The Conscience Campaign: Submission to the International Development Committee inquiry on the ICAI Annual Report 2013-14

Questions for the select committee to ask –

• What progress has been made in implementing the recommendations of the 2012 ICAI report Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool?

• In section 2.78 of the 2012 ICAI report Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool it is cited that annual reports were abandoned by the secretariat because they were “too burdensome”. Does the ICAI believe this is an adequate reason to terminate the annual reporting of a £300 million fund?

• In section 2.75 of the 2012 ICAI report Evaluation of the Inter-Departmental Conflict Pool it is cited that there are “plans to strengthen monitoring and evaluation as part of the current round of reforms”. What progress has been made in implementing these reforms?

1)              Executive summary

1.1)                         Every government wants to protect and promote peace abroad. The Conflict Pool (CP) is a unique and effective form of government funding for UK peacebuilding projects around the world. A series of events often precede any conflict in failed states whether it’s famine, violence towards women or the proliferation of small arms.

1.2)                         The CP effectively leverages local expertise from NGOs and community leaders in order to build tailor-made programmes to increase security and promote community cohesion. The Conflict Pool is a flexible policy mechanism that can look at the variety of circumstances that surround conflict and make the best of local resources to prevent an escalation towards conflict.

1.3)                         Despite the effectiveness of the Conflict Pool several issues still remain. Funds have been directed from the CP to cover overspends on military peacekeeping duties. conscience argues this undermines the non-military focus of the small scale development projects which have to be axed before completion and hence cannot be evaluated.

1.4)                         The CP is in need of increased evaluation and monitoring so that the most effective projects can be expanded as quickly as possible.

1.5)                         The Independent Commission for Aid Impact cited a lack of clear accountable evidence for evaluation as one of the most important issues facing the CP.

1.6)                         Going forward, the Conflict Pool clearly has value as a tool for international peacebuilding. By retaining its non-military focus, monitoring outcomes and developing a clear strategic plan the Conflict Pool can become a more effective component of UK conflict prevention strategy.

2)              About Conscience

2.1)            conscience campaigns for a progressive increase in the amount of UK tax spent on peacebuilding, and a corresponding decrease in the amount spent on war and the preparation for war. In addition, we advocate the use of non-military security and provide information and resources to support the development of peacebuilding and conflict prevention methods. These methods are widely recognised to provide more effective and better value forms of security than military intervention.

2.2)            We also campaign for an update in the law, so that people with a conscientious objection to war can have the part of their taxes currently spent on war and its preparations – approximately 6% – spent on peacebuilding and conflict prevention instead. This is in recognition of the fact that although we no longer face military conscription in the UK, we continue to bear a moral responsibility for war through our taxation contribution to the Ministry of Defence.

2.3)            Part of that mission was setting up a peace tax fund so that conscientious objectors could redirect their tax money towards peacebuilding efforts. To the credit of Her Majesty’s Government this is now unnecessary as, with reform, the Conflict Pool would operate effectively as a peace tax fund. The Conflict Pool is a funding mechanism for non-military conflict resolution and conflict prevention managed by the FCO, MoD and DFID. The performance of the CP was the focus of the 2012 ICAI report Evaluation of the Inter-departmental Conflict Pool.

3)              Conflict Pool Background

3.1)            The Conflict Pool is a funding mechanism for non-military conflict resolution and conflict prevention managed by the FCO, MoD and DFID.

3.2)            The Conflict Pool remains one of the most effective methods of funding small scale peacebuilding projects. The flexibility of the CP and its ability to respond quickly to escalating events makes it very effective in the potentially hostile and unpredictable environments that peacebuilding organisations work in.

3.3)            Despite the important and effective work the CP finances, it cannot mask the weakness in administration, project monitoring and strategic planning of the CP. The funding of the CP has come under pressure as a reserve fund for the UK contribution to international peacekeeping efforts. This funding concerns itself with arming military personnel, purchasing military transport vehicles and deploying soldiers into theatres of war.

