Written evidence submitted by the Home Office [CT 04b]

Letter from James Brokenshire MP, Security Minister, to the Chair of the Committee, 3 October 2013

Please find attached to this letter the Government's response to the Committee's call for evidence in respect of its inquiry into the Pursue strand of the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST. Whilst I did not feel it appropriate to address each point in the inquiry's Terms of Reference, I have set out the Government's approach to Pursue, focusing in particular on Pursue delivery, counter-terrorism and security powers, countering terrorist finance and international co-operation.

A number of the inquiry's Terms of Reference cover areas which fall chiefly within the purview of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC); I have not, therefore considered these points in detail. Whilst there are clear parallels with Northern Ireland related terrorism in respect of the Government's approach, the CONTEST strategy focuses on tackling International Counter-Terrorism; as such, consideration of Northern Ireland related terrorism does not form part of this evidence.

JAMES BROKENSHIRE MP

Security Minister

3 October 2013

Evidence Submission: Home Affairs Select Committee Inquiry into Pursue

Introduction

1. The Pursue strand of the Government's counter-terrorism (CT) strategy CONTEST seeks to identify, investigate and disrupt terrorist attacks in this country and against our interests overseas, and - wherever possible - to prosecute those involved. This paper sets out in brief the key aspects of Pursue, considering the structures within which Pursue is delivered; the powers in place to target and disrupt terrorist activity; the roles of organisations such as the Charity Commission and Financial Conduct Agency in tackling terrorist financing; and the way in which the UK co-operates with other countries and multilateral organisations to counter the threat.

2. Recent events in Woolwich and the attack against the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, are a reminder that the threat the UK faces remains both serious and sustained and that the nature of that threat is evolving and diversifying.

3. The UK's record on CT remains a strong one. We continue successfully to disrupt attempted attacks against this country and its interests overseas. We are becoming more successful at prosecuting and convicting individuals engaging in terrorist activity. We delivered a safe and secure Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012. And our CONTEST strategy, and the way we implement it, continue to be held up as examples of good practice around the world.

4. Key to this success is our commitment to continuous improvement: we regularly review our powers and capabilities to ensure they remain both effective and proportionate. A ·root-and-branch review of CT and security powers was an early priority for this Government and led to considerable reform; but monitoring and evaluation is an ongoing process. As we develop our powers and capabilities to meet new challenges, we will continue to ensure that we get the balance between security and civil liberties right. Recent events have led to some debate about the powers we have and the way we and our partners use them. Whilst it is not the

Government's policy to comment on intelligence matters or leaked material, the Committee will be aware that the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has already published a report into allegations made by former US government employee Edward Snowden, which found that GCHQ acted entirely properly. In respect of the detention of David Miranda, we await the report of David Anderson QC, the Independent Reviewer of CT Legislation.

5. Despite our successes, there is no room for complacency: the threat continues to diversify both in terms of geography and methodology, and maintaining current levels of assurance will be challenging . Whilst we still face a significant threat from AI Qa'ida (AQ) in the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, groups affiliated or associated with AQ have become stronger and more active across a range of unstable states, such as AI Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and AI Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb in West Africa. In Somalia, AI Shabaab remains capable of mounting attacks throughout the country and against targets in the wider

region. The conflict in Syria has drawn extremists on both sides; whilst instability across that region has provided new ungoverned spaces for terrorists to operate in. Domestically,. there has been a trend towards 'low signature' terrorism by self-directed groups and lone actors. These individuals or groups develop the intent and capability to conduct attacks without support or direction from AQ or AQ-affiliates. Of similar concern· are 'self-starters' who radicalise themselves over the internet and plan attacks independently. Their attack methods tend to be simple, requiring little money or technical ability, but detecting and disrupting such threats is a significant challenge.

6. To put these words in context, there have been six foiled terrorist plots in Great Britain since April 2010[1]. Other terrorist incidents of note over this period include the attempted murder of an MP by a student in May 2010 and the discovery of printer cartridge bombs in transit at East Midlands airport in October 2010. However, attack plots represent just a small proportion of all terrorist activity in the UK, and they tend to develop in groups already involved in terrorist facilitation. Timely disruption of these groups has prevented further attack plans developing.

