Written evidence submitted by Andrew J Cordiner

This is a personal submission but I wish that members of my village society in Hyde Heath can take reliance on this submission if they so choose. This consultation response is without prejudice to the contention that the entire consultation and the processes taken by HS2/DFT is deeply flawed and contrary to UK Law, EU Directives as well as comments already made by the Environmental Audit Committee looking into the emerging Green Paper on Bio Diversity Offsetting. Without limitation, significant impacts have been ignored or inadequately assessed; unsupported assumptions have been made and conclusions drawn, and the volume and difficulty of navigating the consultation documents and the limited time allowed to do so are unfair and prejudicial to an informed response.

Chairwoman,

I understand you are seeking comments on the extent to which specific route-wide environmental impacts are adequately reflected and addressed in the HS2 Environmental Statement — specifically including: agriculture, forestry and soils; air quality; climate; ecology; and water resources and flood risk; and excluding Chilterns-specific matters; community and cultural heritage; landscape and visual aspect; noise/vibration; traffic and transport; and waste and material resources.

I am unsure why your committee has been set up to investigate certain aspects of the route wide effects but ignore others? Given the reference to biodiversity offsetting and the emerging Green Paper, I have assumed you are seeking comments in relation to these items as you consider the items identified appropriate for biodiversity offsetting. In which case, to enable your committee to consider or reach any conclusion in this regard, you need robust study work to inform the process. As the evidence will establish below, HS2 have not undertaken sufficient study work, the work they have presented is wholly reliant on work produced by 3rd parties or of no more value than desktop. Many of the 3rd parties who cooperated and provided the information have since been critical of the way it has been presented and the failures by HS2 to suggest adequate mitigation. Furthermore, in many of the sections such as Air Quality, HS2 failed to present the information as it was either lost, delayed, did not address anything beyond desktop interpreting out of date data or simply (as in our Community Forum) presented the data for other community forums areas. In short, multiple agencies have criticised the Final ES for its inaccuracies and failings and to even establish a starting point as to whether biodiversity offsetting is appropriate, HS2 need to provide a robust baseline, methodology and mitigation proposals that both meets UK guidance and is considered best practice. HS2 have singularly failed to do this and all of these matters must be considered by the Hybrid Bill select committee as I do not believe biodiversity can even be considered appropriate given the cumulative impacts of a project such as HS2.

Bio–Diversity Offsetting – why it is not appropriate for HS2.

Biodiversity offsetting (BO) is a planning mechanism through which developers will be able to compensate for habitats they destroy by creating or improving other landscapes. It is a tool that could work in development but only on small schemes where the impacts are specific, localised and easy to identify. Applying this to HS2 is impossible as the impacts are spread over 100`s of miles and the impacts are therefore cumulative. Applying it to HS2 would be a 'license to trash nature' on a monumental and unprecedented scale and it is inconceivable this was the original intent of such a concept.

The Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) has already commented that the government's initial proposals for bio-diversity required significant changes in order to offer proper protections for the environment. I quote “The twenty minute assessment for calculating biodiversity losses at a site is also overly simplistic. Biodiversity offsetting could improve the way our planning system accounts for the damage developments do to wildlife, if it is done well. But ministers must take great care to get offsetting right or they risk giving developers carte blanche to concrete over important habitats." I cannot think of a better quote that addresses exactly what HS2 is doing to important habitat whether it be protected or otherwise.

I should comment that while I support the principle of localised biodiversity offsetting where there are not cumulative effects, many “green” groups and commentators are suspicious of the potential for BO to amount to a rubberstamp for destruction.

The EAC has correctly urged a cautious approach and advocated the necessity to allow pilot programs (established in 2011) to run their full course, this is not happening as many of these schemes will need a significant number of years to evolve to establish whether the concept has been successful. To seek to rush them into action to justify development of HS2 would be irresponsible and wholly inappropriate as incorrect methods could exacerbate the environmental impact.

The EAC report recommended the government place biodiversity offsetting (BO) on hold. It called them an "admission of failure" on the part of existing planning mechanisms. Saying BO "should only arise after alternative development sites or means of mitigating the environmental loss from development have been considered". If the mechanism was to be adopted, the EAC raised concerns about the inclusion of irreplaceable habitats such as ancient woodland and sites of special scientific interest (SSI). Although, a reading of the government's Green Paper suggests that these types of sites will be governed by existing legislation, taken holistically, HS2 and evidence from elsewhere is that Government are seeking to over ride such legislation with a creeping agenda for development – the misquote of NPPF by HS2 indicated below is evidence in this regard.

It cannot be argued that destruction of ancient woodland could be warranted by BO replacement planting as this ancient woodland is irreplaceable – a fact acknowledged by HS2. How then is the offset figure calculated in this regard given the extent of destruction of such woodland by HS2? Furthermore, how can the loss of BMV agriculture land or creation of uneconomic agriculture fields split by HS2 possibly be offset? 

The committee recommended several key aspects of the Green Paper be amended and these amendments if enacted would be critical to understanding how they would be applied to HS2. Namely the simplistic metric, the location of sites to be rehabilitated, risk factors associated with relocating habitats and wildlife, monitoring and the need to make any scheme mandatory. The metric which the Government estimates would take only 20 minutes to apply, is overly simplistic and placed in context with the cumulative impacts of HS2 route wide and for 100`s of miles would be less than adequate - an understatement! A proper metric applied to HS2 needs to reflect the full complexity of habitats and the cumulative impact on the symbiotic relationship they have with each other, the ecology and the health and wellbeing of persons who interactive with the habitat.

In particular, species and 'ecosystem networks' must be considered and there would be a need to recognise the ecology hub characteristics in breeding and migration generated by such sites with special status such as ancient woodlands and sites of special scientific interest. The starting point for all of this is robust and detailed study which could take decades to fully understand – what HS2 have produced to date is woefully inadequate to even allow such a program to start.

Biodiversity assessments would need to be transparent and independent to command respect from local authorities, environmental groups and local people. The EAC report recommends offsets have to be near enough to the development site that local people can still enjoy the types of habitat and wildlife being affected, yet this is completely impossible in the case of HS2 as many of these sites are currently tranquil locations whose appeal and establishment are directly derived from this tranquil enclosure.

If bio-diversity is to proceed, it must be focused at the lowest local planning authority level possible and not administered by HS2 or central government – the local authority should determine what is appropriate and the Government should simply fund the mitigation.

Any offsetting system must emphasise the continuing primacy of the 'mitigation hierarchy', where offsetting is only considered after alternative development sites or a means of mitigating the environmental loss in situ have been exhausted. With regard to HS2, no such mitigation hierarchy has been followed as the 51M proposal to upgrade the West Coast Mainline was dismissed on grounds of cost and disruption, but such dismissal has taken place without comparison costs and disruptions for the bio-diversity offsetting required for HS2 – this will be a petitioning point to the select committee as clearly an upgrade to the WCML needs little bio-diversity offsetting, while HS2 and the costs of doing so would be significant and not considered or included in the statement of expense to the Hybrid Bill.

There needs to be recognition that unless like-for-like habitat replacement is required, any process will have to make ultimately subjective 'equivalence' judgements about the value of nature. That concern should prompt the Government to develop a system where offsetting 'risk factors' are initially given very high weightings which can only be reduced when experience of offsetting in practice provides confidence that the environment has not been harmed overall. Given the locations that HS2 will travel through, these risk factors will be of the highest nature and therefore the costs of the highest nature also – none of this is studied or assessed in any detail to facilitate any conclusion by your committee that such risk can be mitigated successfully by BO.

Owen Patterson has stated “The process of biodiversity offsetting (BO) is intended to add to, rather than replace, other parts of the planning approvals process”. There is a 'mitigation hierarchy' which according to Defra, is designed to avert "unnecessary impacts on the environment" from development. In the first instance harm should be avoided, for instance by locating development at an alternative site. Alternatives are available as regards HS2 both in route and concept to deliver the core aims of capacity and connectivity. Yet the entire justification for HS2 is that such alternatives will not deliver “the same” benefits as HS2. In which case, applying Mr Patterson’s “equivalence principle” if HS2 alternatives are rejected on the basis they do not deliver “the same” benefits, under equivalence it should be mandatory that HS2 must replace “the same” or similar standard of habitat as the one lost to HS2 or else avoid it altogether if it cannot. In short, to established equivalence and ensure no disproportionate impact, the greater benefits that HS2 offers when compared to the alternatives must by logic produce a financial sum/benefit for the country that is greater than the cost to fully offset on a like for like principle of equivalence any impacted Habitat. 

