Written Evidence from Dr Rodger Patrick [CST0005]

 

Introduction:

 

 

 

 

1.   Q1: Are crimes being recorded by the police when they should be? Are crimes being categorised correctly?

1.1 The short answer to both these questions is “no”.

1.2 The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced in April 2002 in order to ensure that police forces across the country were recording crime to a common standard. The then Home Secretary David Blunkett stated that this was a fundamental requirement if crime was to be tackled effectively.   It was also believed that it would increase trust in the police as victims’ needs would be paramount in such a system. The NCRS states:

•          The aim of NCRS is to be victim focused and maintain a consistent data set of recorded crime allegations across all forces.

•          Following the initial registration, an incident will be recorded as a crime (notifiable offence) if, on the balance of probability:

•          (a) the circumstances as reported amount to a crime defined by law (the police will determine this, based on their knowledge of the law and counting rules), and (b) there is no credible evidence to the contrary.

(Home Office 2006: Appendix A)

1.3 Prior to the introduction of the NCRS an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard was being applied. This involved victims having to convince the police that a crime had actually occurred. In effect officers were treating victims as suspects. This system had a long history of abuse as officers employed a number of dubious measures to ensure reported crimes didn’t appear in the official returns. These included:

 

1.4 Wrongly categorising more serious crimes as lesser offences is also a way of hitting key targets such as burglary reduction. These would include:

 

1.5 These methods are collectively known in police circles as ‘cuffing’ after the magician’s art of making objects disappear up their sleeve or cuff (Young 1991).

1.6 Whist the NCRS enjoyed a brief period of success from 2002-2004 it suffered from a re-interpretation from 2004 onwards. This can be traced back to the then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s initiative to reduce street crime. During this operation, involving the twelve forces with high robbery rates, it became evident that victims of robberies involving mobile phones were reporting these offences sometime after the incident. It was also discovered that mobile phone providers were advising victims to report their phones as stolen in order to validate their insurance claim. Despite the evidence from the British Crime Survey that victims of robberies are reluctant to report these crimes to the police, with only 51% reporting robberies to the police (Dodd et al 2004:38), those officers co-ordinating the street crime initiative convinced themselves that a high percentage of reported robberies were false reports in pursuit of bogus insurance claims. This led to the introduction of ‘false reporting’ policies which required victims to prove their report was genuine. In effect a return to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard.

1.7 This in turn led to a re-interpretation of the NCRS where the overriding victim focussed emphasis was replaced by the secondary conditions, initially relating to third party reports, based on a ‘balance of probability’ test carried out by the police. The evidence (Patrick 2011a) suggests this re-interpretation spread from robberies to all offences and then from force to force.  The impact on the recorded crime rates is evident from the analysis of Nottinghamshire’s recorded crime profile (Fig. 1)

 

1.8 The Nottinghamshire data (Fig 1) shows a significant rise in 2001 corresponding with an HMIC inspection report (HMIC/Notts 2001) criticising their recording procedures which were clearly based on an ‘evidential’ standard. The sudden fall in 2004/05 corresponds with the introduction of false reporting procedures and would suggest a return to the previous ‘evidential’ standard of crime recording.     

1.9 Similar patterns are clear from an analysis of other forces where evidence of a shift back to an ‘evidential’ standard and associated ‘cuffing’ has emerged.  A report in the Daily Mail ( 6.5.08) contained a revelation from a police ‘whistle blower’ that officers in Norfolk had been instructed not to record reports of criminal damage unless the victim could prove it was not accidental. This had a dramatic impact on the levels of criminal damage in that force (Fig. 2). Again the return to pre NCRS levels is significant.   

(FIG. 2)

1.10 More recently the Police and Crime Commissioner of Gwent cited un-reliable crime recording as grounds for asking the Chief Constable to retire. The HMIC audit of crime recording procedures suggested ‘cuffing’ was occurring:

              “HMIC looked at 120 incidents logged by Gwent Police. Seventeen had been wrongly               closed without a crime being raised, which indicated that crime recording in Gwent gives               cause for concern.” HMIC/Gwent 2012

1.11 The same report indicated recorded crimes were also being wrongly categorised and the authors were clear on where the blame lay:

              “The quality of crime and incident data would be significantly improved if there were               greater clarity and focus from chief officers and the police authority on the importance of               the issue.” HMIC/Gwent 2012

1.12 Further evidence of ‘cuffing’ emerged in Kent in 2012 when HMIC investigated the force after an officer ‘blew the whistle’ on ‘gaming’ behaviours designed to improve the detection rate.

