Written Evidence from the Liverpool High Speed Too Group (HSR 026)

Executive Summary

We, the Liverpool High Speed Too Group, believe that the government preferred route for Phase 2 of HS2 is entirely inadequate in term of its provision for the City of Liverpool and the Liverpool City Region. The current proposals, far from ensuring the future prosperity of the city and region, will be of dubious benefit and possibly damaging to its economic prospects.

The proposals fail Liverpool in the following ways:

• By not providing any dedicated infrastructure to serve the city.
• By providing journey times to London that are significantly higher than those provided to rival commercial centres.
• By providing minimal capacity for future expansion of the Liverpool HS2 service.
• By having no connectivity to other commercial centres such as Birmingham, Glasgow and Edinburgh.
• By releasing no local capacity needed to expand the LCR economy through new commuter and regional services – currently constrained by limited capacity at Liverpool Lime Street.
• By reducing the capacity of existing rail freight routes and thereby restricting rail access to the Port of Liverpool and other regional freight terminals.

We believe, and can demonstrate, that the City of Liverpool and the Liverpool City Region are of sufficient size and economic importance to justify significant infrastructure investment and, therefore, strongly disagree with the current proposals.

We recommend that the government demands that HS2 provides a service to Liverpool that helps achieve the stated aim of rebalancing the national economy. Specifically, we recommend that:

• The current proposed service pattern is revised to remove intermediate station stops unrelated to the city region and to maximise the length of high speed infrastructure used by Liverpool services.
• Enhancements to the proposed classic compatible service are investigated both to reduce the journey time penalties inherent in the current proposal and to remove the conflict between high speed passenger services and freight services.
• A captive route for trains into central Liverpool is identified for delivery as part of Phase 2 or as part of a subsequent phase with a published timescale and funding arrangement.

The Liverpool High Speed Too Group

The Liverpool High Speed Too Group was formed in response to the publication of the Government Preferred Route for Phase 2 of HS2 in January of this year. We are an independent group of Liverpudlian professionals, broadly supportive of the HS2 scheme but dedicated to the aim of exposing the deficiencies of the current proposals with respect to the proposed Liverpool service.

1.     Why Liverpool Needs an HS2 service.

1.1.   Liverpool and its City Region represent one of the most important metropolitan regions of the country. Following a long period of economic decline, the last decade has witnessed a revival in Liverpool’s fortunes with the successful bid for European Capital of Culture in 2008 and economic developments such as the Liverpool One retail centre, the Arena and Convention Centre and the Cruise Liner Terminal.

1.2.   This revival does not show any sign of abating. Population is increasing and next year (2014), Liverpool will host the International Festival of Business showcasing the city to the world and will see work commence on the Liverpool Exhibition Centre at Kings Dock. Infrastructure developments are also taking place – most notably the Liverpool 2 Post-Panamax container port in Sefton and the Mersey Gateway Bridge in Halton. Plans have now been approved for the massive Liverpool and Wirral Waters office, commercial and residential developments.

1.3.   The City Region is host to internationally important industries including the Jaguar Land Rover factory in Knowsley, the Vauxhall factory and petro-chemical industry in Halton and the pharmaceutical and biotech industries in Liverpool. The City of Liverpool has a large and well-established financial services industry.

1.4.   The City has three universities, Liverpool, Liverpool John Moores and Liverpool Hope and is an internationally renowned centre for education.

1.5.   The City and Region has developed a major tourist industry and possesses some world class tourist attractions including the Albert Dock, Cavern Quarter, Mersey Ferries, Museum Quarter, the Grand National and the two Premier League football teams. The City is an international brand, frequently cited as the most well-known English city outside of London.

1.6.   Liverpool John Lennon Airport has, in the past fifteen years, developed into a major international airport listed amongst the top ten in the UK and is pursuing further expansion.

1.7.   Liverpool has a growing cruise liner terminal, which, is developing as an important alternative to the established south coast ports.