7. Between April 2010 and March 2013, 580 individuals were arrested in Great Britain for terrorism-related offences. The majority of arrests over this period (446) were categorised by the police as international terrorism[2] (77°(o), with 80 categorised as domestic terrorism (14%) and 9 as Northern Ireland related terrorism. The number of arrests has increased in each of the past two years. In the most recent year from April2012 to March 2013, the number of arrests increased by 21% to 249 from 206 in the previous year. The longer term trend is fairly stable: since 2002, there have been on average 210 arrests per year. It should be noted that the relatively small number of terrorism-related arrests each year means that proportionately large fluctuations in percentage terms are not uncommon.

8. Of the.580 arrested between April 2010 and March 2013, 241 (42%) were charged with an offence.[3] Of the total arrested, 98 (17%) were charged with a terrorism-related offence, of whom 35 (36%) were charged with preparation for terrorist acts (Terrorism Act 2006, section 5)[4]. This has led to 64 people being convicted of a terrorism-related offence so far[5]. Of these, 31 (48%) were convicted of preparation for terrorist acts (Terrorism Act 2006, section 5). Following a number of trials relating to the most recent foiled plots, 2012/13 saw a significant number of individuals (13) convicted of preparation for terrorist acts. Since current records began in September 2001 and March 2013, 64% of those charged with terrorism related offences have been convicted.

9. As the threat changes, we will continue .to focus on improving our understanding of the threat picture and maintaining our ability to disrupt and detect terrorist plots. No strategy can be 1 00% effective in mitigating the threat, and the risk of a successful attack is always present. Recent tragic events here and abroad have only strengthened our resolve to do all we can to protect the public from those who would do us harm, and we will continue to monitor, develop and refine our powers and capabilities to ensure they remain both effective against - and proportionate to - the threat we face.

1. Pursue Structures

10. Ownership and governance of Pursue sit, like the rest of CONTEST, with the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office, but a wide range of organisations and partners are responsible for contributing to the development and delivery of Pursue policy. Whilst the police and the security and intelligence agencies - the Security Service (MI5), Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) - are at the forefront of operational delivery, a number of other Whitehall departments and their agencies have important roles to. play in Pursue, including the FCO, Cabinet Office, HM Treasury and HMRC, along with other bodies such as the Charity Commission and Financial Conduct Authority. Close co-operation and dialogue between these organisations, underpinned by common objectives and priorities, and effective information and intelligence sharing, form the basis of successful Pursue delivery.

11 . The work of the security and intelligence agencies falls mainly within the purview of the ISC. These organisations play an important role in delivering and supporting policy, judiciary and law enforcement partners alike in combating ·the terrorist threat. On the operational side, the most important of these is the police.

12. Policing is key to Pursue delivery in the UK, and whilst the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) plays a leading role in Great Britain, CT policing is delivered by every police force in the· country. The national Police CT Network comprises the Counter-Terrorism Command (S015) within the MPS; four Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs) in the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Thames Valley; and Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) in the East Midlands, South West and Eastern regions, and Wales and Scotland. Individual forces also have their own Special Branch capability or equivalent.

13. The police contribution to delivering CT is co-ordinated by an ACPO committee - the ACPO (TAM) Board - using authority delegated by the Chief Constables' Council; major CT investigations are co-ordinated across force boundaries by the Senior National Co-ordinator under a national agreement. Police activity is funded by dedicated CT grants, the level of which is based on advice from the police and ·the agencies. Funding for CT policing has been protected since 2010, maintaining core capabilities, and as announced in the recent Spending Round, it will continue to be ring-fenced until 2015-16. The intelligence agencies also received a 3.4% increase in their combined budget for 2015-16.

14. A key aspect of police Pursue work focuses on protective security at ports and airports. The National Border Targeting Centre uses advance passenger information to issue alerts to Special Branch officers at ports about subjects of interest travelling to and from the UK, and to deny airlines authority to carry to the UK individuals who pose a threat. These officers investigate people and goods involved in terrorism to obtain intelligence, and make arrests where appropriate. ·

15. · The creation of the National Crime Agency (NCA), which will be formally established in October 2013, represents a significant change to the policing .landscape. The NCA will lead work on serious, organised and complex crime, including cyber crime and border security.  Once the agency is up and running the Government will consider what - if any - role, it should play in respect of CT. Until then, the NCA will work with the Police CT Network on issues of. common interest.

