Letter from Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey QPM, Metropolitan Police, to the Chair of the Committee, 2 June 2014
I write in response to your letter dated 26th March 2014 in which you ask me to provide information in relation to:
1. The current level of authority required for the destruction of corruption files;
2. Reports relating to three corruption investigations; and
3. A memorandum written by Detective Chief Inspector Hurley.
I will deal with each of your requests in turn;
1. The current level of authority required for destruction of documents and evidence relating to corruption.
In 2006 the Guidance on the Management of Police Information (MOPI) was published by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) following the Bichard Inquiry. The document is currently in its second edition which was published in 2010. This document details specific retention periods for information dependent on the subject matter. Corruption is not a defined subject matter per se according to MOPI but as a result of this publication the MPS will not destroy any papers currently held that relate to corruption before 2018.
At present MOP I does not specify the level of authority required for destruction of such documents. I have directed a review of MPS policy in relation to records management. This included assessment of suitable authority levels for destruction.
It should be noted, in the context of MOPI, that we also face legal challenges to the effect that the current retention periods for various categories of data that we hold are too long. This was discussed recently, for example, by the Court of Appeal in the case of R, on the application of TD v the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the Secretary of State for the Home Department, a copy of the judgment of which is enclosed for your information.[1]
You will note the comment of the Court of Appeal, at paragraph 19, that the context of the length of retention of data involves much litigation and that the position is "fluid and changing".
2. Copies of the following Operation reports
Regarding your request for copies of the Operations Othona and Tiberius files:
These two operations reflect development of MPS strategy and supporting tactics in relation to counter corruption from around 1994 to 2002. Op Othona commenced as a review of intelligence and counter-corruption activity and proposed an innovative new approach which emphasised covert tactics and operational security. The majority of the file relates to delivery of this operational capability. Op Tiberius sought to review Op Othona and adjust strategy and tactics following learning from a series of trials of corrupt officers. Both operations also sought to inform future tasking priorities by reviewing existing intelligence.
In my view, the release of the documents held for Operation Othona and Operation Tiberius at this time would not be in the public interest. I have however set out below the details of each operation.
Operation Othona
Authorised by the then Commissioner Paul Condon in May 1994, Othona recommended establishment of a covert team capable of gathering intelligence on officers believed to be involved in corrupt practice. Previous efforts to identify and prosecute corrupt officers were believed to have been hampered by breaches of operational security and extensive measures were put in place to ensure the existence and tactics of this unit remained covert. This 'intelligence gathering' element went on for some three years. In early 1998 an investigative unit (CIB3) was established to conduct criminal investigations and bring about prosecutions of individuals suspected of corruption.
The Op Othona file precedes the intelligence gathering phase of the Operation. Whilst there is some intelligence contained within the file it is not the full intelligence picture that Mr Ellison sought and he is aware of this.
The file is marked secret and contains the details of officers and staff who were deployed within the team. There is some very limited intelligence naming possible early subjects. To disclose these names would place certain individuals at risk of reprisal not only from those who were targeted but also their criminal associates.
The file does go into detail regarding covert tactics. The depth of the information given is such that disclosure would compromise still viable tactics. A redaction of all such material would effectively render the document meaningless. I am sure you will understand why therefore I consider that it would not be in the public interest for this material to be shared or disclosed at this time.
It should be noted that the majority of the intelligence gathered as a result of the operation is not contained within this file. The MPS has already disclosed much of this intelligence to Mark Ellison QC and the hard drive that is believed to have held the intelligence is currently being forensically examined. Current MPS counter corruption intelligence systems do hold some 10,000 reports that originate from the hard drive, the position regarding further intelligence held on it may become clearer once the forensic examination is complete.
Operation Tiberius
Operation Tiberius, like Operation Othona, is a document detailing a strategic proposal rather than a proactive investigation against an individual and/or individuals. The report is dated March 2002. The documentation comprises an executive summary, intelligence documents detailing suspected corrupt officers and their criminal associates and the scope of the problem including damage to the criminal justice system. The document proposes strategies to address the issues identified.
Operation Tiberius summarises intelligence on corrupt activity of officers I staff connected to a number of Organised Criminal Networks and proposes concentrating significant MPS anti-corruption resources on these networks.
From this document and the associated intelligence, a number of covert operations were commenced. These are recorded under a number of operational names. To date the MPS has identified in excess of 260 crates of documents that could hold material that arises from intelligence developed from the original Tiberius report. This number is likely to expand as linked operations are identified.
To date no mention of officers connected to the investigation of Stephen Lawrence has been found. The MPS continue to examine the material contained in the crates identified and although I have no reason to believe that this material contains any information relevant to Mr. Ellison's review I cannot specifically rule out this possibility until the source material has been re-read in detail. A process is in place whereby any such documents will be disclosed to him if they are identified.
To disclose the report would place individuals' safety at risk, heighten the awareness of such Organised Criminal Networks to covert tactics deployed against them and place current and past covert tactics at risk of compromise. Consequently again, it is my view that disclosure of this information should not take place at this time.
The MPS has received requests for disclosure of the report under the Freedom of Information Act. In the interests of openness I have enclosed a redacted copy of the following sections 'Introduction & Terms of Reference', 'Context' and a small section of the 'Executive Summary' that have been provided to the applicants.[2]
Operation Russell
Operation Russell was a CIB investigation into former Commander Adams, based around two separate allegations of corruption.
The papers held by the MPS show that the file was reviewed by CPS who stated that there was no case to answer in regards to either allegation. No further action, either criminally or from a misconduct perspective was taken against Ray Adams.
There were no further corruption allegations against Ray Adams during the rest of his service.
I have provided redacted copies of both the criminal and disciplinary reports completed by the investigating officer DAC Peter Winship as requested.[3] The reports have been redacted simply to protect the identity of third parties.
Operation Russell did not lead to any criminal or misconduct proceedings and cannot therefore be said to be in the public domain.
3. The memorandum written by OCI Hurley, and those that have seen it.
I have provided a copy of the document you refer to as a memorandum.[4] This is in fact a version of an internal briefing note supplied to Mark Ellison QC by the MPS. It has been necessary to redact this document to protect identities of individuals and covert methodology.
You will see that this report differs from the final published version[5], specifically regarding a paragraph at the foot of page 11 which was later changed. This paragraph, mentioned by Mr. Ellison has not been redacted.
The Senior Investigating Officer from the Ellison review team has made enquiries regarding the evolution and editing of the May 2012 report from its inception to final publication. These enquiries have revealed that Mr Hurley's report had input from a significant number of individuals across the Deputy Commissioner's Portfolio, the Directorate of Professional Standards, Directorate of Legal Services and Directorate of Media and Communications.
Electronic copies of the report were sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Deputy
Assistant Commissioners Patricia Gallan & Rose Fitzpatrick, Commander Peter Spindler and Detective Chief Superintendent Richard Heselden. The final version of the report was ultimately endorsed as suitable for public release by the then Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Professional Standards, Patricia Gallan on 31st May 2012.
Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey QPM, Metropolitan Police
June 2014
Annexes
Annex 1 Op Tiberius
Annex 2 Op Russell Criminal Matters
Annex 3 Op Russell Discipline Matters
Annex 4 DCI Hurley Review
Annex 5 DCI Hurley Internal briefing note
[1] Not printed
[2] Annex 1
[3] Annexes 2 & 3
[4] Annex 5
[5] Annex 4