3.4)            conscience argues that this compromises the non-military focus of the CP and furthermore that non-violent peacebuilding intervention is far more effective at moving towards conflict resolution and lasting peace.

3.5)            Other areas of development that are needed are:

• CP is often too reactive to conflict and lacks a long term plan
• Funds and outcomes are poorly monitored

4)              Strategic Plan

4.1)            The large amount of short-term commitments the CP currently finances has created a problem in enabling the development of a long term strategic direction for the CP.  Spread across three government departments, consensus is required in order to push forward with a given project, and this has meant strategy has been side-lined in favour of flexibility.

4.2)            As the CP evolves into Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) there may be cause to re-examine the necessity for such a complex management structure. The aims of the Conflict Pool may benefit from the expertise of more specialised management from DFID.

4.3)            Whilst a flexible and inclusive approach has advantages it also undermines the CP’s ability to develop and achieve long term goals. The 2012 ICAI report Evaluation of the Inter-departmental Conflict Pool  envisaged that the Conflict Pool would “Contribute to high level objectives… enabling conditions for conflict prevention.” It was unclear what these high level objectives were/are.

4.4)            This has partly been addressed by tying the Conflict Pool into the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), the UK’s first overarching strategy on conflict issues. There have already been some benefits to this as the BSOS has allowed the distribution of grants on a more frequent basis allowing the CP to become more responsive in the event of a conflict escalation. It is currently unclear how the implementation of BSOS will affect the recommendations of the ICAI report.

4.5)            Despite the publication of BSOS there is little to no guidance on what programmes and direction to take in the different spheres in which the CP operates. Size and scope of the programmes also are not made clear – the CP often funds local-level projects but there may be instances where a widening of a particular programme may be beneficial to peacebuilding efforts yet no framework exists to help these projects expand.

4.6)            So whilst BSOS may help allocate CP funds it doesn’t have an overarching plan for ongoing development of the Conflict Pool.

5)              Transparency issues affecting the Conflict Pool

5.1)            The BSOS has highlighted the problematic approach to the monitoring and evaluation of individual projects. Recommendation 6 of the ICAI report (Section 3.10) called for “balanced system of monitoring and evaluation” which included reporting quantitative and qualitative data from regions receiving CP funding. 

5.2)            These reports made a number of clear recommendations which have all been accepted by HMG, though it has been difficult, due to a lack of transparency, to find out the extent to which these have been implemented.

5.3)            The last annual report of the CP was in 2009/10 and if the CP is to be an effective policy mechanism in the future a more consistent approach to ongoing monitoring and evaluation must be undertaken. An effective start to ongoing monitoring would be for HMG to commit to undertaking annual reviews enabling better direction and effective scrutiny of the CP.

5.4)            Whilst best practice would be to measure the impact of each individual project it is not always possible to do so. Given the volatile environments in which peacebuilders operate there may be instances where revealing the funding and recipients of individual projects may put lives at risk or otherwise impede the activities that NGOs undertake.

5.5)            The Conflict Pool currently provides little or no public documentation allowing no public scrutiny of any undertakings funded by CP whatsoever. Given the increase in funding the CP is going to receive over the coming years it is extremely important that some degree of financial transparency is put in place so better financial evaluation can take place. It would also then be easier to highlight projects that deliver excellent value for money and to then make the case for them to be expanded.

5.6)            This may be best achieved by a sub-committee of the International Development Select Committee that has specific remit to monitor and evaluate the Conflict Pool. Given that Conflict Pool funding is going to expand to over £1000 million a greater level of scrutiny will be required make these funds as effective as possible.

5.7)            BSOS has also recommended external experts; NGOs and academics are involved to review the CP and CSSF. There may be a role for impartial NGOs such as conscience to review the strategic direction and financial effectiveness of the Conflict Pool.