increased stress. 

23.6     In the study “HS2’s cost to Camden” document relocation costs are assessed to be in the region of £318.1 million (p9) with a further £20 million estimate of loss of development opportunity (p9)

24. Leaseholders

24.1     Leaseholders having exercised their Right to Buy council homes, face a far from satisfactory compensation package.  HS2 Ltd.is prepared to compensate them in the normal way.  However, this sum falls many thousands of pounds short of that necessary to purchase a similar sized property.  In its submission, LB Camden states:

“... the value gap between an ex-local authority flat and a private flat is estimated to be around £200,000.

24.2     This effectively means that many of those who have invested in their homes and neighbourhood will not be able to afford to remain nearby without paying a heavy price to do so.  Effectively HS2 Ltd. are forcing leaseholders out of Camden or into debt to the tune of several hundred thousand pounds through no fault of their own.

25. Dragging corporate feet

25.1     Clearly, the loss of homes due to significant demolition locally is a cause of major concern for those facing home loss.  The impacts will fall not only on those required to relocate to replacement homes but also to those who will spend longer time on Camden Housing waiting list due to reduced numbers of social housing available.

25.2     HS2 Ltd. were offered the chance to purchase seventy units of housing under construction locally to replace some of those they plan to demolish.  This offer was made well over a year ago and the sale has only very recently been agreed despite LB Camden pressing for an agreement. Clearly this is good news and means that some replacement homes are now provided for.  Unfortunately, this agreement does not provide comfort to families facing home loss as no decisions have been made as to who will get priority housing in the new development should HS2 in its current or emerging plans be constructed.

25.3     HS2 Ltd. have tunnel vision where consequences of their actions are concerned – behaving as if irrelevant and making little or no effort to ameliorate the results of their actions.  HS2 Ltd. are judge and jury over mitigation outcomes holding, as they do, their invaluable Get Out of Jail Free card that allows them to decide what is ‘reasonably practicable’. 

26. Loss of Public Open Space and Public Amenities

26.1     Access to natural environment within urban area is a prerequisite to health and wellbeing.  Similarly, access to playgrounds and sports facilities for children and young people is vital for healthy development and general fitness and an important resource in tackling the national epidemic in obesity.  These ‘green’ spaces also attract older people to parks to sit and relax and ‘engage’ with life around them.  Such exercise and engagement helps to keep senior citizens mobile and healthy in mind and body and reduce isolation.  Removal of urban green space, parks and gardens, playgrounds and sports facilities will have a serious negative impact in terms of health and wellbeing and is likely to put additional financial burden on local health services. 

26.2     HS2 Ltd. plan to fell up to 200 mature trees in the vicinity of Euston destroying the natural setting and benefit, both physical and emotional derived from trees. Destruction of much loved and environmentally friendly natural assets will interfere with micro-climate and CO2 exchange thus negatively affecting air quality.  Killing trees on such a scale is viewed locally as nothing short of environmental vandalism.

26.3     In a relatively small area of 120mt from the track, children and young people will lose multiple valuable leisure and sports facilities as listed:

• Playground in St Pancras Gardens playground - permanent
• Playground in Hampstead Road Open Space - permanent
• Playground on Ampthill (probable reduced access long-term)
• MUGA sports facility at St James Gardens – permanent
• MUGA sports facility on Ampthill (probable reduced access long-term)
• Open Space at Euston Gardens – long term
• Park and Gardens at St Pancras Gardens – permanent
• Community Hall (Silverdale) on Regents Park – permanent
• Community Hall (Ampthill) probable reduced access – long term

26.4     It is understood that HS2 Ltd. have a statutory obligation to replace lost open space and recreational facilities.  There are no plans to replace and relocate any of these facilities until after the completion of Euston station which at best will be nine years and could be seventeen years.  All contribute to health and well-being and the cumulative impact of loss of these facilities represents a significant loss to Camden communities.

26.5     The Barker Review of Housing Supply 2001 places a value on Urban Core Open Space of £54,000 per hectare per year (now £77,920 adjusted for inflation).  The following areas will be lost in Camden for the duration of construction:

St James Gardens*                                                         2.5 Hectares

Euston Gardens (East and West)                             1.5 Hectares

Hampstead Road open space                                          0.4 Hectares

Total                                                                                                  4.4 Hectares

Cost to Camden

Over 9 years construction               £3,085,632

Over 17 years construction              £5,828,416

*The loss of St. James Gardens will be permanent, the authors do not know how to calculate the loss of such an amenity to the community.

27. Construction Compounds

27.1     The two major construction compounds and 8 satellite compounds will occupy approximately 2 hectares of land.  Coupled with other land lost this amounts to approximately 0.1 km2.  In addition these compounds will form barriers which will affect pedestrians particularly causing significant detours. The length and time to negotiate such detours could well deter people, especially the elderly, from undertaking frequent trips to shops or social visits.  These detours will also have a detrimental effect on school children from Regents Park getting to and from schools in Somers Town in terms of additional journey length but also potentially on safety.

27.2     HS2 Ltd. plans to site a satellite compound within Ampthill Square housing estate.  Though no details are forthcoming it seems likely that since Barnby Street, the southern access to the estate, is to be ‘stopped up’ access will be restricted to associated HS2 commercial and HGV vehicles causing loss of estate parking for the duration, and likely restricted access to , play and sports facilities and open space for many years.  All these impacts reduce amenity directly, not only to 365 households on Ampthill, but for others from local areas who take advantage of the facilities.

28. Air quality

28.1     Air quality is already poor and breaks EU regulatory limits of pollution along Euston Road.  Demolition, excavation and construction on the scale planned together with the level of HGV trips to remove spoil and other commercial vehicles adding to congestion and exhaust fumes from idling engines must increase pollution in an already highly polluted area. This can only have a detrimental effect on health of impacted populations and there is likely to be an associated detrimental impact of health, particularly respiratory disease.  Though not caused by air quality, associated noise and vibrations will inevitably increase the incidence of stress related illness.

29. Conclusion

29.1     Camden communities face significant cumulative impacts from HS2 that will prevent the quiet enjoyment of their homes and threaten jobs and business.

29.2     Despite the extent of the negative impacts and the unprecedented duration of the construction period, these remain unquantified and do not appear in the HS2 business case.   The report gives just a flavour of the range of uncompensated losses incurred by reluctant ‘host’ communities.

29.3     Camden people should expect to receive a fair deal for all the inconvenience and devastating impacts they face during the extensive construction period.  If the Government cannot afford (or chooses not to afford) to compensate people for personal losses incurred as a direct result of HS2, then it cannot afford HS2. Expropriation should not lead to profit for the expropriator.

Bibliography

1.  Aizlwood, K and Wellings, R. High Speed 2: the next government project disaster?  Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) 2012

2.  HS2’s cost to Camden: an assessment of HS2’s immediate cost to the people, communities and businesses based in the London Borough of Camden.  Commissioned by London Borough of Camden. Prepared by Pell Frischmann Consulting Engineers, Regenris Economic research Analysis and Lambert Smith Hampton July 2013

September 2014

Appendix 1: Map of Community Forum 1 Area Euston and Approach

Construction Impacts of HS2

Appendix 2: Census Analysis Methodology

Appendix 3: Compiled Charts and Tables