1.8.   Table 1 (below) shows that Liverpool is the third busiest flow, into and out of London, on the West Coast Main Line. Although Liverpool currently has almost half the annual passenger numbers to London of Manchester, it only has a third of the service.

1.9.   The above demonstrates that Liverpool has a diverse and modern economy for which good connectivity to the national transport network is vital. The current HS2 proposals do not recognise this fact and appear rooted in an outdated image of the city and its economy.

Table 1:  Main HS2 served locations, annual passenger totals to/from London,

(Source: LENNON 2012-2013)

2.     Why the Current HS2 Proposals are Unacceptable

2.1.   The HS2 proposals ignore the recommendation of the Heseltine / Leahy report (Ref 1) – ‘Government should commit to ensuring Liverpool’s historic parity with Manchester for travel time to London and thereby avoid harmful competitive disadvantage to Liverpool in attracting inward investors.

2.2.   The report accompanying the HS2 Phase 2 submission (Ref 2) gives minimal attention to the provision of a Liverpool service. Reference is made to a ‘high level’ gauge clearance study and to unspecified routes via Warrington. The conclusion is drawn that the provision of services to intermediate destinations is more important than an improved Liverpool service.

2.3   The attention given to Liverpool falls far short of that given to other cities such as Sheffield and Derby, where captive station sites and routes have been identified.

2.4   The effect of the Merseyrail network – the most intensive suburban railway network outside of London – in concentrating the Liverpool market is not recognised. The MVA consultancy report (Ref.3), on which the HS2 proposals is based, claims that the Liverpool market is ‘polycentric’ based on the odd inclusion of Stafford, a station remote from the Liverpool City Region as well as Crewe.

2.5   The faster of the two hourly Liverpool services will run for 40 miles on existing tracks. The train units on this route section will be restricted to 110mph (175kph), which is slower than the present Virgin Pendolinos. The journey time over this section is further restricted by two stops: Runcorn and Crewe.

2.6   The slower service will run for 75 miles on existing tracks due to a stop at Stafford. It will join HS2 at Lichfield, uniquely making no use of Phase 2 infrastructure.

2.7   Nine miles of the classic Liverpool route (Chorlton, south of Crewe to Minshull Vernon near Winsford) will run parallel to the HS2 route. Trains on this section will run at half the speed of the adjacent HS2 captive services (175kph vs 360kph).

2.8   The effect of the current proposals on the economy of Liverpool has been evaluated on behalf of HS2 by KPMG, a world leading firm of auditors and accountants (Ref. 4 and 5) . They have calculated two possible outcomes based on assumptions business sensitivity to transport connectivity. The low assumption results in a net gain to the city of £114.95million per annum whereas the high assumption results in a net loss of £50.19million.

2.9   The corresponding figures for Preston, which though further from London and smaller than Liverpool, are gains of £178.77million and £141.46million respectively.

2.10                     The need for the proposed classic compatible units to share tracks used by relatively slow commuter passenger trains and freight services reduces capacity. This is particularly acute on the double track section of the West Coast Main Line from Crewe to Weaver Junction used by services from and to the Port of Liverpool. The freeing up of freight capacity on existing lines is highlighted as a major benefit of HS2, however, in the case of Liverpool, this is clearly not the case.

2.11                     Liverpool does not have a Birmingham service provided by HS2 despite having significantly more passengers to that city than either Leeds or Sheffield, which both enjoy a good connection under current proposals.

3       Possible Improvements to the Current Proposals

3.1  Revising the Service Pattern

3.1.1         Revising the proposed service pattern can significantly improve Liverpool’s current HS2 proposal with minimal investment in infrastructure. Reducing the number of station stops and maximising the use of HS2 high speed infrastructure will allow more competitive journey times.

