Written evidence submitted by Quilliam [CT 20]

THE LIMITATIONS OF TERRORISM PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION MEASURES

ABOUT QUILLIAM

Quilliam is the world's first counter-extremism organisation, set up in 2008 by leading former extremists. It is a not-for-profit private company in the United Kingdom (UK) and incorporated as a 501(c)(3) organisation in the United States of America (USA). At present, Quilliam has ten full-time staff members and three volunteer interns.

At Quilliam we recognise that, not being merely a legal or military challenge, extremism and terrorism are now firmly entrenched social phenomena stripping away social, economic, political, civil and cultural rights for many societies across the world. We believe that the key to preventing the conflict and injustice caused by extremism and terrorism is worldwide social change led by civil society itself. We aim to bring about this change by engaging, educating and encouraging civil society to make their own strategic civic interventions which are able to challenge intolerant extremist narratives and instead advocate a more peaceful and just world for all. Quilliam seeks to challenge what we think, and the way we think. It aims to generate creative, informed and inclusive discussions to counter the ideological underpinnings of terrorism, while simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures.

The following is written evidence as requested by the Rt. Hon. Keith Vaz MP in his capacity as Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee to review the policy of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) and their implementation.

TERRORISM PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION MEASURES

The situation in the United Kingdom is admittedly more positive than in many places in the world, yet the threat of terrorism and the extremist ideologies and narratives that aim to legitimise it are still prevalent and must be addressed. Any response should be well-rooted in the universal human rights that underpin the liberal and democratic values we seek to protect and any component of counter-terrorism or counter-extremism must not further complicate other components of the effort. Quilliam believes that democracy will only defeat extremism by killing it softly, not by mimicking it.[1] It is widely accepted that “we cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root”[2] and we welcome the fact that the neo-conservative wars of George Bush jnr to instill democracy at the barrel of a gun, replaced by the neo-conservative-lite measures of Barrack Obama that treat al Qaeda as a mafia-style organisation and aim to decapitate its leaders through drone strikes, are now finally being complemented by a ten-year effort to counter violent extremism. Just as the former control orders were dismissed for being incompatible with human rights, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) also face accusations of being control orders-lite, rebranded for political capital.[3] However, it is here argued that TPIMs, if brought further into line with human rights and integrated with counter-extremism methods including challenging extremist ideology and narratives, can be a successful component of the current efforts to counter terrorism and counter extremism. Any assessment must, therefore, be both of the measures in isolation and as part of a larger agenda.

The need for measures to deal with individuals whom officials assess to be involved in terrorism-related activities but deem unable to charge or deport is valid. These British citizens will not have committed the “use or threat of action designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public, or a section of the public; made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.”[4]

The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 is a welcome amendment that repeals and replaces the Control Orders in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. It thereby ensures greater compatibility with the ECHR and less intrusion on the human rights of the individuals subject to them than the previous control orders, particularly in reference to the potential forced relocation and indefinite length of the control orders that have now both been written out of the revised TPIM legislation.[5] However there remain several significant problems with TPIMs that mean they are inconsistent with a clear human rights-based counter-extremism strategy and we hereby argue that the following further amendments need to be implemented in order to strike an appropriate balance between national security and civil liberties:

1) Currently, someone subject to a TPIMs notice will not face a fair trial, has no opportunity to present evidence to show their innocence, nor has the right to appeal. The British traditions of justice and liberty must be upheld, not least because failing to do so feeds into false extremist narratives. While evidence collected by MI5 may not be appropriate for the traditional criminal justice system, there should be the possibility in the TPIM legislation for fair trial with the presumption of innocence and subsequent review or appeal. The addition of a legal representative for the suspects would help mitigate potential mistakes made by the authorities and would support vulnerable people as well as make the system more transparent and in line with the criminal justice system without compromising national security.

