Written evidence submitted by Burma Campaign UK
1) About Burma Campaign UK
Established in 1991, Burma Campaign UK has a mandate to promote human rights, democracy and development in Burma. It has more than 60,000 supporters in more than 60 countries, and is a respected source of information and analysis on Burma. In 2007 Burma Campaign UK gave evidence to the International Development Committee as part of its inquiry into aid to Burma.
Summary
2) Reforms in Burma have provided more space and new opportunities for promoting human rights and democracy in Burma.
3) By being overly enthusiastic in endorsing and working with the government of Burma, and overly cautious and neglecting to provide adequate and properly targeted assistance for grass roots civil society advocates, DFID is in danger of backing the wrong horse. DFID should adopt a more people centred programme in Burma, rather than one centred on the government.
4) By taking at face value and giving such strong support to President Thein Sein, there is a risk that DFID will help build the institutions of an authoritarian regime, rather than help promote human rights and genuine democracy in Burma.
5) DFID should be using the new political space to help build a strong civil society which is able to engage with the institutions of the state and the people of Burma to apply pressure for legal and constitutional reforms which improve human rights and make Burma democratic, and thereby enable poverty and underdevelopment to be addressed.
6) DFID should seek to support existing civil society networks, including those on Burma’s borders, rather than funding Rangoon based or international NGOs to re-create networks and projects which are already on the ground.
7) Serious restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance remain. DFID does not use its role as a leading donor to sufficiently pressure the government of Burma to lift these restrictions.
8) DFID remains overly cautious in funding civil society actors whose works relates to human rights and which are critical of the government.
9) Refugees in Thailand are facing ration cuts which they describe as being ‘starved back to Burma’ even though it is not yet safe for them to return. DFID should base its grants to refugees on needs, including basic needs and help for when it is safe to return.
10) Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are living in appalling squalid conditions; DFID should start providing assistance to them.
11) DFID provides no specific and direct funding to help women who are victims of rape and sexual violence in conflict, or to former child soldiers. It must do so.
12) DFID’s entire aid budget for Burma is equivalent to 8 percent of Burma’s military budget. The failure of DFID and the British government to use its leverage to persuade the government of Burma reduce military spending and increase health and education spending risks undermining public support for aid to Burma, and assisting the government of Burma to avoid domestic pressure to spend resources on services for the people, rather than on the military.
13) Political context
Assessing DFID’s approach to democracy and development in Burma cannot be done without taking into account the current political context. Burma Campaign UK believes that the approach of DFID and the British government as a whole is based on a false assumption that Burma is currently in a period of transition away from dictatorship and towards democracy.
14) It is undeniable that there have been significant and welcome changes in Burma in the past two and a half years, and that Burma is going through a period of transition. However, it is not the view of Burma Campaign UK, or the view of more than 100 political and human rights organisations and activists, and civil society, community and religious organisations and leaders in Burma with whom we are in regular contact, that the current process is a transition towards democracy. Many people in Burma have told us that they see Burma on a path from military dictatorship to an authoritarian regime along the lines of China or Russia. They do not believe the destination of Thein Sein’s reforms is democracy. Many people in Burma argue that the government is making the minimal reforms required to persuade the international community to drop sanctions and normalise relations, and that this has been very successful, with economic and political pressure lifted even without any of the benchmarks for improving human rights having been met.
15) The current reform process began with Thein Sein as then Prime Minister bringing in Burma’s new undemocratic constitution in a rigged referendum. This new constitution places the military outside control of government, gives it the ability to assume direct control at any time it wishes, guaranteed seats for the military in all Parliaments enabling the military to veto any reforms which threaten its power, and also guarantees key ministerial posts for soldiers which are the equivalent of cabinet level positions.
16) Only once the military’s grip on political power was constitutionally assured at every level of government did limited reforms begin. A lot of attention has been paid to the reforms which have taken place, and there has been a tendency by DFID and the British government as a whole to downplay or ignore the great many serious problems which remain. The British government now has a policy of not criticising the government of Burma. Two and a half years into the reform process almost every repressive law remains in place, arrests of political activists are at a five year high, most new arrests are taking place under new laws supposed to improve human rights, Human Rights Watch has evidence of state involvement in ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in Rakhine State, and many promised new freedoms, including new media laws, have not been delivered.
17) Democratisation or modernisation?