3.1.2         The present proposed route layout has led to Crewe and Stafford being included in the Liverpool service. The provision of a north junction at Crewe would allow for services from Glasgow and/or Edinburgh to stop at the town, thereby retaining top flight Scottish services and removing an unnecessary Liverpool connection. (Crewe to Liverpool would continue to be served by local services).

3.1.3         The removal of the Stafford stop would result in a considerable reduction in journey time for the slower Liverpool service due to the elimination of both the station stop and the 35miles of additional reduced speed running.

3.1.4         Stafford’s rail connection to London could be maintained by a similar solution to that proposed for the nearby and larger city of Stoke on Trent.

3.2  Enhancing the Classic Compatible Service

3.2.1         The following proposals list ways of enhancing the present classic compatible service without developing a full captive service. They are not fully developed but illustrate options that do not appear to have been considered by HS2.

3.2.2         Minshull Vernon Junction: A new junction north of Crewe at the point where the HS2 and West Coast Main Line (WCML) routes diverge allowing Liverpool services to use the HS2 route to by-pass the town. This would remove the parallel running situation outlined in 2.6 (above).

3.2.3         Cheshire Link Line: A new line, some 15km long, linking the HS2 spine route at a point north east of Northwich to Weaver Junction where the Liverpool line branches from the WCML. This would not only allow for a greater length of running at full linespeed (360kph) and maximum branch linespeed (230kph) but would address the freight capacity issue outlined in 2.10 (above). The new line would also improve services to Warrington and could form part of a future captive branch.

3.2.4         By serving Warrington from the Liverpool route, the opportunity would arise for freeing up a valuable hourly train path on the HS2 spine route. Possible routes are listed below.

3.2.5         The Ditton Freight Route – Opening to passenger services of an existing freight line from Ditton Junction near Widnes to HS2 south east of Warrington. This would involve reopening the disused Warrington Bank Quay low level station and so providing Warrington with a much improved service. Some realignment of existing tracks and reopening of a section of disused route would be necessary.

3.2.6         Warrington Central Route. The connection of HS2 to the existing passenger route from Liverpool to Manchester via Warrington Central via a new curve at Birchwood would be relatively inexpensive and make use of freed up capacity following the completion of the more northerly Chat Moss route. This would reduce the length of classic track running into Liverpool Lime Street to 40km (25 miles).

3.3  Constructing a Captive Route

3.3.1         To gain the maximum benefit from HS2 investment, a captive route taking trains into the city centre is a high priority. Such a line would allow much reduced journey times and far greater capacity. It is the obvious solution for a major city region. The following paragraphs contain suggestions for constructing such a route using a mixture of new and existing infrastructure.

Figure 1: Liverpool Captive Route Option

3.3.2         Figure 1 illustrates some options for constructing a captive train service into central Liverpool. The numbers in the following paragraphs relate to this figure.

3.3.3         Item 1. Liverpool Exchange Station Site – This, largely undeveloped site would have obvious advantages as a Liverpool HS2 terminal due to its proximity to the existing underground Moorfields Station with its Wirral and Northern Line services plus its location in the business district of the city and its closeness to the waterfront and cruise liner terminal. It also has very good road access and is walking distance of the proposed Liverpool Waters development.

3.3.4         Item 2: New approach tunnels from Exchange. Two single track tunnels are likely to be required, although initially, a single track tunnel might suffice.

3.3.5         Item 3: Liverpool Lime Street Station. As Liverpool’s current main line terminus, the development of an HS2 station here is an alternative to Item 1. The length of station required would mean some demolition and / or projection west the current site but could prove a catalyst for the regeneration of the Lime Street area. A Northern Line connection to Liverpool Central is possible.

3.3.6         Item 4: The Victoria Tunnel. An existing disused tunnel formerly used for traffic to Liverpool docks. This has sufficient size and straightness to accommodate one line of HS2 track. A new parallel tunnel would take the second track, if required. The tunnel emerges at Edge Hill Station.

3.3.7         Item 5: Edge Hill to Wavertree. A section of disused land north of the current railway would allow two tracks of HS2 to be constructed as far as Wavertree Technology Park Station.

