Written evidence submitted by Lisa Webb-Salter (FSS023)

Please find attached my personal submission to the Science and Technology committee inquiry into the aftermath of the closure of the Forensic Science Service.

Introduction

I am currently an employee of Abu Dhabi Police (ADP), working as a Strategic Advisor in the UAE National DNA Database Centre in Al-Ain, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Prior to my current employment, I worked for the FSS, previously the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory (MPFSL), for nearly 20 years. As a result of the winding down of the FSS, I was made redundant on the 31 May 2011.

Over the course of my forensic career I have examined hundreds of body fluids cases, carried out several generations of DNA profiling techniques (SLP, SGM and SGM Plus), reported simple DNA cases in the UK, and carried out complex paternity analysis of DNA cases to help identify Kuwaiti Nationals exiled during the first Gulf War.

I managed a team of DNA analysts in the FSS London DNA Unit for a number of years, and was then seconded to a special projects team where I was responsible for implementing the UK National Firearms Forensic Intelligence Database (NFFID) which was the precursor of the current National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS).

During the second half of my forensic career I have provided consultancy and assistance to overseas governments as a member of the FSS International Division. During this time I delivered forensic laboratory improvement projects in Kuwait, Trinidad and Abu Dhabi. The three year project in Abu Dhabi culminated in UKAS granting ISO 17025 accreditation to the Abu Dhabi Police Forensic Evidence Department in 2009.

1           Declaration of Interests

1.1          I am currently an employee of Abu Dhabi Police (ADP), working as a Strategic Advisor in the UAE National DNA Database Centre in Al-Ain, Abu Dhabi.

1.2          Prior to my current employment, I worked for the FSS, previously the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory (MPFSL), for nearly 20 years. As a result of the winding down of the FSS, I was made redundant on the 31st May 2011.

1.3          My husband, Martin Webb-Salter, also worked as a forensic scientist for the MPFSL and the FSS for 35 years. He was made redundant on the 31st March 2010 as part of the FSS Transformation Programme, and now works for Surrey Police as an Intelligence Researcher.

1.4          This is my personal submission to the Science and Technology Committee inquiry into the aftermath of the closure of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). The views contained in this submission are my own, and do not represent the views of Abu Dhabi Police.

2           Q1. Does the Government have an effective strategy for forensic science in the UK and is it sufficient to support forensic science R&D and criminal justice?

2.1          The current Government strategy for forensic science in the UK is focused on the reduction of costs through commercial competition. This strategy is not effective, as it has reduced the quality, consistency and efficiency of the provision of forensic science to the criminal justice system, and has led to a decrease in the amount of forensic R&D being carried out.

2.2          The reasoning behind the merger of the MPFSL with the rest of the FSS in 1996 was to create a single service provider that would offer impartial, consistent, best-practice delivery of forensic science to all the police forces in England and Wales. This strategy concentrated the UK’s extensive forensic expertise into one world-renowned organisation, and therefore facilitated the sharing of knowledge and best practice between scientists across the country.

2.3          The development of a forensic market with several private forensic science providers effectively reversed this strategy and fragmented the provision of forensic science to the UK criminal justice system.

2.4          The closure of the FSS in March 2012 has increased this fragmentation, as the 60% market share previously held by the FSS has been distributed across expanding in-house police laboratories and an increased number of private forensic science providers. As a consequence, different methods of forensic analysis are being used across the UK to variable quality standards, and the duplication of equipment, facilities and personnel involved will have increased the overall cost of the provision of forensic analysis.

2.5          Commercial forensic providers and police forces do not have the resources to carry out forensic research on the scale previously carried out by the FSS. The small amount of forensic research that is being done is focused only on areas where providers believe it may give them a commercial advantage.

2.6          Forensic development should be properly funded and coordinated, and driven by the clearly defined needs of the UK Criminal Justice System (CJS).

3           Q2. Did the FSS transition and closure run smoothly and within budget?

3.1          As I left the FSS in May 2011, I am not in a position to comment on whether the transition and closure ran smoothly.

3.2          In 2011 the cost of closing the FSS was estimated to be around £100 million, however, I don’t believe that the full cost of the closure will ever be fully calculated. Costs such as staff redundancy payments may be clearly documenteded, but there will be numerous hidden costs not recorded such as the time spent by the members of the Transition Board administering the closure, by police personnel replacing FSS contracts, and by the members of two Select Committees and those who made submissions to the two inquiries commissioned to date.

3.3          In addition to this there will be ongoing costs associated with the closure, such as the Government’s guarantee to maintain the FSS Pension Fund even though no further staff contributions are being made, and costs associated with tracing ex-FSS staff to give evidence in court.