It is understandable that the changes in Burma since 2011 have generated much excitement. There is new political space and new opportunities which must be seized. However, DFID and the British government as a whole have taken a rather rose-tinted view of the current reform process, and while publicly acknowledging some problems, in practice are taking Thein Sein and his ministers at face value that they are genuine in their intention to reform. This has included directing British aid towards projects to build government capacity, so-called good governance.
18) Building effective government institutions is essential if Burma is to better address poverty and meet the needs of its population. While the government of Burma is very keen to promote economic development and modernisation, it has not yet shown the same willingness to promote genuine democratisation by putting words into action in terms of constitutional change, repealing repressive laws, and ending human rights abuses. It is the view of Burma Campaign UK that steps towards assisting the government of Burma in developing its institutions should follow, or at the very least be at the same pace as, steps towards democratisation. This is not what is currently happening. If current trends continue there is a danger that British aid money will be used to assist what remains one of the worst human rights abusers in the world to modernise its institutions, rather than democratise them. In effect, British aid could help develop the institutions of a more modern, efficient and effective authoritarian state.
19) Missing opportunity of building on existing networks
One of the most impressive things about the people of Burma has been their ability to continue resistance to dictatorship despite living for decades under one of the most repressive regimes in the world. They have done this through many forms, including underground networks which have provided services such as health and education, women’s empowerment, documentation of abuses, and advocacy for change.
20) Donors which used to fund border organisations which were headquartered in neighbouring countries although actually operating underground in Burma, are now withdrawing funds. Networks and skills which took years to build are being allowed to die, while donors channel funds through Rangoon based NGOs which lack those skills. This is a tragedy.
21) For DFID to let underground and grassroots community networks wither while funding outside NGOs to work in same areas does not make sense in terms of achieving poverty reduction and development goals, building the capacity of civil society, or making the most efficient use of funds.
Unduly cautious approach to funding which promotes human rights and democracy, and to challenging aid restrictions
22) DFID can and should be much more robust in challenging restrictions on aid which are still in place in Burma. These restrictions in Kachin State violate international law. DFID has not used its leading role in Burma to mobilise strong international pressure on the government to lift these restrictions. Given the enthusiasm of the government of Burma to receive aid, there is considerable potential leverage which is not being used.
23) DFID has an apparent preference not to fund projects or organisations involved in anything which documents human rights abuses or overtly challenges and is critical of the government. While on paper DFID can point to funding which appears to tick the right boxes, in practice the majority of civil society organisations which play a leading role in promoting human rights and democracy do not receive support from DFID.
24) Refugees
The 2007 IDC report on Burma recommended significantly increased funding to IDPs and refugees in Eastern Burma. DFID has increased funding for refugees and this is welcome, but the funding provided to The Border Consortium appears rather arbitrary, rather than being based on need.
25) Some donors have used the reforms in Burma as justification for reducing funding for refugees, despite the fact that the number of refugees has not fallen. This is resulting in cuts in rations, shelter, clothing and other essential services. In some instances funding has been diverted towards livelihood programmes designed to help refugees when they return to Burma. By cutting and diverting funds, many refugees feel that the international community is trying to force them back to Burma against their will, Burma Campaign UK has been asked by refugees if the EU is trying to ‘starve us back’.
26) Burma Campaign UK has consulted refugees and internally displaced people about their opinions on returning to Burma, and we found almost universal agreement on six key issues.
27) First is withdrawal of the Burmese army. They won’t feel safe while Burmese army posts are in their old village areas. People have been sneaking back to their villages and report that the number of soldiers is increasing since ceasefires were agreed.
28) Second issue is landmines. Very little mine clearance is taking place.
29) Third was the fact that for some their land has been confiscated by the army or government. They want it back.
30) Fourth is needing support for returning, and also compensation for their homes and farms being destroyed, and everything they owned stolen or destroyed.
31) Fifth, most want to return to their old villages, not be forced into special economic zones as the Burmese government proposes. They don’t want to be cheap labour in factories.
32) Sixth, justice and accountability. They want those who committed the abuses, who were responsible for what happened, to be held accountable. Not revenge, but justice.
33) DFID does not provide funding to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, who live in desperate and squalid conditions. Nor does it use its influence with the government of Bangladesh as a major aid donor to sufficiently challenge restrictions on aid to Rohingya refugees. DFID support will not only save lives, but also send a useful political signal to the government of Bangladesh regarding treatment of refugees.
34) No funding for rape and sexual violence
DFID does not provide any direct funding for any project in Burma helping women or children who have been raped by armed forces.
