Written evidence submitted by the Aylesbury Park Golf Club Limited
The Environmental Audit Committee inquiry; submitted to illustrate where alternatives will reduce community and other impacts
The Transport Selection Committee evidence from HS2 did not justify the extent of the impacts resulting from +400 KPH trains and a most intrusive rout: Route 3 Phase 1 for the proposed limited high speed railway between London and Birmingham which requires extremes of excavating cuttings and creating long embankments , line side spoil mound dumps, viaducts and some tunnels. If the inquiry is able to recommend reassessment of alternatives, particularly across Buckinghamshire, this will be appreciated by thousands of people in this County. If the inquiry can obtain evidence of HS2 shortcuts and limitations that were evident in the period 2009-2012 this will allow the public to know that there are checks and balances that must be incorporated even when the final stage is a hybrid bill. Such a bill grants extremely wide powers for HS2 to make currently undefined changes after the time the hybrid bill is voted into legislation. The public is very aware of environmental and human community considerations in the Twenty First Century and as witnessed to date, there has been gross disregard for care and adjustments by HS2 and the Department for Transport. The planning inspectorate and other statutory organizations permitted HS2 free reign.
To Quote from Aylesbury Vale District Council which has said, as part of engaging with the government’s legislative process, it must petition the Parliamentary committee that scrutinises the details of the High Speed Rail (London – West Midlands) Bill to seek changes that will benefit the district. The Bill will set out the work for the rail link, including where the work will take place and the land that will be required.
If the House of Commons gives the Bill its second reading, objections can no longer be made about the principle of the scheme. However, by opposing the Bill the council will be allowed to have a say and give evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee to try to secure changes that will benefit the Vale. These could include:
• Improved measures to combat any disruption caused by the construction
• Noise and environmental mitigation measures to reduce the operational impact of the railway
• Measures to prevent loss of local amenities either during construction or permanently
• Measures to ensure that both during construction and operation HS2 will not increase the flood risk to properties in Aylesbury, particularly those which were damaged by flooding earlier this year.
At a meeting of the full council on 26 February, Aylesbury Vale councillors voted to oppose the Bill at the next stage of the Parliamentary process.
Councillor Neil Blake, Leader of the Council, said: “If left unchallenged the proposed route for HS2 will cause unacceptable damage to our countryside and communities in Aylesbury Vale. Petitioning against the High Speed Rail Bill presents an opportunity to work with other authorities to influence the current design and detailing, both during construction and if the line becomes operational.”
The following presentation to the Environmental Audit inquiry is from the Aylesbury Park Golf Course and neighboring farms. It is based upon four years of review, analysis and engagement of issues from the HS2 Route from London to Birmingham through a part of Buckinghamshire, across the Aylesbury Vale. It addresses real examples to reflect the inquiry’s four questions that the Environmental Audit Committee as defined as the terms of reference.
It is understood that:
The EAC’s inquiry will not examine decisions about the route, or local environmental concerns about particular sections of the line (areas which the HS2 Hybrid Bill Committee will examine). The uses of examples below are to illustrate extents, impacts and processes that have been determined and experienced.
1. The extent to which specific route-wide environmental impacts are adequately reflected and addressed in the Environmental Statement: specifically including forestry and soils; air quality; climate; ecology; and water resources and flood risk; community and cultural heritage; landscape and visual aspect; noise/vibration; traffic and transport; and waste and material resources.
In 2011 51M and the National Trust decided fly the route from Denham to Northamptonshire. A helicopter was hired to produce aerials videos and to also be used as a noise generator, near to Aylesbury. The aim was to understand the impacts of noise within a distance of 300 metres from the Route to Hartwell House. To do this it was necessary to land the helicopter and hover within the Aylesbury Park Golf Course. The locations are illustrated in Figure 1. The location in Figure 1 for the landing was Helicopter Landing 2. Hovering near ground level took place between the A418 and Helicopter Landing 2. Scientific measurements were made between that location and Hartwell House and also inside Hartwell House, over a distance of 300 metres which measured higher levels than the HS2 sound maps. The Aylesbury Park Golf Club management were asked permission for this landing to take place and through that process became aware of the designated ‘preferred’ Route 3 and its location impacts for the first time in detail. The future closure of the Club was judged likely.