2) TPIMs must have an additional element that comprises deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration where appropriate. In the current situation, someone subject to a TPIMs notice is under surveillance and investigation for a period of up to two years, often requiring reporting to a police station and with restrictions on movement, financial assets and association. These negative measures may be deemed necessary on a case-by-case basis, but are a blunt instrument if implemented for two years then lifted immediately thereafter unless new evidence emerges of involvement in terrorism. A suspect may commit a terrorism related offence once the TPIMs notice is lifted and the authorities would be unable to prevent such an action unless its planning was identified by the surveillance and investigation team. TPIMs punish suspected intent but do nothing to challenge this intent as there is no element that challenges the ideology or narratives that may support this intent. By integration of these measures with Channel projects or by developing new deradicalisation theories and processes to engage with suspects, not only will it be easier to ascertain a truer sense of an individual’s intent to commit a terrorism related offence, it will also help prevent future acts of terrorism once the two year expiry date has passed without the need for further negative measures. Given that movement and association are already limited under TPIMs, the addition of pastoral visits would be a welcome addition.

Two high profile abscondences of those under TPIMs notices have called into question the effectiveness of the measures. While particular details of these two cases are unavailable and commenting on the ability of the authorities to monitor individuals is unnecessary, it must be noted that engaging with and rehabilitating the suspects coupled with a renewed commitment to the rule of law on the part of the authorities, even in terrorism related cases, may help to prevent such situations. This can be achieved by providing incentives related to the reinstating of personal freedoms, may remove the desire to abscond through the provision of rehumanising pastoral care and may restore a suspect’s faith in alternative non-violent methods for advancing political, religious, racial or ideological causes within the confines of the law. Likewise, such provisions will also avoid further problems created by the ineffective current system where suspects who are considered too dangerous to be left uncontrolled one day are relieved of the measures the next day for administrative reasons without any clear ideological change.

If TPIMs must be kept, they will be limited or no use unless combined with a human rights-based, civil society-supported and joined up approach to countering extremism that includes the challenging of ideological narratives, deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration at every stage of the criminal justice system.

As we advised the Task Force on Countering Extremism that was set up after the Woolwich attacks:

After this government’s much needed 2011 reform of its Preventing Violent Extremism Strategy (Prevent), the counter-terrorism brief was rightly split from the work on integration and social cohesion. Whereas the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) at the Home Office maintained its counter-terrorism portfolio, the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) took on board the integration and challenging extremism remit. Eight months after this ‘Prevent’ reform, CLG finally published its ‘integration’ strategy, indicating that a separate plan to ‘outflank extremism’ would be forthcoming. Eighteen months went by – until the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby - and no plan to ‘outflank extremism’ had yet been issued. In light of recent events therefore, it is imperative that the British Government urgently revisits and reclaims responsibility for developing a joined up counter-extremism strategy to challenge the rising threat of extremisms in the UK[6].

By way of a joined up counter-extremism strategy, we recommend the establishment of a permanent office led by counter-extremism experts, either elected or unelected, acting in a non-partisan capacity to ensure that the strategy is clear and consistent at judicial, policy and grassroots levels. A permanent office would avoid problems stemming from a lack of continuity, keep the debate above party politics and would ensure that there is an independent and expert source of advice for public officials at every stage of the criminal justice system. If TPIMs are to continue, this office can act as an independent reviewer of all individual cases, provide official deradicalisation and pastoral oversight to the suspects and ensure that a doctrine of “legal tolerance” is adhered to when dealing with extremist views while promoting a doctrine of “civil intolerance” by implementing counter-extremism training and education at a grassroots level.

We anticipate that the need for TPIMs will increase as the conflict in Syria continues as ever more British Muslims are drawn to fight alongside Al Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria. While it is possible to charge returning British jihadists using the traditional criminal justice system as they have committed a crime by affiliating with a proscribed terrorist organisation, those with the intent to fight will be difficult to prosecute and TPIMs notices are most appropriate to prevent future acts of terrorism either in the United Kingdom or against British interests abroad. However, we urge that our recommendations for a human rights-based and rehabilitative approach are integrated into TPIMs in order to maintain and improve the effectiveness of these measures.

Quilliam

January 2014