Biodiversity offsetting is designed to be applied as a part of the 'last resort' compensation process. Defra's BO impact assessment says:

“Without protection, habitat in England is being lost, fragmented and degraded as biodiversity suffers from market failure. As an unpriced externality it tends to be neglected in market-based transactions and is therefore over consumed and under produced. The planning system attempts to counter this for the impacts of development on biodiversity, but this is not always effective and can also create delays and uncertainty which impose costs on developers. A regulated biodiversity offsetting market offers a potentially efficient solution to both problems, helping to ensure biodiversity issues are dealt with more transparently and with greater certainty in the current planning system, to encourage growth and improve the environment”.

With regard to this objective, it is clear bio diversity offsetting was never intended to be applied to projects that are as expansive such as HS2. The nature of the scheme means it travels through habitats that are pricelessly incapable of being replaced. There is no remedy for replacing that which is irreplaceable or already the best it can be and this is true either side of the line for much of the route. In the USA when considering the same concept as regards the Californian High Speed Rail (HSR), the sitting judge in their circuit court stated that HSR was a major impact on the environment and stated “you just can’t wave a magic wand and hope the environmental impact will go away”. Attempting to use BO as a means to mitigate HS2 is precisely reflected in this statement by the judge.

Specifically with regard to cost, Natural England director of land use Rob Cooke has commented that while BO could offer advantages to the UK's environment, its implementation would need careful management and using examples where these projects have been successful, the costs were not insignificant. Other commentators have made reference to the fact that implementation has stalled due to lack of funding or resources (including appropriately qualified personnel). Therefore, to consider HS2 when comparing cost of alternatives or cost of implementation of BO would require vast and as yet uncalculated sums to be included in the statement of expense. Equally a decade long training program would need to be implemented to train and employ qualified personnel to properly administer the projects. It is therefore a non point to consider BO with regard to HS2 until costing comparison and the concept of training and implementation is capable of being determined – is it even financially viable or possible? Given that alternatives to HS2 exist that require little BO, these alternatives must be compared and reassessed when the true and detailed estimate of BO expense for HS2 is added to the Hybrid Bills Statement of Expense – at this point a decision would be required if HS2 (properly bio offset) still offers better value for money for the UK than the alternatives. 

It should also be noted that as regards biodiversity offsetting, you have stated that you felt the process for bringing in BO was being rushed? I believe you have raised concerns over the fact that the government had not been prepared to wait for the results of pilot programmes before moving forward with their proposals. I quote your statement, "We've got these evaluations and then before there's any independent assessment of them we've got a Green Paper. So there could be many unintended consequences and because it's such an important issue this all needs to be thought through". You have also stated your concern the process was being subverted to streamline development before its environmental mitigations were properly understood. Again, I quote, "If it's is going to be done it should be done for its own sake... Not just to give a green light to economic development at any cost". You have also stated, “the committee had mixed feelings about the potential for BO to be environmentally successful”. Taken in the context of HS2, it would be deeply worrying that such comments made by the chair of such an important environmental committee were ridden roughshod over by the government to enact the development of HS2.

The Lawton report in 2010 warned that biodiversity offsetting must not become a license to destroy or damage existing habitat of recognised value. This is important in the context of habitats on the line which are impossible to recreate on a meaningful timetable. Ancient woodland and resultant impacts on chalk aquifers fall into this category. Any development which damages these habitats effectively leads to an irreversible loss and the consequences of resultant impacts are little understood and certainly not informed in anyway by the HS2 Final ES.

Friends of the Earth commissioned a report into BO which warned, "Important and unique habitats could be lost forever. Biodiversity is often irreplaceable especially ancient woodland, meadows, peat and soils. New sites will not contain the same features as existing habitats and reintroducing or trying to recreate biodiversity is fraught with problems."

The Chartered Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management produced its own report in response to Defra's Green Paper on BO. The conclusions reflected the general sense that the government are putting the cart before the horse. They state that “they were concerned at the overall tone of the document, which seemed to be aimed at enabling faster, cheaper ways to evaluate impacts of development and gain planning approval. Biodiversity offsetting will fail if it is not primed and maintained with the appropriate resources, and charged with a measure of impartiality by close involvement of ecologists within the public sector. Additionally, any offsetting measures need to be supported by rigorous ecological assessments, backed up with a precautionary approach. Implementing biodiversity offsetting is going to cost money. It is not a panacea for government, or developers, to overcome the current economic situation. The government should be clear from the outset about where these costs lie and who will pay them so that stakeholders can realistically consider the costs and benefits of the proposals”.

In conclusion with regard to BO and HS2, I reflect the friends of the earth comments which have stated that, nature is too complex to simply be moved at the whim of a developer. Ancient habitats are impossible to recreate and many others difficult to restore or recreate. Nature’s intrinsic value cannot be accurately measured by a metric and access to the natural world is valued by local communities – both values are lost if nature is treated as a chess piece to be shifted around the country and any economic benefits which accrue to the Cities at the expense of the rural area and loss of habitat is a disproportionate impact created as a consequence of specific bias. Under the High Speed 2 Preparation Act, the promoter has a duty to fully assess and fairly present any and all impacts. This duty to be impartial is an enshrined concept of statutory law. HS2 have demonstrated significant bias and failures to assess, seeking to rely on BO and consequently the impacts are biased, discriminating and ultimately infringing basic Human Rights of any and all persons affected. Myself and members of my village reserve the right to take legal action should any actions of biodiversity as a consequence of the development of HS2 or the development of the scheme itself, infringe such rights.

General Comments on Environmental Considerations for the Final ES

1. HS2 is proposed to be built in two phases. Phase One, the subject of this ES, will involve the construction of a new railway line of approximately 230km (143 miles) between London and Birmingham. Construction will include a connection to the existing HS1 railway line in London. To ask why there is no link with Heathrow given Teresa Villiers when announcing the proposal for High Speed Rail at the Conservative Conference in 2008 stated this as a core aim to reduce flights and therefore environmental pollution caused by flying? The Davies Commission has informed the Transport Committee that it was specifically asked “not to report” until after the General Election in 2015, yet the Davies Commission and how the 3rd runway links with Hs2 would appear to be critical as regards any considerations of Route Wide Environmental Impact!

To state that Davies confirmed in the Transport Select Committee that HS2 will make a 3rd runway at Heathrow inevitable as it will bring more customers from the north. The original aim of HS2 was to alleviate the need for a 3rd runway at Heathrow not increase the environmental burden on West London. The resultant over flights of the Home Counties which a 3rd runway would produce would be a compounded environmental impact alongside HS2 which due to specific instructions given to Davies by the Government, has deliberately not been assessed. Regardless of being illegal under the EU Directive, visiting double environmental impact on the areas that will experience additional train and aircraft noise is wholly disproportionate and leaving it unassessed invites significant and long term court action, particularly in light of the duties HS2 have under the Preparation Act S2HS2Hhhh.

More information is provided in the climate section of the ES, however, it should be noted that the HS2 report concludes modal shift has dropped since moving HS2 from Heathrow Hub to Old Oak Common and Phase 1 (if connected to Heathrow at some stage) will only deliver relief of the equivalent of 6 take offs and landings per day of a A320 class aircraft (800 passengers). I do not support a 3rd runway at Heathrow, however, if HS2 is to visit such environmental destruction along the route, it must come with some form of environmental benefit to reducing Heathrow Flights (i.e. no 3rd Runway) as per the original Conservative Election Manifesto otherwise the Government do not have a mandate for HS2. At present HS2 does not significantly reduce over flights of the home counties and therefore there can be little justification.

BY way of reminder, Teresa Villiers at the Conservative Autumn conference in September 2008 announced that HS2 would cost “£20bn to build a high speed line to travel from London to Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds”. It was announced quite categorically that its purpose was “to encourage modal shift from Air to Train and remove 65,000 flights per year from Heathrow which meant there would be no need for a 3rd runway” and significant carbon savings in less flights.

Ruth Kelly, then Transport Secretary for Labour, responded the same day to this announcement stating:-

“if every flight from Manchester and Leeds to Heathrow were replaced by a new high-speed line, Heathrow would still be operating at 97% capacity. These proposals are politically opportunistic, economically illiterate and hugely damaging to Britain's national interests. The Tories are posing a false choice - we need both more capacity in Britain's airports and on our main rail lines”.

It would appear Ruth Kelly was correct but in addition, the environmental impact to be endured for HS2, on HS2 figures removes only 2000 flights per year which falls woefully short of Villiers claims. HS2 does not solve Heathrow and Davies statements would suggest in fact it is more likely to make Heathrow far worse.  