Figure 2 indicates by the Red line Route 3 from Sedrup between Glebe House and the A418 across the golf course to the River Thame and to Putlowes Farm in Fleet Marston to Waddesdon and the hamlets of Quainton, Calvert, Twyford and Chetwode across Aylesbury Vale. This image was extracted from the helicopter HD aerial video produced by the Buckinghamshire New University Media Unit who has a copy of the aerial video if it is required by the inquiry.
Figure 3 is an image of the Great Central Railway that is now overgrown and there is a pond to illustrate the effectiveness of incorporation of traditional railways in the Nineteenth and Twentieth century into a rural agricultural landscapes. At that time, HS2 road shows and the HS2 maps were thin lines not representing impacts. This continued through the public consultation of 2011, until the release of Environmental Statement map books in November 2013.
Figure 4 illustrates how different alignments emerged during research to explain how the route through the AylesburyPark Golf Course had been moved by HS2 to be nearer to the community of Fairford Leys and to Putlowes Farmhouse. This analysis was achieved by superimposing the coordinates of Route 3 Phase 1 on the Google Earth images, a year before HS2 and others made available the kmz route file to overlay. During this period of time the route was shown as a narrow line from the M25 to Wendover from Wendover to Stoke |Mandeville to Aylesbury and north to Chipping Warden in HS2 maps/road shows. Extensive field trips were undertaken to try to understand how HS2 had during 2009 and early 2010 focused on Route 3, rather than other possible routes near Bicester/ M40 and Chiltern Line. Using Google Earth sliced elevations were produced to understand and show HS2/DFT the extents of earthworks. Using this useful slicing method found where realignments and tunneling could be better mitigations, as under the A418 and golf course.
During a visit to the Stoke Mandeville HS2 road show in 2011 a HS2 map was found on one of the display walls of the partial search by HS2 for route sections. That map is reproduced in Figure 5. The map identifies only 90 sections that HS2 considered to create routes up to 8 routes, as illustrated in Figure 6. These routes were examined and found to omit significant possible route sections. Exploration over the past 3 years identified that there were other ways to find and align routes to Birmingham as Route 3 Phase 1 became too costly to mitigate properly, resulting in too many environmental impacts. For example there were local realignments that could have been and be used to move the route 3 from the side of Aylesbury. There were some route alignments that could have moved the route from so near to Stoke Mandeville, Aylesbury, Fleet Marston Waddesdon, Quainton and making the A4010, A418 and A41 dangerous. Alternative routes can move HS2 from the East to the West of Chipping Warden and changing the location of the Calvert IMD infrastructure (Infrastructure Maintenance Depot) is possible along an East-West proposed Oxford Cambridge line. Fixing Calvert for an IMD was premature and Route 3 was the default.
Figure 7 shows some of the gaps between the 90 route sections and there are a number of sections that are up to 4 kilometres from Aylesbury, but are brought back onto Route 3 near RAF Croughton, which can be avoided. This bias towards the Aylesbury because of Calvert can be overcome by a short tunnel under RAF Croughton to reduce impacts on across most of Buckinghamshire. Tunneling requirements through the Chilterns can be reduced west of South Heath.
Figure 8 shows how Route 3 became locked into the choice of the Calvert IMD when the East-West line from Bicester to Bletchley permits an IMD to be created between Bicester and Poundon on less productive agriculture land, within the Chiltern line and M40 transport corridors. A National Grid line is there.
These images are used to demonstrate the extent of the scope DfT and HS2 had available to use to compare with modern survey techniques and technologies the specific route wide environmental impacts prior to preferring and deciding upon Route 3 Phase 1. Reflecting on this HS2 made a detrimental shortcut. In 2013 and 2014 research identified that there were other infrastructure options to improve the East Coast Mainline and Midland Mainline as 51M had with the West Coast Mainline instead of committing over £20B to Route 3 Phase 1 for only an unreliable intercity passenger service route of only one track each way.
