Written evidence submitted by
Cressida Dick, Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police [CT 02a]

RE: HASC Inquiry into the PURSUE Strand of CONTEST - CT Policing Contribution

1. I welcome the opportunity to provide written evidence to your inquiry into PURSUE. Policing makes a very considerable contribution to this pillar of the CONTEST agenda and I believe CT Policing capabilities, structures and processes have improved significantly in recent years and continue to evolve.

2. I fully agree with the Home Secretary’s recent assertions that whilst the threat of terrorism remains real and sustained, our ability to counter it remains strong. There are several reasons for this, not least that our collective understanding of the threat has broadened and deepened over recent years, improving our ability to detect and disrupt it. In addition to this the increasingly integrated nature of the UK counter terrorism effort, whilst to the outside eye can often look quite complex, is critical in mitigating daily the risk from terrorism.

3. This note sets out briefly how we support activity that seeks to identify, investigate and disrupt terrorist attacks in this country and our interests overseas. I will then turn to the role of our partners and how we integrate operationally and strategically with them, before finally highlighting some current issues which are at the forefront of our thinking. Whilst this is not an exhaustive account of our arrangements, you will notice that it does highlight two critical components, notably structures and collaboration.

THE COUNTER TERRORIST NETWORK

Local

4. There can be a misconception that the Pursue effort begins with counter terrorism specialists. However, the ability to prevent and detect terrorist offences is led within communities and by front line policing. A core part of the neighbourhood officer’s role is the ability to build relationships, confidence and trust, which in turn can encourage greater public vigilance, responsiveness and passing of intelligence. It is also front line policing that will be the first to respond to a terrorist attack in a manner which preserves life, safety and evidence and sets the tone for the investigation and wider community confidence.

5. With this in mind we have been committed to developing the relationship with policing at a local level. Doing so has ensured full engagement with the wider police service and local partners - from intelligence assessment to overt responses on the street, from community engagement to the in-force provision of Special Branch Officers. It is worth noting that a significant proportion of Pursue related intelligence leads come from the police, therefore it is vital that we keep casting the net for intelligence gathering as widely as possible, harnessing all our policing capability and strengthening community links.

Regional

6. The local, core policing function is the bedrock upon which we have built specialist CT Policing capability. Force Special Branches units provide the link between local policing activity and the regional hubs that sit above them. These ‘parent’ hubs divide into two types. Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) which co-ordinate regional police intelligence resources, whilst Counter Terrorist Units (CTUs) have expanded capabilities to manage major counter terrorism operations and disruption activity.

7. These hubs are located in those geographical areas of highest projected demand, anchored in local forces, which in turn reach back into the communities they serve. At the same time, the CT Network operates collectively as a single national entity and engages with a range of partners, including the Security Service and the Secret Intelligence Service. In particular the relationship with the Security Service, which I reflect on later, has been instrumental in enhancing joint regional working and developing our collective understanding of the threat at a local level.

8. Activity at this level can range from simple disruption activity, such as the seizure of vehicles and prosecution for road tax offences, to full blown covert operations utilising the panoply of covert intelligence-gathering techniques. It is also worth noting at this point, the significant amount of resources and effort required to investigate a terrorist incident. By way of example, I mentioned to you in my appearance before you on 4th June 2013, following the horrific murder of Lee Rigby, that around 600 officers were employed directly on that investigation. More than 150 of these were from the national police CT Network beyond London.

9. A key point here, and often unrecognised, is the sheer number of successful terrorist prosecutions that we have undertaken. Since the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the UK CT effort has been responsible for 330 convictions related to terrorism. The level of skill, knowledge and determination in bringing those people to justice is manifested in the majority of guilty pleas entered (a previously unheard of phenomenon in the history of terrorist-related prosecutions).

National

10. In addition to the capability within CTUs/CTIUs, the police CT Network has a number of units with national responsibilities performing highly specialised roles. They support the wider Prevent and Pursue effort through bespoke, and often cutting edge, capability. An example of this is the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) whose remit is to ensure the internet is an environment where terrorist and violent extremist messages are challenged. Through its public facing web page and industry links, it seeks to identify and take down extremist online content from a host of platforms ranging from social media to static web sites. Allocating resources to tackle the almost exponential growth of online activity, recognises that radicalisation takes many forms and we must be alive to all of them. Moreover, the figure of over 18,000 takedowns of online content since June 2012 alludes to the scale and complexity of the challenge.