2. An HS2 connection to HS1 will allow some services to access the high speed line through east London and Kent and connect with mainland Europe via the Channel Tunnel. Aside from the fact this connection remains uncertain; there has been no environmental consultation with regard to the intensification of use of HS1 as a consequence of HS2 – HS2 is a faster train with wholly different characteristics to the HS1 trains. Persons affected in Kent and South East England will be impacted by HS2 using the HS1 line?

3. National Planning Policy regarding protected landscapes is set out in paragraphs 115 and 116 of the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The NPPF states “Planning permission should be refused for major developments in these designated areas except in exceptional circumstances AND where it can be demonstrated they are in the public interest”. To bring to the attention of committee that HS2 misquoted NPPF and removed “and” to replace it with a comma. The NPPF is clear in its intentions; to protect the environment, HS2 must demonstrate both “exceptional circumstances” AND the need for the project is in “the public interest”. The democratically elected Government may consider they have a mandate to decide what is in the “national interest”, however, it is clear that the intent in drafting of adding the word “and” is designed to prevent oppressive legislation.

It is explicit that “exceptional circumstances” have to be established in addition to what the Government considers to be in the national interest. The word exceptional can be defined as “extraordinary, non-typical and unusual”. The word “circumstances” can be defined as “fact of conditions or state of affairs”. HS2 have failed to establish or indeed present any case for “exceptional circumstances” in the Final ES and therefore they have failed to establish any law that allows them to undertake environmental damage before even considering the biodiversity offset necessary to repair them.

4. Field surveys were undertaken between July 2012 and July 2013 to establish the baseline character of the route. To state that HS2 admit to only undertaking 48% survey work and therefore the majority of land on the route has not yet been surveyed. It is difficult to begin to quantify the cost or appropriateness of BO with regard to HS2 if less than half the route has been surveyed?

5. HS2 Construction activities will result in the removal of significant amounts of woodland, much of which is ancient woodland. Although these losses represent a small proportion of woodland in the UK as a whole the extent of ancient woodland lost is considerable by comparison and the impact on areas with ancient woodland will be disproportionate. To state the PRoWs that run through these ancient woodlands, in combination form the defining reason why walkers and ramblers and cyclists and recreational users come to visit many of the locations impacted along the route. HS2 acknowledge the ancient woodland is an irreplaceable national resource and its loss is a significant adverse effect as the economy of these locations and reputation loss will be considerable. There is no reference or risk assessment to the fact that this damage is likely to be increased if the remaining ancient woodland fails to survive the significant damage caused by the scheme. There has been no mitigation of the ancient woodland and the unique species that inhabit these locations. It is widely acknowledged that replacement planting is not and cannot be a form of BO with regards to Ancient Woodland.

6. Construction activities will result in the temporary removal or severance of approximately 4km2 (400ha) of agricultural land and the removal of approximately 40km of hedgerow vegetation with associated mature trees. To state that 400ha of agricultural land is not a small proportion of farmland. To state that this figure does not take account of the severance that will make certain field’s uneconomic leading to disproportionate impact together with loss of management of such fields. To state the National Farming Union has made it clear to HS2 and the Government the route wide disruption to farms leading to loss of important agriculture and severing significant numbers of farms throughout the route leaving such farms uneconomic and no longer viable for production. This represents a loss of a major resource at a time when land for food production is under acute strain across the world. This is wholly irresponsible behaviour which can be avoided if existing transport corridors are followed.

No account of the agricultural economic loss, compensation or future subsidised management costs of the uneconomic land have been factored into the BCR, estimate of expense or compensation arrangements for HS2 Impacts. Such land cannot be BO as much of the land along the route is BMV land (75% in Chilterns) and therefore how do you recreate such land close by under a BO process?

7. The operational assessment of impacts and effects is based on year 1 (2026), year 15 (2041) and year 60 (2086) of the Proposed Scheme. HS2 state they employed a process of iterative design and assessment to avoid or reduce adverse effects during the operational phase of the Proposed Scheme. However, route wide, almost every local authority and community organisation has stated that no such process has been carried out and indeed communities that did engage to suggest mitigation which could have formed BO and therefore reduced environmental impact, have been universally ignored for engineering and cost considerations which have taken priority – this is a classic example of the precise statements on development first, nature second “cart before the horse approach” taken by Government which the Environmental Audit Committee and Friends of the Earth made reference to above. For example, the alignment of the route has been raised but compensated with more earthworks increasing impact but reducing development cost. There is water pollution, loss of more ancient woodland than is necessary, no attempt to adopt or change satellite compounds or create haul routes to reduce environmental impact on agriculture, forestry, soils or ecology and all to save money and facilitate faster development by HS2 and cheaper cost to taxpayer. The route of HS2 may not be up for discussion in this committee, but the cost of Bio Diversity to properly offset the impacts of the route, certainly is. The fact HS2 have chosen the worst and possibly most expensive route to properly BO is a factor they should have been expected to take into consideration at route decision stage. To then seek to BO to a cheaper, faster, less mitigation level resulting in engineering savings for the taxpayer is a failure of management by HS2 and the consequences of this failure should not be visited on the environment.

Agriculture Forest and Soil

HS2 maintain that efforts have been made (particularly during the HS2 London to the West Midlands Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) process) in selecting the route alignment to avoid the highest quality agricultural land, but this has not always been possible given the need to satisfy or balance a number of other important environmental and engineering considerations. I consider this a disingenuous statement as a route following an existing transport corridor would fully achieve this aim. The AOS 2011 is a flawed document and evidence of this was presented in the Carbon Outputs section of the ES which confirms the CO2 emissions for HS2 are 4.5x greater than suggested in the AOS. If it is not always possible to balance up agricultural needs as they must give way to engineering and environmental needs, why was the route with most agricultural loss, greatest environmental impact and worst soil for engineering chosen? Arups informed the route selection process that the soil in the Chilterns section is the worst kind and should be avoided for reasons of risk and unknown cost. No further intrusive soil studies have been undertaken by HS2 to suggest otherwise so Engineering cannot support this statement.

The National Farming Union has informed us the impact on agriculture throughout the route is the maximum it could possibly be. Therefore not one variable has given way to afford balance to the other 2. In fact all 3 are the worst possible outcomes?

The agricultural land required for the Proposed Scheme and its construction will amount to approximately 4,800ha, of which approximately 2,500ha (52%) will be the BMV agricultural land in Grade 2 and Subgrade 3a. While the BMV figures presented are averaged along the route, it must be recorded that some areas are disproportionately affected more than others, such as our local area whose BMV loss is over 75%. Aside form the disproportionate impact, it is completely impossible to suggest any form of Biodiversity Offset that will mitigate this. 

An area of approximately 250ha of forestry land will be permanently removed but will be offset by the replanting of approximately 650ha of woodland for landscape mitigation and ecological habitat creation or replacement. To state that clarification must be made to MPs as there can be no offset for ancient woodland which is irreplaceable. There is no cumulative assessment of the loss of ancient woodland. Given that this is a national resource, and accounts for only 2% of all woodland, it is misrepresentation by omission. The Woodland Trust’s analysis of the route indicates that 21 ancient woodlands are under threat, covering 409ha. There is no assessment of remaining ancient woodland.  The ES fails to address the loss of woodland apart from identifying the loss of 250 ha and replanting of 650ha. The long term management of such plantations is not identified. The consequences on water attenuation is not consider (more detail in flood risk section), the CO2 sequestration capabilities of farmland and mature trees is not considered or factored into the Carbon Outputs case, indeed it is presented one way with savings from trees planted but no deductions for trees lost. A mature tree sequesters more CO2 in 1 year than an acre of whips planted and allowed to grow for 25 years. Equally a mature tree attenuates 67 times more water than a whip. None of this has been factored into the HS2 case and equally is an important consideration when considering any form of BO towards HS2 or indeed any development project. 

The baseline data on Agriculture, Soils and Forestry has been derived from desktop investigation. The desktop data used for soils is based on reports that date from 1984 and a national soil map from 2001? The forestry data has been heavily questioned by the Woodland Trust (amongst many other organisations) who have commented the desktop information used to produce the reports on Ancient Woodland are so out of date, HS2 could have miss calculated the number of Ancient Woodlands by as many as 50% on Phase 1 alone.