Figure 9 is an extract from the HS2 CFA11 Volume 2 Map book issued in November 2013 which presented to the public for the first time the extreme construction works and much large land take requirements between Stoke Mandeville, Aylesbury and Fleet Marston. The changes to the existing railway line from Marylebone to Aylesbury and for the A4010 has shocked many local people who had previously only seen schematics of the type in Figure 2.
Figure 10 illustrates the proximity of Route 3 too near to the area of Aylesbury where many people live with chronic conditions, including people who are invalid and will have problems coping with construction dust and fume impacts, losing their opportunities to discuss day-to-day events over garden fences.
Figure 11 shows the National Grid overhead line and the large main feeder that will connect to the railway near Aylesbury. HS2 refused to tunnel this unsightly National Grid line. The figure illustrates how a tranquil setting at Sedrup shown in Figure 2 by a tree line along the Oxford A418 is to become a new and more dangerous route is the left of Figure 11. Figure 11 shows Ellen Road where there was new flooding reported by the local MP and Counsellors.
Figure 12 is a similar area to that in Figures 1 and 4 showing the excess land takes and the unnecessary construction routes across Aylesbury Park Golf Club and Lower Hartwell Farm and Whaddon Hill Farm. The large pink coloured areas show the land to be taken which are not the football pitches at Coldharbour Way used by many school children and youths and the land take and impacts on Aylesbury Park Golf course used by hundreds of people for leisure and wellbeing by the local communities. This is part of the Ernest Cook Trust Hartwell Park land and the golf course was created as a green wedge to Aylesbury.
Figure 13 is the remainder of the golf course which will be lost by Route 3 and illustrates the near1 kilometre long viaduct across a regular flooding plain of the River Thame and Bear Brook vales. The Aylesbury Sewage Farm which floods due to runoff increases from housing developments is under capacity and discharges kill the fish and contaminate pastures along this section of the River Thame. Flooding up to 4 times per year occurred in 2012, 2013 and into 2014.
Figure 14 illustrates the proximity of Route 3 to Putlowes Farm and the satellite construction compound that is on the wrong side of the River Thame and the extensive excavation across the Fleet Marston Roman settlements and Akeman Street. Route 3 continues into a proposed development site for 2,400 homes near Hunters Farm, now a developers project. Route 3 cuttings reduce the land available for that development by 20%. The A41 through Fleet Marston is being realigned between Wayside Farm and Putlowes Drive. The junction at Putlowes Drive is already extremely dangerous. HS2 has proposed to put an intrusive construction access road by Putlowes Drive and through Putlowes Farm buildings. This makes the junction dangerous, a HS2 poor judgement.
Figure 15 shows that extreme cuttings and land take continue towards Waddesdon. There is construction of a large auto transformer facility planned and more changes to the A41 junction near the Waddesdon where a young lady was killed in February 2014 and children were seriously injured. More dangers.
The Annex eblow includes extracts from the ES HS2 Volume 3 Route Wide Effects which illustrate how superficial the references are for all the Route 3 Phase1 and demonstrates particularly how little directly addresses the Aylesbury Vale section which is used as real illustrations of Wendover to Waddesdon.
To answer the Committee’s Inquiry Question 1, there has not been adequate reflection and consideration by HS2 prior to determining Route 3 when other routes and track upgrades were possible with fewer impacts. Comparing the May 2013 Draft Environmental Statement with the November 2013 Environmental Statement increases the extent of damage and community losses not been demonstrated in 2009 to 2012 by HS2 to the public when unrealistic representation of the lesser extents of changes were shown at the road shows and in HS2 maps released for the public consultation. HS2 does not demonstrate at that time that they understood the extent of all these specific factors within Volume 3 prior to the SST Decision. The communities did not understand between 2009 to late 2013 the emerging extent. Some large bodies that routinely address national planning matters, who also have professionals can interpret simplistic schematics and envisage detailed impacts, the public cannot. People rely on professional independent Inquires to reduce impacts. In Aylesbury, for example, and people using the football pitches and the golf courses or walking along the River Thame could not be expected from the limited information HS2 provided, to have grasped during 2011 and the public consultation, what was to come 2 years later and is beginning to be more fully understood, after the legal challenges have timeout. The communities voted against Route 3 Phase 1 as did amenities such as the Aylesbury Park Golf Club and local authorities.