11. In recognition that financing is fundamental in enabling terrorists and extremists to operate at home and overseas, the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit (NTFIU) fulfils a key role in providing quick time intelligence and evidence. Understanding how terrorists raise, move, store and use money is an integral part of not only increasing terrorists’ vulnerability but also of enhancing our ability to disrupt their activity. More widely the NTFIU has a broader strategic role in contributing to the HMG counter terrorist finance strategy.

12. Whilst much of our effort is focused toward the threat of terrorism from Al Qaeda and its associates, we remain cognisant of the threat from individuals who engage in terrorist activity in the name of Extreme Right or Left wing views or other ideologies. The National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) sets the national strategic direction for understanding extremist threats to the UK. It has a wide range of international partners which it works with, particularly law enforcement and security agencies in Europe. Furthermore it enables us to understand and respond more effectively to the nexus of terrorism and hate crime. For this reason Domestic Extremism policing remains an integral part of CT and wider law

enforcement activity.

13. Despite some obvious differences in law, funding and structures, the Network I have described is fully integrated with colleagues in Police Service Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland. We operate to the same standards and processes and have integrated systems and technology wherever possible. The Chief Constables are members of ACPO(TAM) Board and dialogue involving their services is constant. This join-up is a vital part of managing the terrorist threat across the UK.

International

14. To reiterate the recently-expressed view of the Director General of the Security Service, the current terrorist threat is both diverse and diffuse. Moreover, those who seek to do us harm pay little attention to international borders. In recognition of this fact, the police CT Network plays a full and critical role in supporting countries overseas to investigate and prosecute terrorists who may threaten the UK and our interests. Our network of Counter Terrorism and Extremism Liaison Officers (CTELOs) are strategically located and work closely with police counterparts in their host countries and regions.

15. CTELO activity is wide ranging and includes:

- providing assistance in efficiently progressing CT-related enquiries emanating from, and directed into, the UK (this includes working within Europol);

- acting as the forward deployment for UK CT police in respect of terrorist incidents where UK nationals or interests are involved to assist the host country in conducting their investigation;

- mentoring and building effective and human-rights-compliant CT capability within foreign police agencies in support of the FCO Justice and Human Rights Partnership (JHRP) Programme.

16. The CTELO network has already had a significant impact in effectively changing the approach of some JHRP countries towards the way they conduct CT investigations by shifting their focus towards building a sound evidential prosecution case which meets international human rights standards. There is still much more that the UK CT Network can contribute to the Government’s overseas strategy in this area and the CT police overseas network will be consolidated and extended further in the months to come. We are committed to providing assistance and support wherever a CT police officer can work legitimately with our partners to make a significant difference in delivering effective investigative capability.

17. In addition to our overseas footprint we are able to rapidly deploy officers from the CT Network in response to attacks overseas on UK citizens or where there is a UK interest. For example the Counter Terrorist Command in the MPS led the UK response following the terrorist attack on a gas plant processing facility in In Amenas, Algeria in January. You will be aware that six British citizens and one British resident were killed and many more affected. This is an ongoing operation, with extensive support being provided by us to the Foreign Office and the HM Coroner and there continues to be significant family liaison work and engagement with a range of international partners.

18. The deployed team were able to manage the recovery, identification and repatriation of any UK deceased, conduct interviews and evidence gathering from survivors.

19. Led by the Forensic Management Team, the UK set a strategy for the international identification and repatriation of deceased and their remains, managing all aspects of the mortuary process. With the assistance of international partners from Norway and Japan, the team examined a high number of bodies and body parts, conducting all DNA work here in the UK. This process enabled the repatriation of UK and other international victims and all associated body parts to UK Coronial standards. The mortuary process allowed the UK team to support local authorities through the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) process with the sharing of best practice and the training of local staff. In addition, officers were able to visit the scene and gain an insight into the events of this attack in order to support the coroner.