HS2 inform us that engagement with landowners and tenants between May 2012 and June 2013 established the nature and extent of agriculture, forestry and related rural enterprise, however, it should be noted that the extent of aggravation that HS2 consultation brought to the community forums (this is acknowledged by HS2 that personalities from HS2 made engagement “difficult”) meant that permission was sought to study the impact but refused by landowners due to hostility towards members of the community by HS2 personnel during the community process – HS2 acknowledge they got the consultation badly wrong and aggravated people with arrogance and failure to consult or communicate. Therefore, the substandard study of Agriculture, Forestry and Soil study is probably explainable as a consequence of this failing by HS2 – it should not be accepted as an excuse for shoddy work!

The scheme itself has not assessed the potential for top soil erosion. For example, the River Misbourne lies to the West of the route 130ft AOD. The height of the line in this area is over 500 ft AOD falling with a 1 in 8 gradient in parts. The gradient is recognised as posing a significant engineering hydrology challenge as regards run off and therefore the designs as currently envisaged will lead to substantial top soil erosion as a function of channelled methods/drop inlets employed to capture run off exacerbated by the gradient. The methods and designs being used to conserve such important topsoil are grossly inadequate and contrary to guidelines provided by DEFRA “Construction CoP for sustainable use of soils on construction sites”.

There is also a flood link with soil in areas of the route. In the CF8 – CF10 area, north west of the chalk scarp is an extensive clay pan of Kimmeridge Clay. This is a largely impermeable barrier that allows the natural water to drain down into the Misbourne without unduly creating a level of run off that disrupts the topsoil. The project will disrupt this natural geology to the extent it may be permanently damaged – no cognisance has been taken of the potential for such damage. A tunnel driven through this area together with the necessary piling solutions will create great fractures in these natural characteristics which will increase turbidity (another form of topsoil erosion) yet the effects of this are neither understood or acknowledged in any depth. Worryingly HS2 have not undertaken any intrusive soil investigation studies therefore they do not know the depth of piles or type of piling solution they will use. More piles and the greater the depth of pile will all increase fracturing and run off. None of this is modelled?

No recognition is made of the type of soil and the impact of removal. For example in the CF8 – CF10 area the predominate soil is Batcombe series. The Batcombe series is particularly productive for forests and in particular the unique geology has been critical to establishing ancient woodlands forming over such a long period of time. The majority of soil being sent to the sustainable placement areas is the Batcombe series and therefore future evolution of ancient woodland may be prevented in this area.

When analysing and presenting soil data, a normal developer would be expected to follow DEFRA recommend guidelines and present data that establishes pH, salinity, particle size analysis, nutrients, organic matter, and potential contaminants. HS2 have not provided this information and have also not developed a Soil Resources Plan that DEFRA suggest is good practice to accompany an ES. DEFRA also recommend strongly that soil is not dumped haphazardly in stockpiles but defined with stockpiles classes and haul routes to avoid cross contamination. The ES report provides no indication this is being considered? The Channel Tunnel Rail link produced an Agricultural Management Plan – there is no reference to such a report in the Soil study? The entire DEFRA guidelines on soil and top soil management are being ignored? Why? 

HS2 maintain there is insufficient detailed evidence at the local level to assess the impact on soils and how it will react to climate change. The reason why there is insufficient detailed evidence is because HS2 have never undertaken any intrusive sampling of the soil in the area and are reliant on weak desktop data. A fact that is dangerous to both tunnelling, construction and route selection outlined elsewhere in this response.

The spread of noxious weeds by HS2 will be a major factor affecting agriculture. Indeed invasive varieties that are difficult to contain for extended periods will need a recurring annual program beyond the construction date. Equally, chemical treatment is ineffective in many cases. It should be noted that no account has been made of the potential for introduction of noxious weeds. The Great Western Railway has been responsible for the spread of the destructive Japanese Knotweed which has spread from the west. The current Chiltern Line is a self contained line, whereas the HS2 trains will share marshalling with GWR trains. Such marshalling will lead to contagion issues for this noxious weed and the impacts on areas of the line will be catastrophic as the cost of damage by this invasive species will be significant – this is not to be underestimated as I have significant professional experience of these weeds.

Air Quality

Traffic Data used for Air Quality has been woefully inadequate and much of the air quality information was contained in the USB sticks that went missing. Of the information on Air Quality that has been presented to the public under the ES, many of the locations are based on historic readings and overly reliant on 3rd party study work. HS2 are knowingly placing the health of the public at risk by failing to undertake adequate Air Quality study work.

In this area, HS2 adopted the County Core strategy from 2011, but this strategy is out of date with both EU directives on Air Quality and DEFRA update on DAQI in April 2013. These updates place a more stringent monitoring and testing regime following recommendations made by the Committee on Medical Effects of Air Pollution and their findings. Indeed, evidence of this is the fact HS2 have ignored the London Air Quality Impacts which is currently facing a fine of £300m per annum from the EU due to breaches of Air Quality regulations. Air Quality has significant effects on medical health and therefore given the need to have the correct standards set and adopted is critical to ensure the health of the public is not knowingly placed in danger.

HS2 inform us that no ecological receptors are predicted to be impacted by the construction phase. This appears to be a disingenuous statement in light of the 2011 EU Nitrogen Assessment that found over 60% of our prime Wildlife Sites are being heavily affected by nitrogen pollution from Motor Vehicles. Equally HS2 have assumed significant effects would not occur 50m from the Haul Routes which is a difficult assumption to verify in the context of IAQM guidelines?

There are two sources which could affect air quality; construction activities and traffic on highway network. The main pollutant emitted from construction sites is dust. HS2 acknowledges that dust can be carried a few hundred meters from construction sites. The statement that the Code of Construction Practice (CoCP) would enable these activities to be controlled such that the effects on air quality would generally only be locally slight is misleading. Shifting large amounts of earth will create significant dust and areas that have a high content of clay means in drought conditions this amount of dust will be significant. It is an inevitable consequence. It may be reduced by watering but never eliminated. Spoil heaps are too large to be sheeted, Dump trucks operating within the site will not be sheeted, haul roads surfaced with granular material will generate dust under heavy trafficking and in drought conditions, excavation and depositing of spoil in live working areas will not be on hard standing. 

Construction traffic and changes in the volume and location of traffic on the highway network will result in impacts further from the construction sites (up to a few tens of kilometres away). Changes in volume and location of traffic on the highway network will result in impacts further from the construction sites and the extent of this impact is not assessed within the report. Equally there is no cumulative assessment leading to invalid conclusions. HS2 have adopted a strategy of segmentation of information which means that there is no overall cumulative assessment which should be considered vital in such a linear project.

Climate

The climate section presents the assessment of the Green House Gas (GHG) emissions of the Proposed Scheme during construction and operation. This issue was considered in detail in the Appraisal of Sustainability (AoS) of Phase One in 2011, where a range for the carbon footprint was presented. This AOS made a statement prior to the key vote to proceed with HS2 that Ph 1 carbon emissions would be 1.2 MtCO2e. To state that the current Final ES Carbon Assessment records this figure is now 5.6MtCO2e. This figure is therefore 4.5 times greater than originally reported to Parliament and MPs. The original AOS is flawed and has misled MPs. Meantime, as a consequence of this document; many MPs including the former Minister for Transport and current Secretary of State are continuing to state that HS2 is carbon neutral or positive when this is clearly wrong.

A bespoke carbon model has been developed for the GHG assessment. Given the evidence presented by this bespoke model in the AOS 2011, it would make sense that the EAC conduct and commission independent research to scrutinise and interrogate this “bespoke” carbon model to ensure it functions objectively and presents fair assessment. This model is wholly necessary to give MPs confidence a decision at second reading is made in keeping with commitments to the Climate Change Act.

GHG emission reductions are not made by HS2; indeed it is a net contributor to CO2 emissions both in construction and during operation. The modal shift of freight during operation - released capacity on the classic network will allow additional freight to move from road to rail – is the primary creator of the HS2 case for CO2 reduction used to establish a reduction in CO2 emissions in favour of HS2. There are several issues with this assumption that are both misleading and require further investigation in the context of duties under the Climate Change Act –

1. Modal shift of road freight to rail freight only produces carbon savings if the assumption is that no more freight will take up the capacity released. We are aware that the Leaders of Halton Council, Warrington and Manchester Councils together with the Mayor of Salford all sit on executive boards which are promoting the Atlantic Gateway Freight Distribution Hub and are chief supporters for HS2 and therefore the development of new super ports at Liverpool2 and Salford. These new super ports are being developed to handle and transfer millions of tonnes of freight from ship to rail and road. Salford requires a new rail link to the West Coast Mainline and up to 80 new train pathways per day to become viable. Liverpool2 will no doubt be seeking same once HS2 is provided which frees up train pathways on the WCML link. The Atlantic Gateway is a private venture but is being promoted and assisted by public figures and public money to create the rail freight capacity. Peel, the owner, is an offshore vehicle and according to the Public Accounts Committee pay “little or no tax” which reveals a stunning disregard for the investment being made by public funds for their benefit.