There hasn’t been sufficient public inquiry into HS2 to enable the individual people impacted, in all manner of ways to object for improvements. Planning appeals and planning inquiries have been ousted. Lord Justice Ouseley remarked that counter objectors and those people and organizations with alternatives would have normally had a direct opportunity to influence an independent group of planners who would be able to ensure changes were made and verified.
2. The overarching systems and processes which will guide how environmental considerations are taken into account in the detailed routing of the track and the use of local environmental protection measures (but not examining the route itself).
The systems and processes did fail along the Phase 1 Route in London and particularly Camden and in County communities such as, in Buckinghamshire. Failures occurred because there was a lack of feedback into the planning and engineering units HS2 engaged from 2009 to 2011 and since. There was no open process for the public to be able to guide HS2 in a systematic way to reduce the most damaging effects of route impacts along sections by changing alignments more significantly of 1 to 40 kilometres length. This was possible but not attempted across parts of Buckinghamshire. Loss of jobs and loss of community amenities have become evident to organizations and groups such as the Aylesbury Park Golf Club when it is late. Communities will lose their leisure and sports facilities at four golf clubs, at the Aylesbury football fields, at a rugby club and where bridle ways and walks are being closed for horse riders and walkers. HS2 did not establish sufficiently wide conservation criteria in the 2009 and 2010 ‘invitee only period’ and the lack of cooperation of local authorities resulted in inadequate processes. A very inadequate AOS was produced but not widely available in 2009 and the AOS in 2011 was inadequate for the public consultation, mainly based on local authority and national body diagrams and general text. With little local knowledge Arup Consultants and the skeleton HS2 staff had insufficient understanding and HS2 had little previous mega project experience and no road change experience.
It was some disappointment in the judicial review in the High Court when Lord Justice Ouseley threw back his arms and said “a few MPs can do what they like.” This was the indication that with a whipped combination of MP’s and three leaderships committed to a costly damaging misaligned route there was little the public can do ahead of the Hybrid Bill with its inevitable decision to proceed and not correct the route or significant alignments. A grave outcome.
It was Lord Justice Sullivan who questioned what the law was regarding the SEA and EIA requirements and equally disappointing for many to learn from the Supreme Court that the Hybrid Bill process can keep all options open. This is unlikely to be the case. The legal cases did not have the benefit of the Judges reviewing the difference between the Draft ES, the current November Environmental Statement and the current Hybrid Bill clauses and plans. There is now a presumption that because a significant number of MPs voted for the HS2 paving bill, a similar overwhelming number of MPs will vote for Route 3 Phase 1, regardless of its poor rail services delivery, its expensive price and significant environmental impact. The unknowns are the number of MPs who abstained previously and will vote against the Hybrid Bill and support petitions as they realise that there other priorities their voters for motorways, power stations, housing, flood defences, rail routes to Cornwall and a need for more resilience urgently for the Network Rail infrastructure. A post Bill case may arise also.
There have not been diligent scrutinizing planning and appeal processes to take into account changes to the detailed routing of the track and to secure changes to build confidence in the local environmental protection measures. HS2 was too dismissive of the requests to move the route for example, towards Bicester in the case of Calvert, Twyford, Aylesbury and other hamlets with two short tunnels under Ashendon and A418 ridge. A route near Chearsley was ruled out by HS2 in 2010 on the unjustified grounds of landscape impact, an extreme exaggeration. A route embankment or viaduct/dam could be used to contain flood water from the River Thame valley to reduce flooding Thame and locations along the River Thames in 2014 near Datchet, Runnymede, Chertsey and Walton.