35) Insufficient funding for former child soldiers
DFID does not provide specific direct funding to assist former child soldiers. There does not appear to be any coordinated approach to assisting former child soldiers in Burma or abroad.
36) Aid must not relieve pressure on Burma’s government to spend its own money on poverty reduction and development
Almost three years into the reform process, Burma still has one of the lowest levels of government spending on health in the world, and one of the highest percentage spending on the military in the world.
37) While there have been some small increases in the health budget, bringing it to approximately four percent of government spending, this is dwarfed by military spending, which according to different estimates is between 16 and 21 percent of overall government spending.
38) Burma does need international aid, but it also has significant financial resources which instead of being spent on tackling poverty and promoting development are instead being spent on a military which continues to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity with impunity, on glory projects, or are stolen or wasted through corruption.
39) It is astonishing that Thein Sein and his government has not come under any significant pressure to re-allocate resources away from these areas and towards development and fighting poverty. As far as Burma Campaign UK can ascertain, the huge level of military spending compared to health and education is rarely raised by British or other countries’ diplomats with the government of Burma, and when it is raised is usually only softly at a very low diplomatic level.
40) Based on media reports of Burmese government military spending for the year 2013-2014 of $1.15bn, DFID’s entire bilateral annual aid budget for Burma of £60m for the year 2013-1014 is equivalent to just 8 percent of annual military spending by the Burmese government, or to put another way, 30 days worth of Burmese government military spending.
41) The Burmese government has become very adept at using language on development that has persuaded international donors to pledge huge increases in aid. Following years of obstruction of international aid, the change in tone and apparent new willingness to co-operate has created so much excitement and relief that some very important problems are being overlooked.
42) The failure of DFID and the British government as a whole to challenge and persuade the government of Burma to reallocate resources away from military spending risks undermining public support for the significant increases in British aid to Burma. Comparisons of British aid compared to the Burmese Navy reportedly spending the same amount of money on new ships as the entire DFID aid budget, risks India style headlines. At the same time, there is also the danger that DFID and other international aid will alleviate domestic pressure on the government of Burma to provide services, thereby unintentionally facilitating continuing high levels of military spending on an Army which is still committing human rights abuses which violate international law.
43) There is an opinion among some Rangoon based aid workers that this is an issue which should not be openly discussed because it risks undermining public support for aid or upsetting the military in Burma. Burma Campaign UK has for many years been a strong advocate for increased aid to Burma and this remains our position, but we believe that failing to address this issue presents a greater long-term risk to continued aid to Burma.
Recommendations for action
44) DFID should adopt a much more cautious and careful approach in assessing whether Thein Sein and his government are genuinely interested in democratic change.
45) Until there is more fundamental democratic change in Burma, including changing the constitution and repealing repressive laws, DFID should limit government capacity and institutional building to health, education and agriculture.
46) As a leading donor, DFID should do more to challenge restrictions on aid in Burma, and with the assistance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, coordinate high-level international pressure on the government of Burma to immediately lift all aid restrictions.
47) DFID should commission a study into the needs of child soldiers who are demobilised or have escaped into neighbouring countries or areas not under the control of the government of Burma, and start providing funding to meet these needs.
48) DFID should fund local women’s organisations to assist victims of rape and sexual violence by armed organisations in Burma. Burma should be fully included in the PSVI.
49) The cuts in refugee camps in Thailand risks driving refugees back to unsafe areas in Burma without a means of income and access to health and education services. In this period of potential transition it is essential DFID increase financial support to The Border Consortium to a level which ensures adequate food, shelter and other essential services continue, and to properly resource projects to assist return which are based on what the refugees themselves say they need.
50) DFID should start providing funding for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, and start to challenge the restrictions on aid in place by the government of Bangladesh.
51) DFID should be more willing to fund civil society organisations which are overtly promoting human rights and democracy and more openly engaged in documenting and challenging human rights abuses.
52) DFID should engage with the government of Burma on issues of concern that refugees and IDPs have regarding returning to Burma.
53) DFID should seek to support existing civil society networks, including those which are or were based on the Thai-Burma border, rather than funding Rangoon based or international NGOs to re-create networks and projects which are already on the ground or could be more effectively implemented by local grassroots organisations if given proper support.
54) DFID should provide significant resources for demining programmes in Burma.
55) As a leading donor, DFID should help coordinate pressure being applied on the government of Burma to reduce military spending and increase spending on poverty reduction and development.
October 2013