3.3.8         Item 6: The Olive Mount Cutting. The historic cutting was originally built for four tracks but is now used by two. The unused south side of the cutting could accommodate one track of HS2. The second track would run in tunnel to the north. The route would continue in tunnel to Bowring Park where it reaches open land.

3.3.9         Item 7: The Liverpool Loop Railway. The disused but intact Liverpool Loop Line could form an alternative route for HS2 southwards. It was built for four tracks and so would easily accommodate the two track of HS2. A route to open country is available at Gateacre.

3.3.10      In total, the length of tunnelling required, in the worst case, would be 7km. (This compares favourably with the 12km of double track tunnel required for the branch into Manchester).

3.3.11      From the outskirts of Liverpool to HS2, the route would be across country. The nearest point for a connection to HS2 is at Culcheth, north east of Warrington, some 30km from Liverpool (see Figure 2 below). The route would be entirely across open country and would follow the M62 motorway to reduce environmental intrusion. A parkway station could be provided both to serve Warrington and road traffic from the M62 and M6, so providing a major HS2 facility for the southern part of the north west region.

3.3.12      The Culcheth route would allow a journey time of around 71 minutes, so competitive with the fastest Manchester journey time of 68 minutes.

Figure 2: The Culcheth Route

3.3.13          As an alternative, a route from the HS2 spine via Daresbury south west of Warrington would allow for a new parkway station with road and rail access to Runcorn and Warrington. This would require a greater length of track and a Mersey crossing . The route has the advantage that it could be developed from the Cheshire Link Route described in paragraph 3.2.3 above.

4       The Benefits

4.1   We believe that HS2 Limited has ignored the potential benefits for the entire network of improving the service for the Liverpool City Region.

4.2   Network Rail in their High Speed Rail proposals of 2009 (Ref 6) estimated that a Liverpool and Warrington Spur would contribute around 5 million London passengers per year. A Liverpool Spur would provide journey time savings for around 32mins per journey for each of those passengers.

4.3   Additionally, it would allow the cheaper Captive trains to be used and, due to improved journey times, only two thirds of the train sets would be needed to provide the same service, ringing substantial savings.

4.4   A spur would also make additional services viable, adding more benefits and using existing infrastructure more efficiently.  A twice hourly service Liverpool – Warrington – Birmingham would increase revenues, release capacity for reuse and provide agglomeration benefits for all cities involved.

4.5   A spur joining the HS2 spine near Culcheth would create the opportunity of a Liverpool – Warrington – Manchester Airport – Manchester Piccadilly regional “javelin” service to improve the current congested and slow service.  The potential for agglomeration and capacity release are substantial for both cities and feed into plans for Manchester’s “Airport City” and the Liverpool Waters development.

4.6   Initial research by Liverpool High Speed Too have show that Liverpool HS2 Spur could have a Benefit Cost Ratio in the “Very High” range (greater than 4.0), excluding any wider economic benefits.

Martin Sloman                                                                                    Andrew Morris

Gareth Parr                                                                                    Neil Cardwell

The Liverpool High Speed Too Group – November 2013

References

1. Rebalancing Britain: Policy of Slogan? Liverpool City Region – Building on its Strengths: An Independent Report (The Rt. Hon. The Lord Heseltine CH and Sir Terry Leahy – Oct 2011).
2. High Speed Rail: Investing in Britain’s Future – Phase 2 – the Route to Leeds, Manchester and Beyond  - (HS2-Jan 2013).
3. Options for Phase Two of the High Speed Rail Network – Demand and Appraisal Report (MVAconsultancy).
4. HS2: The Regional Economic Impact (KPMG)
5. Freedom of Information Request F0113-801 (Regional Economic Impact Statistics) (KPMG- Oct 2013)
6. Meeting the Capacity Challenge – The Case for New Lines (Network Rail 2009)

November 2013