4           Q3. What impacts have the FSS’s closure had on (i) the criminal justice system and (ii) forensic science R&D and training? In particular, have the appropriate quality standards and accreditation been rigorously maintained? (please provide evidence/examples)

4.1          Before the FSS closed, it was normal practice for an entire case to be examined within the same organisation. This made it easy for the different experts carrying out different types of analysis on a case to work together, share information, and ensure examinations were carried out in an order and manner that did not compromise other evidence types. It also minimised the number of Expert Witness statements submitted to the courts.

4.2          Now, the holistic examination of a case within one organisation is rare. Most of the private forensic providers and the police forces who currently carry out forensic analysis offer a much more limited range of services than the FSS, and police forces procure different types of forensic examination from different providers.

4.3          In a typical body fluids case today, the initial examination of items is carried out in a police screening laboratory. If body fluids are found, the isolated stains are transferred to a private forensic service provider to carry out DNA analysis. In some police forces, the staff carrying out the initial screening stage are ex-FSS scientists with many years experience in reporting DNA results, but the DNA analysis results are reported by the private forensic provider, so their valuable skills are not being utilised. In other police forces, relatively inexperienced staff are carrying out the screening stage in laboratories that are not accredited, significantly increasing the risk that evidence is missed or contaminated.

4.4          In both scenarios, none of the scientists involved have an overview of the entire case. The forensic evidence is reported to the courts in multiple Expert Witness statements, which makes it harder for the court to understand the significance of the results in the context of the case and increases the potential for confusion and misinterpretation of the evidence.

4.5          Closing the FSS has also led to the loss of some unique forensic services that were pioneered by the FSS. One example of this is DNA Boost – a powerful way of searching DNA mixed profiles against the National DNA Database – which is no longer available to forensic scientists working in the UK CJS.

4.6          Whilst several of the private forensic service providers have ISO 17025 accreditation for some or all of the services they offer, there are still differences in the methods of forensic analysis being used across the UK. For example, different providers have different guidelines relating to the interpretation of DNA profiles. In some cases where a mixed DNA profile is obtained this means that no intelligence information is provided from that profile, even though it would have been using FSS guidelines. In other cases, analysis is repeated on some samples at extra expense to the CJS because DNA profiles generated by different providers using different guidelines cannot be directly compared.

4.7          One of the biggest concerns regarding the impact of the FSS closure on the UK CJS is that an increased number of police forces are carrying out screening of exhibits and other forensic analyses even though they are not accredited to carry out these procedures. This poses a serious risk that a miscarriage of justice will occur through the use of poorly maintained equipment, a lack of adherence to anti-contamination procedures, the use of un-validated scientific methods or inadequate staff training.

4.8          A review of the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) website1 on 5th January 2013 showed that only a handful of police forces are currently accredited – Table 1. This number is only a small proportion of the forces who are actually carrying out forensic examinations. Obtaining ISO 17025 accreditation is complex, time consuming and costly. There is a huge duplication of effort involved in individual police forces going through this process, and the small number of forces that have actually achieved it indicates that quality standards and accreditation in the forensic examination process have not been maintained.

Table 1: Accredited UK Police Forces  - data taken from UKAS website1 on 5th January 2013.

4.9          The extensive research programme to develop new forensic analysis techniques that was previously funded and carried out by the FSS has not been replaced. As a consequence, forensic development in the UK has significantly reduced since the FSS closed.

4.10       When I started my forensic career, I joined a team of experienced forensic scientists with hundreds of years of experience between them. I was trained in the whole forensic examination process by someone with over ten years experience, and coached and mentored by several scientists with over 20 years of experience. In this environment I was able to learn a great deal, as knowledge was transferred from one generation to the next. A large number of these experienced scientists have left the forensic field as a result of the closure of the FSS, or now work in small consultancy firms where they have little or no contact with junior staff. University graduates joining the profession now most often join young inexperienced teams, and are trained to do one or two aspects of the forensic examination process, giving them little opportunity to learn this complex subject in depth.

5           Q4. What should be role of the Forensic Science Regulator?

5.1          The role of the Forensic Science Regulator should be to regulate the provision of forensic science in the UK. At its simplest level, this means setting standards in all areas of forensic science, checking compliance with those standards and having statutory powers to enforce these standards and/or stop organisations that don’t meet the minimum requirements.

5.2          The remit of the Forensic Science Regulator should cover all organisations that supply forensic services to the UK CJS, irrespective of whether they are Government owned, private sector or police forces.

5.3          The Forensic Science Regulator should investigate quality failures, and work closely with UKAS to ensure that all forensic suppliers are appropriately accredited to ISO 17025.

6           Q5. What is the size of the forensics market and how stable is it?

6.1          I am not in a position to comment on the current size of the forensics market, but would be very interested to hear if there is someone out there who can answer this question and accurately predict the future size of the market. I am however aware of the serious impact the continued instability of the market is having on forensic providers and individual forensic scientists across the country.