Therefore, given a new port and new road and rail connections from the port to Motorways and WCML are being made, this means there is no CO2 saving on modal shift by HS2 as it is directly encouraging the development of ports which will increase the amount of freight to transfer through the UK. These super ports with faster load and unload times are capable of competing with the great EU ports such as Antwerp and Stephen Hammond MP and Tim Yeo MP have links to rail freight businesses that are promoting greater use of the Channel Tunnel for freight via the UK to Europe. Therefore the freight uptake figure of 2.07 MtCO2e is presented as a benefit but is in actual fact a disbenefit as HS2 becomes the catalyst for a development that will substantially explode the road and rail freight emissions in the UK – its is conceivable we become the new port for Europe! Equally these modern super ports will inevitably “steal” business from other ports in the UK which lack the same investment making them financially unviable and effectively leading to closure. Such other ports may in fact be better placed for shorter transfer distance, but without the investment and access to train pathways on the WCML, they cannot compete. The environmental impacts of this are incalculable and why the Government should be supporting such a venture that takes from one to give to another is a mystery!

2. Evidence presented by HS2 states their CO2 reduction by freight relies on 40 extra pathways on the WCML. However, a table later in this section records the fact that 27 of these pathways are already available and therefore 1.4 MtCO2e of the 2.07 MtCO2e savings claimed by HS2 is already available. This singular fact confirms that HS2 will officially be polluting more Co2 into the atmosphere than it saves.

3. The 5.6 MtCO2e of CO2 for phase 1 of HS2 should be placed in context with our climate change reduction target for Rail under the Climate change act. To 2027 we are committed to reducing some 4 MtCO2e from the rail network emission and despite these grand efforts, HS2 simply makes setting such a target pointless.

4. The Rail Freight Industry themselves acknowledge that while a single freight train can do the work of 60 HGV, the deliveries to/from the railhead (last mile problem) increase Co2 and this is never taken into consideration when assessing freights credentials to reduce GHG. Indeed, studies produced by the DFT suggest that because of the last mile issue, freight must travel over 212 miles before it achieves a demonstrable GHG saving when compared with HGVs – how many journeys in the UK will undertake this distance? Furthermore, while rail freight may remove 60 HGV, it is replaced by 10x as many vans undertaking the local last mile delivery leading to greater congestion and damage to local roads, slowing down traffic and therefore increasing Co2 emissions to all road users via longer journeys and stationary vehicles. Rail freight is not the panacea it is made out to be and comes with many flaws which are papered over by vast funding for lobbyists and connections to MPs. Of course, the former shadow Transport Minister (and environment minister), Tim Yeo MP is well aware of this issue given he is a non-executive of Eurotunnel who own the 3rd largest rail freight company in the UK – Railfreight GB. He is also a non executive of ECO-City Vehicles who manufacturer electric vehicles for last mile delivery.   

With regards to carbon sequestration the 2 million trees planted amount to 0.5mtCO2e of savings, yet there are significant issues of bias with this approach. Firstly, the carbon outputs report assumes these trees are planted in 2017, this is clearly erroneous as the trees would need to be planted then dug up again for construction? Clearly this date must be moved to 2026 which then halves the Co2 saving. Secondly, if newly planted trees carbon sequestration is to be taken into consideration within the calculation of carbon outputs, then other factors must also be assumed. Firstly an acre of newly planted trees sequesters in 25 years what some mature trees can sequester in a year – this loss in MtCO2e must be factored into the equation or it is biased. Equally there is no calculation for the CO2 sequester of the farmland that is being lost temporary or permanently and this will be significant. The loss of any and all trees to make way for the scheme will return significant amounts of captured CO2 back into the atmosphere and this has also not been assessed or factored into the carbon output. It would appear HS2 have chosen to calculate the positive CO2 benefits but decline to take into consideration the negatives.

In the interests of fairness and equality, it would make sense for the EAC to conduct an inquiry and independent study and calculation to be presented to MPs which focuses on all of these issues and a more impartial assessment made to accurately assess the CO2 of HS2 as the evidence presented to date is specifically biased and therefore misleading to MPs which will result in disproportionate impacts with regard to climate change.

Within the route wide effects report, table 1 illustrates a large carbon saving associated with the operation of the Proposed Scheme. The scheme is presented as having one of the lowest carbon transport solutions compared to other modes such as road, air and classic rail (using the network average). Based on projected carbon emissions in 2035, the Proposed Scheme has lower emissions per passenger kilometre (8gCO2e/pkm) than interurban cars (67gCO2e/pkm); intercity rail (22gCO2e/pkm) and UK domestic flights (170gCO2e/pkm). The figure produced for the high speed train suggests that it will be the lowest Co2 form of travel in the UK, despite the fact it uses 3x more power than classic trains?

On closer investigation, we find, the calculation makes no effort at comparison since its figure for existing rail includes the Diesel service on the existing network that due to lack of funding have not been upgraded. Diesel rail emits 90% of the total network CO2 emissions for rail and this is includes a high percentage of rail freight units (43% on WCML) – which HS2 is not only seeking to increase but also claiming a CO2 reduction from this increase? Aside from the fact this is illogical, a like for like comparison with IC225 classic trains which are electrified would be more appropriate – this has been avoided as we know classic electrified rail is substantially more Co2 efficient than HS2, which blows a significant hole in the environmental case!

The failure to upgrade the Diesel units on the existing network will mean continued CO2 emissions on the existing network and HS2 will take the funding that prevents this from happening, therefore, the opportunity costs should also be added to the increase in Co2 caused by HS2 as it is a direct effect of funding being switched from investment in classic rail to high speed.

HS2 assumes significant passenger numbers switching to the service with 70% occupancy per trip to arrive at their Co2 numbers. Given the Public Accounts Committee warned the DFT that their forecasting and estimates fell woefully short as regards passenger numbers projected for HS1, how are MPs and the general public to have any confidence that the 70% will be achieved? It is apparent that HS1 has missed passenger targets by a high speed mile achieving 9.6m of a projected 28m. Of course, the cynical view is that HS1 was never delivered for passenger services but for private rail freight and this is evident with the increase of freight use of CTRL. There are strong parallels with HS2, except, it is my contention that the WCML will be downgraded and converted to freight use for Atlantic Gateway and HS2 will carry passengers. If this suspicion is right, there are significant and unassessed environmental consequences of this (not to mention economic and social) which need to be consulted upon – the EAC have a duty to get to the bottom of these facts. 

Currently emerging Electric and Zero Emission Hydrogen Cars with 1.6 occupancy have lower emission per passenger km than a 75% full IC225 train which is the nearest comparable to HS2 currently running inter city. Therefore, given that HS2 will require more energy than an IC 225 train, these figures are flawed and like for like comparison between IC225 and HS2 should have been presented in Table 1.

HS2 is also taking funding from other regional rail projects that could be implemented. The scheme will increase the total carrying capacity of the rails but no opportunity cost assessment has taken place to determine whether greater capacity of the entire UK Rail Network can be delivered with a package of regional rail investments and upgrades. MPs should be reminded that HS2 is simply connecting the same locations that already have the best connected rail services in the UK. It will suck in maintenance budgets and expenditure and investment for 20 years when in fact a sequence of regional projects could potentially deliver more for less and indeed in the context of this committee would be more appropriate for localised Biodiversity Offsetting.

Previously when HS2 was connected via Heathrow Hub and M40 route, the modal shift from Air and Road was 8% and 8% but this has since dropped to 1% and 4% as a consequence of the move to Old Oak Common. The only benefit derived from this move is a 6 minute time saving between the current route and an M40 route. Equally, an intermediate station at say Oxford Parkway via the M40 could have delivered significantly more Co2 savings via the A34/M40 modal shift from car and the Hub at Heathrow would have connected the Great Western Line, West Country and offered a parkway station on the M4/M25 – this has not been assessed and the modal shift advantages would be significant. Instead it has been dismissed on grounds that the time penalty of 6 mins is too great, yet not so great that we cannot connect up Birmingham Airport which offers little if any modal shift or CO2 savings?

To state any freight benefits must be discounted since the entire HS2 proposal would facilitate the construction of super ports which will increase the amount of freight via the UK and channel tunnel to Europe or across the UK and therefore, no Co2 savings can be claimed as HS2 is a facilitator of more CO2 being created via road and rail freight.