In the Judicial Review HS2 did not explain in detail why they had not documented analysis of alternatives to move the route from Aylesbury. There wasn’t an overarching system or process that embraced formally and transparently alternatives from people and welcomed discussions. HS2 did not reassess Route3. HS2 had a dismissive process and used symbolic names, such as design refinements. There was an inconsistent approach to HS2 to decide local and medium length route sections mainly on costs/savings. HS2 process was made up to include stealth and worked back to front by stating this is the route, but not demonstrating that other routes were possible. HS2 had little evidence grounds from 2009 to mid 2013. HS2 had inadequate knowledge from the GIS and Ordnance Survey maps which were also small scale. They had not significant aerial survey information in 2009/2010 to compare and judge the different route sections and to join the 90 route sections other possible sections. Some sections examined and visited were poor. HS2 had insufficient budget to incorporate more short tunnels to reduce most impacts from some communities and to provide the means to save amenities and reduce extreme land takes now on maps.
There are planning techniques HS2 could have used, such as RASP, which examine multiple perspectives of infrastructure project to improve planning and environmental outcomes and these techniques do not appear to have been used by HS2. The challenge groups within the HS2’s structure were ineffective and there were statements of individual challengers who felt the challenge process had been weak on outcomes. Rush to delivery in a Parliament is unwise.
The HS2 Chief Engineer dismissed all intermediate stations in Phase 1 and reduced curvatures. In Phase 2 every town/city wants a station and with one track each way this will not achieve the frequency of trains promoted by HS2, which is questioned in practice. One track each way is insufficient for commuter trains. The increase in price for Phase 1 for dual tracks each way will be over 50% because of the additional tunneling and excavations works required.
3. The arrangements for funding measures to protect biodiversity or to limit environmental impacts, and any constraints on such funding.
It is not only funding constraints but also resources, experiences, the range of competences and the haste to have a Hybrid Bill regardless of quality of work which has resulted in the public’s vote against Route 3 Phase 1. Some environmental impacts as in Camden, the displacement of many people to extend the size of the Euston Station footprint and a prime task of building a structure with increased use of air rights for commercial offices and apartments are being challenged. For the rural areas across Buckinghamshire, Northamptonshire and Warwickshire many communities and farmers want tighter limits for the environmental impacts listed in Question 1. More uses of tunneling and the route aligned to active transport corridors not the pretence of the disused GCR.
Nature can respond to protect some biodiversity, but this cannot extend to mature and ancient woodlands or pastures. It is not about reaction planting, when there is loss of productive agriculture land or loss of an amenity such as a golf course, or football pitch. Land owners, tenants and local authorities do not know what the arrangements currently are for the biodiversity and environmental mitigations. These are hard to measure issues as the Environmental Audit Committee understands from its Inquiry in 2013 into Biodiversity Policy. HS2 has not created the relations with the communities, or with the farmers and estate owners to be able to better discuss and develop joint approaches to biodiversity protection and mitigation. HS2 has derided the local farming and other stewards and has not engaged people in Community Forums prior to the release of the Environmental Statement to determine where protection measures are mutually acceptable and what this would include. If you lose a hundred, to three hundred acres of a dairy farm, as do two across the Aylesbury Vale or amenity, you have undermined the viability of a farm or business. Money does not always replace a way of life, jobs, or a local community facility. Protecting biodiversity and limiting construction impacts on the environment were not addressed in detail early prior to the choice of the route, not in any depth or detail. HS2 is trying to retrofit these important factors onto a dictated project route. This is the very opposite to the methodologies applied for smaller projects and a vital part of this mega-project. Public inquiries have been eliminated and petitioning is an “after the event” plea for inadequate modifications in too little time. Funding measures may go to the wrong recipient to achieve wider biodiversity and offset impacts. Currently tenant farmers and tenant golf club operators promote biodiversity but they cannot if the land they have access to is reduced, or if their organization is no longer viable.
