Written evidence from Gareth Stansfield (KUR0014)

 

 

Introductory biography

 

Gareth Stansfield is a Professor of Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter. His research interest in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq commenced in 1997, when he was funded by DFID to work alongside the Kurdish authorities and political parties that administered the Kurdish autonomous area of Iraq that had emerged in 1991. His work brought him into direct contact with the institutions of the (two) Kurdistan Regional Governments, then in Erbil and Suleimaniyah, and the political parties and their leaderships that operated in the region, including the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), among others. He worked in this role between 1997 and 2001, undertaking his PhD at the same time on the subject of the consolidation of governmental structures in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. His PhD was awarded by the University of Durham in 2001. From 2002, he has been continuously engaged with researching the politics of Iraq, with a particular focus on the Kurdish dimension, while a member of staff at the University of Exeter and, until 2012, an Associate Fellow at Chatham House. He has published widely on these subjects and his views are regularly sought by HMG departments and other organizations. In 2009, for example, he was a Senior Political Adviser to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Iraq, advising on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq’s (UNAMI) engagement with the question of the ‘disputed internal boundary’ between the KRG and Government of Iraq. He remains a Professor at the University of Exeter and is now a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), with his current research focusing upon the consolidation of the KRG, political developments in Iraq, and the regional ramifications of the increasingly impactful Kurdish dimension in the Middle East.

 

Summary

 

 

Historical overview

 

  1. It is useful to open my evidence with a brief historical overview of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR), to illustrate the significant engagement the UK has already had with the entity. The KR emerged in 1991, in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s expulsion from Kuwait, his subsequent targeting of the Shi’a uprising in the south and the Kurdish uprising in the north, and the establishment of a safe haven in a small part of northern Iraq, under the terms of UN Resolution 688. The ‘Safe Haven’ owes its origins largely to the UK, which led Europe and then the UN to take action and protect the inhabitants of northern Iraq (who are mainly Kurdish) from the retributive acts of Saddam’s regime. The KR’s origins, however, go back further, to the Autonomy Law of Iraq 1974 and the March Agreement of 1970, between the Kurds, led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, and the Government of Iraq. Even though never fully implemented, this agreement and this law introduced the concept of autonomy for the Kurds to Iraq.

 

  1. Between 1991 and 1997, the KR had an uneasy existence inside Iraq, and within the wider region. Existing as a geopolitical anomaly as an unrecognized, de facto, state surrounded by countries that viewed developments in the KR with a combination of suspicion (in terms of the destabilizing impact the KR could have on the Kurds of Syria, Turkey, and Iran) and opportunism (in terms of how the Iraqi Kurds could be used as proxies against Saddam’s Iraq), the KDP, PUK, and IMK succumb to civil war (between 1994 and 1997), and the region saw the direct intervention of the military forces of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran at varying times. The region was divided into two by the KDP and PUK, with two Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRG) sitting in Erbil and Suleimaniyah respectively.

 

  1. The situation began to improve from 1997 onwards. UK diplomatic efforts to ensure stability between the KDP and PUK, and to engage Turkey as a constructive neighbour, were critical in the brokering of a peace process between the two parties that ultimately led to the US-sponsored Washington Agreement of 1999. This agreement set out a series of confidence building measures that would finally culminate with the reunification of the KRG in 2006.

 

  1. The Kurdish leadership was heavily engaged in the removal of Saddam Hussein, being leading forces in the Iraqi opposition groupings of the 1990s and also having bases in Iraq itself. They then assumed positions of prominence in the post-Saddam political landscape, ensuring that federalism was adopted as the administrative structure of Iraq in Transitional Administrative Law of 2004 and the Constitution of 2005, thus codifying their own status as a federal region of Iraq. Since then, they have sought to consolidate their autonomy in Iraq by applying the federal prescriptions of the constitution to a significant degree. With their own military force, administration, and now independent hydrocarbons sector that is on the verge of exporting to Turkey bilaterally  - without the involvement of the Government of Iraq – the KR is autonomous and may soon by economically independent. The question for many observers is whether this autonomy and economic independence is the penultimate stage before secession from Iraq and the declaration of full independence.

