PPC 16
Written evidence from the Howard League for Penal Reform
The Howard League for Penal Reform (hereafter the Howard League) welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the Justice Select Committee Inquiry into Crime reduction policies: a co-ordinated approach?
The Howard League particularly welcomes the inquiry on this topic. Crime reduction is too frequently seen as primarily the responsibility of the Home Office and the police. It is vital that there is a joined-up approach across all relevant departments if we are going to continue to see falling crime rates and a reduction in the numbers who reoffend following contact with the criminal justice system.
1. About us
1.1 Founded in 1866, the Howard League is the oldest penal reform charity in the UK. The Howard League has over 5,000 members, including prisoners and their families, lawyers, criminal justice professionals and academics. The charity has consultative status with both the United Nations and the Council of Europe. It is an independent organisation and accepts no grant funding from the UK government.
1.2 The Howard League campaigns for less crime, safer communities and fewer people in prison. We aim to achieve these objectives through conducting and commissioning research and investigations aimed at revealing underlying problems and discovering new solutions to issues of public concern. The Howard League’s objectives and principles underlie and inform the charity’s parliamentary work, research, legal and participation work as well as its projects
1.3 The Howard League undertakes and publishes research on a variety of criminal justice issues which informs our work and viewpoints. We have recently published Intelligent Justice: Balancing the effects of community sentences and custody, which examines the benefits and weaknesses of short term custodial sentences and community orders (Howard League, 2013). Other relevant publications include No winners: the reality of short term prison sentences (Howard League, 2011), and Do Better Do Less: The report of the Commission on English Prisons Today (Howard League, 2009).
2. Crime reduction, crime prevention and reducing reoffending
2.1 Crime reduction policies must be assessed in context. Crime reduction focuses on reducing reoffending and the harm caused by those already in contact with the criminal justice system. While this is an important policy area, it is only part of what is needed to tackle crime. If we are to continue to see crime levels fall, a wider approach must be taken that also looks to crime prevention and seeks to tackle the underlying causes of crime and make communities safer.
2.2 Current government policy is incoherent and consists of different departments and agencies pursuing different policies without co-ordination. The majority of government policy focuses solely on reducing reoffending. Furthermore, many of these policies are deeply flawed, dismissing evidence on desistance and the causes of crime. A broad, coherent strategy on crime prevention and reduction is urgently needed.
3. Government policy
3.1 The government’s crime reduction policies seem to be narrowly focused on reducing reoffending amongst those sentenced to short periods in custody. The Ministry of Justice’s flagship policy Transforming Rehabilitation: a strategy for reform was published in May 2013 and sets out plans to reduce reoffending rates through the introduction of twelve month periods of supervision in the community for those sentenced to less than 24 months in prison, the reorganisation of the probation service from 35 local trusts to a single national agency, designating 70 prisons as resettlement prisons and contracting out 88 per cent of probation work to private and voluntary providers via payment by results. The proposals are highly problematic and fail to join up with the other reducing reoffending initiatives.
3.1 The government’s reducing reoffending policy dramatically increases the reach of the criminal justice system, creating disproportionately lengthy sentences for minor crimes, so that for example a two-week prison sentence effectively becomes a year and one week of being trapped in the criminal justice system. Drawing people into the criminal justice system for longer periods during which they can be recalled to prison time and time again will do little to help those who have offended desist from crime. Crime is caused by a myriad of social and economic problems, the vast majority of which are best tackled outside of the justice system.
3.2 The proposals contained in Transforming Rehabilitation are largely evidence-free. In developing the policy the Ministry of Justice have paid little attention to evidence on desistance which shows that changing patterns of behaviour is a lengthy and difficult process, is best achieved through motivation rather than coercion and success is dependent on a co-ordinated approach between justice and other statutory agencies (McNeil et al, 2012).
3.3 Furthermore, the privatisation of the probation service via payment by results is untried and untested. Two small payment by results pilots have been set up in Peterborough and Doncaster prisons, however these are based on a different model of payment by results than that proposed in Transforming Rehabilitation and will not have been completed and evaluated by the time Transforming Rehabilitation is due to be implemented. The Major Projects Authority has also cast doubt on the pilots, labelling them as ‘red/amber’ in its annual report – meaning that success is unlikely with major problems and risks identified (Major Projects Authority, 2013). It would be informative to see how the Major Projects Authority might risk assess the decision to roll-out payment by results before these pilots have been completed.
3.4 As well as lacking evidence, it is unclear how much Transforming Rehabilitation will cost. The Offender Rehabilitation Bill, which puts forward the legislative changes needed to implement the Transforming Rehabilitation reforms, contains very little detail on the cost of the policy and suggests that these will only become known to the Ministry of Justice once contracts have been negotiated with prime providers. It is therefore likely that knowledge of the full costs of the proposals will be unavailable to the public on the grounds of commercial confidentiality.
3.5 The Howard League has grave concerns about the implementation of an untried, untested and expensive policy. It is difficult to imagine other areas of government making up policy without reference to evidence or a clear indication of cost. If this occurred in relation to health or transport policy, for example, there would be outcry. At any time, but particularly when public spending is tightly constrained, it is crucial that money be spent on reducing reoffending initiatives that are proven to be cost-effective.
3.6 Transforming Rehabilitation is incompatible with several other government policies and initiatives, including policy on women in the criminal justice system. The way in which issues affecting women have been neglected in the development of the Ministry of Justice’s flagship policy clearly demonstrates the lack of joined-up thinking in this area.