4. How and where biodiversity offsetting will operate, and any limits that will be put on such offsetting.
The Inquiry may be able to apply the 2013 biodiversity findings to this mega-project for example, the current Thameslink approach is considered better than the HS2 proposals. HS2 has provided a double jeopardy for farmers and landowners by trying to incorporate all the mitigations, spoil dumping and biodiversity within the Volume 2 Route map width/areas. There are areas of Buckinghamshire for example which repeatedly flood and are below raised river levels. Spoil can be put on top of sub-formation after topsoil removal. Topsoil can then be spread on the excavated sub-formation. This is possible near Bicester, and near Thame if water is retained in the vale. This could provide better land quality above the flood plain that could benefit agricultural loss in the Route corridor. HS2 has allocated offsets without reference to occupying tenants and in some cases without reference to land and estate owners. Alternative and more productive uses will be welcomed by farmers that extra land take for meadows, tree plantings or earth mounds. Offsetting in the corridor is a loss.
It appears from HS2 environmental statement maps in Volume 2 that HS2 has not put any limits on such offsetting where it assists them to overcome an obligation, make a saving or is a PR proposal. HS2 does not have prior agreement with some landowners and tenants usurping their choices. Limits of free will been dictated and imposed by DfT/HS2’s Bill in four areas the Environmental Audit Committee Inquiry is addressing, impacting amenities and farms.
Annex of Extracts from Volume 3: Route-wide effects
The following are extracts from Volume 3 to demonstrate how little is included in this document to reflect and address impacts.
Understanding the Environmental Statement
The Environmental Statement (ES) is an assessment of the likely significant environmental effects of the proposed hs2 railway between London and the West Midlands. Prepared by independent consultants, it reports on the effects of constructing and operating
Phase one of hs2 from an environmental point of view. What is the ES for? The Government is promoting legislation for Phase One of High Speed Two – a new, north-south railway to run between London, Birmingham and the West Midlands. On 25th November 2013, a Bill was deposited in Parliament with a view to providing the powers to construct, operate and maintain the new railway. Parliament has also received the ES, which describes the Phase One scheme and the proposals to avoid, reduce or remedy the likely significant environmental effects it
identifies. Its purpose is to ensure that Parliament considers these effects of Phase One before determining whether it should receive development consent.
Volume 3: Route-wide effects
This document did not set out the likely significant environmental effects that were considered on a wider scale. For example, the report assesses the project’s effect on the Chilterns Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB) which the inquiry does not include. The Volume excludes where there are significant environmental effects.
6 Community
6.1.1 Community impacts arising from both the construction and operation of the Proposed Scheme are considered to be of no more than local significance and have accordingly been assessed in Volume 2, CFA reports 1-26, Section 5. Impacts on PRoW which run
through multiple CFA are considered to be localised and therefore appropriately reported in Volume 2, CFA reports 1-26, Section 5.
6.1.2 Construction worker impacts on community resources are considered at a route-wide level in Appendix CM-002-000. The assessment takes into account the number of workers, the type and location of accommodation, working hours, facilities provided on construction compounds, experience from other large projects (such as HS1) and the measures contained in the draft CoCP. On this basis it is concluded that there will be no significant effects associated with construction worker accommodation. 6.1.3 Localised effects on amenity are reported at CFA level for both construction and operation in the relevant Volume 2 CFA report, Section 5.
7 Cultural heritage
7.1.1 Heritage assets can be affected through the physical removal of the asset or changes to its setting due to development. The loss of individual heritage assets and effects on setting, are not considered to be of route-wide importance and are therefore reported within Volume 2, CFA reports 1-26, Section 6.
7.1.2 The Proposed Scheme will not have a direct physical effect on any World Heritage Site and will not require the demolition of any Grade I or Grade II* listed building.
7.1.3 Across the entire route of the Proposed Scheme, a number of designated assets will be significantly affected through direct physical impact, including:
Heritage assets comprising:
One registered battlefield;
One scheduled monument;
18 Grade II listed buildings entries; comprising six which will be demolished, four which will be altered and eight which will be removed and relocated; and alteration to a curtilage wall to a Grade I listed building.