 

  1. The KR has undertaken many transformations over the last 23 years. Socially and politically, the transformation is clearly evident – the Kurds of Iraq, on the whole, view themselves as obliged to be Iraqis, rather than buying in wholeheartedly to the concept of Iraq as a country, let alone a people. It is now impossible to imagine a scenario by which the Kurds could exist in Iraq other than being a region in a federation, and threats to aspects of Kurdish autonomy that emanate from Baghdad (such as those against the existence of the Kurdish peshmerga (army) or the independent hydrocarbons sector) push the Kurdish leadership to further strengthen their independence from Baghdad.

 

  1. At the regional level, what was once a geopolitical anomaly on the map of the Middle East is now a geopolitical reality – it now seems that the KR is a permanent feature of the Middle East in territorial terms (although the southern boundary has yet to be demarcated), and in political terms (with many of the region’s countries having bilateral relations with Erbil, along with several prominent members of the wider international community), and increasingly in energy terms (if the KR does succeed in exporting oil and gas to Turkey, then it becomes of importance not only to Turkish energy security, but also, potentially, to European energy security as well).

 

Implications for UK foreign policy of the existence of the KR

 

  1. The KR provides challenges and opportunities for UK foreign policy. The challenges are significant, not least because the situation in the KR, and in Iraq pertaining to the KR, is moving very quickly.

 

  1. Internally, the KR is undergoing a process of democratic transition. The political landscape of the KR is changing significantly, with the older, established, parties (namely the KDP and PUK) that developed their legitimacy through being leaders of the rebellion against Iraq having now to satisfy the increasingly democratic, and economically aspirational, demands of the Kurdish populace. The demands of the Kurdish electorate include the provision of security and stability, but also raise strongly the need for further democratization, transparent government, and the eradication of corruption. Under these pressures, a faction of the PUK split away in 2009 to form the Bezutinewey Gorran, otherwise known as ‘Gorran’, meaning ‘Change’, and succeeded in the KR parliamentary elections of September 2013 to push the PUK into third place, with the KDP of Massoud Barzani maintaining its leading position. These pressures will continue to grow, placing the KR and its political and governmental institutions under stress as parties that are by their nature centralist attempt the painful process of decreasing their own version of a democratic deficit in what is a highly charged political environment. There is an implication for UK foreign policy of being caught in a ‘national interest’ versus ‘values’ debate, as happens in other parts of the Middle East (and especially the Gulf), if the KRG and leading Kurdish parties fail to positively maintain their democratic transition; yet there is an opportunity for UK foreign policy to engage further with Kurdish political leaders, groups, and society to further enhance democratic development and overall good governance strategies in the KR.

 

  1. The relationship between Erbil and Baghdad, particularly since 2006 and the premiership of Nouri al-Maliki, has been fractious and characterized by perennial arguments over the status of the disputed territories (the swathe of land lying to the south of the extant KR, and claimed by Erbil), the funding of the KRG, the status of the peshmerga, and divergent approaches to regional issues (namely the civil war in Syria). There is a real possibility that the difficult relations between Erbil and Baghdad will magnify and generate a significant moment of crisis. When this happened previously, the aim of western powers, including the UK, has been to maintain the integrity of Iraq with a strategy of crisis diplomacy, the seeking of concessions from Baghdad, and strongly worded warnings to the Kurdish leadership not to push matters further. Up until now, these strategies have achieved their aims. However, the situation inside Iraq may be reaching an inflexion point, as wider regional interests align in such a way as to further the political division between Erbil and Baghdad, rather than close it. With the KR now enjoying a firm alliance, built upon mutual interests, with Turkey, with Erbil and Ankara signing a bilateral oil export agreement (in November 2013), and with the KR pursuing a foreign policy towards Turkey that is significantly different, to the point of being opposed, to the policy of Iraq-proper, the ability of western powers to maintain Iraq’s integrity, between Erbil and Baghdad, will be lessened as the regional realities become more salient. Very quickly, a UK foreign policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq, and being opposed to the concept of an independent ‘State of Kurdistan’ emerging in the northern parts of Iraq (i.e. not in Turkey, Iran, or Syria), may be overtaken by regional realities.