16. Successful disruption and prosecution of terrorist suspects does not necessarily eliminate the risk they pose, meaning partners such as the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) are also vital to Pursue delivery. NOMS has a well-established intelligence infrastructure which identifies risk and threats within prisons, from evidence of attack planning to radicalisation and recruitment activity, and ensures that relevant intelligence is shared and jointly analysed with partner agencies and the police to disrupt extremist activity. This includes informing decisions about how and where high risk offenders are held, to developing appropriate interventions to tackle extremism and radicalisation within prisons.

2. Counter-Terrorism & Security Powers

Prosecution

17. The most effective way of dealing with terrorist suspects is to prosecute them and, in the case of foreign nationals, subsequently to deport them. Responsibility for prosecuting terrorism-related cases in Great Britain lies with the Special Crime and Counter-Terrorism Division of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Suspected terrorists are prosecuted for 'ordinary' criminal offences as well as those provided for by specific CT legislation; many of those involved in serious terrorist activity are prosecuted for offences based on the wider legal framework, most notably offences such as conspiracy to murder. Last year, 43 people were charged with terrorism related offences in Great Britain, with 18 prosecuted and 16 convicted. A further 24 were awaiting trial on 31 December 2012, with 2 individuals having been acquitted. These figures represent a strong performance.

Disruption

18. While prosecution is always our preferred option, it is not always possible. The first priority must be to protect the public; as such, the police often need to take action to disrupt terrorist activity before they have been able to gather enough evidence for a prosecution. In other circumstances, a prosecution might not be practical because information against the suspect is not admissible in court due to . national security concerns - frequently, the need to protect our capabilities. For this reason, other means of disrupting terrorist activity are necessary to address the threat these individuals pose to public safety. Again, these measures are subject to robust safeguards to ensure they are effective, proportionate and consistent with our

legal and human rights obligations. The main measures are as follows:

• Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs): Examined extensively by the Committee in the past, the TPIM regime restricts the ability of terrorist suspects to engage in terrorist-related activity, thus reducing the risk they pose to the public. In his 2012 report, David Anderson QC concluded that "so far TPIMS have been effective in preventing terrorist related activity".

• Exclusion: The Home Secretary has the power to exclude from the UK individuals from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) whose presence she does not consider 'conducive to the public good.' Since January 2005, 442 people have been excluded from the UK, including on grounds of national security (234) and unacceptable behaviour (extremism) (162).

• Deprivation of citizenship: Since 2006 over 20 individuals who posed a real national security threat to the UK have been deprived of their British citizenship and either prevented from returning to the UK or removed from this country. Deprivation of British citizenship results in simultaneous loss of the right of abode in the United Kingdom and so paves the way, for possible immigration detention, deportation or exclusion from the UK.

• Deportation with assurances (DWA): Deportation with assurances agreements are an important component of CT co-operation with international partners. They enable the UK to deport foreign nationals suspected of terrorist activity in compliance with its obligations under human rights law. DWA arrangements have been agreed with Jordan (to which the Government recently succeeded in deporting Abu Qatada), Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia and Libya (not currently operational).

• Royal Prerogative: The Government's ability to stop individuals from travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity has become increasingly important with recent developments in Syria and other places of concern. A range of measures are in place which can be used to disrupt such travel, which include the Home Secretary's Royal Prerogative power to refuse or withdraw a British passport on public interest grounds. This is an important

tool to disrupt individuals who plan to engage in fighting, extremist activity or terrorist training overseas and then return to the UK with those skills. New powers to search for and seize passports cancelled by the Home Secretary under the Royal Prerogative, as well as other invalid -travel documents, have been introduced into the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill.

Preventative Measures

19. As well as targeting individuals, an important element of Pursue is to disrupt the activities of terrorist groups, including their recruitment and funding activities.

• Proscription enables prosecution for membership and other activities in support of terrorist groups; it also shows solidarity with international partners. Proscription also facilitates other disruptions, including prosecutions and immigration disruptions such as exclusion. In July 2013 Boko Haram and Minbar Ansar Deen in Nigeria were proscribed, and the AI Nusrah Front in Syria was recognised as an alias of AI Qa'ida.

• Working through the UN and EU, the UK also uses targeted international sanctions against individuals and groups suspected of terrorist activity which can severely restrict their ability to operate. In July 2013, after a sustained period of UK lobbying, EU Foreign Ministers agreed to list Hizb'allah's military wing as a terrorist organisation; and in the first half of 2013, the UK worked with other Member States at the UN to ensure that the UN AI Qa'ida sanctions regime reflected the emerging terrorist threats in north and west Africa. The restrictive measures imposed by CT sanctions include travel bans, arms embargoes and asset freezes on designated individuals or entities.