The construction carbon footprint is calculated to be a range between 5.3 M and 6.46 MtCO2e, assuming that the construction industry is able to implement its research on carbon efficiency and assuming no improvement from 2013 in the efficiency of the manufacture of materials such as steel and their use in construction. A central figure based on likely improvements by 2020 is estimated to be 5.59 MtCO2e; and has been used in the preparation of a total carbon footprint for scenario A, whereas the lower figure of 5.3 MtCO2e is used for scenario B. The assumption that Co2 will not rise in the manufacture of steel and concrete is entirely misleading as the contrary is true. More of the UK cement is being sourced from overseas as our stocks decline. EU Steel has been in decline for some time and the figures assume all the steel will be sourced from the EU who have only 10% of the Global Steel Market vs. China that has 60% of Global Steel market. It is inevitable given the decline of EU Steel that the source of Steel will be China and therefore the Co2 emissions are presented incorrectly.

A significant proportion of the construction footprint is associated with the construction of earthworks, bridges, viaducts, tunnels and underpasses; some of which help to mitigate other significant environmental impacts, such as noise and visual amenity. The amount of tunnel, earthworks, bridges and viaducts are increased to reduce the environmental impact, however alternative routes which select existing transport corridors, such as M40, will create a far lower embedded Co2 construction impact and less environmental impact as well as less engineering.

The total net carbon footprint of the Proposed Scheme over the 60 year assessment period is between 2,140,000 tCO2e and 2,620,000 tCO2e to include all the most favourable estimates of GHG savings that HS2 can bring including a full decarbonised grid. If the same assumptions are applied across the Proposed Scheme's 120 year design life, the total carbon footprint is between 360,000 and 230,000 tCO2e. In effect this means that HS2 will be polluting our atmosphere and contributing to GHG emissions, even under the most favourable assessment basis, for over 120 years?

An analogy of the Co2 footprint is best illustrated with Hs2 own climate assessment in the route wide report which confirms the construction footprint of a hypothetical new motorway between London and the West Midlands to carry the same amount of people will have a lower GHG emission profile than building HS2? The operational footprint, however, would be significantly larger ranging between 23 and 25 million tCO2e over the 60 year appraisal period. However, this ignores the fact that such a motorway could be dedicated to zero emission vehicles which would offer a significant saving on Hs2 operations. Such a motorway would offer greater flexibility, fewer subsidies than rail and potentially generate more in road tax become a net contributor to UK revenue as opposed to a subsidy drain that HS2 is expected to become.

The UK Government currently obtain £58bn in tax from road users per year and subsidise the train network between £5bn and £10bn (depending on debt classification). French TGV is currently costing £2bn a year in subsidy to run and is a drain on French Transport Finances as it is 3x more expensive to maintain. A zero emission vehicle, either electric or hydrogen, in production currently can deliver lower Co2 emissions per 1.6 person occupancy than a IC225 train at 75% occupancy and HS2 is more power hungry. This type of technology is not only the future but is based on existing production technology which over the lifetime of HS2 will evolve beyond recognition. Therefore, to state that a new motorway exclusively for zero emission vehicles could deliver substantially lower Co2 emissions and far more economic benefits – assuming people don’t work on trains which HS2 say they do not.

In 2011 (the latest figures available), the UK’s progress against its Climate Change Act targets was a reduction of 29.1% (i.e. 549,200,000 tCO2e) from 1990 levels excluding the effects of emissions trading. In terms of overall UK emissions, transport accounted for 134,800,000 tCO2e (25%) and rail for 4,400,000 tCO2e (less than 1%). The HS2 construction tCO2e is greater than the entire target budget reduction for the entire rail network as set by the Climate Change Act which then jeopardises this target. To ask how the rail budget will be achieved in light of this information? It runs contrary to the Climate Change Act as HS2 will be a net contributor of Co2 affecting the target reduction and therefore undermines the efforts to date and in the future by rail passengers to reduce their Co2 footprint to meet the terms of the Climate Change Act. To ask what measures are being made to bring HS2 into compliance with the climate change act targets. Why should the Government get to spend the Co2 savings rail passengers have been contributing?

The central estimate of the Proposed Scheme’s construction carbon footprint is 5,590,000 tCO2e. Route Wide Report, Figure 9 presents the breakdown of the Proposed Scheme’s construction phase carbon footprint. The elements contributing the largest proportion to the embedded carbon footprint are the construction of tunnels including ancillary rail electrification and telecommunications equipment, tunnels, Tunnel Boring Machines (TBMs) and dive-unders (1,200,000 tCO2e). In many cases, tunnels have been included in order to mitigate other significant environmental impacts such as noise and visual amenity. It should be noted that no intrusive studies have as yet been undertaken so the design of the train tracks and the need for more structural reinforcing is completely unknown therefore it is far likely this figure together with associated costs will rise. Under the Climate Change Act, HS2 have a duty to properly assess the Co2 and since the lack of intrusive study prevents this, HS2 simply cannot comply with the Act.

The Co2 generated by train maintenance is held to be based on equivalent maintenance of classic services; however, HS2 requires 3x more maintenance than classic services.

While there are very few comparable infrastructure projects to the proposed scheme, published data for the carbon footprint for Crossrail, a £14.5 billion, 118km railway between the east and west of London, states that its emissions are estimated to be between 9,600,000 tCO2 and 14,900,000 tCO2 during its lifetime for construction and 120 years of operation. The range is dependent on assumptions on rolling stock and future grid mix projections. The operation of Crossrail is expected to comprise the majority of these emissions, with the construction emissions estimated to contribute approximately 1,500,000 tCOe. Modal shift is estimated to save 1,300,000 tCO2 per year. This compares with an anticipated total construction footprint of 5,600,000 tCO2e for HS2 and modal shift savings of only 5,270,000 tCO2e over the 60 year assessment period.

What is most interesting is that Crossrail has almost twice as much tunnel as HS2 and in the route wide report HS2 confirmed their extra mitigation tunnelling for the AONB had increased Co2 by 1.2MtCo2e. Set against the entire Crossrail scheme of 1.5 MtCo2e suggests HS2 is somehow creating far more Co2 impact with fewer tunnel – such discrepancy needs further explanation? Perhaps the fact Crossrail is one continuous tunnel is the reason it’s embedded CO2 is less? Less HGV movements, less construction camps, less variation in material, less construction of roads and bridges and flyovers etc. In which case, a full bore tunnel through the Chilterns is a far better outcome for UK climate as regards embedded CO2.

HS2 admits that the embedded carbon will jeopardise the climate change target for Transport, as it is more than the entire UK Rail Transport target committed reduction to 2027 as set by the Climate Change Act. HS2 admit this is due to the fact they have selected to travel through the centre of an AONB rather than the edge as per precedent set by M40, M25 and WCML and therefore require far greater mitigation in the form of tunnels. HS2 admit they did not forecast the embedded carbon correctly in the AOS 2011 and now admit that the extra tunnels will result in an extra 1.2 MtCO2e Co2, yet they fail to explain why such extra tunnelling is almost equivalent to the entire embedded MtCO2e of Crossrail, despite the fact Crossrail tunnels are almost twice as long?

HS2 admit that the singular saving grace of HS2 is the fact that it will qualify for the EU Emissions Trading system. This is heralded as a significant advantage over car and diesel rail – diesel rail generating 90% of all CO2 rail emissions. However, this fails to assess the consequences of what would happen if £50bn was invested into converting the existing diesel fleet to electric and delivering a new motorway exclusively for zero emission electric vehicles. Equally, the ETS should not dictate policy towards carbon reduction if true CO2 reductions can be obtained rather than artificially “traded out” results.

In Table 5 of the climate section of the route wide report, HS2 reveal there are 3 standard off peak freight paths per hour currently available on the WCML and only half this amount is used. The table then goes on to highlight that the freight emissions figure for Co2 reduction is based upon releasing 20 – 40 new freight paths 300 days per year post 2026 when HS2 is operational. Such release is available for 60 years and informs the Co2 operational reduction statements made in this report and the core reason why HS2 is claimed to be environmentally neutral. However, a lay observation suggests there are 1.5 train pathways currently available to freight on the WCML (out with peak) and therefore 1.5 x 18 off peak hours suggest there are currently 27 train pathways capable of delivering the capacity HS2 consider they will need to generate to 2085? Furthermore, this would suggest there is no need for HS2 on a freight capacity basis as clearly the existing capacity to 2085 – 20 up to 40 trains per day - is already available. The primary question though is, with 27 freight pathways available, why does HS2 claim in their Carbon Outputs that HS2 creates CO2 savings by creating freight capacity when this capacity already exists and can be used? Surely it’s only the incremental freight capacity that HS2 creates that can be allowed (if at all) into the CO2 calculation.