20. Following the attack on the Westgate shopping centre, the CTELO had been heavily engaged with the Kenyan police response. The decision was taken to deploy a Counter Terrorism Command team of investigators in order to assist the Kenyan police investigation and mentor local resources in the effective examination of a terrorism scene, along with all the issues associated with body recovery to an internationally approved standard.

21. The CTELO has an extremely good relationship with the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit and this allowed the investigation team access to relevant material and allowed for the team to assist local staff with scene examination and body recovery. Previous training has been delivered to the Kenyan police by the Counter Terrorism Command but this was their first major scene. Working alongside the Kenyan police, with the assistance of FBI colleagues, the team were able to mentor them through all aspects of scene management, scene investigation and body recovery. This included mortuary management in mass fatality terrorist attacks.

Governance and Co-ordination

22. Having attempted to give a coherent account of CT structures it may be helpful to describe the overarching governance and coordination arrangements which focus those broad functions toward the strategic aims of Pursue.

23. In the UK, operational command of policing is vested in Chief Constables, however in order to deliver a nationally consistent and collegiate approach, those chief officers have agreed that CT Policing will be overseen by ACPO (Terrorism and Allied Matters) (ACPO TAM). Strategic direction of ACPO(TAM) is set by the ACPO(TAM) Board, chaired my me with Vice Chairs who are Chief Constables from the police forces which host the regional CTUs.

24. Taking a step down from strategic oversight, operational activity is led by the Senior National Coordinator (SNC) who is a Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). The SNC is mandated by all Chief Constables to coordinate major CT investigations nationally. It is the empowerment of the SNC by Chief Constables that ensures that the Network can flex and surge its assets across regions and disrupt threats effectively. It is also a recognition that CT Policing is delivered by consensus and buy-in with all forces being equitable partners.

25. At an operational and tactical level, the ACPO Counter Terrorism Coordination Centre (ACTCC) provides the tasking and coordination function for the national Network. The key role of the ACTCC is to direct assets and operations toward the most critical threats and intelligence in line with the SNC’s mandated responsibility. A secondary function is the oversight and scrutiny of this activity through the collation and analysis of national operational demand information, which assists the strategic modelling of resources and ensures that activity is directed to the most appropriate operations and regions.

COLLABORATION AND RELATIONSHIPS

The Security Service

26. The increasingly collaborative and integrated nature of how we operate is a critical component of our ability both to understand and to disrupt terrorist threats. Although the Security Service has the lead role in National Security, it is widely recognised that the close partnership between the police and the Security Service is essential for the effective delivery of PURSUE. It is our ability to work seamlessly and collaboratively together, despite sometimes differing objectives, that makes our unique relationship the envy of the world.

27. The principle of joint working is particularly important in order to reach a shared understanding and prioritisation of the threat. On that basis we have processes in place that allow us to work together to gather intelligence and evidence, continually re-assess the threat and to identify and task potential disruption opportunities. A balance must always be struck between immediate risk mitigation and longer term disruptive impact. Because of our executive powers and experience in mitigating criminal threat, the police play a significant role in disruptions of terrorist networks.

Broader Policing Partners

28. As I have mentioned earlier, the ability of counter terrorist specialist policing to respond effectively to the threat from terrorism relies heavily on the activities of every police officer, community support officer, and member of police staff. Individual instances of police activity can contribute to community confidence that will, in turn, encourage reporting of valuable intelligence and reduce the risks of radicalisation. All front-line staff must respond appropriately to suspicious incidents. They can receive information from the public or partners, and can pass it to CT specialists. This intelligence can be assessed against other local information and against other sensitive intelligence.

29. When police intervene against terrorist suspects, this can inevitably impact on communities. The close integration between officers dealing directly with the suspect, those helping to deal with the family, with neighbours and with the wider community is critical to ensuring this is conducted safely and sensitively whilst respecting operational sensitivities and the rights of the suspect.

30. A powerful example of where an integrated policing response is so effective was following the murder of Mohamed Saleem in April and the planting of bombs outside mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton in June and July. Not only did an excellent terrorism investigation lead to the arrest and charge of Pavlo Lapshyn, a Ukrainian student who subsequently pleaded guilty. But front line policing were instrumental in engaging and reassuring the local Muslim community by visiting over 200 Islamic institutions in the West Midlands to dispense safety advice and reassurance. And when it came to tracking down the offender, specialist counterterrorism officers worked effectively with local police to find and identify him.