 

  1. This alignment of KR interests with the interests of regional states was unforeseen until recent years. Up until 2007, Turkey engaged with the KRG in only a limited fashion, with most Turkish economic engagement with the KR being in the form of contract work (construction, in particular). The most significant external investors up until this time tended to be from Arab states, and especially from Arab Gulf states. The regional relationship changed significantly in 2007, as Turkey shifted its focus from trying to build a relationship with the Maliki government of Iraq, to strengthening its ties directly with the KRG and the leading political parties. This happened for several reasons, with the main ones being the concern in Turkey at the ongoing civil war in Iraq, and Ankara’s failure to find a way to engage constructively with the Maliki government – a government that was increasingly being viewed as having a sectarian agenda, rightly or wrongly. A further, important, reason to acknowledge was the significant efforts put into development the Erbil-Ankara relationship by leading Kurdish politicians. Since then, the KR has found itself drawn, by shared national interests and association, into a regional complex that includes Turkey and the Arab Gulf states, which, if viewed within a longer historical timeframe, is very surprising as the traditional ‘enemies’ of the Kurds have now become their closest friends. At the same time, the Kurdish leadership has strived to maintain a working relationship with Iran – a country with which the Kurdish leaders from all leading parties have strong historical ties – due to the necessity of keeping all the neighbours of what remains a vulnerable, land-locked, entity in a volatile region, content. In conclusion to this paragraph, the regional powers that once sought to maintain the status quo of the Middle East state system, with Iraq’s integrity being a key element of this, are now far more closely tied to Erbil than they are to Baghdad. With a government in Baghdad that is perceived to be strongly ‘Shi’a’ in its orientation, and with a prime minister that, in March 2013 accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of being at war with his country, it is perhaps sensible to consider that the integrity of Iraq may no longer be as sacred, in the region, as it once was.

 

The role of the UK Government in facilitating the KR-Iraq relationship

 

  1. If the KR and the Government of Iraq are to overcome what are now not only significant differences over policy and the interpretation of the Constitution of Iraq, but deeply held personal grudges between leaders, and to thereby maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq, then there is a clear role for neutral arbiters to be engaged with both sides to find a way through what is a precarious situation. To the outside observer, three issues stand out, from the perspective of the KRG’s engagement with the Government of Iraq, that would seem to require resolution in order for the Kurds not to change their expressions of self-determination from autonomy to secession. These are (i) an agreement over the detail of how the federal system of Iraq will operate. At present, Iraq is federal in theory (in the constitution), but not in practice (ii) related to this, an agreement between Erbil and Baghdad over the exploitation of oil and gas, and the mechanism by which revenues would then be redistributed, and (iii) the status of the disputed territories (mainly in Ninevah, Erbil, Kirkuk, and Diyala provinces, and, to a lesser degree, in Salahadin and Wasit provinces) and particularly the city and province of Kirkuk. In each of these issues, the UK Government could perform an important role in facilitating the KR-Iraq relationship

 

  1. The federal system: If Iraq is to have a future, with the Kurds within it, then that future has to be federal – it is unlikely that a situation will emerge whereby the Kurds will be willingly brought back into a centralized, unitary, Iraqi state, and it is just as unlikely that a scenario will come to pass whereby this would happen by force. At present, the KR is the only region of Iraq, in effect making Iraq an unstable bi-national federation. There now seem to be two options available going forward (i) to enshrine the specificity of the KR further, and in effect make a ‘confederacy’, putting the KR on an equal footing with the rest of Iraq, and making the Iraqi state formally a partnership between Erbil and Baghdad, or (ii) facilitate the emergence of more regions in Iraq, creating the federal structure allowed for by the Constitution. Both of these options are difficult to achieve, but, beyond a ‘muddling through’ scenario that the Kurds seem increasingly unwilling to accept, are more likely than any other possibilities. The UK Government, with its experience of devolution, regional assemblies, and power-sharing within the framework of the EU is well placed to act as a mediator between different Iraqi interests, and not only with regard to the Kurds and Baghdad - other regions have, in recent years, sought federal region status, only to be refused by the central government.