1.13 The Chief Constable of Kent, who had previously served in Norfolk, announced his retirement in October 2013.

1.14 The research on which this submission is based was recently corroborated by a report from the Office for National Statistics:

              “Given the consistent pattern, one possible hypothesis is that there has been a gradual               erosion of compliance with the NCRS such that a growing number of crimes reported to the               police are not being captured in crime recording systems. There are a range of possible               drivers for this including:

 

              • lack of awareness or adequate understanding of the NCRS as time passes from its launch               leading to some officers recording ‘as charged’ or ‘if detected’ which might result from               staff turnover and lack of sufficient on-going training;

 

              • performance pressures associated with targets (e.g. to reduce crime or increase               detection rates) acting as perverse incentives for some crimes to be downgraded from               notifiable into non-notifiable categories or as ASB or as crime-related incidents (which are               not captured in data returned to the Home Office);

 

              • though forces have continued with their own internal audits, the cessation of               independent audits from 2006/07 onwards may have reduced the focus on addressing non-              compliance;

 

              • the move to Neighbourhood Policing in recent years may also have led to more low level               crimes being dealt with informally and outside the formal crime recording system; and,

 

              • in the context of pressure on police budgets and a general policy shift to promote greater               officer discretion, a return to a more evidential recording model”

                                                                                                                (Flatley and Bradley 2013:12)

 

1.15 Whilst this submission is technical in nature, the human cost of such perverse behaviour should not be overlooked. The failure to record crimes prevents offences being investigated and offenders brought to justice. In a number of cases this has allowed criminals free rein to commit serious crimes, including murder. In 2006 the IPCC investigated the contact Colette Lynch had with Warwickshire police prior to her death. In this case it emerged Warwickshire officers failed to record and investigate a report of criminal damage involving the victim’s estranged partner. The IPCC made the following comment on the force’s crime recording procedures:

“A review should be undertaken of the extent to which those who are required to implement the policies on domestic violence, crime recording and call handling are aware of their responsibilities.” (IPCC 2006:5)    

 

1.16 The impact of such an unsympathetic response to victims is encapsulated by the experience of the parents of one Birmingham schoolboy, who was robbed at gunpoint:

 

“The  couple claim they were told they could sign a form to say they had made a false report and pay an £80 fine – or face a court summons” (Lillington Birmingham Post 15.7.12)

 

 

 

2. Q2. What are the factors which can influence mis-recording of crime?

 

2.1 Performance Management as a system of control has since its inception been vulnerable to ‘gaming’ type behaviours Argyris a leading expert concluded:

 

              “the dream of many management information system designers is to design a               tamper-              proof, guaranteed-to-catch-the-culprit information system. If they succeed, they will also               succeed in superimposing on defensive routines a control system that will call the               individuals to new heights of creativity on how to bypass the threatening features of the               information system.” (Argyris 1985:147)

 

2.2 The advent of ‘false reporting’ policies and associated re-interpretation of the NCRS is an example of this theory in action. The fact that Performance Management systems are a threat to the leadership of the service explains the involvement of chief officers in the re-interpretation of the NCRS. Once the NCRS was undermined then pressure could be applied throughout the system to ensure that obstacles were placed in the way of victims and officers under-recorded crime.

 

2.3 Officers are fully aware of how the system operates and also know that if something goes wrong then senior officers will deny any knowledge or complicity. This phenomenon is referred to as ‘organisational hypocrisy’ (Ericson 1981).

2.4 Research has also established that sending an officer to assess every report of crime results in less crimes being recorded:

“It seems plausible that crime allegations dealt with by telephone investigation are more likely to be accepted ‘at face value’ by the police. By comparison, it is inevitable that where police officers do attend crime scenes they will be in a position to be more discriminating about allegations made” (Burrows et 2000:28)

 

 

2.5 They went on to conclude:

“If the hypothesis posed by the research team – that forces which attend more crime scenes will tend to record fewer crime allegations (or categorise offences more rigorously) – is credible, this factor is likely to influence that force’s low crime rate” (Burrows et al 2000:29).

2.6 This could explain why sending an officer to every reported crime has been adopted by a number of forces claiming impressive reductions in recorded crime e.g. Merseyside, Essex and Kent. Of course this policy is presented as good practice in customer care. 