31. CT Policing also relies on specialist police activity that is not CT-specific such as firearms policing, forensics, and surveillance. This support can vary in volume significantly. During ‘routine’ investigations, CT assets are allocated in a clear tasking process against an agreed set of priorities. During and after a terrorist incident and at other critical times, the demand for these specialist resources can greatly exceed usual capacity. In those circumstances, support would be drawn from broader policing. It is imperative that in those circumstances, all the assets can operate effectively together and considerable work has been carried out to ensure this works well.

Local Delivery Partners

32. One area which presents options to disrupt the spread of extremist ideology is the police contribution to the Prevent strategy, which is inextricably linked to Pursue. The police contribution includes the implementation of the ‘Channel’ project. Channel is a multi-agency project funded by the Home Office, Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT). It is aimed at protecting people at risk of radicalisation, through the provision of a mechanism for early intervention to divert them away from being drawn into the commission of terrorist activity. It is only at a local level that we can integrate effectively with those organisations and groups that have a deeper and more credible reach into groups or individuals susceptible to radicalisation. We continue to work hard to build trust and confidence within communities and local partnerships to identify and divert those involved in or vulnerable to radicalisation. We can only deliver effective Channel interventions in close partnership with local partners.

The Crown Prosecution Service

33. The involvement of dedicated specialist prosecutors working closely with police officers from the Counter Terrorism Command and the Counter Terrorism Units around the country is key to one of the fundamental aims of PURSUE, to prosecute terrorists successfully and bring them to justice. Prosecutors from the Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division of the CPS work with the police and the intelligence agencies from an early stage and in many cases prosecutors advise long before suspects are arrested. This close working practice has helped to build a strong trilateral relationship between prosecutors, police and the intelligence agencies based on mutual respect and trust.

34. It is usual for the prosecutor to be apprised of the intelligence picture from the outset in order to ensure that there is nothing that will adversely affect a prosecution and for prosecutors to advise on how intelligence can be converted to reliable admissible evidence. Advising early on evidence collection and the strength of the on-going investigation, assists law enforcement to take actions to maximise the potential for admissible evidence in any future trial. Prosecutors are also better able to anticipate those areas that might cause them difficulty if they are aware of the whole picture including any sensitive or national security issues from the outset. The importance of these relationships and early engagement must not be underestimated; as I have suggested already, the number of successful investigations and prosecutions that the agencies have achieved together over the last 10 years or so are testament to that.

National Offender Management Service (NOMS)

35. Another key delivery partner is the National Offender Management Service (NOMS). NOMS and CT Policing work in partnership to identify and assess radicalisation and extremism in prisons and jointly to deliver interventions and management of extremist offenders once released back into the community. Key risks that NOMS seeks to help manage include, inter alia, a terrorist incident outside prison arranged or conducted from within prison; a terrorist incident taking place inside a prison; a participant in a terrorist incident outside prison found to have been radicalized and or recruited inside prison and; a terrorist/extremist under probation supervision taking part in a terrorist incident.

BORDERS

Importance of Border Controls

36. Law enforcement at our ports and borders plays a core role in protecting the UK and our interests overseas from any act that may jeopardise our security and stability. Intelligence assessments have continually highlighted the significance of international travel and the vulnerability it creates in relation to national security. The predominant threats to the UK now and for the foreseeable future are from International and Northern Ireland Related Terrorism. The ideology, capability and objectives of the main terrorist groups present a complex challenge as to how our borders need to be policed.

Schedule 7

37. Police officers at ports have powers under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop, question, search, and if necessary, detain people entering or leaving the UK. The legislation is used by officers to determine whether a person appears to be (or has been) concerned in the commission, preparation and instigation of acts of terrorism. This power remains a vital tool in our armoury and recent events only serve to highlight the scale and complexity of the threats that pass through ports across the world where there is only a fleeting opportunity to assess whether a person should be stopped and examined further. In simple terms, the use of Schedule 7 has identified many previously unknown persons who have been discovered to be involved in terrorism, and who could have carried out or assisted an attack causing much loss of

life and injury, here or abroad.