 

  1. The exploitation of oil and gas: Iraq generates some 95% of its foreign exchange from the export of oil and gas, yet there is no legislation in place codifying and legalizing the operation of the sector. This lack of laws stems from the fact that Baghdad and Erbil have disagreed vociferously over the interpretation of the Constitution with regard to the rights given to ‘regions’ to develop their own, new, oil and gas fields. Baghdad, claiming the sovereign right to manage and oversee Iraq’s oil and gas sector has refused to acknowledge the legality of Erbil’s policy to build its own sector by signing Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with a range of International Oil Companies (IOCs), including ExxonMobil, Chevron, and Total. This disagreement colours the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil more than any other as it uncovers the difficult questions of the financial dependence of Erbil on Baghdad (which can still withhold the KRG budget, as it has done at the beginning of 2014), and the sensitive questions of sovereignty over natural resources. The dispute then manifests itself politically, with elections being contested over the rights and wrongs of these decisions, on both sides, and with post-election negotiations giving ad hoc resolutions to the dispute prominence over other issues. If Iraq is to maintain its integrity, then a solution needs to be brokered between Baghdad and Erbil – a solution that neither side has shown itself capable of finding.

 

  1. The status of the disputed territories: The only reason why the Kurds voted en masse to accept the Constitution of Iraq in 2005 was because of the inclusion of Article 140 – an article that gave a time-limited prescription for the resolution of the status of the disputed territories. This article was never implemented, yet the status of the disputed territories remains an unresolved question capable of destabilizing the relationship between Baghdad and Erbil, with local flashpoints having the ability to escalate to a point where the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF – the Iraqi army) and the Kurdistan Region peshmerga are deployed against each other – something that has happened three times in recent years, in Khanaqin in 2008, and Tuz Khurmato and Zammar in 2012. Engagement with this most complex of problems has traditionally been viewed with great circumspection by outside observers, but its resolution present an opportunity to enhance Iraq’s integrity and promote a positive relationship between Erbil and Baghdad going forward. Its leaving as a festering sore, politically and territorially, only serves to generate further animosities going forward.

 

The UK Government’s approach to trade and investment

 

  1. As is said regularly by KRG representatives and leaders, the KR is very much ‘open for business’, yet it seems to be the case that this message has not been taken on board to a significant degree by UK businesses. This could be because of the fact that the KR is still part of Iraq, and the Middle East as a whole does not look to be an attractive investment proposition right now, but the KR has shown itself to be remarkably stable and secure since 2003 and is set to continue being so.

 

  1. The Kurdistan Region Board of Investment place the level of annual external trade in the KR at around US$ 14 billion, in 2011. Of this, Turkey’s bilateral business volume stood at about US$6 billion, with Arab Gulf states enjoying significant shares as well. Yet the economy of the KR is still relatively underdeveloped. There exist considerable areas in need of expansion. The KRG has significant plans to rehabilitate the agricultural sector, which has remained in a state of decay since 1991; there are the telecommunications network is widespread but lacking coordination and enjoys limited international connectivity; the hydrocarbons industry, while advancing quickly but little attempt seems to have been made to plan ahead for investment into the sector, or to develop the service sector further; the KR is particularly well placed to develop environmental and cultural tourism, with Erbil being a world heritage site, and the region being endowed with significant areas of natural beauty; and the banking and financial services sector is virtually non-existent. The KRG is also committed to enhancing its Higher Education sector through the capacity-building of its staffing resource, and recognizes the need to improve the health provision, from primary health centres through to specialized hospitals.

 

April 2014