6.2          Contracts to provide forensic services are being won and lost all the time. As a consequence, forensic science providers have had to become very agile, expanding and contracting with the fluctuating demand for their services. When a new contract is won, staff are recruited on short-term contracts and rapidly trained to meet the immediate need. Conversely, when a contract is lost, short-term contracts are terminated and staff are put on notice of redundancy. Within a matter of months, a new contract may be won, and this inefficient cycle of recruitment and training will be repeated.

6.3          One recent example of this occurred in one of the largest private forensic service providers in the UK. They recruited extra reporting officers to increase their reporting capacity at one of their sites. Staff were relocated for six months to allow changes to be made to accommodate them at this site, and then contracts were lost to the extent that the decision was taken to cease reporting from that site all together. As a consequence, both the original and the new staff were then put on notice of redundancy.

6.4          In my view, this continuously changing environment has made it impossible for forensic service providers to make robust long-term plans and investments, and has lead to individual forensic scientists being utilised and then discarded at the whim of the market.

7           Q 6.  How are forensic science services procured by police forces and could procurement processes be improved?

7.1          I have no direct experience of the forensic science procurement process, but am concerned about the consequences of its use.

7.2          The focus on products rather than forensic science services in the National Forensic Framework Agreement (NFFA) is driving the wrong behaviours. Police forces often ask scientists to carry out one type of examination on one item in isolation, without understanding the need for the scientist to interpret the evidence in the context of the whole case.

7.3          It is also not uncommon for scientists to be prevented from carrying out an analysis they believe to be necessary, on the grounds that this type of analysis is not covered by the contract between the submitting police force and the forensic service provider. I know of numerous examples where forensic examinations have been done in the best interests of the UK CJS, but the police customer has failed to understand the importance of this work and has consequently refused to pay for it.

7.4          I would highly recommend that the police procure forensic services rather than products, and that these services are carefully defined in partnership with experienced forensic scientists.

8           Q7. Has the closure of the FSS resulted in a loss of intellectual wealth through its scientists leaving the forensic science profession, or the UK? (please provide evidence/examples)

8.1          As I stated in my submission to the previous inquiry, the most valuable asset of the FSS was its staff – their skills and knowledge, their experience, their commitment and dedication, and their passion for justice. A small number of these staff have found employment with private forensic service providers and police forces, but the majority of them have now left the field and are lost to the UK CJS.

8.2          I am one of several forensic scientists who have had to leave the UK to find employment in my specialist area. For example, I am aware that three other ex-FSS scientists are currently working for Abu Dhabi Police. We all have two year contracts that end in 2013, after which our professional futures are uncertain.

8.3          My husband, Martin Webb-Salter, is another example of a wealth of forensic expertise having been lost to the UK CJS. Martin is a textile fibres specialist. Over the course of his 35 year forensic career, he achieved ISO 17025 accreditation for the analysis of fibres at the MPFSL, and maintained this accreditation after the laboratory merged with the FSS. He developed a comprehensive fibres training program and trained and mentored more than 40 scientists in the examination and analysis of fibres. He evaluated and implemented new methods and equipment in this field, established and implemented best working practice for fibres recovery and analysis across the six FSS labs, and conducted quality audits to ensure compliance. He also contributed to the Fibres Working Group of the European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) in setting European best practice, and undertook and published fibres research.

8.4          After being made redundant from the FSS, Martin hoped to stay in the field of forensic science, but found that there were no opportunities for him to do so. It seems that the pressure on private service providers to reduce costs means that they prefer to employ relatively inexperienced staff on lower salaries. Martin currently works as an Intelligence Researcher in Surrey Police, however this role does not utilise his extensive and unique forensic knowledge.

8.5          Further evidence of the loss of forensic expertise can be found in my professional network on LinkedIn. I currently have connections with 90 Ex-FSS scientists, and only 16 of these are currently employed by one of the larger private forensic service providers in the UK. A further 17 ex-FSS colleagues have set up or are associated with small specialist forensic consultancy firms, but are not routinely carrying out casework. The rest, 63%, have left the field of forensic science altogether or work overseas.

9           Q8. Are current arrangements for the FSS’s archives satisfactory? How could arrangements for the retention of case files and forensic materials in the UK be improved?

9.1          There is currently huge fragmentation of the UK’s forensic archive. The FSS legacy archive is being maintained, but all private forensic science providers return case materials to the police. As a result, each police force now maintains its own archive of forensic materials, which is an additional overhead for police budgets, and poses a significant risk to the integrity of these items.

9.2          Archiving of forensic materials is a specialist function, and in my view, the UK should have a single National Archive, located at two or three strategic sites, all run and managed by one organisation. This would reduce the current duplication of effort and facilities, reducing costs, and would ensure that all forensic materials are maintained in correct storage conditions and can be retrieved when necessary.

10       Conclusion

10.1       Whilst I welcome this new Select Committee inquiry, it is my belief that it could take several years for the full impact of the closure of the FSS to become visible.

11       References

1. United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) website: www.ukas.com

January 2013