Historic landscape assets comprising:
Two Grade II* registered parks and gardens;
81 lengths of historic hedgerow; and
19 areas of ancient woodland.
7.1.4 Heritage assets physically affected by the Proposed Scheme will be subject to a programme of archaeological and built heritage investigation, recording, analysis, reporting and archiving. Although such a programme contributes to advancing our understanding, it will not fully mitigate the loss of the heritage assets and consequently each effect is considered on an individual basis within Volume 2, CFA reports 1-26, Section 6.
10 Landscape and visual assessment
10.1.1 Within Volume 2, CFA reports 1-26, Section 9, landscape effects are reported against LCA which have been defined with reference to available published documents and professional judgement, where no published information is available. It is not considered that there are any significant route-wide effects on landscape and visual receptors arising from the construction or operation of the Proposed Scheme.
10.1.2 Due to its national importance, the effects of the Proposed Scheme on the Chilterns AONB are assessed in their own right. This assessment is provided in Section 2.
11 Socio-economics
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 Direct socio-economic effects of the Proposed Scheme are reported at a route-wide and CFA level. The potential overall changes to employment levels, i.e. both the wider socio-economic benefits and those that arise from construction and operation of the Proposed Scheme, are reported in this section at a route-wide level. Significant localised effects on employment are reported in Volume 2, CFA reports 1-26, Section10.
11.2 National policy and guidance
11.2.1 The key points from national policy and guidance, which have informed the planning and development context for the socio-economic assessment are:
the UK Government’s commitment to sustainable development presented in the Defra publication ‘Mainstreaming sustainable development’110. The document sets out an approach based on providing ministerial leadership and oversight, leading by example, embedding sustainable development into policy, and providing transparent and independent scrutiny;
the NPPF which identifies the role of the planning system in promoting sustainable development and suggests that economic, social and environmental gains should be sought jointly and simultaneously. As well as the NPPF, local planning policy helps to define the significance of impacts. This is because it is planning policy which typically identifies areas and issues of environmental sensitivity and economic opportunity;
the National Infrastructure Plan which provides a strategic framework for the identification and prioritisation of infrastructure development within the UK and establishes a series of objectives for infrastructure investment. The original 2011 plan111 identified HS2 as a priority project with the potential to deliver the essential capacity and connectivity, attract investment and secure long-term economic prosperity and therefore generate employment. An update was undertaken in 2012112 in which the Government announced its decision to proceed with HS2, and a further update published in 2013113 which set out the progress made on priority infrastructure investments; and
the January 2012 Command Paper114 articulates a national strategy for high speed rail placing the Proposed Scheme as part of a wider network supporting the continuing growth of rail services in the UK to support on-going economic growth.
Existing businesses and organisations
11.3.3 Three types of impact are defined:
businesses and organisations (socio-economic resources) that will be relocated due to land being acquired for the construction of the Proposed Scheme. Socio-economic resources are defined as a property used by one business or organisation, or by a group of businesses and/or organisations115;
socio-economic resources affected by a change in amenity as a result of construction and operation of the Proposed Scheme. Amenity of resources may be affected by a combination of factors such as: sound, noise and vibration; air quality/construction dust; HGV traffic flows; and visual impacts. An adverse change in amenity could lead to a possible decline in trade for the affected resources; and
socio-economic resources affected by isolation from customers/users as a result of the construction and operation of the Proposed Scheme. This analysis considered the consequence of these isolation effects on business operations.
Businesses affected
11.6.7 The construction phase will result in the displacement of some existing businesses through land required for the construction of the Proposed Scheme. These effects have been assessed and reported within the relevant Volume 2, CFA reports, Section 10. In most cases, it is concluded that the majority of businesses affected in this way will be able to relocate135, given the availability of alternative premises and the
payment of compensation, and therefore continue to operate. It is also concluded that a large proportion of employees who may lose their jobs as a consequence of their employer closing or relocating and contracting, will be able to re-enter the workforce relatively quickly given the size and strength of the relevant local labour market.