 

 

3. Q3. Are the right checks in place to ensure that the systems for recording crime function effectively and accurately?

 

3.1 The evidence presented above demonstrates that quality control systems have consistently failed to ensure reliable data. However the re-interpretation of the NCRS to an universal ‘balance of possibility’ standard makes the task of any auditor extremely difficult. To question the judgment of an officer who has attended the scene of an incident and decided a crime has not occurred is a time consuming task potentially involving re-contacting the victim.

 

3.2 The data quality checks carried out by the Audit Commission did provide a degree of independent scrutiny however they were discontinued with the demise of the organisation. Their report on the falling standards at the Met (Audit Commission/MPS 2007) corresponded with a 6% reduction in recorded crime in that force. This was exposed by Andrew Gilligan in the London Evening Standard (17.4.08).

 

3.3 The Home Office also used to carry out validation checks on police recording rates as part of the National Crime Survey. However they stopped publishing the results in 2006 when it became clear recording rates were falling:    

 

“Comparing with the previous year, there have been reductions in the estimated recording rate for burglary (77% to 64%), bicycle theft (62% to 54%) and robbery (53% to 44%)” (Walker et al 2006:47)

3.4 In 2005 I had alerted the National Crime Registrar to the suspicion that the NCRS was being interpreted literally and the ‘balance of probability’ rule applied to all reports. This senior statistician’s role was to oversee and offer guidance on the NCRS and at that time he was of the opinion that victim sovereignty was still the overriding consideration and the ‘balance of probability’ test was only to be used in relation to third party reports. However at a further meeting in 2006 the same individual confirmed the ‘balance of probability’ test was in fact being applied universally.  It should be noted that at the time of the second meeting this official had been replaced as National Crime Registrar by a Police Superintendent on secondment from the Met.

3.5 The reliability of police recorded crime data has been the subject of number of reviews; Smith 2006 and The National Statistician 2011. Whilst they have tended to be supportive, notes of caution have started to appear in later reports:

              “Despite the existence of the NCRS the quality of recorded crime data will vary as               there will always be an element of subjectivity in recording against the crime               categories,               and interpretation of the HOCR that guide that coding. Police recording policies and               processes may also vary, leading to inconsistencies in recording.” (National Statistician               June 2011:13)

 

3.6 In 2011 HMIC carried out a further National audit of crime recording standards and found little of concern (HMIC 2012). However this finding has been questioned by the results of the report from the Office for National Statistics (Flatley and Bradley 2013) and the revelations at Kent.

 

3.7 The variation in these national reports is in marked contrast to the rank and file who have consistently made disclosures exposing the fact that they are being pressurised into under-recording crime.  These regularly appear in the local press e.g. the Birmingham Mail revealed West Midlands Police had been systematically under recording shoplifting offences for years (5.2.13).  A West Midland’s officer contacted the TV show The Wright Stuff to report that crime was increasing but they, the police, weren’t recording it: she cited the ‘cuffing’ of common assaults in support of her disclosure (Channel 5: 19.7.13). Such failings have been a feature of many domestic homicides. The Police Federation have also highlighted the issue at their conferences.

 

 

4. Q4. Has enough been done to ensure the integrity of crime data? What more should be done?

 

4.1 The fact that police officers are openly admitting that they are ‘fiddling the figures’ suggests not enough has been done.

 

4.2 The research I conducted on this topic (Patrick 2011b) led me to the conclusion that too close a relationship between Chief Officers of Police and those responsible for their governance and regulation led to what Hood and Bevan (2006) referred to as a Nelson’s eye approach to scrutiny. This was manifestly clear from the response to the HMIC audit of detections (Appendix A) which led to ACPO approaching the Information Commissioner. The correspondence between ACPO and the Information Commissioner makes it self-evident there was a reluctance to expose critical failings (Appendix B).  

 

4.3 The shift in responsibility for publishing crime statistics from the Home Office to the Office for National Statistics appears to have stimulated the report by Flatley and Bradley.

 

4.4 The problem with the ‘looseness’ introduced to the NCRS through its re-interpretation as an universal ‘balance of probability’ standard needs to be addressed. This can be achieved by moving to a ‘prima facia’ standard ensuring that all offences reported are recorded as crimes. In the past this approach has been adopted by forces caught manipulating their figures thus demonstrating that if sufficiently incentivised chief officers are capable of delivering accurate data.