38. Notwithstanding that, we acknowledge that use of this power is a contentious issue for some, and we recognise that appropriate safeguards need to be in place to ensure it the power is exercised proportionately. We have therefore fully engaged in the recent consultation to review the Schedule 7 power and continue to work to add clarity to how it will be used in the future. This includes working to support the development of the new codes of practice. We continue to engage with communities to clarify and explain how and why we use Schedule 7, respond to recommendations from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and where necessary streamline access to the complaints process.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

Managing Residual Threat

39. The police and Security Service have long recognised that, given the finite nature of investigative resources and the intensive resource requirements of counter terrorism investigations, careful prioritisation has to take place to ensure resources are appropriately directed to the areas of greatest risk. However, it has also been recognised that, outside the specific investigations, a mechanism is necessary to analyse and manage the risk posed by individuals who are not subjects of interest within active investigations.

40. The ‘Emerging & Residual Threats’ (ERT) process is a national programme, being developed jointly by the police and Security Service, to ensure identification and mitigation of the extremist threat at both a regional and national level. The process is based on an integrated police and Security Service assessment process, which considers a more holistic view of risk. This approach is aimed at gaining an understanding of the broad range of issues that affect each particular region.

Communications Data

41. We continue to give a perspective to Government on legislative powers. Communications Data is vital for law enforcement. It is an essential tool in our ability to protect the public and keep people safe from harm. It provides investigative breakthroughs in the most heinous of crimes, including child abuse (in particular large paedophile rings), murder, kidnapping, cyber crime and terrorism offences. Communications data provides evidence that can be put before a court to ensure the successful prosecution of offenders. The necessity to obtain web logs, foreign Internet based data and to resolve IP addresses has not changed; while the usage of web based services increases exponentially.

42. Technology is increasingly moving society towards virtual lifestyles, with 94% of UK adults having access to mobile phones. The duty of law enforcement to protect and investigate when required to do so, is being hindered without the necessary provisions being available. The continuing erosion of this capability, without the necessary legislative changes, will severely impact on our ability to conduct terrorist investigations, with potentially grave consequences.

CONCLUSION

43. There have been numerous and significant counter terrorist disruption operations undertaken in the last few years, many of which have resulted in successful trials. But these also serve to remind us of the scale of the threat posed from those determined to mount attacks against us. Recent events both here and overseas remind us that we can never be complacent. Our national CT Network is continually tested. We played a major role in keeping the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games secure. Our preparedness for this left many important legacies, not least improved structures and processes and strengthened relationships with key partners.

44. Underpinning all of our activity and providing the “golden thread” through our national and international reach, is the local, specialist knowledge and ongoing neighbourhood policing efforts, every day, across the country, building confidence and links with communities. Keeping our citizens safe requires us to be effective at our evidence gathering and we can only do this with community confidence and engagement.

45. For obvious reasons, the London Counter Terrorism Command is a very large unit and the Metropolitan Police provides day-to-day strategic leadership and co-ordination through the role of the Assistant Commissioner and Senior National Co-ordinator. But there is no single lead force that delivers CT Policing. It is a truly collaborative endeavour, mandated by all Chief Constables, and one which provides national strategic direction and oversight, through a board of Chief Constables chaired by me, whilst maintaining and harnessing critical links into local policing, in turn anchored to local communities. Our structures allow the broader intelligence community, in particular the Security Service to harness local intelligence and link downstream and upstream intelligence. We are rooted firmly into a myriad of local partners, local authorities and voluntary and statutory agencies. These links are more important than ever in light of the diverse and more localised nature of the threat, the increasing risk posed by self starting individuals and other violent extremists.

46. In late 2012 we initiated a programme of work to consider and provide evidence of what works most effectively across the CT Policing Network and to identify areas of performance requiring further improvement and enhancement. We will continue to improve on what we’ve built so that we are in the best possible shape to meet the enduring threat we face.

Cressida Dick

Assistant Commissioner

Chair of ACPO TAM