3.7 Many community services for women who have committed crime are small, local and take a holistic approach to women’s needs. Research suggests that women’s centres are particularly successful as they are not restricted to offering only those services available through the criminal justice system, and are consequently able to help with a wide range of needs and difficulties that many women who have committed crime encounter (Women’s Justice Taskforce, 2011). It is likely that many of these services would face closure under current proposals as they are not large enough to bid for contracts, often do not work across entire contract package areas, and usually work with small numbers of women at a time, making producing evidence showing that they reduce reoffending particularly challenging. Many of those who responded to the consultation on Transforming Rehabilitation expressed concern that specific women’s services would disappear under the proposals unless they were commissioned separately (Ministry of Justice, 2013). However, the Ministry of Justice has dismissed these concerns and is planning to proceed to commission all services under a single contract (Ministry of Justice, 2013).
3.8 Threatening the sustainability of women’s centres through the implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation even runs contrary to the Ministry of Justice’s own commitments to gender-specific services. In March 2013, Helen Grant, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Justice, Women and Equalities set out the government’s strategic objectives for women offenders and outlined the Ministry of Justice’s commitment to community services which recognise and address the specific needs of female offenders (Ministry of Justice, 2013).
3.9 In addition, Transforming Rehabilitation contains plans to reorganise the prison estate and create a network of 70 resettlement prisons. The aim of resettlement prisons is to designate a small number of prisons to each contract package area to enable the prime contractor in each area to work with people both before and after they are released from custody. The resettlement prisons proposal is incompatible with the women’s prison estate, which consists of only 13 prisons. It is clear that the Ministry of Justice have not considered women in prison when developing plans to create ‘through the gate’ support.
3.10 Furthermore, Transforming Rehabilitation contradicts and lacks co-ordination with the policies of other government departments. For example, part of the role of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), which were introduced in 2012 under Home Office policy, is reducing and preventing crime in their local areas. However, it appears likely that the implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation will limit the ability of PCCs to commission reducing reoffending work locally as there is a lack of coterminosity across areas with only seven of Transforming Rehabilitation’s contract package areas mapping directly onto a PCC area. The Ministry of Justice is yet to declare how these two policies will be reconciled, stating only ‘that all PCCs will be consulted in the design of the new system and engage collaboratively with it in live operation’ (Ministry of Justice, 2013a: 28).
4. A coherent strategy
4.1 A series of ‘off-the-shelf’ crime reduction policies, which lack co-ordination and are not based on evidence of what works to reduce reoffending is insufficient and unacceptable. The Howard League urges the development of a broader, coherent strategy which involves all relevant government departments and agencies and aims not only to reduce reoffending but also tackle the underlying causes of crime.
4.2 The Howard League gave evidence to the Justice Select Committee’s inquiry into justice reinvestment and supports and welcomes the findings and recommendations contained in its 2010 report Cutting crime: the case for justice reinvestment - which calls for justice reinvestment to be at the centre of criminal justice policy.
4.3 In the UK there are currently two justice reinvestment pilots, one in London and one in Manchester, which launched in June 2011 and will run until 2013. Year one results from pilots are promising. Both areas delivered savings to the Ministry of Justice, a substantial amount of which was returned to the local areas for reinvestment – with Greater Manchester receiving £2.6 million and London boroughs around £1 million to invest in crime prevention (Ministry of Justice, 2012). Justice reinvestment has proved successful as it operates on a local level and involves not only criminal justice agencies, but also agencies concerned with health, housing, education, addiction, and other social factors linked to crime.
4.4 An independent evaluation of the justice reinvestment pilots conducted by researchers at Sheffield Hallam University concluded that the projects were most successful where there was coterminosity between local authorities and criminal justice agencies and where the pilots were able to link up with other government initiatives, particularly the Department for Communities and Local Government’s Whole Place Community Budget projects (Wong et al, 2013). The evaluation offers several suggestions as to how the success of justice reinvestment can be strengthened and built upon.
4.5 Furthermore, there are several policies and initiatives which have a strong evidence base and align with a strategy based on justice reinvestment principles. Restorative justice, for example, is increasingly being incorporated into the youth justice system and several pathfinders have been established in the adult system. The Howard League supports the recommendations of the justice select committee regarding restorative justice in the youth justice system and believes restorative justice should have a prominent place in a coherent crime prevention strategy.
4.6 Finally, the Howard League calls for evidence-led criminal justice policy. Initiatives must always be thoroughly tested prior to implementation and the potential for randomised control trials in this area of social policy should be seriously considered.
June 2013
References
Major Projects Authority (2013) The Major Projects Authority Annual Report. London: Cabinet Office
McNeill, F., Farrall, S., Lightowler. C., Maruna, S. (2012) How and why people stop offending: discovering desistance. Glasgow: IRISS
Ministry of Justice (2013a) Transforming Rehabilitation: a strategy for reform. London: Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice (2013b) Transforming Rehabilitation: Summary of Responses. London: Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice (2013c) Strategic objectives for women offenders. London: Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Justice (2012) Justice reinvestment pilots: first year results. London: Ministry of Justice
The Howard League for Penal Reform (2013) Intelligent Justice: Balancing the effects of community sentences and custody. London: The Howard League for Penal Reform
The Howard League for Penal Reform (2011) No winners: the reality of short term prison sentences. London: The Howard League for Penal Reform
The Howard League for Penal Reform (2009) Do Better Do Less: The report of the Commission on English Prisons Today. London: The Howard League for Penal Reform
Women’s Justice Taskforce (2011) Reforming Women’s Justice. London: Prison Reform Trust
Wong, K., Meadows, L., Warburton, F., Webb, S., Young, H. and Barraclough, N. (2013) The development and Year One Implementation of the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot. London: Ministry of Justice