Further written evidence from the Ministry of Defence
Afghanistan inquiry
Follow-Up Questions to Oral evidence on 12 March 2014
1) Please provide evidence of the results of counter-narcotic activity in terms of arrests, detentions, crop destructions, etc.
As the latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report observed in December 2013, poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has reached a record high and significant challenges remain in terms of overall counter narcotics effect. However, there has still been notable progress made. According to the UNODC; “Afghanistan’s counter narcotic institutions have taken a significant step forward in terms of capacity and effectiveness. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics has moved quickly to advance policy and guidelines, as per its mandate. The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan is still far from achieving the seizure rate witnessed in other producing countries, but police have nevertheless tripled their effectiveness over recent years to capturing well over 10% of domestic production.”
The UNODC goes on to state; “the number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions of powerful figures remains a concern, but progress has also been witnessed with two high profile cases this year. Finally, available services in country to deal with a growing addiction problem have expanded from 30 to 90. These are tangible and hopeful signs of improvement.”
While the UK Government and military do not have a remit to conduct eradication, UK Embassy staff and contractors have given the Afghan Government advice, funding and equipment to support eradication in Afghanistan. In 2012, 3,637 hectares were eradicated in Helmand and 9,672 hectares eradicated countrywide. In 2013, 2,112 hectares were eradicated in Helmand and 4,867 hectares were eradicated countrywide.
Afghan special police forces, mentored by UK forces, have also interdicted the following amounts of narcotics and precursor chemicals between 2010 and 2014:
2010: 8,910 kg of dry precursor chemicals, 6862 kg of Heroin, 17,830 kg of Morphine, 21042 kg of dry opium, 9590 kg wet opium, 53967 kg of hashish, 261 drug related arrests.
2011: 54,721 kg of dry precursor chemicals, 3772 kg of Heroin, 1944 kg Morphine, 36,836 dry opium, 20,252 kg wet opium, 9441 kg hashish, 330 arrests.
2012: 7760 kg dry precursor chemicals, 2116 kg heroin, 742 kg Morphine, 32220 kg dry opium, 8367 kg wet opium, 3603 kg hashish, 117 arrests.
2013: 10,870 of kg dry precursor chemicals, 619 kg heroin, 12 kg of morphine, 18048 kg dry opium, 4258 kg wet opium, 3781 kg hashish, 103 arrests.
2014: 400 kg of dry precursor chemicals, 26 kg heroin, 0kg morphine, 861 kg dry opium, 30 kg wet opium, 0 kg hashish, 18 arrests.
These figures are relatively high and should be seen as a success. However, it should be noted that the scale of the Afghan drugs trade is very large compared to the forces ranged against it. For example, in 2010 Afghan forces, mentored by the UK military, seized almost seven metric tonnes of heroin, yet in that year heroin production was almost six hundred metric tonnes.
In 2013, the UK mentored Counter Narcotics Justice Court (CNJC) convicted 665 persons for drug trafficking, including one US treasury nominated “Foreign Narcotics Kingpin[1]” trafficker and one corrupt provincial police chief. The CNJC remains the most effective prosecution system in Afghanistan.
2) Please provide details of Afghan plans for provision of technical mobile protected vehicles.
The Afghan National Security Forces’ (ANSF) vehicle fleet has been developed through the coalition funded purchase of vehicle capabilities, including Protected Mobility (PM) vehicles. To date, over 17,000 Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV), 7,000 Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTV), over 9,500 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) and nearly 500 Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV) has been delivered into service within the Afghan National Army. Similarly, within the Afghan National Police, there are currently over 26,000 LTVs, 5,500 HMMWV vehicles and 1,700 MTVs.
All of the coalition funded vehicles provided to the ANSF have been delivered with a sustainment package as part of the funding arrangements. Most recently, the UK, as part of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), has been involved in the provision and training of Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV), which are PM vehicles, under Deputy Commander-Army and National Training Mission-Afghanistan.
The ANSF’s PM fleet is currently assessed by ISAF to be adequate for the counter insurgency role that the ANSF is structured to conduct.
3) Please provide the “wiring diagram” showing the various institutions, whether single service or joint, including historical branches, which contribute to lessons-learned processes and historical analysis
Attached are the original slides presented to the Committee (Ms Stewart) on 9 December 2013, as part of the MoD briefing on lessons. Also attached is a slide illustrating Defence bodies that have a responsibility for the learning of operational lessons. Beneath the level depicted on the Defence Operational Lessons slide there are a range of single Service and Joint organisations with their own detailed operational lessons processes.
These processes evolved from a series of separate enterprises into a Defence-wide capability, so that the exploitation of operational lessons could transcend Service and departmental boundaries. However, given the range of operational activities and associated lessons, it was and remains neither practicable nor prudent to manage learning through a single Defence-wide bureaucratic lessons process or institutional model, as the stakeholders will vary on any given topic. Moreover, learning from lessons was and remains the responsibility of the chains of command. Therefore, it is the chain of command that employs resource and governance to ensure we learn the lessons identified, rather than a distinct Defence body.
As a consequence of the approach taken, notable improvements have been made in tactical and technical areas, such as the Op HERRICK Theatre Capability Review, development of our doctrine, C-IED training, urgent operational requirement procurement and flight safety. Notwithstanding these improved and effective tactically focussed processes and outcomes, Defence has identified the need for a more effective approach, so that at the operational and strategic levels we critically learn from history, training, education, operations and strategic events, and routinely apply what has been learnt to future activity.
To do this we are developing a Defence Organisational Learning Strategy (DOLS), under the Vice Chief of Defence Staff’s personal leadership. The DOLS concept was outlined to the Committee on 9 December 2013, when the initial scoping work was underway. Fundamentally, the DOLS involves developing the right behaviours, processes and tools across Defence to achieve lasting improvements, so that we systematically apply the acquisition, analysis and use of knowledge to our full range of activities. This initiative is therefore not primarily about an operational ‘Lessons’ process, it is about a far larger system across Defence and how we operate.
The DOLS sets out an ambitious programme of evolution, to begin this summer. It includes MoD Head Office, the Services, Joint Forces Command and other stakeholders, such as Dstl, our academic partners and allies. It focuses on command and leadership, behaviours, structures and processes, analysis and exploitation, knowledge management, training and education.
By taking this holistic approach we will be better equipped to apply what has been learnt before, during and after activities, including operations and at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This should nourish the evidence base, mitigate repetition of mistakes, build on successes, create efficiencies and enable continuous improvement.
Defence is committed to learning from lessons and history, in order to maintain its competitive edge. The MoD would be happy to provide a further briefing to the Committee on the DOLS, once it is further advanced, and following the conclusion of combat operations at the end of this year.
4) Two thirds of vehicles and equipment repatriated so far has been moved by air with around a quarter withdrawn by the multimodal route via the Gulf.
It was always planned for equipment attractive to criminal or terrorist organisations, and sensitive equipment with special carriage regulations attached to it, to transit directly by air or on the multi-modal route to the UK. The security of valuable cargos can not be guaranteed by the other surface lines of communication out of Afghanistan.
The remainder of equipment that is classified, sensitive and of value will be moved via the multi-modal route, or indeed flown directly to the UK on either military air transport or civilian charter aircraft. The protected mobility vehicle fleet falls into this category.
The net additional costs for redeploying assets by air are estimated to be just under £100M. This is to be funded by the HMT Special Reserve.
April 2014
[1] On December 3, 1999, the President signed into law the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (the “Kingpin Act”). The related regulations are styled the "Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations" (31 C.F.R. Part 598).