Reviewing our powers

20. Ensuring our CT powers - and the legislation underpinning them – remain both effective and proportionate is a cornerstone of our strategy, one which reflects our commitment to protecting the people of this country and our interests overseas in a way which is consistent with British values, including transparency, human rights and the rule of law. The Government's review of CT and security powers, published in January 2011[6], made changes to the toolkit to make it more effective, targeted and proportionate.

• We concluded that stop-and-search powers under Section 44 of the TACT Terrorism Act 2000 must be repealed, and replaced them with a more limited power which enables the police to stop and search people and vehicles without reasonable suspicion only in exceptional circumstances where there is a real threat of terrorist attack.

• We also reduced the maximum ·period of pre-charge detention from 28 to 14 days - though recognising that in exceptional circumstances a temporary increase to a maximum of 28 days might be necessary, an emergency Bill has been prepared as a contingency, subject to Parliament's approval.

• We also recently commenced post-charge questioning powers in Great Britain to enable terrorist suspects to be questioned after being charged – an additional investigative tool for the police and prosecutors where further evidence emerges after charges have been brought. The purpose is to allow prosecutors to build more robust evidential cases.

21. Evaluation of our powers is an ongoing process. Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 enables police officers to stop, question, detain and search people travelling through ports to determine whether they are or have been involved in terrorism. Schedule 7 confers an important CT power, but the Government recognises there are concerns about its use. We recently conducted an extensive public consultation on Schedule 7; amendments will be proposed in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime & Policing Bill, including reducing the maximum examination period to six hours.

22. Recognising the need to protect intelligence and the capabilities for gathering it, we also introduced the Justice and Security Act, which allows for closed material proceedings in the small number of civil cases involving national security sensitive material; and for judicial reviews of exclusion and deprivation decisions to be heard by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). These measures have equipped the courts better to handle sensitive material to serve the interests of both justice and national security, while allowing the Government to defend its case for the use of these executive actions, even where decisions are based fully or partly on material which cannot be disclosed in open court without damaging national security.

23. The Government also remains committed to ensuring that the law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to investigate crime, protect the public and ensure our national security, including maintaining access to communications data. The Government's approach will be proportionate, with robust safeguards in place, but we cannot let cyberspace become a haven for criminals and terrorists.

3. Counter-Terrorist Finance

24. The need to tackle terrorist financing is an important aspect of Pursue: terrorists need money to organise and conduct attacks, maintain their networks, travel, and radicalise and train others. This is challenging: the amounts of money involved are often small and difficult to trace, and the means by which terrorists raise, move and store money are diverse, ranging from abuse of charity to exploiting weak regulatory environments to conducting kidnaps for ransom.

Banking & Money Service Businesses

25. Terrorists use banks and money service businesses (MSBs) to move and store funds; the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and HMRC are therefore key partners. The FCA supervises banks1 compliance with the Money Laundering Regulations and focuses on ensuring that banks have robust systems and controls in place to ·prevent money laundering and highlight suspicious activity. HMRC supervises money service businesses under the same regulations; information relating to terrorism is passed to law enforcement agencies.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

26. Ensuring robust regulatory regimes in overseas jurisdictions is an important dimension in countering terrorist finance. The UK is a strong supporter and active member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which sets international · standards for legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering and terrorist finance. FATF conducts regular evaluations of countries' regimes and sets actions plans for those with deficiencies; high-risk jurisdictions which do not take steps to improve their regimes can be 'grey-listed' or 'black-listed' by FATF, which can limit investment and participation in international markets. This has produced tangible results: Kuwait has recently taken significant steps to improve its regime, including ratifying the Terrorist Finance Convention and enacting legislation; and both Kenya and Ethiopia have also introduced legislation due to FATF pressure.

Charities

27. The conviction in February 2013 of three individuals for raising money for terrorist purposes by posing as charity fundraisers, underlined the importance of the role of the Charity Commission, the charity regulator in England and Wales, in countering terrorism and extremism. Traditionally, the Commission has focused on regulatory monitoring and compliance. We have been working closely with the Commission and its new chair William Shawcross to look at how it can take a tougher line with those who seek to abuse the sector for terrorist purposes, including through more effective and targeted use of its existing powers against charities of CT concern. Where necessary we will seek to enhance those powers to improve the Commission's ability to regulate the sector as a whole.