The HS2 route as designed does not deliver any increase in capacity or connectivity that cannot be delivered within the existing network in such a way that the Co2 emission benefits would be substantially greater. On the contrary it is clear that a programme of regional investment and upgrade of the existing diesel fleet would deliver far greater Co2 benefits as would a new dedicated motorway for zero emission vehicles.

Ecology

Bats - Bat Trapping /radio tracking

Bats and other species and their habitats are afforded protection under UK and European Law which includes “a range of prohibitions that include deliberate capture or killing, deliberate disturbance and the deterioration or destruction of a breeding site or resting place of such an animal”. Much of the line will destroy habitats of these creatures, many of whom are rare bats that have the fullest protection we can offer. Construction of the scheme will remove and fragment habitat and this fragmentation and isolation will restrict the movement of the animals between the remaining woods which, over time, could alter the composition of the bat assemblage.

I have found within my own area that permission to carry out surveys were denied, consequently, while it was unhelpful that access was not granted, this has been used as an excuse by HS2 to avoid proper study.

The data obtained makes reference to trapping being carried out under the licence of a Dr Stephanie Murphy’s (ref number 20130854) valid from 3 June 2013 to 30 September 2013, however, it is unclear if Dr Murphy was present and whether the work was conducted in accordance with the recommendations of the Bat Conservation Trust in their paper dated “HS2 – Considerations to Limit Impacts on Bats”.

Details of the methodology are provided in the local surveys, but due to lack of access the methodology was changed to standing at a distance to the wood, looking onto the wood and shining a torch? This “ground-based assessment” identified 19 trees with potential to support roosting bats in the immediate vicinity. The assessment used “close focusing binoculars” and a “high powered torch”? HS2 then searched for areas “where potential roost features were identified, evidence of roosting bats, including droppings, feeding remains such as moth wings, scratch marks around suitable crevices and urine and fur oil stains”. Given the potential for rare and protected species of bats, a survey with a torch and binocular on the outskirts of the wood hardly contributes a robust survey for rare species of bats?

The local area report details six bat types plus unidentified species recorded by bat groups. The section does not detail where or when but this is likely to have been drawn from BCT’s National Bat Monitoring Programme – Annual Report 2012. Again, HS2 are overly reliant on historic evidence gathered by others?

The Trapping surveys were carried out on three occasions and were of limited success in capturing only six bats which were however of three different species, one of which is classified as of principal importance in England. On finding the rare species, the methodology was to radio-tag to allow tracking of the foraging routes and roosting places. Unfortunately the rare bat captured was an underweight juvenile male which could not be radio-tagged. Given this situation it would be reasonable to expect the Trapping Surveys to be extended to offer further opportunity to trap a suitable bat to enable the very important radio-tagging to be undertaken, HS2 did not do so and have dismissed the evidence collected as of no consequence when in fact it is evidence that should be followed up?

Barn Owls

Breeding populations of Barn Owls in this area will be destroyed as a consequence of HS2. As a member of the Barn Owl Trust, I object most strongly to the loss of these magnificent creatures from this area as it will be a significant unmitigated impact which cannot be offset in any meaningful way as the creatures will be lost up to 1.5km from either side of the line.

The Barn Owl Trust have commented on the Final ES as follows :-

We require more time is allocated for a proper assessment of both the short and long-term impacts on habitats and species. The full Environmental Statement must set out exactly how the project will achieve net gains for biodiversity for Barn Owls. The draft ES does not adequately address the issue of the probable effects of HS2 on Barn Owls. The scope of the stated impact on Barn Owls, the terminology used, and other inadequacies indicate the author's lack of relevant knowledge. In considering only the impact on nesting sites within 1.5km of the route, the ES is clearly inadequate. Specifically, the long-term impact of increased annual mortality of dispersing juvenile Barn Owls is not mentioned. The draft ES does not include any measures aimed at preventing owl-train collisions. The idea that the provision of nest boxes over 1.5 km from the route can effectively mitigate the impact of HS2 on Barn Owls ("offset the adverse effect") is ill-founded. Specifically, the statement "if the proposed mitigation measures for barn owl are implemented through liaison with landowners, the residual effect on barn owl would be reduced to a level that is not significant" is not true.

While I endorse the comments of the Barn Owl Trust, my own experience of these creatures tells me that the person who prepared this section of the report is a “complete amateur”.

Crested Newts

English Nature in their advice document Great Crested Newt Advice Mitigation 2001, ask that terrestrial replacement habitat is broadly similar to habitat lost. HS2 cannot replace the lost ancient woodland habitat used by the newts and it will in no way be made “broadly” similar. Equally, they have provided no details of the design of the habitat including and in particular design of habitat screening and fencing to ensure Newts do no migrate across and via the culvert systems and therefore come into contact with roads.  

Ecology – General.

There is a significant body of evidence which establishes effects on Wildlife from EMF, farm animal’s behaviour and specifically birds, bees and bats. This growing body of evidence is considered as a significant factor in colony collapse of Bees and further work is being undertaken. Furthermore, the existence of rare Bats in areas along the line and indeed in close proximity to main sources of generated EMF has already been quantified in other reports as having significant environmental impact to ecology. To request that the EAC undertake further monitoring (perhaps HS1?) and further study work on the effects of HS2 generated EMF and if the environmental impact is found to be significant then alternative solutions must be developed to reduce this impact to acceptable levels. 

Land Quality

The first contact with the Environment Agency was not until 24th April 2013. There is no explanation why other agencies were contacted on 28th November 2012? The report into land quality cannot be considered robust and substantial enough without EA information? The lack of EA information is a direct consequence of late contact.

There are records of former sand and gravel quarries in our local area and there is suspicion they have been filled with contaminants. Construction will disrupt these contaminants potentially releasing them into the Water Supply. This site is situated above the River Misbourne and is also situated immediately to the West (and on higher ground than) the proposed tunnel run off and attenuation system.  Therefore the pathway of vertical and lateral migration is extremely likely and risk at baseline is high.

I would also wish to note that no assessment of the risk posed by Hydrocarbon contamination spills leaking into the water course as a consequence of construction have been assessed.

Water Resources & Flood risk

HS2 inform us that temporary adverse impacts on surface water resources as a result of construction methods or materials, silt, or mobilisation of contaminants, will be avoided or mitigated locally by adopting “good practices”. The piling solution is unknown because the intrusive soil studies have not been done. If the piling is unknown the pile depth and type are unknown. HS2 have been warned to expect significant pile depth which will result in cracks and fissures generating increased turbidity and silt. Good practice cannot mitigate this and such a major engineering issue was stated by Arups during route selection and ignore by the DFT and HS2.

HS2 also inform us that permanent adverse impacts on surface water resources arising during operation will be avoided or mitigated through measures included in the design such as balancing ponds, infiltration ponds, recharge trenches and swales to control the runoff from the railway. Culverts and the realignments of water courses are designed to ensure compliance with the objectives of the Water Framework Directive and avoid adverse impacts on flood risk. Yet no hydrology study has been prepared to inform the initial design, hence the reason why the designs are indicative and therefore wholly unknown in size and scale and a “best guess”. The fact the route travels through the highest point of the Chilterns will exacerbate run off and increase downstream silting which will lead to flooding of the Thames basin. There is no assessment of the impact on the surcharge of soil in the sustainable placement area which will have hydrology issues and no assessment on the loss of water attenuation with the removal of woods including ancient woods upstream from the Thames Valley. Dan Rogerson, floods minister has stated in Parliament that HS2 has not assessed the flood risk, yet their route wide report gives the impression they have? Many of the streams, water courses and flood plains crossed by HS2 are subject to significant flooding issues, it is wholly irresponsible to ignore such important work!

Within the Mid-Chilterns Chalk groundwater body, which spans several CFA, the Proposed Scheme could give rise to a significant temporary adverse effect on water supplies, including public water supplies, which depend on the groundwater in the Chalk in CFAs 6, 7, 8 and 9. As a result, the programme of monitoring will be integrated with monitoring undertaken by the owners to address these receptors. The programme will be structured taking into account all the construction processes that could have an impact on the quantity and quality of surface water and groundwater resources, and the interaction between the water resources and water supplies. The monitoring programme scope and duration will be agreed with the Environment Agency, in consultation with Affinity Water Ltd. While this all sounds logical, to date and after 4 years of work, HS2 have been so far unable to reach any agreement with Affinity or the EA? Some 20% of the water supply to Affinity and so to North West London come from the aquifers in the Chiltern and Colne Valley areas. The statement that construction would only temporarily affect this public water supply is misleading as there would clearly be issues with groundwater and turbidity.