11.6.8 The construction phase will also result in some proposed developments not being implemented as a consequence of land required for the construction and/or operation of the Proposed Scheme. It is assumed that, in the majority of cases
11.6.12 If an assumption is made that 12% of all jobs associated with directly affected businesses as a result of the Proposed Scheme, will be lost route-wide, then approximately 1,010 jobs will be lost.
11.6.13 The direct loss of businesses and employment will have knock-on effects through the business supply chain and expenditure effects, and other economic adjustment factors138. As a consequence, it is estimated an additional 380 jobs will be lost through indirect effects, route-wide.
11.6.14 Businesses displaced by the Proposed Scheme will be fully compensated within the provisions of the Compensation Code. HS2 Ltd recognises the importance of displaced businesses being able to relocate to new premises and will therefore provide additional support over and above statutory requirements to facilitate this.
11.6.15 For those socio-economic resources affected by land required for construction of the Proposed Scheme, there is a total relocation of employment of approximately 8,430 jobs. It is considered that the route-wide impact will be of high magnitude. The route wide sensitivity of businesses is assumed to be medium. As such, there will be a major adverse effect, which is considered to be significant.
11.6.16 Business amenity and isolation effects have been assessed and reported within the relevant Volume 2, CFA reports, Section 10. Route-wide, there are approximately 60 businesses across the length of the route that may experience significant amenity or isolation effects as a result of construction of the Proposed Scheme. As a consequence, the trade of these businesses will potentially be affected. Businesses significantly affected are in the hospitality, leisure and recreation sectors, retail sector and industrial and manufacturing sectors. In total, these businesses support approximately 1,100 jobs139 of which 90 140 jobs could potentially be lost or displaced. As a result of knock on effects through the business supply chain and expenditure effects, an additional 30 jobs could be lost or displaced. Route-wide, there is not considered to be a significant employment effect as a result of business amenity and isolation.
11.6.17 In total, approximately 1,510 jobs could be lost route-wide from businesses directly and indirectly affected during the construction phase. This impact will be mitigated over time as the UK and regional economies grow and new opportunities for employment for people that have lost their jobs, and have been unable to find work, come forward.
From Section 13 Traffic and transport
Stoke Mandeville and Aylesbury area (CFA11): A realignment of the Aylesbury to Princes Risborough Line will be required just south of Aylesbury;
Calvert, Steeple Claydon, Twyford and Chetwode area (CFA13): Works will be required at Calvert to create a number of proposed facilities including an infrastructure maintenance depot, a construction railhead and off-line realignment of the Oxford Branch Line that will all require amendment to the Network Rail infrastructure.
14 Waste and material resources
14.1 Introduction
General
14.1.1 This section presents a route-wide assessment of the likely significant environmental effects associated with the off-site disposal to landfill of solid waste that will be generated by the construction and operation of the Proposed Scheme. This assessment considers:
the types and quantity of waste that will be generated;
the quantity of waste that will require off-site disposal to landfill; and
the availability of off-site landfill disposal capacity.
14.1.2 This assessment does not consider liquid waste, the direct and indirect effects of waste-related transport, or mineral resources located along the route of the Proposed Scheme. These are considered in the appropriate sections of Volume 2 and Volume
3.142
14.1.3 Consideration of material resources in this assessment is limited to the beneficial reuse of excavated material arising from the construction of the Proposed Scheme. Only if excavated material is not required or is unsuitable for the construction of the Proposed Scheme will it be considered waste.
14.1.4 An overview of the types and quantity of waste that will be generated within each CFA is presented within Volume 2 as follows:
Section 2.3 of each CFA report for construction waste and material resources; and
Section 2.4 of each CFA report for operational waste and material resources.
14.1.5 Further details of the types and quantities of waste that will be generated within each CFA are presented within Volume 5: Appendix WM-001-000.
1 March 2014