 

4.5 There needs to be an effective, fully independent audit regime with statutory powers to inspect, require change and impose sanctions. A substantially reformed HMIC could perform this function.  The powers conferred on the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) to dismiss Chief Constables should ensure compliance. However it may be worth considering introducing legislation empowering the Home Secretary to force the PCC to call an election if standards of crime recording are so poor that the public cannot have confidence in the data on which they are expected to judge the force’s performance.

 

4.6 The pressure created by performance indicators to engage in ‘gaming’ behaviours could be mitigated by a radical change in emphasis on what is measured.  If the performance measures on which forces are judged were qualitative audit results and other quantitative data was viewed as for learning purposes it should be possible to develop a knowledge based approach to policing. This approach was advocated by Jackson (2005).

 

 

 

5. Q.5 To what extent can policy-makers have confidence in the statistics which result from the recording of crime by police forces?

 

5.1 To base policy decisions on such un-reliable data could be counter- productive. However consistent identifiable patterns in the performance data linked to various categories of police ‘gaming’ provides a reliable means of detecting the presence of such perverse behaviours. This could be used to focus the activities of the regulatory bodies if they were so inclined.

 

 

 

 

 

6. Q6. Should recorded crime statistics be classified as National Statistics?

 

6.1 Such a title confers scientific status and an impression of neutrality for which the current data does not qualify.

 

6.2 A more accurate definition would be “a police statistical construct of crime in England and Wales”. Such a title would alert users to the dangers of relying on the data.

 

 

 

November 2013

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

References:

 

Argyris C. (1985)    Strategy Change and Defensive Routines, Pitman, 1985

 

Bevan & Hood (2006). What’s Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the English Public Health Care System. Public Administration Vol. 84, No 3, 2006 (517-538)

Burrows J., R. Tarling, A. Mackie, R. Lewis and G. Taylor (2000). Review of Police Force’s Crime Recording Practices. Home Office Research Study 204.  A Research, Development and Statistical Directorate Report, London.  Home Office

De Bruijn, H. (2002). Performance measurement in the public sector. London Routledge

Dodd T., S. Nicholas, D. Povey, A. Walker (2004). Crime in England and Wales 2003/2004. Home Office Crime Bulletin. Home Office 10/04.

Ericson, R.V. (1981) ‘Rules for Police Deviance’, in Organisational Police Deviance, Shearing (ed), 83-110. Toronto: Butterworths

Flatley J. & J Bradley (2013). Analysis of variation in crime trends: A study of trends in ‘comparable crime’ categories between the Crime Survey for England and Wales and the police recorded crime series between 1981 and 2011/12 Office for National Statistics; Crime, Regional and Data Access Division;  24 January 2013

 

H.M. Government 2003.    Select Committee on Public Administration: Chapter 2: Problems of the measurement culture and attempts to solve them. On line report www.parliament. The-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmpubadm/62/6205.htm 29/07/2003

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Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), (2012). Gwent Police. A Review of crime and Incident Reports.  January 2012. HMIC

Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), (2012). ‘The Crime Scene: A Review of crime and Incident Reports. National Report 25th January 2012. HMIC

Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC), (2013). Crime Recording in Kent: A report commissioned by the Police and Crime Commissioner for Kent © HMIC 2013

www.hmic.gov.uk ISBN: 978-1-78246-151-7

Home Office Counting Rules (2006). www.homeoffice.gov.uk

Independent Police Complaints Commission (2006b). Investigation into circumstances attendant upon the death of Colette Lynch. IPCC July 2006

Jackson A (2006) Falling from a great height: Principles of good practice in performance measurement and the perils of top down determination of performance indicators. Local Government Studies Vol. 31 No 1 February 2005

 

Klienig, J. (1996a), The Ethics of Policing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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National Statistician (2011).  National Statistician’s Review of Crime Statistics: England and Wales. June 2011.Her Majesty’s Government London

 

Newburn, T. (1999), Understanding and preventing police corruption: lessons from the literature. Police Research Paper 110. Home Office

Patrick R. (2009) Performance Management, Gaming and Police Practice: A Study of Changing Police Behaviour in England and Wales During the Era of New Public Management. University of Birmingham. PhD Thesis.

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UK Statistics Authority, (2010)   ‘Overcoming Barriers to Trust in Crime Statistics: England and Wales’ UK Statistics Authority London

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