For Mid-Chilterns Chalk, a significant residual risk to the drinking water protected area element has been identified owing to the proximity of the Proposed Scheme to existing public water supply abstractions. Further mitigation measures are under discussion with the Environment Agency in consultation with Affinity Water. In developing the management strategy for the public water supply abstractions, HS2 inform us that “due regard will be given to Catchment Abstraction Management Strategies”. Until the mitigation has been agreed and assessed by all parties, there remains the risk of WFD deterioration with respect to the drinking water protected area WFD element for chemical status of the Mid-Chilterns Chalk groundwater body. HS2 decision to proceed through the middle of an aquifer obviously will carry with it significant impacts which may lead to permanent disruption of water supplies for a significant portion of the south east. This is wholly inappropriate and completely disproportionate. HS2 must be compelled to reach agreement with the Environmental Agency and Affinity Water prior to any second reading of the Bill in Parliament and must also be compelled to properly consult on this issue prior to the second reading delivering a solution to this major impact.

The fact HS2 have failed to do so after 4 years is troublesome and loss of potable local supplies would be a serious breach of the EU Directive, Aarhus and Human Rights Act together with failure on the part of HS2 to meet the terms of their Duties given to them under the Preparation Act. This is a serious Environmental Impact that the EAC cannot allow as it would be a complete dereliction of duty!

More worrying is the fact HS2 contend:

“In light of the work carried out by HS2 in liaison with the Environment Agency, all practicable measures to mitigate adverse impacts on surface water bodies and groundwater have been identified, and those measures will continue to be reviewed. There is an overriding public interest in the construction of the Proposed Scheme, and in any event the benefits of the Proposed Scheme as a form of sustainable development outweigh the benefits of achieving the objectives in Article 4(1) (to the limited extent that the Proposed Scheme will hinder the attainment of those objectives). There are no better environmental options to the works described which are technically feasible and proportionate in cost”.

To state the overriding public interest in the construction of the scheme cannot override the human rights of those affected to be provided with locally sourced fresh water or be left with polluted water? The permanent loss of the aquifer would not give rise to sufficient justification for developing a train line through the AONB when alternative routes are available. The benefits of the scheme being sustainable development is certainly not proven as the CO2 emission calculations are seriously flawed. The EAC must be compelled to investigate this matter in far more detail and seek to rule on this matter as the loss of the aquifer would be a major impact for 20% of the south east which surely cannot out weight the benefits of the scheme?

The entire statement is frustrating to member sof the public and a classic example of the attitude taken by HS2. In their opinion, the individual impacts are less than the cumulative benefits when clear the cumulative impacts are ignored. In this one example, destruction of the aquifer would result in significant downstream flooding but also a loss of water attenuation and storage in the south east England – a location that permanently suffers from hose pipe bans and low water pressure. Mitigation costs would involve creation of new reservoirs and for the displacement of the soil by the HS2 tunnel, such a reservoir the size of King George V in Enfield would be required – where will this be built and who pays for this, why is the expense not in the statement of expense? It will be a direct consequence of HS2 and therefore such a reservoir would need to be consulted upon in the ES following the rules laid down by the EU Directive. It is a leap, however, could it be possible no agreement has been reached with affinity and the EA simply because HS2 would need to declare a new reservoir!    

The Sequential Test is described in paragraph 101 of the NPPF which states: “The aim of the Sequential Test is to steer new development to areas with the lowest probability of flooding. Development should not be allocated or permitted if there are reasonably available sites appropriate for the proposed development in areas with a lower probability of flooding. The Strategic Flood Risk Assessment will provide the basis for applying this test. A sequential approach should be used in areas known to be at risk from any form of flooding.” In keeping with this statement the route chosen by HS2 crosses more flood plains and exposes more risk to flooding than the other 3 routes. The route selection taking the highest point in its passage through the Chilterns may mitigate the risk to the line of flooding but will result in significant destruction of trees and upland attenuation resulting in the lower areas of the Thames Valley being flooded due to increased run off and silt.

In addition, placing a waterproof tunnel through the middle of a major aquifer and displacing so much soil is akin to placing a brick in your toilet cistern without having a float valve or ball cock to cut off the water supply that’s refills it? It is entirely the most irresponsible engineering act to place an impermeable barrier through an aquifer that lies upstream from the Thames Valley and then expect there to be no consequences? The hydraulic consequences alone and flooding that results will be catastrophic and this has been wilfully ignored by HS2. This cannot be a situation that is left without study and conclusion prior to the second reading given recent flooding events in the Thames Corridor. 

The approach for the Exception Test set out within paragraph 102 of the NPPF, states that for certain types of development, where the Sequential Test has been applied, for the Exception Test to be passed it must be demonstrated that the development provides wider sustainability benefits to the community that outweigh flood risk – informed by the strategic FRA when one is available. A site specific FRA “must demonstrate that the development will be safe for its lifetime taking account of the vulnerability of its users, without increasing flood risk elsewhere, and, where possible, will reduce flood risk overall”. There has been no “wider sustainability benefits” to any communities along the line as any and all sustainable benefits accrue to the Cities and not the rural area that are most at risk of flooding.

It is suggested that utilising the 1:100 year event combined with regular maintenance will ensure drainage systems are not blocked. Given the current amount of drainage blockages being experienced on current Network Rail Maintained lines in the 2013/14 storms, is this sufficient enough assurances or measures and has this subject been treated with the appropriate level of depth of consideration given the safety risks involved?

If the conclusion is that under these measures, the flooding risks to track, tunnels and cuttings are low, the standards adopted by HS2 are exactly the same standards applied to Network Rails current flood prevention criteria and the incidence of flood related accidents and disruptions are on the rise. Network Rail are currently in debt by £32bn, the Office for Rail Regulation has recently commented on Network Rails proposals to cut 2500 maintenance personnel and a £0.5bn cut in maintenance as “potentially unsafe”. The EAC should therefore be alarmed that the current CEO of HS2 is the ex CEO of Network Rail who imposed such maintenance cuts?

The events in the 2013/2014 storm proved that the rail network is not resilient enough under current standards and the current inquests are seeking to identify the correct standards and appropriate level of investment to meet these standards as clearly the investment set by Sir David Higgins has been insufficient. 

Furthermore, the maintenance cuts imposed by Sir David Higgins that has led to collapse of the rail resilience, was made following his statement to Rail Technology Magazine in Feb 2013:

“Network Rail chief executive David Higgins said: "The damage that extreme weather can do to a rail network is clear. Whole lines were closed by flooding and tracks came close to being washed away by rivers which burst their banks. On the worst affected parts of the network, torrential rain caused up to sixty landslides in a single day."

This is evidence that Sir David Higgins acknowledged the impact of flooding, took no steps to increase resilience or improve his existing Network Rail Standards, cut the maintenance budget which the Office for Rail called “potentially unsafe”, and is now adopting the same flood standards with HS2.

This is not a Chilterns specific statement but rather relates to the flood issues that will be experienced by the entire Thames Valley if HS2 goes ahead. You may choose not to include this in my submission, however, I strongly advise you read this. The Governments own engineer Ove Arup recommended against the Chilterns Route and in their 2009 route proving report stated that the Chilterns Soil represents many engineering challenges which can be greatly affected by Hydrology. Anticipating and designing for the effects of the predicted change in amplitude of Hydrology flow will be a determining factor in addressing the affects on infrastructure from climate change. Starting from a poor base position will increase and exacerbate the risks not to mention the design costs. Arups classified the Chilterns strata with such statements as “vulnerable to shrinkage and swelling”, “material has low strength and high moisture content”, “contains groundwater and will be troublesome for earthworks slope stability”, “careful handling required”, “slope instability problems”. All problems exacerbated by climate change and the great unknowns of the hydrological effects on the line.

In light of Sir David Higgins comments, the acknowledgement of safety risks and engineering challenges presented by the Chilterns Soil, the recommendation by Ove Arup against the route via the Chilterns associated with the risks that climate change can present that will exacerbate these safety risks, is the Government, Secretary of State and board of HS2 as well as their Engineers, knowingly placing the general public at risk of safety when their route proving Engineers advised against this route?

The preference for the fastest of high speed rail systems means porous ballast systems almost certainly will not be used and instead a non porous slab system must be used which increases run off collection and run off rate. An increase in climatic change does not seem to factor in such a design consideration. Why is a system that is more susceptible to increases in climate change hydrology being adopted in an area with higher than average hydrology?

7 March 2014