28. Working with the Home Office, law enforcement and other partners, the Commission has already increased the number of compliance visits it conducts into charities of CT concern, both to identify and investigate abuse by terrorists and to improve awareness of and increase resilience to such abuse. As part of that awareness-raising the Commission has published guidance to the sector on stopping extremist speakers and monitoring charitable funds, including its successful 'Safer Giving' campaigns. More recently, it has run workshops on sending aid to Syria and other high risk areas. Internationally, we will continue to work with the Commission and other partners to improve its visibility of charities' activities - and of their financial footprints- overseas.

4. International Co-operation

Bilateral and Multilateral Engagement

29. Many threats to the UK involve an international dimension, and the diversification of the threat in recent years has made it ever more important that we work with a wide range of countries to disrupt the threat to the UK and to build capability to counter terrorism at source. We work in close co-operation on both policy and operational channels with our international counterparts in accordance with our values, the rule of law and our own legal obligations.

30. Our most developed CT relationships are with our '5 Eyes' partners: the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. We have unique intelligence relationships with these countries and hold regular, detailed exchanges of views on CT policy and strategy issues. We also have close relationships with European countries, both bilaterally and through the European Union. The UK is regarded as a source of expertise on CT within Europe, and we work closely with EU bodies (CT Coordinator, Commission, Europol, External Action Service) and other Member States to set the direction for European CT activity. The UK opt-out of Justice & Home Affairs measures will not restrict our ability to co-operate fully with other European countries to tackle terrorism. We are also engaged in agreeing priorities and action plans for the EU's external work, notably in building capability in the security and justice sectors in priority countries.

31 . The UK promotes greater international co-operation on CT through other multilateral forums such as the G8 and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF). This year's UK Presidency of the G8 focused on kidnap for ransom – achieving unequivocal rejection of the payment of terrorist ransoms - while the GCTF is developing its work in the areas of rule of law and criminal justice capacity building, including the establishment of an International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (opening in 2014), which will train legal practitioners to international standards.

Overseas Capacity-Building

32. In 2013, the Government introduced a more strategic approach to its efforts to develop the capacity of international partners to investigate and prosecute terrorists by building justice and human rights partnerships with countries where there is both a threat to UK security and weaknesses in the law enforcement, human rights and criminal justice architecture. Supported by a £30m CT Programme Fund, these partnerships include work to:

• Build the CT capacity of overseas security services to improve compliance with the law and human rights and to make them more effective;

• Improve the ability of local investigators to build cases based on evidence rather than confession. The police CT network plays a critical role in this regard: support is delivered through the network of Counter-Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers (CTELOs) posted overseas who work with organisations in their host countries and regions;

• Ensure prosecutors and judges are capable of processing terrorism cases through the court systems, effectively, fairly and in line with the rule of law;

• Improve and where appropriate monitor conditions in detention facilities so that convicted terrorists can be held securely and their treatment meets with international standards.

33. Safeguards have been designed to ensure that this work is carried out within a framework built on accountability and respect for human rights; it is vital that our CT work supports justice and the rule of law as well as meeting our security objectives. Although work on the partnerships is in its early stages, we have already delivered progress in a range of areas, including the establishment of focused CT prosecutor cadres in key countries, more effective handling of CT cases through the courts and improvements in CT investigators' evidence gathering and forensics skills.

Conclusion

34. The latest version of CONTEST considered what success in Pursue looked like: effective disruption of terrorist-related activity in the UK and more prosecutions or deportations of those responsible; reducing the threat from AI Qa'ida, its affiliates and other organisations overseas, including disrupting attacks planned against the UK; and ensuring that our CT work is effective, proportionate and consistent with our commitment to human rights.

35. Judged against these indicators, we are confident that our performance in delivering Pursue has been and continues to be strong. However, as the threat continues to diversify and originate from a wider geographical area, our ability to detect and disrupt potential plots will become ever more challenging. We cannot reduce the risk from terrorism to zero, but we will continue to work to disrupt those suspected of terrorist activity in the UK; to prosecute and convict them where we can; and where we cannot but they are foreign nation.als, to take action to remove them from the UK. We do this by ensuring that our partners have a robust range of powers which enable them to do their job and their work is integrated and coordinated. We keep our powers and capabilities under regular review to ensure that they are effective and proportionate, and we are working ever more closely with overseas partners and organisations to improve both their and our capabilities to counter terrorism.